I don't think that a weak teleological view is in conflict with the fact that in NE 1.1 Aristotle is merely starting with an endoxa (generally accepted) type...
1104b3-13: [1] An index of our dispositions [hexeôn] is afforded by the pleasure or pain that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from ...
1104b3-1105a16: III. An index of our dispositions is afforded by the pleasure or pain that accompanies our actions. A man is temperate if he abstains from...
I'm trying to find a certain text where I remember Aristotle saying that a view is strong if the cause that it posits predicts many phenomena successfully - in...
1105a26-1105b7: [An objection: isn't virtue like a technê, if you can do it, that's the proof that you do have the excellence. Th.] IV. [1] A difficulty may...
1105b7-18: [4] Thus although actions are entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do, the agent is just and...
In defining virtue/evil, Aristotle begins by saying what it is not: it's not in the passion category since passions at the core are not something we choose to...
1106a14-1106b28: [1] But it is not enough merely to define virtue generically as a disposition; we must also say what species of disposition it is. [2] It must...
Some comparative philosophy: There seems to be a great similarity between Aristole's (384-322 B.C.) and Mencius' (Confucian, 380-289 B.C.) view of the Mean,...
1106b29-1107a27: [14] Again, error is multiform (for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery, and good of the limited), whereas...
[1] We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy,...
1107b21-1108b10: [If I follow the diagram of virtues of diagram of means of the Eudemian Ethics 1220b, previously discussed in 2.7, part 1: * and analyzed...
1108b11-1109a19: [1] There are then three dispositions--two vices, one of excess and one of defect, and one virtue which is the observance of the mean; and...
1109a20-1109b26: [1] Enough has now been said to show that moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that it is a mean between two vices,...
... So logically, perception belongs to the irrational part of the soul, since it allows us to find the mean in practical situations. -- Hmm, no this inference...
Rakcham/Perseus: 1109b30-1110a19: [1] Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary [hekousiois] feelings and actions for...
... approximate rather to the voluntary class. For at the actual time when they are done they are chosen or willed [hairetai]; and the end or motive [telos] of...
1110a19-b17: .[7] Sometimes indeed men are actually praised for deeds of this 'mixed' class, namely when they submit to some disgrace or pain as the price of...
[7] Sometimes indeed men are actually praised for deeds of this 'mixed' class, namely when they submit to some disgrace [aischron] or pain as the price of some...
1110b18-1111a21 (Rackham/Perseus): It seems to me that "not voluntary" and "involuntary" are fairly interchangeable in this section, and both refer to actions...
I'm making another attempt to understand Aristotle's rather twisted coherence of terminology in this section. Thomas ... [13] An act done through ignorance...
1111a22-1111b3: Here Aristotle includes passionate acts into the voluntary class, because they stem from inside the person, not from outer circumstances that...
[Chosen actions as a sub-class of voluntary actions. Choice is not purely rational, since it is a choice of means towards a goal that we wish to achieve, and...
1111b30-1112a17: [Choice is a sub-class of voluntary actions, "preceded by deliberation", based on a wish (other volutary actions can be based on anger or...
1112a19-1112b9: [1] As for Deliberation, do people deliberate about everything--are all things possible objects of deliberation--, or are there some things...
1112b11-1113a2 (Rackham): [11] And we deliberate not about ends, but about means. [peri tôn pros ta telê: 'means' is not in the text, this expression is best...
1113a2-1113a14: [17] The object of deliberation [bouleuton] and the object of choice [proaireton] are the same, except that when a thing is chosen it has...
1113a15-1113b2: [1]Wishes, on the contrary, as was said above, are for ends. But while some hold that what is wished for is the good, others think it is what...
1113b3-1114a3: [1] If then whereas we wish [boulêtos] for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation [bouleutos] and choice [proairetos] , it...