Some are not always tied to a recognized, official organization of the same
name.

Daniel


At 11:01 PM 9/20/2005, you wrote:

>It is difficult to maintain an Eastern Orthodox view of Christology and
>still hold to new age universalism.  It may be that Perry is Eastern
>Orthodox in name only.

SOme of you may be interested to know that my translation of the
Physics is now available from St. Augustine's Press. It is available in
both hardback and paperback.
Glen Coughlin

Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar. Any
comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which is
frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75 to be a
loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?

Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his arguments
(e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references where it was
previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was common to 13th century
arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would seem to be against the
strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply make an assertion without
referring to where it has previously been demonstrated, but I find it reocurring
where there is no reference or discussion on where such assertions have
previously been demonstrated.  There are of course many places in SCG where
previous demonstrations are referred to informally, but much less so in Human
Nature for example.  For example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is
clear that through the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all
bodies."  However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas indicates
that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.

Last, has anyone reviewed Cajetan's commentary on Aq. Human Nature q. 75, a. 2
and do you have any comments on Cajetan's analysis of the text and Cejetan's
position on the immortality of the soul?

thanks much.  Kind regards, Tracy Smith


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Folks,

I am asking for some information. Any help will be appreciated.

Does Thomas ever use the word, "Being," for "God?" If so, what is the Latin
word?

Peace,
Finbarr


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

God is not a being, ens,  but rather Subsistent Act of Being Itself, Ipsum Esse
Subsistens.
   ----- Original Message -----
   From: lismoref@...
   To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
   Sent: Sunday, October 23, 2005 2:09 PM
   Subject: [aquinas] "Being"



   Folks,

   I am asking for some information. Any help will be appreciated.

   Does Thomas ever use the word, "Being," for "God?" If so, what is the Latin
   word?

   Peace,
   Finbarr


   [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



   This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of Slow
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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

----- Original Message -----
From: <trey3777@...>

> Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar.
> Any comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which is
> frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75 to
> be a loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?
>
> Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his
> arguments (e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references
> where it was previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was common
> to 13th century arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would
> seem to be against the strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply
> make an assertion without referring to where it has previously been
> demonstrated, but I find it reocurring where there is no reference or
> discussion on where such assertions have previously been demonstrated.
> There are of course many places in SCG where previous demonstrations are
> referred to informally, but much less so in Human Nature for example.  For
> example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is clear that through
> the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all bodies."
> However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
> demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas
> indicates that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.

Where does Aquinas say that Aristotle shows that the intellect can know all
bodies? In the De Anima, Aristotle simple takes that as a premise:

"Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
Therefore, SINCE EVERYTHING IS A POSSIBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT, mind in order,
as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance
and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no
nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." (De Anima
III.4)

Aristotle does not actually argue that everything is a possible object of
thought - he simply takes this as obvious, and uses it as a premise in his
argument that the intellect can have no material nature of its own.

Caleb,

Thank you.

Peace,
Finbarr


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

See In De Anima II, 3.5 and particularly In De Anima III, 8.13.

- Tracy Smith


-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi@...>
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 02:03:16 -0500
Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau


----- Original Message -----
From: <trey3777@...>

> Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar.
> Any comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which is
> frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75 to
> be a loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?
>
> Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his
> arguments (e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references
> where it was previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was common
> to 13th century arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would
> seem to be against the strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply
> make an assertion without referring to where it has previously been
> demonstrated, but I find it reocurring where there is no reference or
> discussion on where such assertions have previously been demonstrated.
> There are of course many places in SCG where previous demonstrations are
> referred to informally, but much less so in Human Nature for example.  For
> example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is clear that through
> the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all bodies."
> However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
> demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas
> indicates that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.

Where does Aquinas say that Aristotle shows that the intellect can know all
bodies? In the De Anima, Aristotle simple takes that as a premise:

"Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
Therefore, SINCE EVERYTHING IS A POSSIBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT, mind in order,
as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance
and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no
nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." (De Anima
III.4)

Aristotle does not actually argue that everything is a possible object of
thought - he simply takes this as obvious, and uses it as a premise in his
argument that the intellect can have no material nature of its own.




This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of Slow
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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

See In De Anima II, 3.5 and particularly In De Anima III, 8.13.  Attachment
included.

- Tracy Smith


-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi@...>
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 02:03:16 -0500
Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau


----- Original Message -----
From: <trey3777@...>

> Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar.
> Any comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which is
> frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75 to
> be a loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?
>
> Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his
> arguments (e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references
> where it was previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was common
> to 13th century arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would
> seem to be against the strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply
> make an assertion without referring to where it has previously been
> demonstrated, but I find it reocurring where there is no reference or
> discussion on where such assertions have previously been demonstrated.
> There are of course many places in SCG where previous demonstrations are
> referred to informally, but much less so in Human Nature for example.  For
> example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is clear that through
> the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all bodies."
> However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
> demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas
> indicates that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.

Where does Aquinas say that Aristotle shows that the intellect can know all
bodies? In the De Anima, Aristotle simple takes that as a premise:

"Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.
Therefore, SINCE EVERYTHING IS A POSSIBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT, mind in order,
as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance
and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no
nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." (De Anima
III.4)

Aristotle does not actually argue that everything is a possible object of
thought - he simply takes this as obvious, and uses it as a premise in his
argument that the intellect can have no material nature of its own.




This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of Slow
Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]




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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

At 12:09 PM 10/23/2005, you wrote:

>Does Thomas ever use the word, "Being," for "God?" If so, what is the Latin
>word?

Esse.

Daniel

St. Thomas also does use ens about God;

I Sent., D. 2., q. 1, a. 1, sed contra 1
I Sent. D. 19, q. 5, a. 1, corpus
II Sent., D. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sed contra 2
II Sent. D. 37, q. 2, a. 2. corpus
III Sent., D. 2, q. a.  1. corpus
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 16
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 18
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 20
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 21
Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 22
Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 12
Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 13
Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 100
Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 3, a. 1, Corpus
Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 3, a. 6, Corpus
Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 3, a. 7, Corpus
Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 3, a. 8, Corpus
Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 105, a. 3, Corpus
Questiones disputatae de Potentia, Q. 7, a. 1, corpus
Questiones disputatae de spiirtualibus creatures, prooemium, a. 1,
corpus
De substantiis separatis, ch.11
De substantiis separatis, ch.15
Compendium Theologiae I, ch. 68
In Librum de causis, lectio 16
In Librum de causis, lectio 18

The reasons for using ens and esse would be seen from the Summa
Theologiae Ia, q. 13. aa. 1-6.

At 02:10 PM 10/24/2005, you wrote:

>The reasons for using ens and esse would be seen from the Summa
>Theologiae Ia, q. 13. aa. 1-6.

I've brought this subject up numerous times and there seems to be little
interest here in Thomas' theory of analogical predication (alas). Be that
as it may, I think the point of saying that God is not "a being" (ens) is
that he is not a being alongside all other beings in the great chain of
being. But both terms can be applied to God with the proper understanding
(being itself) implied.

Daniel

G. Coughlin,

Thank you very much.

Peace,
Finbarr


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

--- In aquinas@yahoogroups.com, Daniel Scuiry <Daniel.Scuiry@u...> wrote:
>
> At 02:10 PM 10/24/2005, you wrote:
>
> >The reasons for using ens and esse would be seen from the Summa
> >Theologiae Ia, q. 13. aa. 1-6.
>
> I've brought this subject up numerous times and there seems to be little
> interest here in Thomas' theory of analogical predication (alas). Be that
> as it may, I think the point of saying that God is not "a being" (ens) is
> that he is not a being alongside all other beings in the great chain of
> being. But both terms can be applied to God with the proper understanding
> (being itself) implied.
>
> Daniel
>


Daniel,

Hello, and how are you doing?  We going over this topic on the thomism list. 
You are invited to join in.   Go to

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/thomism

We will be covering Fabro and the doctrine of participation found in Aquinas and
the transcendental predication or analogy of being.

To buttress this we will also look at Reichmann's article "Immanently
Transcendent and Subsistent Esse: A Comparison," in The Thomist 38 (1974), pp.
332-369.

We will also discuss Cajetan's predication of being.

I hope you can join us.

James



[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

“... concludi potest ... esse aliquid quod est maxime ens, et hoc dicimus Deum”

(CG, I,XIII).

     If the esse purum was not ens, we never would be able to know him; ens being
the first intellectum, we must elaborate this concept to understand analogically
God as the ens primum ; only through ens we can determinate the essence, the
esse and their unity in God.

French language ("l’être" is commonly used, ans not “l’étant”, to say ens) can
help to see this continuity.





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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Greetings Tracy,

Pasnau dismisses some of St. Thomas Aquinas accounts as "nothing more that
an extended just-so story" page 368.


Denis J.M. Bradley wrote a good piece on the errors of Pasnau, in the
Thomist Vol. 68, No.1

Mr. Bradley writes that Pasnau makes the mistake of immersing St. Thomas
into mainstream "Humean" philosophy, which easily allows Pasnau to conflate
diverse problems, methods, and principles and thereby generate
interpretative novelties that are systematically misguided and not merely
anachronistic and eisegetic.




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Thanks to _crispain2004@...._ (mailto:crispain2004@....)

Peace,
Finbarr


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

I seem to remember that for Aquinas, ens usually refers to a composite of
two principles: esse limited by essence. But God is Esse unlimited, as it
were, without the limiting principle of essence.  Hence Aquinas prefers to
speak of God as Esse, in order not to confuse Him with limited being (ens).

Could it be that when Aquinas speaks of God as ens he is being sloppy?  Or
could it be that when in the original Latin, where ens is predicated of God,
there is in that same sentence also the qualification that that Ens is in
fact unlimited.  Hence he is said to be unlimited ens, or,
ens-minus-the-limiting-principle, which would give us esse only. I am not
sure: I do not have the latin with me, but someone could look at the texts
Coughlin quoted, which are very interesting and helpful.


Sincerely,
Jude






----- Original Message -----
From: "Daniel Scuiry" <Daniel.Scuiry@...>
To: <aquinas@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2005 6:28 AM
Subject: Re: [aquinas] "Being"


> At 02:10 PM 10/24/2005, you wrote:
>
>>The reasons for using ens and esse would be seen from the Summa
>>Theologiae Ia, q. 13. aa. 1-6.
>
> I've brought this subject up numerous times and there seems to be little
> interest here in Thomas' theory of analogical predication (alas). Be that
> as it may, I think the point of saying that God is not "a being" (ens) is
> that he is not a being alongside all other beings in the great chain of
> being. But both terms can be applied to God with the proper understanding
> (being itself) implied.
>
> Daniel
>
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
> mailto:aquinas-unsubscribe@egroups.com
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

At 04:10 PM 10/27/2005, you wrote:

>I seem to remember that for Aquinas, ens usually refers to a composite of
>two principles: esse limited by essence. But God is Esse unlimited, as it
>were, without the limiting principle of essence.  Hence Aquinas prefers to
>speak of God as Esse, in order not to confuse Him with limited being (ens).

Actually, he uses esse with reference to created beings too. Cf. De Ente.

Daniel

Thank you Francisco.  I will read the article.  I very much appreciate the lead
since so much scholarship leans toward Scotus and Occam that it has a tendency
to dismiss Thomas.  Personally I believe this goes beyond merely the advances in
logic of the 14th/15th centuries since we see even further advances in
Renaissance philosophy in certain respects following the recovery of classical
greek by the humanists.  However, the Renaissance is not idiolized in the same
regard as Occam and Scotus it seems, but I digress.

It was interesting to discover that in 1438 that St. Andrews University on
October 13th ruled that Buridan (taken as a nominalist logic) was to be read in
place of the the logic of Albertus Magnus and the Summule of Peter of Spain. 
The outcry at Saint Andrews was so great that by Nov. 14 one month later that
the University ruled that the Professors could follow the via of Albertus or
whoever they pleased.

Has anyone seen Loux and Zimmerman's new text given below?  I haven't had a
chance to view the text in any detail so I should probably not comement, but it
seems that it is an explicit formulation of platonism in addition to or in
opposition to nominalism as the metaphysical basis for analytic philosophy. 
However, I would like to be corrected if mistaken since I do like the notion of
abstract concepts in Loux and Zimmerman.  Any comments? The Oxford Handbook of
Metaphysics (Oxford Handbooks) by Michael J. Loux (Editor), Dean W. Zimmerman
(Editor) (Paperback - November 2005)

Tracy Smith

-----Original Message-----
From: Francisco Hernnadez <francox5@...>
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 21:26:32 -0500
Subject: RE: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau


Greetings Tracy,

Pasnau dismisses some of St. Thomas Aquinas accounts as "nothing more that
an extended just-so story" page 368.


Denis J.M. Bradley wrote a good piece on the errors of Pasnau, in the
Thomist Vol. 68, No.1

Mr. Bradley writes that Pasnau makes the mistake of immersing St. Thomas
into mainstream "Humean" philosophy, which easily allows Pasnau to conflate
diverse problems, methods, and principles and thereby generate
interpretative novelties that are systematically misguided and not merely
anachronistic and eisegetic.




[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]






This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of Slow
Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Did St Thomas ever get more specific with his spirituality? Did he
prescribe, for instance, certain daily prayers or specific spiritual
practices such as lectio, meditation, etc? Did he write anything
specifically on prayer?

Ron

In De Anima II, 3.5 refers to Book II, Lectio 3, titled "The Soul's Powers
in General", and In De Anima III, 3.13 is titled, "Problems Arising.
Intellect as Intelligible," yes? (I don't have Leonine numbers that start
over every lectio, only the section numbers that increase throughout the
entire work).

I read through both lectios, and couldn't find any attempt to demonstration
the bare fact that we can in fact know any material nature whatsoever. Could
you perhaps type in the first line of the section that you are thinking of?
As far as I can tell, Aquinas simply takes it as given that every material
thing is in fact a possible object of knowledge.

----- Original Message -----
From: <trey3777@...>


> See In De Anima II, 3.5 and particularly In De Anima III, 8.13.
>
> - Tracy Smith
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi@...>
> To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
> Sent: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 02:03:16 -0500
> Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <trey3777@...>
>
>> Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar.
>> Any comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which
>> is
>> frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75
>> to
>> be a loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?
>>
>> Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his
>> arguments (e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references
>> where it was previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was
>> common
>> to 13th century arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would
>> seem to be against the strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply
>> make an assertion without referring to where it has previously been
>> demonstrated, but I find it reocurring where there is no reference or
>> discussion on where such assertions have previously been demonstrated.
>> There are of course many places in SCG where previous demonstrations are
>> referred to informally, but much less so in Human Nature for example.
>> For
>> example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is clear that through
>> the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all bodies."
>> However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
>> demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas
>> indicates that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.
>
> Where does Aquinas say that Aristotle shows that the intellect can know
> all
> bodies? In the De Anima, Aristotle simple takes that as a premise:
>
> "Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is
> sensible.
> Therefore, SINCE EVERYTHING IS A POSSIBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT, mind in
> order,
> as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
> admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a
> hindrance
> and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no
> nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." (De
> Anima
> III.4)
>
> Aristotle does not actually argue that everything is a possible object of
> thought - he simply takes this as obvious, and uses it as a premise in his
> argument that the intellect can have no material nature of its own.
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow
> Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
> mailto:aquinas-unsubscribe@egroups.com
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
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>
>
>
>
>
>
>

I remember that Aquinas wrote quite a bit about prayer as secondary
causation, in the Summa I think.  He also argued that prayer should be
persistent.

Jude


----- Original Message -----
From: "Ron Criss" <roncriss@...>
To: <aquinas@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 3:54 AM
Subject: [aquinas] Aquinas and Spirituality


> Did St Thomas ever get more specific with his spirituality? Did he
> prescribe, for instance, certain daily prayers or specific spiritual
> practices such as lectio, meditation, etc? Did he write anything
> specifically on prayer?
>
> Ron
>
>
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
> mailto:aquinas-unsubscribe@egroups.com
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

Anthony,

There seems to me to be an inductive justification given by Aquinas in
commenting on Aristotle as follows:

"He says then, recapitulating (431b 20), that one can admit that the soul is in
a way all things; for everything is either sensible or intelligible, and sense
and intellect (or science) are in the soul, sense being somehow the sensible,
and intellect, or science, the intelligible or the scientifically knowable. §
788. But we must ask how this is so. For sense and intellectual knowledge are
divided 'into realities', that is, their division into act and potency
corresponds to a like division in reality; but in such a way that while
potential intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to things potentially
understood or sensed, and actual intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to
things actually understood or sensed, there is a difference between the two
relationships..."  In De Anima III, 8.15 787-787ff

Note that Aquinas explains that Aristotle again recapitulates that one can admit
that the soul is all things because, since, or for everything is sensible or
intelligible (you can check the Latin for a causal or explanatory clause).  Then
Aquinas commenting on Aristotle says, but then we must ask how this is so.  How
everything is either sensible or intelligible which is the basis for the soul
being all things.  Aquinas then explains, essentially that the reason the soul
is all things is because sense and intellectual knowledge are divided into
realities corresponding to act and potency.  In de Anima II, 3.5 makes clear
these are essentially two modes of existence that the Philosopher says, in Book
III, 8.15, that the soul is somehow all things as given below.  Aquinas
continues to explain the anthropology in In de Anima III, 8.15.

Aquinas refers to In de Anima III, 8.15 when discussing the immateriality or
universality of intellection of objects based on two modes of existence,
material and immaterial and it is this that is the basis for the soul being all
things according to In de Anima II 3.5.  I could go into the much longer
inductive argument or observation from Aquinas's anthropology that Aquinas makes
based upon metaphysics and anthropology but this can be drawn from the In de
Anima III, 8.15 text.  "For as things exist in sensation they are free indeed
from matter, but are not without their individuating material conditions, nor
apart from a bodily organ. For sensation is of objects in the particular, but
intellection of objects universally.  It is with reference to these two modes of
existence that the Philosopher will say, in Book III, that the soul is somehow
all things (cf. Bk. III, lectio 13, §§ 787; 788.)"  In De Anima II 3.5.

As a note on method, Aquinas is a systematic theologian and philosopher and
hence works systematically, as such one must approach the study of Aquinas
systematically since he does not attempt to reiterate himself in every text.  If
one fails to approach Aquinas by isolated exegesis of a particular passage, one
can easily misinterpret Aquinas.  It is the old story of loosing the forest for
the trees as opposed to loosing the trees for the forest type of exegesis.

Aquinas is a much more subtle thinker than most contemporary scholars assume. 
Aquinas like Aristotle typically only take first principles as self-evident and
for the rest they explain how or why it seems to me.  One can even see this same
program in Albert Magnus in extreme detail.  Aquinas may not have used the Greek
text to check Moerbeke's translation to see if Aristotle was discussing how, but
the William of Moerbeke translation has been shown to be accurate by in large I
believe.  I haven't had a chance to check the Greek or Latin texts of these
translations, but the context in general makes clear the development when one
associates the two passages appropriately and from the passages themselves taken
independently of each other (In de Anima II, 3.5 and III, 8.15).

Aristotle explain that one must enquire "how" knowledge is in some way the
knowable and how sensation is in some way the sense object, and in investigating
how this is the case, one is able to understand how the soul is all things: "let
us repeat that the soul is somehow all that exists; for things are either
sensible or intelligible; and knowledge is in some way the knowable, and
sensation is the sense object. But how this is so we must enquire."  Note that
Aquinas takes "that the soul is somehow all that exists" to mean that "the soul
can be all things" because the soul is potentially both sensible and
intelligible knowledge and hence potentially all things.  Aquinas goes into more
detail on the metaphysics stating that there are two modes of being and then
Aquinas goes into the anthropology of what this means.  I don't have time to go
into any more detail but this would make an interesting article for the Thomist
or Modern Scholasticism if someone wants to write it up.  I'm afraid that there
are far too many misconceptions on this point and it also illustrates a larger
methodological issue as one approaches both Aristotle's and Aquinas's texts, so
an article would be worth while if such an article doesn't already exist that
takes into account both how the soul can be all things and the methodology of
"reading Aristotle through Aquinas" (nice title for the article). (:  Hope this
explains a bit.

I don't have time to provide a rebuttal to any arguments to the contrary I'm
afraid, so in advance I will be at a disadvantage if you disagree.  I have 5
fifteen page papers to write over the next week and something like 13 courses
many of which have orals this semester that I need to pass along with two
research papers/thesis next semester.  To make things worse I have one Professor
that assumes that the entire class can read by sight Greek LXX and the Hebrew
Mesoretic text without a prior translation of the either and only by sight
reading, which is insanity.  Many in the class do not even know how to read
Hebrew for the orals even with a prior translation.  So, please excuse my
silence Anthony since I need to stay focused.  I just needed to get information
on Pasnau's text.  Kind regards, Tracy Smith




-----Original Message-----
From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi@...>
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Thu, 27 Oct 2005 15:19:22 -0500
Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau


In De Anima II, 3.5 refers to Book II, Lectio 3, titled "The Soul's Powers
in General", and In De Anima III, 3.13 is titled, "Problems Arising.
Intellect as Intelligible," yes? (I don't have Leonine numbers that start
over every lectio, only the section numbers that increase throughout the
entire work).

I read through both lectios, and couldn't find any attempt to demonstration
the bare fact that we can in fact know any material nature whatsoever. Could
you perhaps type in the first line of the section that you are thinking of?
As far as I can tell, Aquinas simply takes it as given that every material
thing is in fact a possible object of knowledge.

----- Original Message -----
From: <trey3777@...>


> See In De Anima II, 3.5 and particularly In De Anima III, 8.13.
>
> - Tracy Smith
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Anthony Crifasi <crifasi@...>
> To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
> Sent: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 02:03:16 -0500
> Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: <trey3777@...>
>
>> Working through Pasnau's translation of Aq. on Human Nature in a seminar.
>> Any comments on the translation?  There is no critical apparatus, which
>> is
>> frustrating, but does anyone find particular passages, say in Quest. 75
>> to
>> be a loose or inaccurate translation?  Any examples?
>>
>> Does anyone know why Aquinas seems to make certain assertions in his
>> arguments (e.g. on Human Nature q. 75, art. 2) without giving references
>> where it was previously demonstrated?  Does anyone know if this was
>> common
>> to 13th century arguments and the reasons for this?  Intuitively it would
>> seem to be against the strict demands of a syllogistic argument to simply
>> make an assertion without referring to where it has previously been
>> demonstrated, but I find it reocurring where there is no reference or
>> discussion on where such assertions have previously been demonstrated.
>> There are of course many places in SCG where previous demonstrations are
>> referred to informally, but much less so in Human Nature for example.
>> For
>> example, in q. 75, a. 2 contra Aquinas asserts "it is clear that through
>> the intellect a human being can cognize the natures of all bodies."
>> However, Aquinas never explains why this is clear nor that he has
>> demonstrated that this is the case in the In de Anima where Aquinas
>> indicates that Aristotle had shown why this is the case.
>
> Where does Aquinas say that Aristotle shows that the intellect can know
> all
> bodies? In the De Anima, Aristotle simple takes that as a premise:
>
> "Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is
> sensible.
> Therefore, SINCE EVERYTHING IS A POSSIBLE OBJECT OF THOUGHT, mind in
> order,
> as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all
> admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a
> hindrance
> and a block: it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no
> nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity." (De
> Anima
> III.4)
>
> Aristotle does not actually argue that everything is a possible object of
> thought - he simply takes this as obvious, and uses it as a premise in his
> argument that the intellect can have no material nature of its own.
>
>
>
>
> This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of
> Slow
> Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe by e-mail,
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>
>
>
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>
>




This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy, home of Slow
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Yahoo! Groups Links






[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

On Thu, 27 Oct 2005, Ron Criss wrote:

> Did St Thomas ever get more specific with his spirituality? Did he
> prescribe, for instance, certain daily prayers or specific spiritual
> practices such as lectio, meditation, etc? Did he write anything
> specifically on prayer?

I haven't been following this thread, but there is an excellent work by
Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP on St. Thomas.  It is a two volume opus.  The
first, _St. Thomas Aqinas: The Person and His Work_, is a groundbreking
study placing St. Thomas within the historical, societal, cultural and
ecclesial context, and discussing his opus.  The second volume, _St.
Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master_, discusses the Angelic Doctor's
spirituality discerned from both a careful reading of his works and from
the testimonies of his contempories.  Aquinas treatsof prayer in various
works and sermons.  There is ample material in the Summa Theologiae.  Then
one finds references in his biblical commentaries.  One thing that Torrell
brings to light is that Thomas prayed almost constantly in one manner or
another.  His works are not only the fruit of thought, but fundamentally
the result of his intense prayer life.  Hope this helps somewhat.

Stan Ziobro

When I say below that Aquinas says that Aristotle refers to two modes of
existence-- material and immaterial, I am referring specifically to the division
between the sensible and intelligible or particular and universal.   Properly
speaking Aquinas in dividing between what can be potentially and actually known,
explains that the soul knows all things because a) it knows things as they exist
in sensation insofar as they are free from matter but not free from the
individuating material conditions, b) it knows things as they exist in
intelligibility.  In this sense, according to Aquinas, the soul is somehow all
things and in this division into act and potency, act and potency correspond to
like divisions in reality insofar as potential knowledge answers to what is
potentially understood or sensed and actual knowledge corresponds to what is
actually understood or sensed.

It is interesting that Aquinas seems to make a division between act and potency
on one hand and between the sensible and intelligible or particular and
universal on the other such that both sensible and intelligible knowledge can be
either potential or actual.  In this way, the soul is all things since it is
potentially all things and if such things are actually known, the soul knows
that which is actually known and not simply what is potentially known.  In my
opinion, the genius is that the hylomorphic principle allows for there to be
complete unity between sensible and intelligible knowledge in the soul itself
and this conception for Aquinas was of course based in both metaphysics and
anthropology as well as physics due to potency and act.

"He says then, recapitulating (431b 20), that one can admit that the soul is in
a way all things; for everything is either sensible or intelligible, and sense
and intellect (or science) are in the soul, sense being somehow the sensible,
and intellect, or science, the intelligible or the scientifically knowable. §
788. But we must ask how this is so. For sense and intellectual knowledge are
divided 'into realities', that is, their division into act and potency
corresponds to a like division in reality; but in such a way that while
potential intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to things potentially
understood or sensed, and actual intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to
things actually understood or sensed, there is a difference between the two
relationships..."  In De Anima III, 8.15 787-787ff

Tracy Smith

-----Original Message-----
From: trey3777@...
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Fri, 28 Oct 2005 01:28:08 -0400
Subject: Re: [aquinas] On Human Nature- Pasnau


Aquinas refers to In de Anima III, 8.15 when discussing the immateriality or
universality of intellection of objects based on two modes of existence,
material and immaterial and it is this that is the basis for the soul being all
things according to In de Anima II 3.5.  I could go into the much longer
inductive argument or observation from Aquinas's anthropology that Aquinas makes
based upon metaphysics and anthropology but this can be drawn from the In de
Anima III, 8.15 text.  "For as things exist in sensation they are free indeed
from matter, but are not without their individuating material conditions, nor
apart from a bodily organ. For sensation is of objects in the particular, but
intellection of objects universally.  It is with reference to these two modes of
existence that the Philosopher will say, in Book III, that the soul is somehow
all things (cf. Bk. III, lectio 13, §§ 787; 788.)"  In De Anima II 3.5.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

I'm looking for something a little more specific. Like did he
prescribe certain prayers? Meditation? Did he use or promote the
rosary?

Ron

--- In aquinas@yahoogroups.com, "Jude Chua Soo Meng" <judechua@s...>
wrote:
>
> I remember that Aquinas wrote quite a bit about prayer as
secondary
> causation, in the Summa I think.  He also argued that prayer
should be
> persistent.
>
> Jude
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Ron Criss" <roncriss@h...>
> To: <aquinas@yahoogroups.com>
> Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 3:54 AM
> Subject: [aquinas] Aquinas and Spirituality
>
>
> > Did St Thomas ever get more specific with his spirituality? Did
he
> > prescribe, for instance, certain daily prayers or specific
spiritual
> > practices such as lectio, meditation, etc? Did he write anything
> > specifically on prayer?
> >
> > Ron
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > This is one of the  lists sponsored by The Free Lance Academy,
home of
> > Slow Reading: http://www.freelance-academy.org  To unsubscribe
by e-mail,
> > mailto:aquinas-unsubscribe@egroups.com
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>

Thanks, I've added it to my shopping cart at amazon.

Ron

--- In aquinas@yahoogroups.com, "Stanley J. Ziobro II" <ziobro@w...>
wrote:
>
> On Thu, 27 Oct 2005, Ron Criss wrote:
>
> > Did St Thomas ever get more specific with his spirituality? Did
he
> > prescribe, for instance, certain daily prayers or specific
spiritual
> > practices such as lectio, meditation, etc? Did he write anything
> > specifically on prayer?
>
> I haven't been following this thread, but there is an excellent
work by
> Jean-Pierre Torrell, OP on St. Thomas.  It is a two volume opus.
The
> first, _St. Thomas Aqinas: The Person and His Work_, is a
groundbreking
> study placing St. Thomas within the historical, societal, cultural
and
> ecclesial context, and discussing his opus.  The second volume,
_St.
> Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master_, discusses the Angelic Doctor's
> spirituality discerned from both a careful reading of his works
and from
> the testimonies of his contempories.  Aquinas treatsof prayer in
various
> works and sermons.  There is ample material in the Summa
Theologiae.  Then
> one finds references in his biblical commentaries.  One thing that
Torrell
> brings to light is that Thomas prayed almost constantly in one
manner or
> another.  His works are not only the fruit of thought, but
fundamentally
> the result of his intense prayer life.  Hope this helps somewhat.
>
> Stan Ziobro
>

--- In aquinas@yahoogroups.com, christian paint <crispain2004@y...> wrote:
>
>
> "... concludi potest ... esse aliquid quod est maxime ens, et hoc dicimus
Deum"
>
> (CG, I,XIII).
>
> If the esse purum was not ens, we never would be able to know him; ens being
the first intellectum, we must elaborate this concept to understand analogically
God as the ens primum ; only through ens we can determinate the essence, the
esse and their unity in God.
>
> French language ("l'être" is commonly used, ans not "l'étant", to say ens) can
help to see this continuity.
>
>


I would agree with this assessment.  Ens is used rather broadly here and
something of a bow to convention is made, with flexibility used to keep the
synthesis together.  Pseudo-Dionysius is brought to mind, as well as the
analogical predication that you point to above.

James

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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Really, the “convention” (doxa) using “ens” to think the object of theology

arises from the “dokein”, to appear and to believe this material manifestation,
what seems being real to the sensus communis. So, as Cajetan say (in Proemium De
Ente et Essentia), the (first) object of the intellect is (only) “ens concretum
quiditati sensibili”.

We have to work hard before clearing what appears (by the abstractio fomalis)
confusely through properties (in ... sensibilibus ...differentiae essentiales
nobis ignotae sunt, ...significantur per ...accidentales” De Ente, c 6).

Since in “ens” essentia and esse are necessarily present, the in-finite ens has
an in finite essence. And so, we cannot say the infinite esse exclude essentia;
as infinite esse is known through finite ens, the same with the infinite
essentia. All these dimensions are converging in Deo, and we can say God
infinity only through the metaphysical constitution of phenomena.


jamesmiguez <jamesmiguez@...> escribió:

--- In aquinas@yahoogroups.com, christian paint <crispain2004@y...> wrote:
>
>
> "... concludi potest ... esse aliquid quod est maxime ens, et hoc dicimus
Deum"
>
> (CG, I,XIII).
>
> If the esse purum was not ens, we never would be able to know him; ens being
the first intellectum, we must elaborate this concept to understand analogically
God as the ens primum ; only through ens we can determinate the essence, the
esse and their unity in God.
>
> French language ("l'être" is commonly used, ans not "l'étant", to say ens) can
help to see this continuity.
>
>


I would agree with this assessment.  Ens is used rather broadly here and
something of a bow to convention is made, with flexibility used to keep the
synthesis together.  Pseudo-Dionysius is brought to mind, as well as the
analogical predication that you point to above.

James

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