Here’s where Aquinas connects SUNÉSIS and GNOMÉ to the law:



II-II, Question 48. The parts of prudence

Article 1. Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

Respondeo: The <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/01124a.htm> potential parts of
a <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15472a.htm> virtue are the
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15472a.htm> virtues connected with it, which
are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the
whole power of the principal <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/15472a.htm>
virtue. On this way the parts of <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12517b.htm>
prudence are " <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06636b.htm> good counsel," which
concerns counsel, "synesis," which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary
occurrence, and "gnome," which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09053a.htm> law: while "
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12517b.htm> prudence" is about the chief act,
viz. that of commanding.



Sunésis and Gnomé are part of phronetic judgment, and so it seems to me that
understanding their relationship to one another ought to be critical for
understanding how Aristotelian and Thomistic moral philosophy agree with and
differ from utilitarian adherence to the Good of the Many.



I think most people’s intuitive belief (synderesis?) is that the Good of the
Many is the starting point, and from there we explore exceptions. What else
could Aquinas have meant when he said that the object of the Will is the
Universal Good? Of course, the Universal Good is broader than the Good of the
Many. The latter is a social concept and is tainted with notions of social
engineering by governments (as opposed to individual moral judgment), but for
the individual, seeking the Good of the Many comes very close in practice to
seeking the Universal Good.





From: DANIEL DILEO [mailto:dxd22@...]
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2009 4:42 AM
To: John Strong
Subject: RE: [aquinas] gnome, sunesis, epieikes, original intent



John:

Yes. in general, the concept of equity in U.S. law is similar to Aristotle's
notion of equity. What is all too often forgotten is that Aristotle wants the
courts (Athenian courts were composed of juries of about 500 citizens) to be
guided by the original intent of the lawgiver even specific cases do not seem to
fit well within the categories of existing law.



I am not sure if he was specifically thinking about application of law when he
wrote about gnoomee and suneesis.



I basically agree with your point about the general case/ hard case dichotomy.
Courts and administrators are most tempted to rely on their own judgment when
faced with hard cases. Aristotle alerts us to the danger associated with this,
the undermining of the rule of law. And he gives us clear reasons for preferring
the rule of law to the rule of men. One of them is that we are less likely to
resent laws that constrain our behavior than we are to resent people who
constrain our behavior.



Dan

On Mon, May 25, 2009 08:47 AM, "John Strong" <pluviosilla@...> wrote:





Very interesting. Thanks for this, Dan. My understanding was that equity courts
in the U.S. handle cases when the general rule of law does not provide an
adequate remedy. Do you know if this is correct?

It does seem to me that the legal maxim “hard cases make bad law” is
profoundly true, and failure to understand this has led to much confusion in
modern politics. Don’t you think Aristotle had the general case/hard case
dichotomy in mind in his discussion of GNOMÉ and SUNÉSIS?

From: aquinas@yahoogroups.com [mailto:aquinas@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of
DANIEL DILEO
Sent: Monday, May 25, 2009 5:30 AM
To: aquinas@yahoogroups.com
Subject: [aquinas] gnome, sunesis, epieikes, original intent

John:The main focus of your concern is more specific than gnoomee and suneesis.
It it epieikes (usually translated as "equity").
What we need to consider is that epieikes in Aristotle's view compensates for
the insufficient specificity of law, BUT it does so by construing the INTENT OF
THE LAWGIVER as it would have applied to the current case. This speaks directly
to a very contemporary (and perennial) political/ legal/administrative
questions: 1. what limits if any should be placed on the scope of judicial and
administrative discretion?2. if some limits are appropriate (and if the rule of
law is, as Aristotle argues, preferable to the rule of men, then some limits on
administrative/ judicial discretion are necessary), then what should the source
of those limits be?
Aristotle argues that the ORIGINAL INTENT of the lawgiver should be the source
of those limits. This is consistent with two observations that he makes about
law.1. It derives its authority from its stability. We obey primarily out of
habit.2. The educative capacity of law stems from its generalizing function. It
supports logos and the virtues by teaching us to subordinate fear and desire to
general principles that do not vary over time.
In order to achieve the consistency over time that is both the source and the
purpose of the law's authority, it is necessary to discern and comply with the
original intent of the law to the greatest degree possible.

Dan

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Dan





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