First I think it's necessary to return to section 6.12 (1144a) where
Aristotle described the 4 parts of the soul and their virtues:
"First then let us assert that Wisdom and Prudence, being as they are
the virtues of the two parts of the intellect respectively, are
necessarily desirable in themselves, even if neither produces any
effect. Secondly, they do in fact produce an effect: Wisdom [sophia]
produces Happiness, not in the sense in which medicine produces health,
but in the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health. For Wisdom
is a part of Virtue as a whole, and therefore by its possession, or
rather by its exercise, renders a man happy. Also Prudence [Phronęsis]
as well as Moral Virtue [ęthikę aretę] determines the complete
performance of man's proper function: Virtue ensures the rightness of
the end we aim at, Prudence ensures the rightness of the means we adopt
to gain that end. The fourth part of the soul on the other hand, the
nutritive faculty, has no virtue contributing to the proper function of
man, since it has no power to act or not to act.
[Part 1] scientific => Sophia: theoretical intelligence (nous) +
scientific knowledge +Â theorętikę (Contemplation).
[Part 2] calculative => Phronęsis: includes practical intelligence (nous)
[Part 3] appetitive: => moral virtue: ęthikę aretę
[Part 4] nutritive faculty

Parts [1+2] make up the rational soul; [3+4] the irrational part.
Parts [1+2] were explained in 6.1 (1139a12): "These two rational
faculties may be designated the Scientific Faculty (epistęmonikon] and
the Calculative Faculty [logistikon] respectively; since calculation is
the same as deliberation, and deliberation [bouleuesthai] is never
exercised about things that are invariable, so that the Calculative
Faculty is a separate part of the rational half of the soul."
[Part 1]: 1141a18: "Wisdom (sophia) must be a combination of
Intelligence (nous) and Scientific Knowledge (epistęmę)". 1177b31: "the
intellect (nous) is something divine in comparison with man" and
involves contemplation: 1177b20: "the activity of the intellect is felt
to excel in serious worth, consisting as it does in contemplation"
[Part 1] is related to the best life of contemplation: 1177a24:
"activity in accordance with wisdom [sophia] is admittedly the most
pleasant of the activities in accordance with virtue"
[Part 2] phronęsis includes a practical form of nous: 1144b12: "if a man
of good natural disposition acquires Intelligence (nous) then he excels
in conduct."
[Parts 2 and 3] are involved in " The life of moral virtue...happy only
in a secondary degree" (1178a9). "Prudence is intimately connected with
Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence"

As to immortality at the end of this section: "but we ought so far as
possible to achieve immortality, and do all that man may to live in
accordance with the highest thing in him; for though this be small in
bulk, in power and value it far surpasses all the rest." It could be the
Intelligence/nous of [part 1] that would be the immortal part of the soul.
Thomas
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1177a12-1778a8:

But if happiness consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is
reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest
virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then
this be the

ect, or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by
nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as
being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest
part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the
virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has
been stated already that this activity is the activity of contemplation
[theorętikę].
[theorętikę: activité méditative (Bodéüs), activité contemplative
(Gauthier & Jolif), activity of study (Irwin), reflective activity (Rowe).]

[2] And that happiness consists in contemplation may be accepted as
agreeing both with the results already reached and with the truth. For
contemplation is at once the highest form of activity ^since the
intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the
intellect [nous] deals are the highest things that can be known, and
also it is the most continuous, for we can reflect more continuously
than we can carry on any form of action.
[3] And again we suppose that happiness must contain an element of
pleasure; now activity in accordance with wisdom is admittedly the most
pleasant of the activities in accordance with virtue: at all events it
is held that philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom contains pleasures of
marvelous purity and permanence, and it is reasonable to suppose that
the enjoyment of knowledge is a still pleasanter occupation than the
pursuit of it.
[There seems to be a form of bliss here that goes beyond the joy of the
scientist, so theorętikę must be a particular form of study, that seems
to me to involve some form of aesthetic-intellectual rapture in face of
the harmony of the cosmos. Gauthier & Jolif use the word mysticism here,
in a soft sense obviously, and why not! Th.]

[4] Also the activity of contemplation will be found to possess in the
highest degree the quality that is termed self-sufficiency; for while it
is true that the wise man equally with the just man and the rest
requires the necessaries of life, yet, these being adequately supplied,
whereas the just man needs other persons towards whom or with whose aid
he may act justly, and so likewise do the temperate man and the brave
man and the others, the wise man on the contrary can also contemplate by
himself, and the more so the wiser he is; no doubt he will study better
with the aid of fellow-workers, but still he is the most self-sufficient
of men.
[5] Also the activity of contemplation may be held to be the only
activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond
the actual act of contemplation, whereas from practical pursuits we look
to secure some advantage, greater or smaller, beyond the action itself.
[6] Also happiness is thought to involve leisure; for we do business in
order that we may have leisure, and carry on war in order that we may
have peace. Now the practical virtues are exercised in politics or in
warfare; but the pursuits of politics and war seem to be unleisured-
those of war indeed entirely so, for no one desires to be at war for the
sake of being at war, nor deliberately takes steps to cause a war: a man
would be thought an utterly bloodthirsty character if he declared war on
a friendly state for the sake of causing battles and massacres. But the
activity of the politician also is unleisured, and aims at securing
something beyond the mere participation in politics -positions of
authority and honor, or, if the happiness of the politician himself and
of his fellow-citizens, this happiness conceived as something distinct
from political activity indeed we are clearly investigating it as so
distinct.
[7] If then among practical pursuits displaying the virtues, politics
and war stand out preeminent in nobility and grandeur, and yet they are
unleisured, and directed to some further end, not chosen for their own
sakes: whereas the activity of the intellect is felt to excel in serious
worth, consisting as it does in contemplation,and to aim at no end
beyond itself, and also to contain a pleasure peculiar to itself, and
therefore augmenting its activity: and if accordingly the attributes of
this activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisuredness, such
freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other
attributes of blessedness: it follows that it is the activity of the
intellect that constitutes complete human happiness provided it be
granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness
can be incomplete.
[8] Such a life as this however will be higher than the human level: not
in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of
something within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is
superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to
the exercise of the other forms of virtue. If then the intellect is
something divine in comparison with man, so is the life of the intellect
divine in comparison with human life. Nor ought we to obey those who
enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts and a mortal the thoughts
of mortality, but we ought so far as possible to achieve immortality,
and do all that man may to live in accordance with the highest thing in
him; for though this be small in bulk, in power and value it far
surpasses all the rest.
[9] It may even be held that this is the true self of each, inasmuch as
it is the dominant and better part; and therefore it would be a strange
thing if a man should choose to live not his own life but the life of
some other than himself. Moreover what was said before will apply here
also: that which is best and most pleasant for each creature is that
which is proper to the nature of each; accordingly the life of the
intellect is the best and the pleasantest life for man, inasmuch as the
intellect more than anything else is man; therefore this life will be
the happiest.


1178a8-1179a32:
The life of moral virtue, on the other hand, is happy only in a
secondary degree. For the moral activities are purely human: Justice, I
mean, Courage and the other virtues we display in our intercourse with
our fellows, when we observe what is due to each in contracts and
services and in our various actions, and in our emotions also; and all
of these things seem to be purely human affairs.
[2] And some moral actions are thought to be the outcome of the physical
constitution, and moral virtue is thought to have a close affinity in
many respects with the passions. [3] Moreover, Prudence is intimately
connected with Moral Virtue, and this with Prudence, inasmuch as the
first Principles which Prudence employs are determined by the Moral
Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by
Prudence. But these being also connected with the passions are related
to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are
purely human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these
virtues, and the happiness that belongs to it. Whereas the happiness
that belongs to the intellect is separate: so much may be said about it
here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our
present purpose.
[4] And such happiness would appear to need but little external
equipment, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both, it
may be granted, require the mere necessaries of life, and that in an
equal degree though the politician does as a matter of fact take more
trouble about bodily requirements and so forth than the
philosopherďĽ0/00 ; for in this respect there may be little difference
between them. But for the purpose of their special activities their
requirements will differ widely. The liberal man will need wealth in
order to do liberal actions, and so indeed will the just man in order to
discharge his obligations since mere intentions are invisible, and even
the unjust pretend to wish to act justly and the brave man will need
strength if he is to perform any action displaying his virtue; and the
temperate man opportunity for indulgence: otherwise how can he, or the
possessor of any other virtue, show that he is virtuous?
[5] It is disputed also whether purpose or performance is the more
important factor in virtue, as it is alleged to depend on both; now the
perfection of virtue will clearly consist in both; but the performance
of virtuous actions requires much outward equipment, and the more so the
greater and more noble the actions are.
[6] But the student, so far as the pursuit of his activity is concerned,
needs no external apparatus: on the contrary, worldly goods may almost
be said to be a hindrance to contemplation; though it is true that,
being a man and living in the society of others, he chooses to engage in
virtuous action, and so will need external goods to carry on his life as
a human being.
[7] The following considerations also will show that perfect happiness
is some form of contemplative activity. The gods, as we conceive them,
enjoy supreme felicity and happiness. But what sort of actions can we
attribute to them? Just actions? but will it not seem ridiculous to
think of them as making contracts, restoring deposits and the like? Then
brave actions enduring terrors and running risks for the nobility of so
doing? Or liberal actions? but to whom will they give? Besides, it would
be absurd to suppose that they actually have a coinage or currency of
some sort! And temperate actions what will these mean in their case?
surely it would be derogatory to praise them for not having evil
desires! If we go through the list we shall find that all forms of
virtuous conduct seem trifling and unworthy of the gods. Yet
nevertheless they have always been conceived as, at all events, living,
and therefore living actively, for we cannot suppose they are always
asleep like Endymion. But for a living being, if we eliminate action,
and a <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph.jsp?l=a&la=la> fortiori
<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/morph.jsp?l=fortiori&la=la&prior=a>
creative action, what remains save contemplation? It follows that the
activity of God, which is transcendent in blessedness, is the activity
of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is
most akin to the divine activity of contemplation will be the greatest
source of happiness.
[8] A further confirmation is that the lower animals cannot partake of
happiness, because they are completely devoid of the contemplative
activity. The whole of the life of the gods is blessed, and that of man
is so in so far as it contains some likeness to the divine activity; but
none of the other animals possess happiness, because they are entirely
incapable of contemplation. Happiness therefore is co-extensive in its
range with contemplation: the more a class of beings possesses the
faculty of contemplation, the more it enjoys happiness, not as an
accidental concomitant of contemplation but as inherent in it, since
contemplation is valuable in itself. It follows that happiness is some
form of contemplation.
[9] But the philosopher being a man will also need external well-being,
since man's nature is not self-sufficient for the activity of
contemplation, but he must also have bodily health and a supply of food
and other requirements. Yet if supreme blessedness is not possible
without external goods, it must not be supposed that happiness will
demand many or great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend
on excessive abundance, nor does moral conduct, [10] and it is possible
to perform noble deeds even without being ruler of land and sea: one can
do virtuous acts with quite moderate resources. This may be clearly
observed in experience: private citizens do not seem to be less but more
given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It is
sufficient then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of
virtuous activity will be essentially a happy life.
[11] Solon also doubtless gave a good description of happiness, when he
said that in his opinion those men were happy who, being moderately
equipped with external goods, had performed noble exploits and had lived
temperately; for it is possible for a man of but moderate possessions to
do what is right. Anaxagoras again does not seem to have conceived the
happy man as rich or powerful, since he says that he would not be
surprised if he were to appear a strange sort of person in the eyes of
the many; for most men judge by externals, which are all that they can
perceive.
[12] So our theories seem to be in agreement with the opinions of the
wise. Such arguments then carry some degree of conviction; but it is by
the practical experience of life and conduct that the truth is really
tested, since it is there that the final decision lies. We must
therefore examine the conclusions we have advanced by bringing them to
the test of the facts of life. If they are in harmony with the facts, we
may accept them; if found to disagree, we must deem them mere theories.
 v[13] And it seems likely that the man who pursues intellectual
activity, and who cultivates his intellect and keeps that in the best
condition, is also the man most beloved of the gods. For if, as is
generally believed, the gods exercise some superintendence over human
affairs, then it will be reasonable to suppose that they take pleasure
in that part of man which is best and most akin to themselves, namely
the intellect, and that they recompense with their favors those men who
esteem and honor this most, because these care for the things dear to
themselves, and act rightly and nobly. Now it is clear that all these
attributes belong most of all to the wise man. He therefore is most
beloved by the gods; and if so, he is naturally most happy. Here is
another proof that the wise man is the happiest.



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