John:The main focus of your concern is more specific than gnoomee and suneesis.
It it epieikes (usually translated as "equity"). 
What we need to consider is that epieikes in Aristotle's view compensates for
the insufficient specificity of law, BUT it does so by construing the INTENT OF
THE LAWGIVER as it would have applied to the current case. This speaks directly
to a very contemporary (and perennial) political/ legal/administrative
questions: 1. what limits if any should be placed on the scope of judicial and
administrative discretion?2. if some limits are appropriate (and if the rule of
law is, as Aristotle argues, preferable to the rule of men, then some limits on
administrative/ judicial discretion are necessary), then what should the source
of those limits be?
Aristotle argues that the ORIGINAL INTENT of the lawgiver should be the source
of those limits. This is consistent with two observations that he makes about
law.1. It derives its authority from its stability. We obey primarily out of
habit.2. The educative capacity of law stems from its generalizing function. It
supports logos and the virtues by teaching us to subordinate fear and desire to
general principles that do not vary over time.
In order to achieve the consistency over time that is both the source and the
purpose of the law's authority, it is necessary to discern and comply with the
original intent of the law to the greatest degree possible.

Dan




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