You make some very good points there Joe, both about this board as
well as the apparent binary aspect of ontology.  It has been quite a
while since I've waded through Being & Time, but I remember feeling
very confused about what Heidegger meant by Dasein's "pre-
ontological understanding of Being"...  Do you think that it is
relevant here?

It seems to me that all - shall we say "thought," or consciousness-
of - requires negation.  That is, in order to recognize (or
perceive, cognize, intuit, conceptualize... whatever the vernacular)
any object of any kind AS an object, some kind of differentiation
must occur.  The chair IS NOT the table.  But it would also seem as
if we must, at the same time, understand what the chair is, in order
to determine that the table "is not" it.  But what/how does this
differentiation occur?

Sartre and Husserl seemed to appeal to the cogito's - shall we say,
ability - to first distinguish itself from other things.  The chair
IS NOT me.  But self-consciousness seems to arise only with
the "help" of "being-for-others."  That is, I can recognize myself
as a self only after "the Look."  But this too must be
incomplete...  Afterall, to experience "the Look" must require an
act of differentiation as well...  i.e. "the Look" is not "my" look,
but "the Look" of the Other.  Therefore I must also be able to
differentiate between the Other and a chair for instance, in that
the chair can't Look but the Other can.  Ok... I'm rambling, but
does anyone see what I'm saying here?

Basically, if all "thought" or "consciousness" or whatever requires
an ability to differentiate, doesn't this imply what amounts to an a
priori understanding of being - an understanding of is, which also
implies an understanding of is-not (or vice versa)?  But we can't
appeal to the self yet, nor does it seem like we could appeal to an
infinite regress (the chair is not the table, is not the wall, is
not, is not, etc., etc.) not only in determining what the chair IS,
but that the chair IS (it would be like Saussure's problem of the
sign - but instead of meaning we are dealing with ontology).  I
don't know if this has made any sense, but I would appreciate any
and all comments...


- Brian



--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "decker150" <decker150@y...> wrote:
> My feeling is that too many conversations occur on this post that
> would otherwise be dismissed by serious students of philosophy and
> Existentialism.  It has become an opportunity for rambling on about
> almost any subject without reference or respect for the normative
> philosophical language.  At least, we should be drawing more
directly
> off Sartre's thought and language.
>
> Sartre dealt with the existential aspect of 'nothing':  We need not
> merely regurgitate his words in agreement, but might bring the
> relevant issues up again in order to stay focused.  I really get
tired
> of post-in-general becoming a medium for thoughts and views having
no
> direct bearing up the moderator's selected subject.  Can I get an
amen?
>
> Re: Sartre's 'nothing'.
>
> I was wondering if anyone has dealt with the priority of 'being' to
> 'nothing'?  I had come to the conclusion that there is a precedence
> and this is even expressed in the language sequence structure of
> 'is-not'.  I have not explore the language order of 'not-is' or the
> idea of the 'not' have priority over 'being'.  It seems difficult
to
> reflect on 'not-in-general' or non-being without localizing it to
> 'something' prior to it.  Da-sein signifies 'being-there' so when
we
> apply the not to Da-sein, it leads us to 'not-being-there'.
However,
> Da-sein is a generalization, not a localization, therefore I
imagine
> that 'nothingness' is mainly a general principle and 'not-being-
there'
> also attempts to discuss non-being as a generalization.  However,
any
> localization (a concrete example) seems to place a priority upon
> being.  In other words, 'being' is to 'nothing' as 'is' is
to 'not'.
> This constructs a binary opposite or pairing, in which the
difference
> (contrast)is what we explore.  Sartre explored this and if we are
> remotely within the vein of Sartrean thought, we will explore it
too.
> (sooner or later / whenever the discussants become focused and not
> merely drifting off relevant topics).
>
> Referring to real localizations; whenever we declare 'not-being-
there'
> or non-being, the positive (any factual reality that is-there)
seems
> to prevail over the negative.  Within my own human experience (
> perceptual localization ), if I say 'not-being-there' or 'not-
there',
> I will wonder 'what' is not there.(?) I am showing deference
towards
> presence over absence of the paired binary opposites.  It seems to
me
> that presence must be-there-first (earlier) before absence has any
> justification or effectively indicate it by a 'not'.  Within a
> localization, I can say not blue, not human, not solid, not
machine,
> not thinking, not this or not that, but in every case, 'not' is
foiled
> off 'something' - present, there, positive that we relate to our
> central topic 'Being'.  Sartre knew very well that the appropriate
> element of his writing had to be 'nothing' and not framed like
> Heidegger's work in which he paired Being & Time.  In a binary
> opposite, 'Nothingness' is the appropriate opposite.
>
> Joe

Brian said:  " . . .  about what Heidegger meant by Dasein's "pre-ontological
understanding of Being"...  Do you think that it is
> relevant here?

Joe:  Yes.  According to the hermenuetic ambition, we are trying to understand
'through' the act of interpreting every relevant
dimension; the preontological does not escape.  We are trying to establish a
clear view.  Da-sein does not come to relevance
merely because we set out to interpret it's validity.  And I imagine that we
have lost our understand of the primal / prereflective state,
(except when we're drinking) probably rooted in our instintual processes and
genetic evolution.  Philosophy is a secondary process,
just as language itself is, although I have this notion that within all the
orderliness of order, meaning gathers at a prelinguistical,
prereflective, preontological state.  Could it be that we have "forgotten being"
because 'of' language?  Perhaps I'm off on this notion, but
  animals are still at a preontological stage, which gives them a basic
understanding of their presence in the world without adaptations
to 'logical order'.  That is not to say animals have a clearer awareness, but
perhaps a more fundamental orientation to Da-sein as it is
localized within their own sense of being.  But what do we mean when we say
Dasein's pre-ontological understand of being?  Are we
not dealing with raw states of awarness that confronts  the immedfiacy of the
present, that we are so totally absorbed in the purity of
the present, that we may not even comprehend the impact of the past or the
future.  I don't know?  Do birds look forward to tomorrow?
  Do they conjure imagines of yesterday?  What went on in a cave man's mind?

Brian said:  " It seems to me that all - shall we say "thought," or
consciousness-of requires negation.  That is, in order to recognize (or
> perceive, cognize, intuit, conceptualize... whatever the vernacular) any
object of any kind AS an object, some kind of differentiation
> must occur.  The chair IS NOT the table.  But it would also seem as if we
must, at the same time, understand what the chair is, in
order to determine that the table "is not" it.  But what/how does this
differentiation occur?

Joe:  I imagine that we begin with an objective differentiation.  Cleanly, we
see visible differences to start with.  The existentialist
typically returns to 'the thing-in-itself", which has become clear to me as
simple-objective-reality.  We exist in a world that presents
itself to us, in-itself as a partial disclosure.  This presentation is a factual
matter, not one dreamed up:  Although that continues to be
raised as an issue; you know, mayby I'm a butterfly dreaming I am a man, or that
all human reality exist within a tiny raindrop perched
at the tip of a needle.

Do you think 'differentiation' is an external / visible / concrete encounter. 
However, the problematic in my mind is less about chairs
and tables and more about how we differentiate between thought, emotion and
volitional selection.

Brian, I enjoyed you comments - thanks.  Is this not how philosophy conducts
itself?

Joe
>

I would say that ontology is necessarily binary.  As Russell notes, one
either has or has not been acquainted with an object, but how can there be
falsity?  Russell separates the two, and I think he is right to do so.  But
I would say that thought does not need negation.  In fact I would say that
thought cannot even admit of negation.  Truth and it's necessary
counterpart, falsity, are aspects of knowledge which is wholly linguistic.
But in saying this do I give truth a metaphysical aspect that is more than
ontic, or what? I don't know.


>From: "Brian Hodgman" <bhodgman@...>
>Reply-To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
>To: Sartre@yahoogroups.com
>Subject: [Sartre] Re: Staying focused on Sartre and Existentialism
>Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2004 07:01:06 -0000
>
>
>
>You make some very good points there Joe, both about this board as
>well as the apparent binary aspect of ontology.  It has been quite a
>while since I've waded through Being & Time, but I remember feeling
>very confused about what Heidegger meant by Dasein's "pre-
>ontological understanding of Being"...  Do you think that it is
>relevant here?
>
>It seems to me that all - shall we say "thought," or consciousness-
>of - requires negation.  That is, in order to recognize (or
>perceive, cognize, intuit, conceptualize... whatever the vernacular)
>any object of any kind AS an object, some kind of differentiation
>must occur.  The chair IS NOT the table.  But it would also seem as
>if we must, at the same time, understand what the chair is, in order
>to determine that the table "is not" it.  But what/how does this
>differentiation occur?
>
>Sartre and Husserl seemed to appeal to the cogito's - shall we say,
>ability - to first distinguish itself from other things.  The chair
>IS NOT me.  But self-consciousness seems to arise only with
>the "help" of "being-for-others."  That is, I can recognize myself
>as a self only after "the Look."  But this too must be
>incomplete...  Afterall, to experience "the Look" must require an
>act of differentiation as well...  i.e. "the Look" is not "my" look,
>but "the Look" of the Other.  Therefore I must also be able to
>differentiate between the Other and a chair for instance, in that
>the chair can't Look but the Other can.  Ok... I'm rambling, but
>does anyone see what I'm saying here?
>
>Basically, if all "thought" or "consciousness" or whatever requires
>an ability to differentiate, doesn't this imply what amounts to an a
>priori understanding of being - an understanding of is, which also
>implies an understanding of is-not (or vice versa)?  But we can't
>appeal to the self yet, nor does it seem like we could appeal to an
>infinite regress (the chair is not the table, is not the wall, is
>not, is not, etc., etc.) not only in determining what the chair IS,
>but that the chair IS (it would be like Saussure's problem of the
>sign - but instead of meaning we are dealing with ontology).  I
>don't know if this has made any sense, but I would appreciate any
>and all comments...
>
>
>- Brian
>
>
>
>--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "decker150" <decker150@y...> wrote:
> > My feeling is that too many conversations occur on this post that
> > would otherwise be dismissed by serious students of philosophy and
> > Existentialism.  It has become an opportunity for rambling on about
> > almost any subject without reference or respect for the normative
> > philosophical language.  At least, we should be drawing more
>directly
> > off Sartre's thought and language.
> >
> > Sartre dealt with the existential aspect of 'nothing':  We need not
> > merely regurgitate his words in agreement, but might bring the
> > relevant issues up again in order to stay focused.  I really get
>tired
> > of post-in-general becoming a medium for thoughts and views having
>no
> > direct bearing up the moderator's selected subject.  Can I get an
>amen?
> >
> > Re: Sartre's 'nothing'.
> >
> > I was wondering if anyone has dealt with the priority of 'being' to
> > 'nothing'?  I had come to the conclusion that there is a precedence
> > and this is even expressed in the language sequence structure of
> > 'is-not'.  I have not explore the language order of 'not-is' or the
> > idea of the 'not' have priority over 'being'.  It seems difficult
>to
> > reflect on 'not-in-general' or non-being without localizing it to
> > 'something' prior to it.  Da-sein signifies 'being-there' so when
>we
> > apply the not to Da-sein, it leads us to 'not-being-there'.
>However,
> > Da-sein is a generalization, not a localization, therefore I
>imagine
> > that 'nothingness' is mainly a general principle and 'not-being-
>there'
> > also attempts to discuss non-being as a generalization.  However,
>any
> > localization (a concrete example) seems to place a priority upon
> > being.  In other words, 'being' is to 'nothing' as 'is' is
>to 'not'.
> > This constructs a binary opposite or pairing, in which the
>difference
> > (contrast)is what we explore.  Sartre explored this and if we are
> > remotely within the vein of Sartrean thought, we will explore it
>too.
> > (sooner or later / whenever the discussants become focused and not
> > merely drifting off relevant topics).
> >
> > Referring to real localizations; whenever we declare 'not-being-
>there'
> > or non-being, the positive (any factual reality that is-there)
>seems
> > to prevail over the negative.  Within my own human experience (
> > perceptual localization ), if I say 'not-being-there' or 'not-
>there',
> > I will wonder 'what' is not there.(?) I am showing deference
>towards
> > presence over absence of the paired binary opposites.  It seems to
>me
> > that presence must be-there-first (earlier) before absence has any
> > justification or effectively indicate it by a 'not'.  Within a
> > localization, I can say not blue, not human, not solid, not
>machine,
> > not thinking, not this or not that, but in every case, 'not' is
>foiled
> > off 'something' - present, there, positive that we relate to our
> > central topic 'Being'.  Sartre knew very well that the appropriate
> > element of his writing had to be 'nothing' and not framed like
> > Heidegger's work in which he paired Being & Time.  In a binary
> > opposite, 'Nothingness' is the appropriate opposite.
> >
> > Joe
>

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I grew up hearing about black and white thinking, either/or, closed
mindedness, etc.  Polarization signifies consideration of two
extremes.  Is and is-not seem to me as extremes.  But are there
variations or degrees between those extremes?  Derrida would ask us
to explore the difference.  Sartre's binary was being and non-
being.  Heidegger was not searching for the opposite of being, he
was seeking for it's meaning, which turned out, in his explication,
to be 'time' itself.

Sartre explored nothingness, negation, nullity, lack, and absence.
Nothingness explicated had something of it's own meaning.  This does
not explicate being-in-itself, but throws us off toward an extreme
identity that is not-being, but related and seemingly bound to it.
As Sartre said, nothingness is coiled up inside Being.  And I think
the term coiled is metaphorical, not literal.  This leads me to
wonder; since time 'is' the meaning of being, then what is the
meaning of nonbeing?  The patterns is expressed as ... Being is to
Time as Nonbeing is to (X).  What is 'X'?  The consistency of
pattern suggest that nonbeing must still concern us with time, an
extreme identity called non-time, a meaning that expresses the
absence of time.  No past, no present, no future.  We cannot grasp
the meaning of nonbeing because we are grounded to time.  It is
difficult to escape the aspect of the cogitos, of the relation of
time to our own being-conscious.  Time is bound to human
consciousness.  When we die, time's nonbeing moves into place.  I no
longer have any means to recognize or create a past.  One's growing
memory ceases, we lack all consciousness of even having been, there
is no more potentiality for being.  When the individual dies, their
time and presence ceases.  Should we turn out to be 'eternal
beings', the religious idea of unending consciousness, time will be
recognized as an aspect of consciousness.  The continuum will not be
physical space-time, but consciousness-time.  Then we might be back
to Berkleys idealism.

IMO, the cosmos seems devoid of time, which suggest to me why its
duration seems indefinite (a step down from everlasting).  It just
keeps lingering on Billions and Billions of years (so to speak) .
Time has conceptually always been paired up with space, but that may
be more a projection of consciousness, one where time is only a
matter of perception.  Space requires consciousness in order to
create the perception of a past, present and future; all of which
pivot off a localized / personal congitos.  Time is bound to the
cognitos, so Being-in-itself requires consciousness.

Joe

Can someone help me with the meaning of 'ontico-ontological' and the basic
ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater of properties versus
catagories?

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I will offer an explanation.  I understand that the creation of these
terms are driven by root Greek meanings and whenever you add the logos
to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of 'words'.  A word,
spoken or written is a symbolic / representational expression.
Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an exegesis of Being,
towards a critical explanation of Being.

I found it helpful to outline the following variables.

1. A word
2. The meaning of that word
3. The thing in itself to which the word refers

Words and meaning function like indicators, they point to or refer to
various things in themself.  In structuralism, there is a
differentiation between the signifier and the signified.  The ontic is
the purest factual reality that 'is-there' independent of human
consciousness.  In the pre-reflective, pre-ontological condition, I
gather that we have the raw and immediate world before us (in a
ineffable state).  However, human consciousness, especially highly
developed philosophical thinking is an interpretive / logical process.
  We don't merely see the world through what Heidegger called "simple
viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something; a door, a chair,
etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But mainly, the ontological
does not merely view raw experience in it's simple ontic condition,
but projects words and meaning onto the view

If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger is not the
cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup, refers our attention
at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are indicators / signifiers;
whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and 'the signified'.
From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies 'the way things are'
are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself to which the words
and their meaning refer.

In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to use at the highest
level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.  Philosophy is always a
reduction and substitution of the raw and immediate ontical view to
'logical' representation, explanation, to explication, or to rational
interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible for human beings to
ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and I think this is
what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in the meditative state.

Hope that helps - Joe



--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid" <leonpmcquaid@h...> wrote:
> Can someone help me with the meaning of 'ontico-ontological' and the
basic
> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater of properties versus
> catagories?
>
> _________________________________________________________________
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Great post, Joe, thanks for that.

I have to confess that I didn't really understand this distinction
before.

However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't perhaps fully
explicated the distinction between ontic and ontological.

We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction between ontology (the
study of being) and epistemology (the study of knowledge).
Superficially, it may seem that the distinction between ontic and
ontological follows a similar pattern. There is being and there is
knowledge (of being).

However, this is to miss out on the specific philosophical meaning of
"being". Being is not the collection of objects in the material world
as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality independent of human
consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't need the
ontic/ontological distinction as the ontology/epistemology dichotomy
already covers the issue.

Of course, a final definition of being isn't possible, has eluded
philosophers from time immemorial.

Tommy




On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:

> I will offer an explanation.  I understand that the creation of these
> terms are driven by root Greek meanings and whenever you add the logos
> to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of 'words'.  A word,
> spoken or written is a symbolic / representational expression.
> Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an exegesis of Being,
> towards a critical explanation of Being.
>
> I found it helpful to outline the following variables.
>
> 1. A word
> 2. The meaning of that word
> 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
>
> Words and meaning function like indicators, they point to or refer to
> various things in themself.  In structuralism, there is a
> differentiation between the signifier and the signified.  The ontic is
> the purest factual reality that 'is-there' independent of human
> consciousness.  In the pre-reflective, pre-ontological condition, I
> gather that we have the raw and immediate world before us (in a
> ineffable state).  However, human consciousness, especially highly
> developed philosophical thinking is an interpretive / logical process.
>  We don't merely see the world through what Heidegger called "simple
> viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something; a door, a chair,
> etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But mainly, the ontological
> does not merely view raw experience in it's simple ontic condition,
> but projects words and meaning onto the view
>
> If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger is not the
> cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup, refers our attention
> at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are indicators / signifiers;
> whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and 'the signified'.
> From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies 'the way things are'
> are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself to which the words
> and their meaning refer.
>
> In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to use at the highest
> level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.  Philosophy is always a
> reduction and substitution of the raw and immediate ontical view to
> 'logical' representation, explanation, to explication, or to rational
> interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible for human beings to
> ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and I think this is
> what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in the meditative state.
>
> Hope that helps - Joe
>
>
>
> --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid" <leonpmcquaid@h...>
> wrote:
>> Can someone help me with the meaning of 'ontico-ontological' and the
> basic
>> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater of properties versus
>> catagories?
>>
>> _________________________________________________________________
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>
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>
>
>

Hi Tommy, thanks for your insights.

Apparently, there is some mysterious / abstract consideration for Being, not as
actually being-there in any concrete or obvious
manner.  I had pointed this out as a difference between localization and the
being that is nowhere specifically, but associated with the
time/space continuum.  I am not sure if the ubiquitous nature of space/time
satisfies your transendent interest for understanding the
ontic or not.  When we read Heidegger and Sartre, they confirm your points, that
Da-sein is and is-not a specific local manifestation,
but more along the lines of some vague generality.  I never much liked this
metaphysical attribution, as if Being-in-itself was
something mystical; i.e. a mystery to Being:  Actually something like a
God-substitute.  But both Heidegger and Sartre directed
Being toward 'time', while Sartre saw that 'negation' was also fundamental to
the whole issue of Being.  What do we do when we are
comfronted with an utter emptiness and total void?  In my mind, since we are
enveloped inside the space/time continuum,
substantiality prevails.  Where can we go to find 'nothing' since the ubiquity
of space and time prevail; and this is hardly 'nothing'.
When Being in it's manifold expression is describe as being-with-others and
Being-in-the-world, these are manifest localizations, not
an ethereal / omnipresent ontic.  I understand the distinction between ontology
and epistemology,. but they are both 'studies',
and both are exaltations of the logos.  The ontic condition, seperate from the
ontological, is the foundation, pure presence of 'the
there'.  This has never been seen as seperate from the cogitos, or our awareness
of Da-sein in-itself.  I imagine that any
acknolwedgement of the ontic take the pre-reflective cogitos, as we ineffably
observe the pre-ontological silence.

And, negation expressed in ontic terms would be ontologically stated as 'the way
nothing is-not there'.  or as something said -
"nothing - nothings"; that is what it does.  Negative makes for a very good
subject matter.  Since language affirms Being, it is
amazing how we use words to track down Non-being.

But to be sure, there are many unanswered question about the ontic.

This 'is' what existentialism attempts to get at the heart of and that is what I
hope we are also trying to pursue in the tradition of
Sartre.

Joe



Well, there is plenty of mystery, no?

r.butIty --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, Tommy Beavitt <tommy@c...> wrote:
> Great post, Joe, thanks for that.
>
> I have to confess that I didn't really understand this distinction
> before.
>
> However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't perhaps fully
> explicated the distinction between ontic and ontological.
>
> We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction between ontology (the
> study of being) and epistemology (the study of knowledge).
> Superficially, it may seem that the distinction between ontic and
> ontological follows a similar pattern. There is being and there is
> knowledge (of being).
>
> However, this is to miss out on the specific philosophical meaning of
> "being". Being is not the collection of objects in the material world
> as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality independent of human
> consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't need the
> ontic/ontological distinction as the ontology/epistemology dichotomy
> already covers the issue.
>
> Of course, a final definition of being isn't possible, has eluded
> philosophers from time immemorial.
>
> Tommy
>
>
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:
>
> > I will offer an explanation.  I understand that the creation of these
> > terms are driven by root Greek meanings and whenever you add the logos
> > to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of 'words'.  A word,
> > spoken or written is a symbolic / representational expression.
> > Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an exegesis of Being,
> > towards a critical explanation of Being.
> >
> > I found it helpful to outline the following variables.
> >
> > 1. A word
> > 2. The meaning of that word
> > 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
> >
> > Words and meaning function like indicators, they point to or refer to
> > various things in themself.  In structuralism, there is a
> > differentiation between the signifier and the signified.  The ontic is
> > the purest factual reality that 'is-there' independent of human
> > consciousness.  In the pre-reflective, pre-ontological condition, I
> > gather that we have the raw and immediate world before us (in a
> > ineffable state).  However, human consciousness, especially highly
> > developed philosophical thinking is an interpretive / logical process.
> >  We don't merely see the world through what Heidegger called "simple
> > viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something; a door, a chair,
> > etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But mainly, the ontological
> > does not merely view raw experience in it's simple ontic condition,
> > but projects words and meaning onto the view
> >
> > If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger is not the
> > cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup, refers our attention
> > at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are indicators / signifiers;
> > whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and 'the signified'.
> > From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies 'the way things are'
> > are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself to which the words
> > and their meaning refer.
> >
> > In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to use at the highest
> > level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.  Philosophy is always a
> > reduction and substitution of the raw and immediate ontical view to
> > 'logical' representation, explanation, to explication, or to rational
> > interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible for human beings to
> > ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and I think this is
> > what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in the meditative state.
> >
> > Hope that helps - Joe
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid" <leonpmcquaid@h...>
> > wrote:
> >> Can someone help me with the meaning of 'ontico-ontological' and the
> > basic
> >> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater of properties versus
> >> catagories?
> >>
> >> _________________________________________________________________
> >> Free yourself from those irritating pop-up ads with MSn Premium. Get
> > 2months
> >> FREE*
> >>
> > http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-ca&page=byoa/
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> > enca&HL=Market_MSNIS_Taglines
> >
> >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail: Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
> >
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >

On Sat, Mar 06, 2004 at 07:43:10PM -0400, Leon McQuaid wrote:
> Can someone help me with the meaning of 'ontico-ontological' and the basic
> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater of properties versus
> catagories?

Macquarrie and Robinson state the distinction nicely in a footnote on
p.31 of _Being and Time_: "Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily
with Being; ontical inquiry is concerned primarily with *entities* and
the facts about them" (emphasis in original).

'Ontico-ontological' then refers to the general question of Being:
Being itself as well as actual, existing beings.

On Sun, Mar 07, 2004 at 01:23:22AM -0000, decker150 wrote:

> In the pre-reflective, pre-ontological condition, I gather that we
> have the raw and immediate world before us (in a ineffable state).

In his explanation of the "phenomenon of the 'as'-structure", which you
mention below, Heidegger would probably disagree with this...

> However, human consciousness, especially highly developed
> philosophical thinking is an interpretive / logical process.

Should "human consciousness" and "highly developed philosophical
thinking" be placed in such close proximity?  The latter is a derivation
of the former (H. would say a very distant derivation), and while both
are interpretive in nature, only the latter seems relevant to logic
(which is also a derivation).

> We don't merely see the world through what Heidegger called "simple
> viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something; a door, a chair,
> etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But mainly, the ontological
> does not merely view raw experience in it's simple ontic condition,
> but projects words and meaning onto the view

For Heidegger "raw experience" as you seem to mean it is only possible
by making a "readjustment".  The "as" is fundamental to anything we
experience:

     When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things
     which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of
     interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp
     something *free*, as it were, *of the "as"*, requires a certain
     readjustment.  When we merely stare at something, our
     just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand
     it anymore*.  This grasping which is free of the "as", is a
     privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands.
     It is not more primordial than that kind of seeing, but is derived
     from it.  If the 'as' is ontically unexpressed, this must not seduce
     us into overlooking it as a constitutive state for understanding,
     existential and a priori.  (B&T, p.190, emphasis in original).

Note that by "understanding" Heidegger means the most fundamental
character of our Being-in-the-world rather than some variety of
cognition: "Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own
potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being
discloses in itself what its Being is capable of" (p. 184).

Cognition is based upon and derived from this most basic understanding:
"'Intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and
already rather remote ones" (p. 187).  Continuing his point about
interpretation and the "as"-structure:

     In interpreting we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over
     some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value
     on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such,
     the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed
     in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which
     gets laid out by the interpretation.  (pp.190-1).

> Some may wonder if it is possible for human beings to ever have a pure
> state awareness of the ontic, and I think this is what the Buddhist
> claims they are experiencing in the meditative state.

What leads you to believe this?  Meditative states are specifically
*not* about entities or even "about" anything at all; the point is to
clear one's consciousness of "things" altogether.  Or is this not what
you mean by "ontic"?

Well, there is much to reply about.  First of all, I like your post.

My Reply:   The ontological project is to interpret Being through the logical
process.  Meaning is it's necessary trait.  Logical reason is
meaningful.  Interpretation is mainly a clarification made possible through the
'use of words', which is why ontology is a logos.  If we
make a comparison of epistemology and ontology, yes one is about Being and the
other Knowledge, but they are both 'studies', both
interpretive, both clarify their own subjects, and they both 'put words to use'
in a logical context.  But at a deeper level, a more
fundamental level, the distinction between the ontic and the ontology is that
ontology is a derivative of the ontic, much as you make
the comparison of logical reason to consciousness.

You said: In his explanation of the "phenomenon of the 'as'-structure", which
you mention below, Heidegger would probably disagree
with this...
>
> > Joe said:  "human consciousness, especially highly developed philosophical
thinking is an interpretive / logical process."
>
You said:  Should "human consciousness" and "highly developed philosophical
thinking" be placed in such close proximity?  The
latter is a derivation of the former (H. would say a very distant derivation),
and while both are interpretive in nature, only the latter
seems relevant to logic (which is also a derivation).

My reply:  To clarify my statement. Human consciousness begins as the
pre-reflective, but has the capability by development to
become in it's potentiality, a developed philosophical ability.  You are right
to suggest that the two do not belong together, yet
philosophical thought is nontheless still human consciousness, made possible
through the use and gathering of words (a logos).
>
You said:  "For Heidegger "raw experience" as you seem to mean it is only
possible by making a "readjustment".  The "as" is
fundamental to anything we experience:

My Reply:  By 'anything, do you mean everything?  Otherwise you have made a good
clarification.  It seems that Heidegger
understood this readjustment not so much as deliberate, but one that occurs,
say, when you're lost and can not find your directions.
Something pulls us out of 'the state of familiarity', and our lostness in "the
they".  Sartre's book titled Nausea captured this moment,
as his character stared at the roots of a tree, seeing them all twisted and
without meaning.  The readjustment occurs involuntarially
when we are shocked and drawn into an awareness other than our usualy and
conditioned rational response.  But I imagine that we
could deliberately readjust (an intentional privation) if we had the proper
training.

You said:  "Note that by "understanding" Heidegger means the most fundamental
character of our Being-in-the-world rather than some
variety of cognition: "Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own
potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this
Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of" (p. 184).

My Reply:  Well said.  These points refer to Da-sein as 'care'.  We must
'understand', because it is essential for our own survival.

*  *  *
You Said:  "What leads you to believe this?  Meditative states are specifically
*not* about entities or even "about" anything at all; the
point is to clear one's consciousness of "things" altogether.

My Reply: "The mediation is a means to an end.  During the means, you clear your
consciousness of 'knowing, thinking' and achieve
what Buddhist called the 'no mind'.  Meditation, during the means-stage, clears
the mind of particular things (entities as you call
them).  But after a state of concentration occurs, the higher level of
consciousness is achieved with a new clarity.  One then is able to
view the entities with 'new eyes'.  The one in meditation does not go around
blind; they see as much as you or I, but without the
interference of the temporal phases of thought.  But getting there, that is the
trick.  Once achieve, meditation allows you to hear the
purity of sound, the purity of sight. The Buddhist is able to 'see'; they are
not blind.  I imagine that this purest form of sensory
experience touches upon the ontic and takes the person back to the
pre-reflective state of awareness that is generally lost through the
adultration of reason and language.  Meditation at the 'end stage', results in a
high range of awareness that does not need the logical
process for that particular achievement.

Thanks so much for your contribution - Joe

take me off this list

--- Sartre@yahoogroups.com wrote:
> ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
> There are 4 messages in this issue.
>
> Topics in this digest:
>
>       1. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: Tommy Beavitt
> <tommy@...>
>       2. Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
>       3. Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: john@...
>       4. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: john@...
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 1
>    Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 14:39:14 +0000
>    From: Tommy Beavitt
> <tommy@...>
> Subject: Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Great post, Joe, thanks for that.
>
> I have to confess that I didn't really understand
> this distinction
> before.
>
> However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't
> perhaps fully
> explicated the distinction between ontic and
> ontological.
>
> We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction
> between ontology (the
> study of being) and epistemology (the study of
> knowledge).
> Superficially, it may seem that the distinction
> between ontic and
> ontological follows a similar pattern. There is
> being and there is
> knowledge (of being).
>
> However, this is to miss out on the specific
> philosophical meaning of
> "being". Being is not the collection of objects in
> the material world
> as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality
> independent of human
> consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't
> need the
> ontic/ontological distinction as the
> ontology/epistemology dichotomy
> already covers the issue.
>
> Of course, a final definition of being isn't
> possible, has eluded
> philosophers from time immemorial.
>
> Tommy
>
>
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:
>
> > I will offer an explanation.  I understand that
> the creation of these
> > terms are driven by root Greek meanings and
> whenever you add the logos
> > to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of
> 'words'.  A word,
> > spoken or written is a symbolic / representational
> expression.
> > Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an
> exegesis of Being,
> > towards a critical explanation of Being.
> >
> > I found it helpful to outline the following
> variables.
> >
> > 1. A word
> > 2. The meaning of that word
> > 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
> >
> > Words and meaning function like indicators, they
> point to or refer to
> > various things in themself.  In structuralism,
> there is a
> > differentiation between the signifier and the
> signified.  The ontic is
> > the purest factual reality that 'is-there'
> independent of human
> > consciousness.  In the pre-reflective,
> pre-ontological condition, I
> > gather that we have the raw and immediate world
> before us (in a
> > ineffable state).  However, human consciousness,
> especially highly
> > developed philosophical thinking is an
> interpretive / logical process.
> >  We don't merely see the world through what
> Heidegger called "simple
> > viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something;
> a door, a chair,
> > etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But
> mainly, the ontological
> > does not merely view raw experience in it's simple
> ontic condition,
> > but projects words and meaning onto the view
> >
> > If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger
> is not the
> > cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup,
> refers our attention
> > at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are
> indicators / signifiers;
> > whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and
> 'the signified'.
> > From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies
> 'the way things are'
> > are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself
> to which the words
> > and their meaning refer.
> >
> > In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to
> use at the highest
> > level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.
> Philosophy is always a
> > reduction and substitution of the raw and
> immediate ontical view to
> > 'logical' representation, explanation, to
> explication, or to rational
> > interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible
> for human beings to
> > ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and
> I think this is
> > what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in
> the meditative state.
> >
> > Hope that helps - Joe
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid"
> <leonpmcquaid@h...>
> > wrote:
> >> Can someone help me with the meaning of
> 'ontico-ontological' and the
> > basic
> >> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater
> of properties versus
> >> catagories?
> >>
> >>
>
_________________________________________________________________
> >> Free yourself from those irritating pop-up ads
> with MSn Premium. Get
> > 2months
> >> FREE*
> >>
> > http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-ca&page=byoa/
> > prem&xAPID=1994&DI=1034&SU=http://hotmail.com/
> > enca&HL=Market_MSNIS_Taglines
> >
> >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail:
> Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
> >
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 2
>    Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 23:46:12 -0000
>    From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
> Subject: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Hi Tommy, thanks for your insights.
>
=== message truncated ===


__________________________________
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hello,
i am a new student to philosophy and i need some answers to my assignment
1,five definations of philosophy by five different philosophers
2,definations of the following
a,dialectic method
b,existentialism method
c,phenomogical method
d,idealism method
thank you

:
take me off this list

--- Sartre@yahoogroups.com wrote:
> ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
> There are 4 messages in this issue.
>
> Topics in this digest:
>
>       1. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: Tommy Beavitt
> <tommy@...>
>       2. Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
>       3. Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: john@...
>       4. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>            From: john@...
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 1
>    Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 14:39:14 +0000
>    From: Tommy Beavitt
> <tommy@...>
> Subject: Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Great post, Joe, thanks for that.
>
> I have to confess that I didn't really understand
> this distinction
> before.
>
> However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't
> perhaps fully
> explicated the distinction between ontic and
> ontological.
>
> We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction
> between ontology (the
> study of being) and epistemology (the study of
> knowledge).
> Superficially, it may seem that the distinction
> between ontic and
> ontological follows a similar pattern. There is
> being and there is
> knowledge (of being).
>
> However, this is to miss out on the specific
> philosophical meaning of
> "being". Being is not the collection of objects in
> the material world
> as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality
> independent of human
> consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't
> need the
> ontic/ontological distinction as the
> ontology/epistemology dichotomy
> already covers the issue.
>
> Of course, a final definition of being isn't
> possible, has eluded
> philosophers from time immemorial.
>
> Tommy
>
>
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:
>
> > I will offer an explanation.  I understand that
> the creation of these
> > terms are driven by root Greek meanings and
> whenever you add the logos
> > to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of
> 'words'.  A word,
> > spoken or written is a symbolic / representational
> expression.
> > Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an
> exegesis of Being,
> > towards a critical explanation of Being.
> >
> > I found it helpful to outline the following
> variables.
> >
> > 1. A word
> > 2. The meaning of that word
> > 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
> >
> > Words and meaning function like indicators, they
> point to or refer to
> > various things in themself.  In structuralism,
> there is a
> > differentiation between the signifier and the
> signified.  The ontic is
> > the purest factual reality that 'is-there'
> independent of human
> > consciousness.  In the pre-reflective,
> pre-ontological condition, I
> > gather that we have the raw and immediate world
> before us (in a
> > ineffable state).  However, human consciousness,
> especially highly
> > developed philosophical thinking is an
> interpretive / logical process.
> >  We don't merely see the world through what
> Heidegger called "simple
> > viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something;
> a door, a chair,
> > etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But
> mainly, the ontological
> > does not merely view raw experience in it's simple
> ontic condition,
> > but projects words and meaning onto the view
> >
> > If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger
> is not the
> > cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup,
> refers our attention
> > at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are
> indicators / signifiers;
> > whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and
> 'the signified'.
> > From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies
> 'the way things are'
> > are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself
> to which the words
> > and their meaning refer.
> >
> > In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to
> use at the highest
> > level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.
> Philosophy is always a
> > reduction and substitution of the raw and
> immediate ontical view to
> > 'logical' representation, explanation, to
> explication, or to rational
> > interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible
> for human beings to
> > ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and
> I think this is
> > what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in
> the meditative state.
> >
> > Hope that helps - Joe
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid"
> <leonpmcquaid@h...>
> > wrote:
> >> Can someone help me with the meaning of
> 'ontico-ontological' and the
> > basic
> >> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater
> of properties versus
> >> catagories?
> >>
> >>
>
_________________________________________________________________
> >> Free yourself from those irritating pop-up ads
> with MSn Premium. Get
> > 2months
> >> FREE*
> >>
> > http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-ca&page=byoa/
> > prem&xAPID=1994&DI=1034&SU=http://hotmail.com/
> > enca&HL=Market_MSNIS_Taglines
> >
> >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail:
> Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
> >
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 2
>    Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 23:46:12 -0000
>    From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
> Subject: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Hi Tommy, thanks for your insights.
>
=== message truncated ===


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[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

Dear Afolabi,

You misunderstand the nature of this discussion list.  You will have to
find answers to your assignment elsewhere.

Yours,
Aaron



On 9 Mar 2004, at 2:17 PM, afolabi adeniyi wrote:

> hello,
> i am a new student to philosophy and i need some answers to my
> assignment
> 1,five definations of philosophy by five different philosophers
> 2,definations of the following
> a,dialectic method
> b,existentialism method
> c,phenomogical method
> d,idealism method
> thank you
>
> :
> take me off this list
>
> --- Sartre@yahoogroups.com wrote:
>> ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>>
>> There are 4 messages in this issue.
>>
>> Topics in this digest:
>>
>>       1. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>>            From: Tommy Beavitt
>> <tommy@...>
>>       2. Re: Ontico-ontological
>>            From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
>>       3. Re: Ontico-ontological
>>            From: john@...
>>       4. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>>            From: john@...
>>
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________________________________
> _
>>
> _______________________________________________________________________
> _
>>
>> Message: 1
>>    Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 14:39:14 +0000
>>    From: Tommy Beavitt
>> <tommy@...>
>> Subject: Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>>
>> Great post, Joe, thanks for that.
>>
>> I have to confess that I didn't really understand
>> this distinction
>> before.
>>
>> However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't
>> perhaps fully
>> explicated the distinction between ontic and
>> ontological.
>>
>> We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction
>> between ontology (the
>> study of being) and epistemology (the study of
>> knowledge).
>> Superficially, it may seem that the distinction
>> between ontic and
>> ontological follows a similar pattern. There is
>> being and there is
>> knowledge (of being).
>>
>> However, this is to miss out on the specific
>> philosophical meaning of
>> "being". Being is not the collection of objects in
>> the material world
>> as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality
>> independent of human
>> consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't
>> need the
>> ontic/ontological distinction as the
>> ontology/epistemology dichotomy
>> already covers the issue.
>>
>> Of course, a final definition of being isn't
>> possible, has eluded
>> philosophers from time immemorial.
>>
>> Tommy
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:
>>
>>> I will offer an explanation.  I understand that
>> the creation of these
>>> terms are driven by root Greek meanings and
>> whenever you add the logos
>>> to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of
>> 'words'.  A word,
>>> spoken or written is a symbolic / representational
>> expression.
>>> Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an
>> exegesis of Being,
>>> towards a critical explanation of Being.
>>>
>>> I found it helpful to outline the following
>> variables.
>>>
>>> 1. A word
>>> 2. The meaning of that word
>>> 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
>>>
>>> Words and meaning function like indicators, they
>> point to or refer to
>>> various things in themself.  In structuralism,
>> there is a
>>> differentiation between the signifier and the
>> signified.  The ontic is
>>> the purest factual reality that 'is-there'
>> independent of human
>>> consciousness.  In the pre-reflective,
>> pre-ontological condition, I
>>> gather that we have the raw and immediate world
>> before us (in a
>>> ineffable state).  However, human consciousness,
>> especially highly
>>> developed philosophical thinking is an
>> interpretive / logical process.
>>>  We don't merely see the world through what
>> Heidegger called "simple
>>> viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something;
>> a door, a chair,
>>> etc.  This is a meaning-driven imbuement.  But
>> mainly, the ontological
>>> does not merely view raw experience in it's simple
>> ontic condition,
>>> but projects words and meaning onto the view
>>>
>>> If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger
>> is not the
>>> cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup,
>> refers our attention
>>> at the cup-in-itself.  Words and meaning are
>> indicators / signifiers;
>>> whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and
>> 'the signified'.
>>> From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies
>> 'the way things are'
>>> are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself
>> to which the words
>>> and their meaning refer.
>>>
>>> In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to
>> use at the highest
>>> level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.
>> Philosophy is always a
>>> reduction and substitution of the raw and
>> immediate ontical view to
>>> 'logical' representation, explanation, to
>> explication, or to rational
>>> interpretation.  Some may wonder if it is possible
>> for human beings to
>>> ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and
>> I think this is
>>> what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in
>> the meditative state.
>>>
>>> Hope that helps - Joe
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid"
>> <leonpmcquaid@h...>
>>> wrote:
>>>> Can someone help me with the meaning of
>> 'ontico-ontological' and the
>>> basic
>>>> ontic/ontology distinction.  Is it just a mater
>> of properties versus
>>>> catagories?
>>>>
>>>>
>>
> _________________________________________________________________
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>>>
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>>
>>
>>
>>
> _______________________________________________________________________
> _
>>
> _______________________________________________________________________
> _
>>
>> Message: 2
>>    Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 23:46:12 -0000
>>    From: "decker150" <decker150@...>
>> Subject: Re: Ontico-ontological
>>
>> Hi Tommy, thanks for your insights.
>>
> === message truncated ===
>
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I think you should do your own homework!



afolabi adeniyi <ade4labi@...> wrote: hello,
i am a new student to philosophy and i need some answers to my assignment
1,five definations of philosophy by five different philosophers
2,definations of the following
a,dialectic method
b,existentialism method
c,phenomogical method
d,idealism method
thank you

:
take me off this list

--- Sartre@yahoogroups.com wrote:
> ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor
>
> There are 4 messages in this issue.
>
> Topics in this digest:
>
> 1. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
> From: Tommy Beavitt
>
> 2. Re: Ontico-ontological
> From: "decker150"
> 3. Re: Ontico-ontological
> From: john@...
> 4. Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
> From: john@...
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 8 Mar 2004 14:39:14 +0000
> From: Tommy Beavitt
>
> Subject: Re: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Great post, Joe, thanks for that.
>
> I have to confess that I didn't really understand
> this distinction
> before.
>
> However, after reading it I felt that you hadn't
> perhaps fully
> explicated the distinction between ontic and
> ontological.
>
> We are used, as philosophers, to the distinction
> between ontology (the
> study of being) and epistemology (the study of
> knowledge).
> Superficially, it may seem that the distinction
> between ontic and
> ontological follows a similar pattern. There is
> being and there is
> knowledge (of being).
>
> However, this is to miss out on the specific
> philosophical meaning of
> "being". Being is not the collection of objects in
> the material world
> as your definition of ontic (pure factual reality
> independent of human
> consciousness) implies. If it were, then we don't
> need the
> ontic/ontological distinction as the
> ontology/epistemology dichotomy
> already covers the issue.
>
> Of course, a final definition of being isn't
> possible, has eluded
> philosophers from time immemorial.
>
> Tommy
>
>
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2004, at 01:23, decker150 wrote:
>
> > I will offer an explanation. I understand that
> the creation of these
> > terms are driven by root Greek meanings and
> whenever you add the logos
> > to the ontos, the meaning give way to the use of
> 'words'. A word,
> > spoken or written is a symbolic / representational
> expression.
> > Existentialism and ontology use 'words' toward an
> exegesis of Being,
> > towards a critical explanation of Being.
> >
> > I found it helpful to outline the following
> variables.
> >
> > 1. A word
> > 2. The meaning of that word
> > 3. The thing in itself to which the word refers
> >
> > Words and meaning function like indicators, they
> point to or refer to
> > various things in themself. In structuralism,
> there is a
> > differentiation between the signifier and the
> signified. The ontic is
> > the purest factual reality that 'is-there'
> independent of human
> > consciousness. In the pre-reflective,
> pre-ontological condition, I
> > gather that we have the raw and immediate world
> before us (in a
> > ineffable state). However, human consciousness,
> especially highly
> > developed philosophical thinking is an
> interpretive / logical process.
> > We don't merely see the world through what
> Heidegger called "simple
> > viewing", rather, we see something 'as' something;
> a door, a chair,
> > etc. This is a meaning-driven imbuement. But
> mainly, the ontological
> > does not merely view raw experience in it's simple
> ontic condition,
> > but projects words and meaning onto the view
> >
> > If I point my finger at a coffee cup, the finger
> is not the
> > cup-itself, it merely points us toward the cup,
> refers our attention
> > at the cup-in-itself. Words and meaning are
> indicators / signifiers;
> > whereas the cup-in-itself is 'the indicated' and
> 'the signified'.
> > From the Greek root 'ontos', the ontic signifies
> 'the way things are'
> > are correlates to my 3rd item; the thing-in-itself
> to which the words
> > and their meaning refer.
> >
> > In the act of interpreting Being, we put words to
> use at the highest
> > level, we pursue the 'meaning' of Being.
> Philosophy is always a
> > reduction and substitution of the raw and
> immediate ontical view to
> > 'logical' representation, explanation, to
> explication, or to rational
> > interpretation. Some may wonder if it is possible
> for human beings to
> > ever have a pure state awareness of the ontic, and
> I think this is
> > what the Buddhist claims they are experiencing in
> the meditative state.
> >
> > Hope that helps - Joe
> >
> >
> >
> > --- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid"
>
> > wrote:
> >> Can someone help me with the meaning of
> 'ontico-ontological' and the
> > basic
> >> ontic/ontology distinction. Is it just a mater
> of properties versus
> >> catagories?
> >>
> >>
>
_________________________________________________________________
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> >
> >
> >
> > To unsubscribe, e-mail:
> Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
> >
> > Yahoo! Groups Links
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
>
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
________________________________________________________________________
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 08 Mar 2004 23:46:12 -0000
> From: "decker150"
> Subject: Re: Ontico-ontological
>
> Hi Tommy, thanks for your insights.
>
=== message truncated ===


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unsubscribe me please.

         zebesky@...


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this is a big help



>Well, there is much to reply about.  First of all, I like your post.
>
>My Reply:   The ontological project is to interpret Being through the
>logical process.  Meaning is it's necessary trait.  Logical reason is
>meaningful.  Interpretation is mainly a clarification made possible through
>the 'use of words', which is why ontology is a logos.  If we
>make a comparison of epistemology and ontology, yes one is about Being and
>the other Knowledge, but they are both 'studies', both
>interpretive, both clarify their own subjects, and they both 'put words to
>use' in a logical context.  But at a deeper level, a more
>fundamental level, the distinction between the ontic and the ontology is
>that ontology is a derivative of the ontic, much as you make
>the comparison of logical reason to consciousness.
>
>You said: In his explanation of the "phenomenon of the 'as'-structure",
>which you mention below, Heidegger would probably disagree
>with this...
> >
> > > Joe said:  "human consciousness, especially highly developed
>philosophical thinking is an interpretive / logical process."
> >
>You said:  Should "human consciousness" and "highly developed philosophical
>thinking" be placed in such close proximity?  The
>latter is a derivation of the former (H. would say a very distant
>derivation), and while both are interpretive in nature, only the latter
>seems relevant to logic (which is also a derivation).
>
>My reply:  To clarify my statement. Human consciousness begins as the
>pre-reflective, but has the capability by development to
>become in it's potentiality, a developed philosophical ability.  You are
>right to suggest that the two do not belong together, yet
>philosophical thought is nontheless still human consciousness, made
>possible through the use and gathering of words (a logos).
> >
>You said:  "For Heidegger "raw experience" as you seem to mean it is only
>possible by making a "readjustment".  The "as" is
>fundamental to anything we experience:
>
>My Reply:  By 'anything, do you mean everything?  Otherwise you have made a
>good clarification.  It seems that Heidegger
>understood this readjustment not so much as deliberate, but one that
>occurs, say, when you're lost and can not find your directions.
>Something pulls us out of 'the state of familiarity', and our lostness in
>"the they".  Sartre's book titled Nausea captured this moment,
>as his character stared at the roots of a tree, seeing them all twisted and
>without meaning.  The readjustment occurs involuntarially
>when we are shocked and drawn into an awareness other than our usualy and
>conditioned rational response.  But I imagine that we
>could deliberately readjust (an intentional privation) if we had the proper
>training.
>
>You said:  "Note that by "understanding" Heidegger means the most
>fundamental character of our Being-in-the-world rather than some
>variety of cognition: "Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's
>own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this
>Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of" (p. 184).
>
>My Reply:  Well said.  These points refer to Da-sein as 'care'.  We must
>'understand', because it is essential for our own survival.
>
>*  *  *
>You Said:  "What leads you to believe this?  Meditative states are
>specifically *not* about entities or even "about" anything at all; the
>point is to clear one's consciousness of "things" altogether.
>
>My Reply: "The mediation is a means to an end.  During the means, you clear
>your consciousness of 'knowing, thinking' and achieve
>what Buddhist called the 'no mind'.  Meditation, during the means-stage,
>clears the mind of particular things (entities as you call
>them).  But after a state of concentration occurs, the higher level of
>consciousness is achieved with a new clarity.  One then is able to
>view the entities with 'new eyes'.  The one in meditation does not go
>around blind; they see as much as you or I, but without the
>interference of the temporal phases of thought.  But getting there, that is
>the trick.  Once achieve, meditation allows you to hear the
>purity of sound, the purity of sight. The Buddhist is able to 'see'; they
>are not blind.  I imagine that this purest form of sensory
>experience touches upon the ontic and takes the person back to the
>pre-reflective state of awareness that is generally lost through the
>adultration of reason and language.  Meditation at the 'end stage', results
>in a high range of awareness that does not need the logical
>process for that particular achievement.
>
>Thanks so much for your contribution - Joe
>

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Just wanted to thank Joe (and Leon for asking) for the info re: the
ontico/ontological distinction. This explanation clears up a lot of problems
I've had in understanding the link between existentialism (especially
Heideggerian ontology) and language. I'm sure others will find it helpful
too.

Thanks;

Chris

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So I am in the process of writing two short papers.  One on 'the question
concerning Technology' the other on 'Mathematics, Science and Metaphysics'.
Any thoughts on how to proceed?  I don't have the book here so I won't go
into great depth.  It papers will be in general.  With the latter I have
been wondering if Heidegger is saying that, Descartes'' Cogito Ergo Sum is
only possible given the condition of being, being prior to thought.  But on
the same hand the 'I' provides the conditions of creating an ontology, and
hence a reality.  Is this at all right?  In the former, I think I want to
focus on 'enframing'.

On another topic, is there anyone up on Habermas?  Just curious.

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There are several issues that stem from the subject technology.  I
imagine that Heidegger sought to understand the question of technology
by interpreting it from it's primal origins.  Heidegger worked for an
exegesis of Being, making him both concerned with being, as well as
something of a scholar on word origins (probably from his seminary
days) and realized that language speak Being and acknowledges Being.
He attempted to understand technology from the primacy of 'techne'
that indicated according to George Steiner as a "bringing into true
being, a making palpable and luminous, of that which is already
inherent in . . . [nature] . . . phusis".  For Heidegger there was
apparently an authentic technology.

Although a technological creation is a humanly contrived product, and
does not arise by it's own accord, nontheless 'techne' is still a
'showing forth', a 'revealing', and this brings technology around to
being in the truth as apophantic and consistent with aletheia as a
disclosure. Technology unhides the hiddening of being, is a 'shining
forth'.  Yet, in technologies dehumanizing effect, it runs along the
same lines as Da-sein's falleness, our lostness in 'the they', and the
general dehumanizing condition that results from our 'forgetfulness of
being."

This is why we hear of alienation associated with modern technology
and why the Marxist direct the meaning of alienation toward labor in
the technological environment where the worker is described as
seperated from the product of their own labor.  These meanings express
fallenness, separation from the ground of being and inauthenticity in
general.

Through technology humankind challenges nature, exploits it, we put
our will upon and over nature; demeaned into impersonal objects.  In
existential terms the question is, does technology mask Being or does
it bring it into the light?  As I see it, each objective piece of
technology is in itself a disclosure of Being, yet if I am
individually 'lost in the they', then comes the alienation from
technology, because it does not require technology for forgetfulness
to occur or for falleness to have affected a human being, but along
with every other aspect of 'the they', technology makes its
dehumanizing contribution.

If I get some more ideas, I'll post - Joe



--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Leon McQuaid" <leonpmcquaid@h...> wrote:
> So I am in the process of writing two short papers.  One on 'the
question
> concerning Technology' the other on 'Mathematics, Science and
Metaphysics'.
> Any thoughts on how to proceed?  I don't have the book here so I
won't go
> into great depth.  It papers will be in general.  With the latter I
have
> been wondering if Heidegger is saying that, Descartes'' Cogito Ergo
Sum is
> only possible given the condition of being, being prior to thought.
  But on
> the same hand the 'I' provides the conditions of creating an
ontology, and
> hence a reality.  Is this at all right?  In the former, I think I
want to
> focus on 'enframing'.
>
> On another topic, is there anyone up on Habermas?  Just curious.
>
> _________________________________________________________________
> Add photos to your messages with MSN Premium. Get 2 months FREE*
>
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I have been working on a section of an assignment that deals with
Technology and Heidegger, among many's rejection of Technological
advancement.

While twentieth-century art is still regarded as the locus of epiphany, as
Taylor points out, in modernism, there have been significant changes in
relation to our understanding of an epiphany. A far deeper sense of
inwardness is now associated with our understanding of art, where with art's
exploration of new recesses of feeling, an epiphanic work of art is seen to
reflect the artist's personal vision, this vision perceived of in a stream
of consciousness.



Like our ancestors of the Romantic era, we still exalt the power of the
creative imagination. However, our perception of a work of art as the artist
's personal vision has led to a greater sense of subjectivity (p.456), this
personal vision giving a distinct place for individual experience in art.
Much of modernist art is considered to be a negation of "objectively
obligating meaning", a rebellion against the dominant ideas of collective
unity. Yet with our understanding of the "emancipatory potential" of a work
of art, it is still considered to be the locus of epiphany. However, while a
work of art is perceived of as a personal vision, it is not conceived of as
a self-expression (p.478).



Many critics suggest the greatest works of art of the twentieth-century
involve a "decentring of the subject" or as Taylor explains it, a dissolving
of the self in favour of a new constellation. While there has been a slide
toward subjectivism, there has also been an anti-subjectivist thrust,
twentieth-century writers and artists, not unlike those of the Romantic era,
bitterly opposing what they perceive to be instrumental reason's rendering
of a mechanistic world of shallowness and degradation, where technology and
standardization dominate in a mass industrialized society (p.456).



Mechanism had left us with a spiritless or disenchanted world, while
Utilitarianism had given no place for a moral dimension in the human
experience of being-in-the-world. However, Romantics believed that in our
reconnecting with nature, we would once again connect with what was real.
For the real was found in Nature. The real was Nature in itself, this nature
in man, his undistorted feeling (pp.456-7).



Where Wordsworth sought to find this real connectedness in the country and
with simple folk, Coleridge proclaimed the real to be the Spirit, and the
world an emanation of this Spirit. German Romantics believed that poetry
could restore us to this world by capturing and showing us this Spirit. For
this Spirit was the real, that stood behind the world and when one grasped
this Spirit, it was seen to shine through Nature. Embracing this
understanding, Blake had called for us to liberate ourselves from the
"vegetative eye", in order that we may see true spiritual reality and with
poetry's allowing us to grasp, to see, to have recognition of this Spirit,
Shelley proclaimed it to be poetry that 'created anew the universe', a
universe, which had been rendered spiritless, annihilated in our minds by
the habitual reiteration of impressions. Hence, an epiphany, which brought
our liberation, which freed us from a mechanistic world devoid of meaning,
had brought to light this spiritual reality, which reposed behind Nature and
in man, as his uncorrupted human feeling (p.457).



Many, the likes of Wordsworth, Holderlin, Constable and Friedrich, had in
their own way embraced this understanding. However, partly as a result of
the development of industrialization, in the twentieth century, in our
urbanized and technological societies, the natural of Nature, as envisioned
by our ancestors, the great Romantic writers and artists, is now well beyond
our vision, beyond our ability to see and in many cases, it is altogether
absent (p.457).



As Taylor proclaims, our environment has greatly changed. Our environment
has been designed and created by man, as a means to cope with the nameless
masses, wherein this environment, as far as the eye can see, the landscape
is dominated by men and machines (p.457).



That which stands beyond the urban sprawl, we now define as wilderness and
as Taylor points out, this understanding of the natural, as wilderness,
exhibits a very different understanding of Nature than that which had been
embraced by our Romantic ancestors. Social changes, changes in scientific
theory and changes in images articulating sensibility had all contributed to
this differing understanding of Nature and to disbelief in Romantic notions
of Nature as a spiritual reality. Our sense of the natural or Nature, rather
than perceived of as an expression of the Spirit, is perceived of as a wild
force, where even our usage of the term wild-erness is seen to reflect the
Schopenhauerian notion of Nature as a great reservoir of wild or amoral
power (p.457).



As Taylor had previously pointed out, Coleridge believed artistic creation
to be a "process of growth in nature", this process, a striving toward an
undistorted fulfilment in human life, free from the confines of mere
mechanism (p.420). Man needed some form of spiritual nourishment and as
such, a creative imagination and horizons for emotional fulfilment were
deemed imperative (p.457). Expressive freedom in youth had been seen as
responsible for the firing of one's imagination. However, in having joined
the ranks of commercial civilization, one's life was to be dominated by
instrumental reason. While one still yearned to embrace the epiphanies of
creative imagination, expressive freedom and instrumental reason were seen
to be in conflict, flirtation with expressive freedom perceived of as
anti-instrumental in its intent and in some respects to reflect the
anti-moral (p.424).



J.S. Mills had been tormented by a sense of conflict between the demands of
disengaged reason and the need for a deeper sense of meaning. For Mills,
this deeper sense of meaning was found in the works of Romantic poets and
for this reason, he was driven to bring together a synthesis of 'disengaged,
scientific Utilitarianism with an expressivist conception of human growth
and fulfilment'. This attempt to bring together a synthesis was to resolve
this sense of conflict, to integrate Romantic notions of personal fulfilment
with civic demands, civilization run more and more by canons of instrumental
reasons (p.458).



Taylor suggests that with this synthesis, Romantic models of fulfilment
contributed to the self-justification of this civilization, where in the
twentieth century, this same understanding was reflected in notions of
justification for our capitalist system, society deluded into believing "
that the wheels of industry turn in order to give individuals the means for
a rich and satisfying private life" (p.458).



In the late Victorian era, it was believed that personal fulfilment was to
be found in the unity of family life, the family unit perceived of as a
haven of warm sentiment, this idealistic image bringing solace to men
confronted by what they perceived to be the becoming of a disenchanted world
(p.458).



However, as Taylor points out, while Victorian piety and sentimentality had
appeared to capture the Romantic spirit, many confronted by, what they
perceived to be, an entirely, cold, empty and disenchanted world, hungered
after a more profound and meaningful experience of being-in-the-world. They
perceived the expression of 'simple personal emotions' and 'routinized
fulfilments' as mere travesty and as such, rejected Romanticism. However,
they also refused to accept that profound meaning could be found in
disengaged reason (p.458).



For modernists, subjective feelings could not bring solace and they could
not hold to a notion of the world as an emanation of the Spirit. Many
modernists, who followed in the footsteps of Baudelaire, sought to find the
epiphany outside of, or beyond, what they perceived to be a fallen Nature
(p.458).





In the purely technological/mechanistic world all becomes meaningless.  Hum
back to writing this assignment ;)))



Hope this helps



Love & Hugs

Elaine

I'm reviewing Martin Heideggers book Poetry, Language, Thought and
pass along a direct quote;

" There is a world of difference between man's present life as
technological being under the aegis of Gestell, frame, framing . . .
[enframing] . . . - in which everything, including man himself,
becomes material for a process of self-assertive production,
self-assertive imposition of human will on things regardless of their
essential natures - and a life in which he genuinely dwell as a human
being.  This time of technology . . . [I guess around 1971] . . . is a
destitute time, the time of the world's night, in which man has even
forgotten that he has forgotten the true nature of being."

I like that idea, that 'we forget that we've forgotten'.  Well, not
such a bright time I guess.  For Heidegger, it was up to the poets to
save us.  The role of apophantic speech.  The shining forth of the
poetic word.

Joe

Your article is full of helpful directions.  More than I can absorb in
one read.  Thanks for this information.  You points about epihany
particularly interest me.

More later - Joe

--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Elaine Phipps-Earl" <lizral@o...> wrote:
>
> I have been working on a section of an assignment that deals with
> Technology and Heidegger, among many's rejection of Technological
> advancement.
>
> While twentieth-century art is still regarded as the locus of
epiphany, as
> Taylor points out, in modernism, there have been significant changes in
> relation to our understanding of an epiphany. A far deeper sense of
> inwardness is now associated with our understanding of art, where
with art's
> exploration of new recesses of feeling, an epiphanic work of art is
seen to
> reflect the artist's personal vision, this vision perceived of in a
stream
> of consciousness.
>
>
>
> Like our ancestors of the Romantic era, we still exalt the power of the
> creative imagination. However, our perception of a work of art as
the artist
> 's personal vision has led to a greater sense of subjectivity
(p.456), this
> personal vision giving a distinct place for individual experience in
art.
> Much of modernist art is considered to be a negation of "objectively
> obligating meaning", a rebellion against the dominant ideas of
collective
> unity. Yet with our understanding of the "emancipatory potential" of
a work
> of art, it is still considered to be the locus of epiphany. However,
while a
> work of art is perceived of as a personal vision, it is not
conceived of as
> a self-expression (p.478).
>
>
>
> Many critics suggest the greatest works of art of the twentieth-century
> involve a "decentring of the subject" or as Taylor explains it, a
dissolving
> of the self in favour of a new constellation. While there has been a
slide
> toward subjectivism, there has also been an anti-subjectivist thrust,
> twentieth-century writers and artists, not unlike those of the
Romantic era,
> bitterly opposing what they perceive to be instrumental reason's
rendering
> of a mechanistic world of shallowness and degradation, where
technology and
> standardization dominate in a mass industrialized society (p.456).
>
>
>
> Mechanism had left us with a spiritless or disenchanted world, while
> Utilitarianism had given no place for a moral dimension in the human
> experience of being-in-the-world. However, Romantics believed that
in our
> reconnecting with nature, we would once again connect with what was
real.
> For the real was found in Nature. The real was Nature in itself,
this nature
> in man, his undistorted feeling (pp.456-7).
>
>
>
> Where Wordsworth sought to find this real connectedness in the
country and
> with simple folk, Coleridge proclaimed the real to be the Spirit,
and the
> world an emanation of this Spirit. German Romantics believed that poetry
> could restore us to this world by capturing and showing us this
Spirit. For
> this Spirit was the real, that stood behind the world and when one
grasped
> this Spirit, it was seen to shine through Nature. Embracing this
> understanding, Blake had called for us to liberate ourselves from the
> "vegetative eye", in order that we may see true spiritual reality
and with
> poetry's allowing us to grasp, to see, to have recognition of this
Spirit,
> Shelley proclaimed it to be poetry that 'created anew the universe', a
> universe, which had been rendered spiritless, annihilated in our
minds by
> the habitual reiteration of impressions. Hence, an epiphany, which
brought
> our liberation, which freed us from a mechanistic world devoid of
meaning,
> had brought to light this spiritual reality, which reposed behind
Nature and
> in man, as his uncorrupted human feeling (p.457).
>
>
>
> Many, the likes of Wordsworth, Holderlin, Constable and Friedrich,
had in
> their own way embraced this understanding. However, partly as a
result of
> the development of industrialization, in the twentieth century, in our
> urbanized and technological societies, the natural of Nature, as
envisioned
> by our ancestors, the great Romantic writers and artists, is now
well beyond
> our vision, beyond our ability to see and in many cases, it is
altogether
> absent (p.457).
>
>
>
> As Taylor proclaims, our environment has greatly changed. Our
environment
> has been designed and created by man, as a means to cope with the
nameless
> masses, wherein this environment, as far as the eye can see, the
landscape
> is dominated by men and machines (p.457).
>
>
>
> That which stands beyond the urban sprawl, we now define as
wilderness and
> as Taylor points out, this understanding of the natural, as wilderness,
> exhibits a very different understanding of Nature than that which
had been
> embraced by our Romantic ancestors. Social changes, changes in
scientific
> theory and changes in images articulating sensibility had all
contributed to
> this differing understanding of Nature and to disbelief in Romantic
notions
> of Nature as a spiritual reality. Our sense of the natural or
Nature, rather
> than perceived of as an expression of the Spirit, is perceived of as
a wild
> force, where even our usage of the term wild-erness is seen to
reflect the
> Schopenhauerian notion of Nature as a great reservoir of wild or amoral
> power (p.457).
>
>
>
> As Taylor had previously pointed out, Coleridge believed artistic
creation
> to be a "process of growth in nature", this process, a striving
toward an
> undistorted fulfilment in human life, free from the confines of mere
> mechanism (p.420). Man needed some form of spiritual nourishment and as
> such, a creative imagination and horizons for emotional fulfilment were
> deemed imperative (p.457). Expressive freedom in youth had been seen as
> responsible for the firing of one's imagination. However, in having
joined
> the ranks of commercial civilization, one's life was to be dominated by
> instrumental reason. While one still yearned to embrace the
epiphanies of
> creative imagination, expressive freedom and instrumental reason
were seen
> to be in conflict, flirtation with expressive freedom perceived of as
> anti-instrumental in its intent and in some respects to reflect the
> anti-moral (p.424).
>
>
>
> J.S. Mills had been tormented by a sense of conflict between the
demands of
> disengaged reason and the need for a deeper sense of meaning. For Mills,
> this deeper sense of meaning was found in the works of Romantic
poets and
> for this reason, he was driven to bring together a synthesis of
'disengaged,
> scientific Utilitarianism with an expressivist conception of human
growth
> and fulfilment'. This attempt to bring together a synthesis was to
resolve
> this sense of conflict, to integrate Romantic notions of personal
fulfilment
> with civic demands, civilization run more and more by canons of
instrumental
> reasons (p.458).
>
>
>
> Taylor suggests that with this synthesis, Romantic models of fulfilment
> contributed to the self-justification of this civilization, where in the
> twentieth century, this same understanding was reflected in notions of
> justification for our capitalist system, society deluded into
believing "
> that the wheels of industry turn in order to give individuals the
means for
> a rich and satisfying private life" (p.458).
>
>
>
> In the late Victorian era, it was believed that personal fulfilment
was to
> be found in the unity of family life, the family unit perceived of as a
> haven of warm sentiment, this idealistic image bringing solace to men
> confronted by what they perceived to be the becoming of a
disenchanted world
> (p.458).
>
>
>
> However, as Taylor points out, while Victorian piety and
sentimentality had
> appeared to capture the Romantic spirit, many confronted by, what they
> perceived to be, an entirely, cold, empty and disenchanted world,
hungered
> after a more profound and meaningful experience of
being-in-the-world. They
> perceived the expression of 'simple personal emotions' and 'routinized
> fulfilments' as mere travesty and as such, rejected Romanticism.
However,
> they also refused to accept that profound meaning could be found in
> disengaged reason (p.458).
>
>
>
> For modernists, subjective feelings could not bring solace and they
could
> not hold to a notion of the world as an emanation of the Spirit. Many
> modernists, who followed in the footsteps of Baudelaire, sought to
find the
> epiphany outside of, or beyond, what they perceived to be a fallen
Nature
> (p.458).
>
>
>
>
>
> In the purely technological/mechanistic world all becomes
meaningless.  Hum
> back to writing this assignment ;)))
>
>
>
> Hope this helps
>
>
>
> Love & Hugs
>
> Elaine

Speaking of  'we forget that we've forgotten', i hadn't been well recently
and in not being well, i was not thinking well and wrote :-
"It has only been in the past couple of days that i have been able to
"think" again.
For me the most scariest thing in life is the inability to think profound
thoughts.
It could be said that if u cannot think profound thoughts u would not be
conscious
of not thinking of them. However, that does not follow, for memory reminds
us of
having had the ability to think profound thoughts and hence the absence of
them".

U wrote :-  Well, not such a bright time I guess.  For Heidegger, it was up
to the poets to
save us.  The role of apophantic speech.  The shining forth of the poetic
word.

U would probably enjoy reading the last few assignments i have written, as
they are specifically
dealing with the epiphany and the saving grace of the writer, poet and/or
artist.
If u would like to read them just give us a hoy;))))

Love & Hugs
Elaine

Tommy should i post the assignments or send them privately to Joe ?

Kind Regards
Elaine

Elaine,

Thanks for asking.

In general, you should probably post the assignments privately to Joe,
especially if there is more than one at a time!

The assignment you posted last was topical however as it mentioned
Heidegger, a close philosophical relation to Sartre, and dealt
specifically with the issue of technology, a theme that is pertinent to
both Sartre and Heidegger's thinking.

Hope this helps

Tommy

On 12 Mar 2004, at 02:22, Elaine Phipps-Earl wrote:

> Tommy should i post the assignments or send them privately to Joe ?
>
> Kind Regards
> Elaine
>
>
>
>
> To unsubscribe, e-mail: Sartre-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com
>
> Yahoo! Groups Links
>
>
>
>
>
>

Thanks Elaine, but I honestly don't have time for long articles.
However, I would appreciate bite size snippets worked into your
ordinary postings, those you feel would contribute to the continuity
of our acceptable subject matter.

Joe

--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Elaine Phipps-Earl" <lizral@o...> wrote:
> Tommy should i post the assignments or send them privately to Joe ?
>
> Kind Regards
> Elaine

I appreciate what you're saying here.  At some level, Being reveals
the profound and memory preserves the revelations we gain from the
past.  I have thought last week on the notion of preservative forms,
namely, written language.  The reason we write down what we discover
is probably because normal thinking processes and verbal speech,
existentially speaking, belong to the realm of temporality.  This is
the condition of consciousness 'as a stream'and the human experience
in general to know something clearly one moment and then loose it the
next moment.  And this evokes Heraclitus comments about not being able
to step into the same river twice.  Our awareness is that river.
Personally, I always strive to re-member what I already once
understood, but continue to rebuild my awareness up each day.  There
is so much to retain, the more we seek, the more we have, the more
difficult it is to retain it in a summary/comprehensive manner.  Does
anyone have a solution for this finitude of fleeting comprehension?

Joe

--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "Elaine Phipps-Earl" <lizral@o...> wrote:
>
> Speaking of  'we forget that we've forgotten', i hadn't been well
recently
> and in not being well, i was not thinking well and wrote :-
> "It has only been in the past couple of days that i have been able to
> "think" again.
> For me the most scariest thing in life is the inability to think
profound
> thoughts.
> It could be said that if u cannot think profound thoughts u would not be
> conscious
> of not thinking of them. However, that does not follow, for memory
reminds
> us of
> having had the ability to think profound thoughts and hence the
absence of
> them".
>
> U wrote :-  Well, not such a bright time I guess.  For Heidegger, it
was up
> to the poets to
> save us.  The role of apophantic speech.  The shining forth of the
poetic
> word.
>
> U would probably enjoy reading the last few assignments i have
written, as
> they are specifically
> dealing with the epiphany and the saving grace of the writer, poet
and/or
> artist.
> If u would like to read them just give us a hoy;))))
>
> Love & Hugs
> Elaine

You said:  "I think I want to focus on 'enframing'".

My Reply:  I do have a few extra thoughts on this.  Ge-Stell literally
means to-place-together-with.  Fleshing this out in an ordinary
expression, in the sense that the German word signifies, I imagine
that it might sound something like this.  One builder says to his
apprentice - "place one stud together with another stud by nailing
them together.  There is a sense of giving some kind of structure to
constructed form.  This comes to be applied to technology, technics,
and engineering, but overlaps into other things we build.  The main
idea inherent in the Go-stell is that of order, arrangement and
structure.  This has no problem working it's way into practical
expressions such a 'framing a house', being a framer of the
Constitution, or even working to frame ones thoughts, so to speak; it
is the act of placing one thing together with another that Heidegger
applied toward technology.

Not far from consideration are the issues of world and earth,
technology and nature and the split between them that indicates a
breech of harmony.  That is, technology exploits nature to the
precious advantage of human will.  I do this to my own backyard.  I
suspect it would be easy to sense an ideological compatability between
formal Heideggerian concepts and Marxist issues.  Science sides with
the world, not the earth.  I suppose too that there is some
appreciation deserving here for nature-for-its-own-sake, not merely
there as a resource for the human taking.  But back to enframing, we
give structure to our lives by building the world, by drawing from
nature to fund our creations.  Alas, we create alot of machines,
devices, methods, organizations, and various units of structure to
dominate our environments.  We can only be glad that nature lacks an
angry cogitos, or could wake up from it's own self-forgetful state, to
hurl us all off the earth, away from its own harmony and
being-here-for-itself.

Joe
>
> On another topic, is there anyone up on Habermas?  Just curious.
>
> _________________________________________________________________
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Joe wrote: "I suspect it would be easy to sense an ideological
compatability between formal Heideggerian concepts and Marxist
issues."

I too have shared this thought.  In particular, it seems to me
that "being-for-Others" is closely related to Hegel's "Master/Slave
Dialectic."  From what little I have learned about Marx, I remember
that he was a voracious reader of Hegel, so I imagine he must have
been greatly been influenced by this dialectic as well (I know
Sartre was - and lest we forget Sartre's claim that "Marxism is THE
philosophy of our time").

But then again, Marx was completely passed over in my philosophy
courses at Michigan, so I might be completely off base.  But I also
think you could argue Heidegger's analysis of "handiness" (Vorhanden
and Zuhanden) is related to Marx's concept of alienation, in that
the Capitalist's exploitation (objectification) of the worker is the
same as taking/making the Other as something "to-hand" (that is, as
an instrument).

Just some thoughts,

- Brian



--- In Sartre@yahoogroups.com, "decker150" <decker150@y...> wrote:
> You said:  "I think I want to focus on 'enframing'".
>
> My Reply:  I do have a few extra thoughts on this.  Ge-Stell
literally
> means to-place-together-with.  Fleshing this out in an ordinary
> expression, in the sense that the German word signifies, I imagine
> that it might sound something like this.  One builder says to his
> apprentice - "place one stud together with another stud by nailing
> them together.  There is a sense of giving some kind of structure
to
> constructed form.  This comes to be applied to technology,
technics,
> and engineering, but overlaps into other things we build.  The main
> idea inherent in the Go-stell is that of order, arrangement and
> structure.  This has no problem working it's way into practical
> expressions such a 'framing a house', being a framer of the
> Constitution, or even working to frame ones thoughts, so to speak;
it
> is the act of placing one thing together with another that
Heidegger
> applied toward technology.
>
> Not far from consideration are the issues of world and earth,
> technology and nature and the split between them that indicates a
> breech of harmony.  That is, technology exploits nature to the
> precious advantage of human will.  I do this to my own backyard.  I
> suspect it would be easy to sense an ideological compatability
between
> formal Heideggerian concepts and Marxist issues.  Science sides
with
> the world, not the earth.  I suppose too that there is some
> appreciation deserving here for nature-for-its-own-sake, not merely
> there as a resource for the human taking.  But back to enframing,
we
> give structure to our lives by building the world, by drawing from
> nature to fund our creations.  Alas, we create alot of machines,
> devices, methods, organizations, and various units of structure to
> dominate our environments.  We can only be glad that nature lacks
an
> angry cogitos, or could wake up from it's own self-forgetful
state, to
> hurl us all off the earth, away from its own harmony and
> being-here-for-itself.
>
> Joe
> >
> > On another topic, is there anyone up on Habermas?  Just curious.
> >
> > _________________________________________________________________
> > Add photos to your messages with MSN Premium. Get 2 months
FREE*
> >
> http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-
ca&page=byoa/prem&xAPID=1994&DI=1034&SU=http://hotmail.com/enca&HL=Ma
rket_MSNIS_Taglines