--- In TalkAntietam@y..., "Brian Downey" <brdowney@m...> wrote:
> Thanks for the link Marcus.  You have a very clean, readable site
> there - nice introduction to the War between the States.

Thanks, I am glad you like it.

> On your 1862 timeline, you noted "17 Sep - Union forces defeat the
> Confederate forces at Antietam, Maryland."
> I would suggest the forces met on that date, but the matter of who
> was victorious is open to debate.  Also, in the North, the battle
> was named for Antietam Creek.  The battle actually occurred near
> the town of Sharpsburg, Maryland. Those in the South referred to
> the battle by the name of the town.

Good point, I will try to rephrase that.

/Marcus
http://www.skalman.nu

In a message dated 6/9/01 8:54:47 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
awturner@... writes:

<< Hartwig writes of the AoP: "The field army had an effective strength of
  approximately 60,000 men.  On September 6-7, McClellan assigned
  twenty-four new regiments to his field army, distributing them equally
  among his corps, with the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth recieving the
  largest number.  Only eighteen regiments, numbering about 15,000-16,000
  men, actually accompanied the army, the others being unable to join
  their assigned brigades before the army moved.  In addition, several
  thousand volunteers who had been recruited for veteran regiments joined
  their assigned brigades before the army marched, raising the number of
  recruits in the field to approximately 20,000.  This meant nearly
  one-quarter of McClellan's infantry had undergone little or no
  training."
   >>
Just to give you an example, one brigade of Alpheus Williams division in the
the X!! corps had 6 regiments, The 124th, the 125th and the 128th Pa were
just about full strength but were green troops and never in combat, the XII
corps missed South Mt, arriving there the night of the 14th.  The other 3
regiments, the 10th Ct, 46th Pa and 28th NY were veterans, but had strengths
of about company size, if that.

Paula

I ascertained that 27 of the Federal regiments at Antietam were "green" -
being in the service less than six weeks.  Regiments like the 8th Ohio, had
been in actions of some sort but not on the scale of Antietam.  Antietam was
the first real battle of a large portion of the A of P.  It was a very
terrible taste of on the job training.

Mike Priest


-----Original Message-----
From: James Rose <eodrose@...>
To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
Date: Saturday, June 09, 2001 10:29 PM
Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook


>I don't think that our numbers are really very different.  It just takes
>some explaining.  You might call my research the quick and dirty kind.
>Hartwig was talking about the men, while I was simply talking about
>regiments without reference to how many men were present for duty from
>each regiment.  It stands to reason that the unblooded regiments will
>have more men present than the veteran units.  I would not be surprised
>if a full 25% of the men at Antietam were under one month service.  The
>following is how I came up with my numbers.
>
>I had to do the research on this by myself.  Harsh did a good job with
>the ANV, but he has yet to do the AotP.  So I did my research using the
>criteria in "Sounding the Shallows" for what constitutes major battles.
>What I did was use the table in "Gleam of Bayonets" for my list of what
>regiments were in the AotP at the time (from what I understand it is not
>a perfect list, but it was the best I had).  Then using that list I went
>through Dyer's and created a spreadsheet of the 217 infantry regiments
>(that is what I was concerned with at the time).  The tables were:
>branch (all infantry), state, regiment #, muster in date, terms of
>service, corps assign, division assign, brigade assign, previous combat
>(I included skirmishes for this), and major battles (using Harsh's
>definitions).  It took a really long time to put all this information
>together, so I wouldn't be surprised if I made any mistakes.
>
>Of the 217 regiments in the AotP at this time there were 23 absent from
>Antietam (Forth corps and Humphrey's division).  Of the 194 remaining,
>17 were mustered in less than one month before (8.8%); 26 had no
>previous combat experience (13.4%); 40 had never fought a major battle
>(20.6%); 35 had fought one major battle (18%); 92 had fought two major
>battles (47.4%); 25 had fought three major battles (12.9%); and 2 had
>fought 4 major battles (1%).
>
>Note that I did not put numbers of men to each regiment.  That was
>beyond the scope of the research I was doing at the time (not to mention
>that would probably take a year, and I only had a few days).  I will say
>that the absolute most that the new men could make up would be about 22%
>of the total men in the army in the "effectives" group.  It was probably
>fairly close to this percentage.
>
>Jim Rose
>
>Anthony W. Turner wrote:
>
>>
>> Your 13% figure differs, Jim, from the "one quarter" (or 25%) D. Scott
>> Hartwig uses in his essay, "Who Would Not Be a Soldier?" within Gary
>> Gallagher's _The Antietam Campaign_.  I'm not the scholar here, and not
>> about to dispute either figure, but feel two such disparate numbers
>> deserve further discussion.
>>
>> Hartwig writes of the AoP: "The field army had an effective strength of
>> approximately 60,000 men.  On September 6-7, McClellan assigned
>> twenty-four new regiments to his field army, distributing them equally
>> among his corps, with the Second, Ninth, and Twelfth recieving the
>> largest number.  Only eighteen regiments, numbering about 15,000-16,000
>> men, actually accompanied the army, the others being unable to join
>> their assigned brigades before the army moved.  In addition, several
>> thousand volunteers who had been recruited for veteran regiments joined
>> their assigned brigades before the army marched, raising the number of
>> recruits in the field to approximately 20,000.  This meant nearly
>> one-quarter of McClellan's infantry had undergone little or no
>> training."
>>
>> Comments, Jim and others?
>>
>> Tony Turner
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
>
>
>

John Priest wrote:

> I ascertained that 27 of the Federal regiments at Antietam were "green" -
> being in the service less than six weeks.  Regiments like the 8th Ohio, had
> been in actions of some sort but not on the scale of Antietam.  Antietam was
> the first real battle of a large portion of the A of P.  It was a very
> terrible taste of on the job training.


If you count Humphrey's division and Forth corps the number of "Green"
regiments jumps to 27 on my table.  I didn't count them because they
were not at Antietam on the 17th.

Jim Rose

I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy Lee.
But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_ was
whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
_at least_ worth a try?

I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.

-----Original Message-----
From: James Rose [mailto:eodrose@...]
Sent: Saturday, June 09, 2001 9:10 AM
To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook




Curt wrote:

> I would suggest:
>
> Mill Springs (A/D 1:1)
>
> Brice's Cross Roads (A/D 0.4/1.0)

I don't have much information on those two battles, but what I do have
does not equate to "battles of annihilation".

At Mills Springs the forces were US 4,000 to CS 4,000.  Casualties were
US 262 to CS 529.  Crittenden abandoned most of his equipment in the
retreat.  True it was a resounding victory for the US forces, but it
stops well short of annihilation.  I would like to point out two extra
things about this battle.  One, the scale of operations is significantly
much smaller than I was thinking about (when I say army I generally
refer to at least 20,000 men).  Scale of operations does make a
difference.  Two, if what I read about many of Crittenden's men having
weapons that didn't work is correct, then the odds change.  A man cannot
be considered a fighting effective if his weapon doesn't work.

Brice's Cross Roads is a much better example (although the problem of
scale is still there).  The forces were US 8,100 to CS 3,500
(interestingly at 2.3:1 this is close to the superiority that many
people believe McClellan had over Lee).  Casualties were US 2,612 to CS
493.  It was a rout, massive one sided victory (question are there any
victories that were more one sided during the war), and just an all
round good day for Forrest.  However, Sturgis still made it to safety
with the bulk of his army.  I would like to point out one thing about
this battle.  The CS had Forrest.  McClellan was many things, but a
tactical genius was not one of them.

I was looking up Nashville (yes it was the benchmark), and one
conclusion jumps out at me.  The difference between being routed and
annihilation has a lot to do with the support structure of the army in
question.  As near as I can tell the only reason why Hood's army was
"destroyed" was because the South could no longer recover from a massive
defeat.  This was not the situation in 1862.

> As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, in discussion of the
> purported 3-1 rule, there is no real correlation of raw numbers of
> personnel to success in battle.

If this is true (which in general I agree) then why do people
automatically assume that McClellan would defeat and destroy Lee?  From
every account I have read and heard Lee is considered a much better
tactical commander than McClellan.  I don't deny that McClellan might
have been able to destroy the ANV.  What I deny is that it is a given
that had McClellan attacked on the 18th he would have destroyed the
ANV.  If anything Brice's Cross Roads shows that it could have gone the
other way.

In the Maryland campaign McClellan had two things going for him: numbers
(which he was unaware of his advantage), and supply (his supply
situation was far better than Lee's).  He had five things going against
him: strategic defense (i.e. he was reacting to Lee), tactical offense
(if 3-1 isn't an official axiom, it is still better to be in a strong
defensive position when fighting), morale (his army had just been
routed), combat veterans (13% had never been in combat, and many of
those who had been in only one major campaign got their experience at
2nd Manassas), and tactical command ( the Lee/Longstreet/Jackson team is
considered far better than the McClellan/Burnside/Porter team).  The
situation was reversed for Lee except that it is even worse for
McClellan in the morale and combat veterans department.  For morale the
ANV had come off of a summer of victories capped with routing the
federal army.  For veterans, everyone in the ANV had been in at least
one major campaign (the highest percentage being in 3 major battles).

For the life of me I can't see what people base the assumption that it
is axiomatic that the AotP would destroy the ANV if McClellan had
attacked on the 18th.  Possible, yes; probable, maybe (I thinks that's
pushing it); a given, no way.

Jim Rose






Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

TR,
I am probably telling you things you already know, but I hope you have the
revised 1908 version of the 1904 atlas.  Carman made significant changes in
1908 and reissued the maps.  As Kevin mentioned earlier, I have finished a
complete transcription of his 1,800 page manuscript and am working on
editing, notating and publishing it.

TR Livesey wrote:

> Brian Downey wrote:
> >
> > Hi group,
> >
> > I have been wondering for years, but never asked, is there a
> > published source for the Antietam Battlefield Board Papers and/or
> > maps?  I gather from the grapevine that they may reside in the secret
> > back-room at the Battlefield Visitor's Center, but I'm ashamed to
> > admit I've never actually asked to see.
> >
>
> As far as I know, there is only the 1904 edition of the Atlas,
> of which I am lucky enough to have a copy. It is quite spectacular
> (elephant folio) and in color.
>
> I am currently in the process of geo-referencing the troop placements,
> a task which will take quite some time to complete. Geo referencing
> is assigning earth coordinates to features on maps, aerial photographs,
> or satellite images.
>
> Here is a sample from plate 1 "Daybreak":
>
> http://www.enteract.com/~westwood/atlasClose.jpg
>
> Regards,
>         TR Livesey
>         westwood@...
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Perhaps saying "everyone" was a bit strong, but overall that is my
impression of how most people judge McClellan's actions during the
Maryland campaign.  The seize on their vision of what might have been,
and lose sight of what McClellan did accomplish.

As to the specifics of your question (which was phrased quite
differently than I normally see it), I agree that it would have been
worth a try.  That is speaking from the position of hindsight, and
knowing what I know, attacking on the 18th probably would have been a
good idea.  While admitting that attacking might have been the best
course of action, that does not mean that I believe what McClellan did
do was wrong.  I think that Harsh goes into the best detail of how the
situation looked to McClellan after the battle in TATF (Murfin does
little more than try to show that McClellan was little more than a
whinny boy, and Sears is not much better).

Looking at the situation on the evening of the 17th as it appeared to
McClellan his decision is not unreasonable.  In the first place
McClellan did intend to attack on the 18th, but circumstances delayed it
for 24 hours.  McClellan was unaware of his advantage in manpower.  All
of the intelligence reports put the ANV at having a 25% advantage in
men, and nothing that happened during the 17th could have changed that
opinion downward.  The AotP was repulsed at every point with 25-33%
losses (it was worse among the green troops).  The ANV's line was never
broken fully open anywhere.  The ANV was "wacked", but so was the AotP.
Any attack on the 18th could only be done with the Fifth and Sixth
corps'.  The other corps' were unable to conduct offensive operations
(at least that is what the corps' commanders told McClellan).  Of those
two corps' around 25% of the men had less than one month in service.
Then there is the ammo situation.  Small arms ammo was critically short,
and the AotP was completely out of Parrot ammo.  Because of the
destruction of the B&O bridge the AotP would not be resupplied until the
evening of the 18th.  Finally any attack would again give Lee the
advantage of defense.  At best I don't see how McClellan could have
believed that any attack on the 18th would be more than a toss up as to
who would win.

So the question becomes: should McClellan have taken that gamble and
attacked on the 18th?  Considering what McClellan believe his duty to be
I would say that he was unjustified in taking the gamble that it
appeared to be.  McClellan's first duty was the protection of
Washington, and the second was to end the invasion of Maryland (down
around the end of the list is the destruction of the ANV).  By standing
fast on the 18th, and preparing to attack on the 19th McClellan served
both those duties.  Lee had three options.  He could attack, stand, or
leave.  McClellan was ready for any counterattack, he would attack on
the 19th if Lee stood, and the only place for Lee to go was back to
Virginia.  On the other hand if McClellan had attacked and lost, then
Lee might have been able to revive his invasion (unlikely in hindsight
no matter the outcome of the battle).  That would mean a failure of both
the primary and secondary missions.  Quite simply if McClellan had
attacked on the 18th he would have risked everything for the possibility
of gaining relatively little.

Jim Rose

Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

> I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy Lee.
> But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
> whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_ was
> whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
> nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
> _at least_ worth a try?
>
> I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.

Not to entirely rehash this ever-so-familiar topic, but a couple of points:

1. You carefully explain all the reasons Mac had for not attacking on the
18th, yet state that he intended on attacking anyway. Huh?

2. Why did the reasons for not attacking on the 18th not apply to the 17th
as well?

-----Original Message-----
From: James Rose [mailto:eodrose@...]
Sent: Monday, June 11, 2001 2:19 PM
To: TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [TalkAntietam] Re: US Civil War Factbook


Perhaps saying "everyone" was a bit strong, but overall that is my
impression of how most people judge McClellan's actions during the
Maryland campaign.  The seize on their vision of what might have been,
and lose sight of what McClellan did accomplish.

As to the specifics of your question (which was phrased quite
differently than I normally see it), I agree that it would have been
worth a try.  That is speaking from the position of hindsight, and
knowing what I know, attacking on the 18th probably would have been a
good idea.  While admitting that attacking might have been the best
course of action, that does not mean that I believe what McClellan did
do was wrong.  I think that Harsh goes into the best detail of how the
situation looked to McClellan after the battle in TATF (Murfin does
little more than try to show that McClellan was little more than a
whinny boy, and Sears is not much better).

Looking at the situation on the evening of the 17th as it appeared to
McClellan his decision is not unreasonable.  In the first place
McClellan did intend to attack on the 18th, but circumstances delayed it
for 24 hours.  McClellan was unaware of his advantage in manpower.  All
of the intelligence reports put the ANV at having a 25% advantage in
men, and nothing that happened during the 17th could have changed that
opinion downward.  The AotP was repulsed at every point with 25-33%
losses (it was worse among the green troops).  The ANV's line was never
broken fully open anywhere.  The ANV was "wacked", but so was the AotP.
Any attack on the 18th could only be done with the Fifth and Sixth
corps'.  The other corps' were unable to conduct offensive operations
(at least that is what the corps' commanders told McClellan).  Of those
two corps' around 25% of the men had less than one month in service.
Then there is the ammo situation.  Small arms ammo was critically short,
and the AotP was completely out of Parrot ammo.  Because of the
destruction of the B&O bridge the AotP would not be resupplied until the
evening of the 18th.  Finally any attack would again give Lee the
advantage of defense.  At best I don't see how McClellan could have
believed that any attack on the 18th would be more than a toss up as to
who would win.

So the question becomes: should McClellan have taken that gamble and
attacked on the 18th?  Considering what McClellan believe his duty to be
I would say that he was unjustified in taking the gamble that it
appeared to be.  McClellan's first duty was the protection of
Washington, and the second was to end the invasion of Maryland (down
around the end of the list is the destruction of the ANV).  By standing
fast on the 18th, and preparing to attack on the 19th McClellan served
both those duties.  Lee had three options.  He could attack, stand, or
leave.  McClellan was ready for any counterattack, he would attack on
the 19th if Lee stood, and the only place for Lee to go was back to
Virginia.  On the other hand if McClellan had attacked and lost, then
Lee might have been able to revive his invasion (unlikely in hindsight
no matter the outcome of the battle).  That would mean a failure of both
the primary and secondary missions.  Quite simply if McClellan had
attacked on the 18th he would have risked everything for the possibility
of gaining relatively little.

Jim Rose

Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

> I don't think everyone believes McClellan would "automatically" destroy
Lee.
> But with an advantage in manpower, and facing an opponent that had been
> whacked pretty good the day before (and Mac should know this, since _he_
was
> whacked pretty thoroughly too), and with his back against a river and
> nothing but catastrophe awaiting him should the day go against him, was it
> _at least_ worth a try?
>
> I would think even you would have to consider that as a valid choice.






Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

> Not to entirely rehash this ever-so-familiar topic, but a couple of points:
>
> 1. You carefully explain all the reasons Mac had for not attacking on the
> 18th, yet state that he intended on attacking anyway. Huh?

Is there a problem with there being a disparity between what McClellan
wanted to do and what he felt he was capable of doing?  During the
evening of the 17th McClellan had determined to attack the following
day.  The decision not to attack was an evolution of thinking that came
with the information he had.  The situation didn't change, but
McClellan's understanding of it did.  After thinking it through he
determined to postpone the attack until the 19th.  Its called "changing
your mind", and people do it from time to time.

>
> 2. Why did the reasons for not attacking on the 18th not apply to the 17th
> as well?

I would imagine that two important things looked different on the
morning of the 18th then they did on the evening of the 17th.  First, I
don't think that McClellan was aware that the ammunition would be
delayed until the morning of the 18th.  Second, McClellan probably
thought that after marching all night Humphrey's and Couch's men would
not be in very good condition to conduct an offensive.  Since they
constituted close to half of McClellan's available force for the attack,
the thought of using them right then may have looked a bit different
than in the abstract.

Jim Rose

>Is there a problem with there being a disparity between what McClellan
>wanted to do and what he felt he was capable of doing?

Well, yeah. On the face of it, you give very good reasons for not pursuing
offensive actions -- in fact, with the lack of ammo, staying put might not
even have been such a good idea. With said reasons, he shouldn't even have
been considering it under any circumstances. But he was, and it comes
closely to sounding like you want to play it both ways: He doesn't fight,
but deserves credit for at least thinking about it.

>I would imagine that two important things looked different on the
>morning of the 18th then they did on the evening of the 17th.

I was talking about the morning of the 17th -- if it was a good time to
attack then, what changed overnight other than slightly delayed ammo? If
there were reasons not to attack on the 18th, I would think they'd apply to
the 17th even more.

Jim--

I cut your most excellent post to shorten the bandwith for this
message but, in essence, I am in agreement with you on your
statements.

However, I believe there is one very valuable thing that Mac did
with respects to Lee that most historians either overlook or
simply did not take the time to consider. Harsh goes over this
from the viewpoint of what Lee could or could not have done on
September 18th in TATF. Essentially, by remaining "in place"
where he was on September 18th, Mac effectively shut the door for
Lee to continue his Maryland campaign. Hence a large part of the
reason for the ANV retreat to Shepherdstown.

I wonder, too, if Carman says anything about Mac not attacking on
September 18th vis Lee and any plans Lee might have had. IIRC,
Lee was all for attacking on September 18th, but his main
subordinate commanders were unanimously against it.

Hope this helps.

Your humble servant,
Gerry Mayers
Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

"I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
on which he has nobly laid down his life."     --General Robert
Edward Lee

Jeff Beckner (PWC Magazine) wrote:

>
> Well, yeah. On the face of it, you give very good reasons for not pursuing
> offensive actions -- in fact, with the lack of ammo, staying put might not
> even have been such a good idea. With said reasons, he shouldn't even have
> been considering it under any circumstances. But he was, and it comes
> closely to sounding like you want to play it both ways: He doesn't fight,
> but deserves credit for at least thinking about it.

McClellan had to stay put.  It was absolutely imperative that Lee not be
allowed to revive the campaign.  As for the ammo situation, if I
understand it correctly McClellan thought (on the 17th) that he would be
resupplied in time for the attack on the 18th.  That didn't happen, and
the shipment was delayed until the evening.  If you don't want to give
McClellan credit for intending to attack on the 18th that's fine.  It
doesn't actually matter to me.  I personally think that McClellan
answered the questions about moral cowardice, timidity, and
unwillingness to fight on the 17th.  The fact that McClellan thought
about attacking on the 18th and then changed his mind doesn't mean
anything other than he changed his mind.

>
> I was talking about the morning of the 17th -- if it was a good time to
> attack then, what changed overnight other than slightly delayed ammo? If
> there were reasons not to attack on the 18th, I would think they'd apply to
> the 17th even more.
>
Let me see.  What changed during the day of the 17th.  Let's start with
10,000 casualties and go from there.  On the morning of the 17th the
AotP had 6 intact corps' that were capable of offensive operations.  By
evening McClellan was reduced to two corps' capable of offensive
operations.  In the morning there was a full load-out of ammo.  By
evening there were critical shortages (heavy fighting tends to use up ammo).

There were many reasons not to attack on the 17th.  I can think of
several with straining myself.  However, not fighting Lee was out of the
question.  If McClellan did not bring Lee to battle in Maryland it would
have been as damaging, or even more so, than actually losing the AotP.
McClellan had to fight Lee at some point, and thanks in part to S.O. 191
McClellan thought that the ANV was still separated (at least somewhat).
That means that on the 17th McClellan thought that the odds were
probably as good as they were going to get.  Therefore, he attacked.
There were many reasons not to attack, but more overriding ones to
attack on the 17th.  By evening those overriding reasons had been muted
by the battle (i.e. a bloodied ANV leaving Maryland is very different
than an unscratched ANV leaving Maryland).

Jim Rose

>Let me see.  What changed during the day of the 17th.  Let's start with
>10,000 casualties and go from there.

Let me see. I guess all the Yankee bullets missed their marks.

Where was this paralyzing lack of ammo in all of our other discussions? Has
Dr. Harsh written another book?

Let me see. What changed during the day of the 17th. Let's start with
10,000 casualties and go from there.

Let me see. I guess all the Yankee bullets missed their marks.

Where was this paralyzing lack of ammo in all of our other discussions? Has
Dr. Harsh written another book?

I disagree.  The analytical construct is the battle and its immediate
aftermath, i.e., a connected series of events.  Definitions would be
helpful.  If you would like to use 20,000 total engaged as (part of?)
the definition of battle, you will exclude many, many significant
battles of any era.  But, that is your prerogative, if you find it
helpful.

Then, there is the military meaning of "destruction" or "annihilation."
These are terms that are widely misunderstood or misapprehended, even by
professional officers.  Believe me, I know.  I was once at a conference
where a serving officer asked a distinguished German general, who was
explaining the annihilation of large Soviet formations on the Eastern
Front, whether his panzer formation had killed all the Soviets and how
"he felt about it."  The general explained that in fact very few Soviets
had been killed, and he felt just fine about it.

Destruction is simply the act of so damaging a military force that, for
all practical purposes, it can no longer function in its normal or
intended purpose and cannot readily be restored to its condition before
the decisive combat.  In modern war theaters analysts assess the combat
effectiveness of units and formations and "combat ineffective" and
"destroyed" are terms that could be applied.

This is what happened to Sturgis' column, to Hood's army, and to
Zollicoffer's command.  Also to Benedek's at Sadowa, where ca. 435,000
were engaged.

I did not address many of your other comments, since I did not regard
them as germane.  One thing, though, discounting the 20,000-man
artificiality, how exactly is Nashville different from the other
examples?

As far as assumptions made by others about what was within the realm of
the possible for McClellan at Antietam, I think that anyone who would
base an analysis solely on personnel numbers has little or no
understanding of combat.  The raw numbers are simply one part of the
mosaic.  I suspect that what troubles many who have commented on the
campaign and battle is that McClellan, who was not unintelligent or
inexperienced, paid scant heed to commonsense and the principles of war
in his conduct of each.  In the long history of military ineptitude,
this might not be too important, but the butcher's bill for this was
enormous, and so therefore the analysis ought to be of abiding interest
to historians and ought not to be waved off as "20-20 hindsight" or
suchlike.

Curt Johnson
McLean, Va.


James Rose wrote:
>
> Curt wrote:
>
> > I would suggest:
> >
> > Mill Springs (A/D 1:1)
> >
> > Brice's Cross Roads (A/D 0.4/1.0)
>
> I don't have much information on those two battles, but what I do have
> does not equate to "battles of annihilation".
>
(snip)

> As I have attempted to demonstrate elsewhere, in discussion of the
> > purported 3-1 rule, there is no real correlation of raw numbers of
> > personnel to success in battle.
>
> If this is true (which in general I agree) then why do people
> automatically assume that McClellan would defeat and destroy Lee?
> Jim Rose

I received a brochure for the 9th Annual Penn State Fall Battlefield Study
Tour.
This year is: "THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM - AMERICA'S BLOODIEST DAY".

DATE: October 11-14, 2001
LOCATION: Hagerstown, MD

It is led by Carol Reardon and features lectures and extensive walking tours.
Other people scheduled to speak are: Mark Neely, William Blair, Mark Snell,
and Tom Clemens (SHAF).

For more info, contact:
Penn State Mont Alto Continuing Education
612 Chambersburg Mall
Chambersburg, PA 17201-8101
PHONE: 717-709-0778

Tom Shay - Cressona, PA

Curt wrote:

> I disagree.  The analytical construct is the battle and its immediate
> aftermath, i.e., a connected series of events.  Definitions would be
> helpful.  If you would like to use 20,000 total engaged as (part of?)
> the definition of battle, you will exclude many, many significant
> battles of any era.  But, that is your prerogative, if you find it
> helpful.

You misunderstood my using the 20,000 number (which I will admit is
artificial).  The whole purpose of this discussion was to extrapolate an
event that did happen to the possibility of it happening at a different
place.  The difference in scale (if the difference is large enough)
leads to a difference in kind.  Say 11 men get into a fight (6 on one
side and 5 on the other).  The outcome of a fight between 60,000 vs
50,000 cannot be logically extrapolated from the earlier fight.  The
20,000 number (which I am quite willing to change) is to separate the
kinds of battles (i.e. regiment level, brigade level, division level,
corps level, army level).  20,000 men on one side is a multi-division
engagement.  The different levels have different problems, and different
things that must be accounted for.

>
> Then, there is the military meaning of "destruction" or "annihilation."
> These are terms that are widely misunderstood or misapprehended, even by
> professional officers.  Believe me, I know.  I was once at a conference
> where a serving officer asked a distinguished German general, who was
> explaining the annihilation of large Soviet formations on the Eastern
> Front, whether his panzer formation had killed all the Soviets and how
> "he felt about it."  The general explained that in fact very few Soviets
> had been killed, and he felt just fine about it.
>
> Destruction is simply the act of so damaging a military force that, for
> all practical purposes, it can no longer function in its normal or
> intended purpose and cannot readily be restored to its condition before
> the decisive combat.  In modern war theaters analysts assess the combat
> effectiveness of units and formations and "combat ineffective" and
> "destroyed" are terms that could be applied.

Before what decisive combat?  How about this for a definition: If the
unit either cannot be restored to combat effectiveness at all, or if it
will take as long to restore the unit as it would to raise a new unit.
In this case, and in your example above the issue of destruction has
more to do with logistical support than anything else.  This was my
point.  In 1862 the logistical support existed in the Confederacy to
keep the ANV from being "destroyed".

>
> This is what happened to Sturgis' column, to Hood's army, and to
> Zollicoffer's command.  Also to Benedek's at Sadowa, where ca. 435,000
> were engaged.
>
> I did not address many of your other comments, since I did not regard
> them as germane.  One thing, though, discounting the 20,000-man
> artificiality, how exactly is Nashville different from the other
> examples?

As I said I don't know much about the Western theater of the war.  As
near as I can tell (though I could well be wrong) was that the
difference was that Hood's army could not be reconstituted as a
functional fighting force.

>
> As far as assumptions made by others about what was within the realm of
> the possible for McClellan at Antietam, I think that anyone who would
> base an analysis solely on personnel numbers has little or no
> understanding of combat.  The raw numbers are simply one part of the
> mosaic.  I suspect that what troubles many who have commented on the
> campaign and battle is that McClellan, who was not unintelligent or
> inexperienced, paid scant heed to commonsense and the principles of war
> in his conduct of each.  In the long history of military ineptitude,
> this might not be too important, but the butcher's bill for this was
> enormous, and so therefore the analysis ought to be of abiding interest
> to historians and ought not to be waved off as "20-20 hindsight" or
> suchlike.

I agree with that it should be analyzed.  Of course I disagree with your
interpretation of McClellan.  The problem is that to get to a discussion
on the relative merits (or lack thereof) of McClellan's plans we must
first get though the "mass" theory of battle.  The problem with this
theory is that people literally take nothing else into account.  It was
in that context that I was trying to destroy the idea that McClellan
could destroy Lee's army.  In the context of all the other things that
go into war I think that it was even more impossible for McClellan to
destroy Lee (if for no other reason than quite a bit of the ANV was at
Winchester at the time).

Jim Rose

Afternoon All,

	 Thought I would share this letter written by JEB to his wife, Flora,
dated Sept. 4, 1862, from "Hdqtrs, Drainesville"

Regards,
Teej

"My Darling one--

	 Long before this reaches you I will be in Maryland. I have not been
able to keep the list of battles much less give you any accounts of
them. I present position on the banks of the Potomac  will tell you
volumes. My Staff are all well-- Capt. Stuart was killed storming
Groveton Heights. I have seen my Fairfax Sweethearts & all inquired very
much about you--
	 Dr. Coolidge is within our lines on the battle field, Genls Kearney &
Stevens were killed & several of their Generals wounded. We captured Tom
Hight's entire Co. 2 Dragoons--Bob Clary was his Lieut, we paroled them
all.
	 Parson [John] Landstreet was captured & saw all their Generals--Pope
told him to tell me he would send me my hat if I would send him his
coat. I must have my hat first. I recaptured Landstreet at Fairfax C.H.
We pursued the enemy beyond Anandale. We knocked Buford's Brigade into
Bull Run capturing 220. Killing a Col.
	 Landstreet says all the officers on the other side spoke kind of me.
May God help you. In haste

									 Ever yours
									 JEB Stuart
									 Major Ge 							 [The words "Major Ge" is struck through]

PS: I send 200 in draft, $50 in notes can you pay my tailors bill? Gen
Ewell leg was amputated, it is hoped he will get well. Trimble was
wounded. Hampton has joined me.
	 Tell Miss Mary Lee that Wilson Turner was killed fighting most
heroically, Kinloch Tom, tell her, is now with me. Gen. R.E. Lee fell &
bruised his hand badly the other day.

				 JEB

Thanks for the Stuart letter, Teej.  I hope the Weather Channel is
correct and that Soaker Allison has finally left NC.

BTW, was the Capt. Stuart whom Jeb mentions a brother or cousin?

Tony Turner

"Anthony W. Turner" wrote:

Tony,

> Thanks for the Stuart letter, Teej.  I hope the Weather Channel is
> correct and that Soaker Allison has finally left NC.

	 Not quite, still a few lingering storms and heavy down pours.
>
> BTW, was the Capt. Stuart whom Jeb mentions a brother or cousin?
>
	 Capt. James Hardeman Stuart and JEB Stuart were double third cousins. I
let you figure that one out. :-) Like Pelham, Hardeman Stuart took part
in a battle that was not his and was killed.

Teej

>

No, I did not misunderstand.  As you appear to recognize, there is a
difference between a gang fight [or, duel], if you will, and a battle,
which is an organized phenomenon.  When the numbers get large enough to
permit maneuver by units, there is not much difference in combat forms
(maneuver) and results.  You will find that battles of annihilation
exist at all levels of aggregation in organized combat.  So the posited
equivalency of "large" numbers has no relevance to the argument.  You
will also find that in the great majority of cases, such battles are won
by envelopment and/or encirclement.

The decisive combat that you ask about below is the battle.  You want to
extrapolate to the campaign or to the national means and will, and this
is fine, but analytically, things can get very hazy there.  You wish to
proceed from a discrete event to the rather inchoate sequellae to the
battle.  Thus, you would rob the battle of its decisive nature,
analytical utility, and consequences by saying (in effect), "Oh well,
they could recover and field another force."

Well, you can rest assured that if McClellan had the destroyed Lee's
army at Antietam, the odds and ends at Winchester would have been
incapable of effectively resisting even a military sloth like McClellan.

You mention a mass theory of battle, which you disparage.  I've never
heard of it.  It is a straw man.  However, "mass" is one of the
principles of war, and of course McC. violated that principle in the
battle of Antietam.  McC. had the means and the opportunity to destroy
Lee's army at Antietam, but he did little if anything to effect that
destruction.  It was all within his grasp, as he himself recognized.
Also, what da heck was McClellan's plan?  I know we have something sort
of cobbled together ex post facto as an apologia, but is there evidence
of a coherent, integrated plan of battle being in place, coordinated,
understood by all the principal actors, etc., on the eve of the battle?
Further, if you review McClellan's conduct of the battle, can you name
one, just one, of the Principles of War that McClellan employed,
maintained, and exploited to win the battle?

Curt Johnson
McLean, Va.

--------

>
> Curt wrote:
>
> > I disagree.  The analytical construct is the battle and its immediate
> > aftermath, i.e., a connected series of events.

James wrote:
>
> You misunderstood my using the 20,000 number (which I will admit is
> artificial).  The whole purpose of this discussion was to extrapolate an
> event that did happen to the possibility of it happening at a different
> place.

-------

Curt wrote:

> >
> > Then, there is the military meaning of "destruction" or "annihilation."
> > These are terms that are widely misunderstood or misapprehended, even by
> > professional officers.  Believe me, I know.  I was once at a conference
> > where a serving officer asked a distinguished German general, who was
> > explaining the annihilation of large Soviet formations on the Eastern
> > Front, whether his panzer formation had killed all the Soviets and how
> > "he felt about it."  The general explained that in fact very few Soviets
> > had been killed, and he felt just fine about it.
> >
> > Destruction is simply the act of so damaging a military force that, for
> > all practical purposes, it can no longer function in its normal or
> > intended purpose and cannot readily be restored to its condition before
> > the decisive combat.  In modern war theaters analysts assess the combat
> > effectiveness of units and formations and "combat ineffective" and
> > "destroyed" are terms that could be applied.
>

James wrote:

> Before what decisive combat?  How about this for a definition: If the
> unit either cannot be restored to combat effectiveness at all, or if it
> will take as long to restore the unit as it would to raise a new unit.
> In this case, and in your example above the issue of destruction has
> more to do with logistical support than anything else.  This was my
> point.  In 1862 the logistical support existed in the Confederacy to
> keep the ANV from being "destroyed".
>
Curt wrote:

> >
> > This is what happened to Sturgis' column, to Hood's army, and to
> > Zollicoffer's command.  Also to Benedek's at Sadowa, where ca. 435,000
> > were engaged.
> >
> > I did not address many of your other comments, since I did not regard
> > them as germane.  One thing, though, discounting the 20,000-man
> > artificiality, how exactly is Nashville different from the other
> > examples?

James wrote:
>
> As I said I don't know much about the Western theater of the war.  As
> near as I can tell (though I could well be wrong) was that the
> difference was that Hood's army could not be reconstituted as a
> functional fighting force.
>
--------

Curt wrote:
> >
> > As far as assumptions made by others about what was within the realm of
> > the possible for McClellan at Antietam, I think that anyone who would
> > base an analysis solely on personnel numbers has little or no
> > understanding of combat.  The raw numbers are simply one part of the
> > mosaic.  I suspect that what troubles many who have commented on the
> > campaign and battle is that McClellan, who was not unintelligent or
> > inexperienced, paid scant heed to commonsense and the principles of war
> > in his conduct of each.  In the long history of military ineptitude,
> > this might not be too important, but the butcher's bill for this was
> > enormous, and so therefore the analysis ought to be of abiding interest
> > to historians and ought not to be waved off as "20-20 hindsight" or
> > suchlike.

James wrote:

>
> I agree with that it should be analyzed.  Of course I disagree with your
> interpretation of McClellan.  The problem is that to get to a discussion
> on the relative merits (or lack thereof) of McClellan's plans we must
> first get though the "mass" theory of battle.  The problem with this
> theory is that people literally take nothing else into account.  It was
> in that context that I was trying to destroy the idea that McClellan
> could destroy Lee's army.  In the context of all the other things that
> go into war I think that it was even more impossible for McClellan to
> destroy Lee (if for no other reason than quite a bit of the ANV was at
> Winchester at the time).
>
> Jim Rose
>

Reminder...this weekend (Sat and Sun, 23rd and 24th) is Artillery Weekend at
Antietam battlefield. There will be artillery firing demonstrations and
special Ranger walks highlight this weekend dedicated to artillery at
Antietam. This weekend will feature the Baltimore Light Artillery living
history group.

I had the pleasure last weekend to visit the 4th Texas camp in my region and
member "New Jersey Rebel" Gerry Mayers. Thanks for the sampling of hardtack!

Tom Shay

Tom--

Errrr...but I made one monumental mistake...put in baking powder
when I should have used some baking soda! All the pards had a
good laugh over the "bite" from the biscuits...even I did....

Was glad to see you as well as Mark Pflum there..........

Your humble servant,
Gerry Mayers
Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

"I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
on which he has nobly laid down his life."     --General Robert
Edward Lee


----- Original Message -----
From: <rotbaron@...>
To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2001 11:06 AM
Subject: [TalkAntietam] Artillery Weekend


> Reminder...this weekend (Sat and Sun, 23rd and 24th) is
Artillery Weekend at
> Antietam battlefield. There will be artillery firing
demonstrations and
> special Ranger walks highlight this weekend dedicated to
artillery at
> Antietam. This weekend will feature the Baltimore Light
Artillery living
> history group.
>
> I had the pleasure last weekend to visit the 4th Texas camp in
my region and
> member "New Jersey Rebel" Gerry Mayers. Thanks for the sampling
of hardtack!
>
> Tom Shay
>
>       Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
>       Click for Details
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.
>
>

Hi group,

for those interested and local to Sharpsburg, I'll be at the
battlefield most of the day Sunday for this event.  Anybody else?

For visual recognition, I'm a tall, black-going-to-white haired,
goateed guy.  I'll prob have at least one son, maybe both, with me.
They're 11 and 12, and impressed by noise, fire, and smoke. So am I.

Have a great weekend, however you spend it.

Brian

I hope--- In TalkAntietam@y..., rotbaron@a... wrote:
> Reminder...this weekend (Sat and Sun, 23rd and 24th) is Artillery
Weekend at
> Antietam battlefield...

Teej,

thanks for posting this letter.  I love to read actual letters written
by historical figures.  It helps bring then to life.

susan

--- In TalkAntietam@y..., Teej Smith <teej@p...> wrote:
> "Anthony W. Turner" wrote:
>
> Tony,
>
> > Thanks for the Stuart letter, Teej.  I hope the Weather Channel is
> > correct and that Soaker Allison has finally left NC.
>
>  Not quite, still a few lingering storms and heavy down pours.
> >
> > BTW, was the Capt. Stuart whom Jeb mentions a brother or cousin?
> >
>  Capt. James Hardeman Stuart and JEB Stuart were double third
cousins. I
> let you figure that one out. :-) Like Pelham, Hardeman Stuart took
part
> in a battle that was not his and was killed.
>
> Teej
>
> >

Greystone Books is again hosting a tremendous week of talks and book-signings
by Civil War authors. It is held at Gettysburg next week and all talks are
free.

On July 7at 5:00 PM, Joseph Harsh will speak on the Antietam Campaign.

Entire schedule is at:
<A HREF="http://www.greystonehistory.com/hb2001/schedule.shtml">
http://www.greystonehistory.com/hb2001/schedule.shtml</A>

Tom Shay - Cressona, PA

Have those of you who attended the artillery event in Sharpsburg last
weekend anything to report about firing in what must have been a very
heavy rain?

Tony Turner

Tony--

I was there in my unit uniform. Other than a few showers on
Saturday, there did not appear to be a problem. Sunday was a
gorgeously sunny day.

Saw Jim Morgan there as well....

Your humble servant,
Gerry Mayers
Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

"I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
on which he has nobly laid down his life."     --General Robert
Edward Lee


----- Original Message -----
From: "Anthony W. Turner" <awturner@...>
To: "TalkAntietam" <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, June 25, 2001 7:11 PM
Subject: [TalkAntietam] The perils of wet powder


> Have those of you who attended the artillery event in
Sharpsburg last
> weekend anything to report about firing in what must have been
a very
> heavy rain?
>
> Tony Turner
>
>
>       Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.
>
>

Tom--

Dang! And I will be at Gburg on that date with my unit for the
reenactment!!!!!!!!!!!!

Your humble servant,
Gerry Mayers
Co. B, "Tom Green Rifles",
Fourth Regiment, Texas Volunteer Infantry

"I know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the field
on which he has nobly laid down his life."     --General Robert
Edward Lee


----- Original Message -----
From: <rotbaron@...>
To: <TalkAntietam@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, June 25, 2001 8:58 AM
Subject: [TalkAntietam] Harsh & other authors at Gettysburg


> Greystone Books is again hosting a tremendous week of talks and
book-signings
> by Civil War authors. It is held at Gettysburg next week and
all talks are
> free.
>
> On July 7at 5:00 PM, Joseph Harsh will speak on the Antietam
Campaign.
>
> Entire schedule is at:
> <A
HREF="http://www.greystonehistory.com/hb2001/schedule.shtml">
> http://www.greystonehistory.com/hb2001/schedule.shtml</A>
>
> Tom Shay - Cressona, PA
>
>
>       Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! Terms of
Service.
>
>