The Kingdom of Morocco:
An Absolute Monarchy Averse to Democratic Reform

By Sidi M. Omar
Researcher in Peace and Conflict Studies,
UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace,

Universitat Jaume I, Castellón,
Spain 2004


Plan for reform

It has been recently reported in the media that the US
Administration is working on a ³reform plan² aiming at promoting
democracy in the ³greater Middle East². Scheduled to be announced at
the G-8 summit hosted by President Bush at Sea Island, Georgia, in
June, the plan would call upon the governments of the region to
adopt major political reforms, be held accountable on human rights
and introduce economic reforms. In return, the countries that choose
to embrace the proposed reforms would be offered more aid packages,
enlarged security arrangements and better deals to facilitate their
integration in the global economy.

Some commentators have suggested that the plan aims at filling the
gaps that had been highlighted in the Arab Human Development Report
2003 released by the United Nations Development Programme concerning
the situation of freedom, knowledge, democracy, economy, and women
emancipation in Arab nations. In this sense, the plan will probably
recommend educational reform programmes, democratisation and human
rights schemes as well as the need to strengthen the region's
entrepreneurial and economic capabilities. It has also been
indicated that the proposed plan is partly a response to the failure
of the existing US-led policy in the Middle East, which seems to
have generated many hostile reactions among a wide sector of the
population of the region.

Although there is still an ongoing discussion on the genesis and
objectives of the plan, what is obvious is that it comes in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the USA, on 11th September
2001, and the accelerating events that have taken place ever since
both in the Middle East and elsewhere. In this context, the present
plan could be viewed as part of the American post-11 September
approach that aims at coming to terms with the complexity of the new
developments in ³the Greater Middle East², and with the root causes
of the major problems facing the region, including particularly the
rise of radicalism and its links to global terrorism.

A recent indication to this new approach could be deduced, for
instance, from the speech delivered by President Bush, on 4th
February 2004, in honour of former British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. In his speech, President Bush underlined that the United
States was seeking to foster the growth of democracy in the greater
Middle East in order to remove conditions there that have bred all
sorts of oppression and hopelessness amid the population of the
region. He precisely made it clear that, ³as long as that region is
a place of _tyranny and despair and anger_ , it will produce men and
movements that threaten the safety of Americans and our friends. We
seek the advance of democracy for the most practical of reasons:
because democracies do not support terrorists or threaten the world
with weapons of mass murder² (emphasis added)(1).

President Bush also went on to point out that he would ask the US
Congress to double the budget for the National Endowment for
Democracy, raising its annual funding to $80 million, with a view to
focusing ³on bringing free elections and free markets and free press
and free speech and free labour unions to the Middle East.²(2) It
is in this context that the launching by the US Government of a new
Middle East television network called Alhurra (meaning the free one
in Arabic) can be appraised. The network is meant to be a media tool
for reaching out to the population of the region, and telling them
the truth about the values and the policies of the United States, as
President Bush put it.

As expected, there have been many reactions to the proposed plan,
especially from some leaders of the region who appeared to warn
against any attempt to dictate change from outside. By contrast,
many intellectuals across the Arab world, for instance, have
approved of the underlying idea of the plan, while stressing that
its goal should be the introduction of global reforms that would
also involve the existing political structures.

Although its details are still being crafted, the proposed plan is
not unproblematic. Above all, its professed scope is too ambiguous
since it refers to a vast and heterogeneous area that does not lend
itself easily to region-wide generalisations. Nevertheless, despite
whatever reservations that one may understandably have about the
plan, it can still serve as a timely reminder of the need to embark
on a purposeful reflection on the root causes of the major
socio-economic and political problems facing the region as a whole,
and subsequently on the kind of structural reforms that are needed
to tackle those problems.

In this sense, there is no denying the fact that the US
Administration has hit the nail on the head when highlighting the
direct correlation between ³despair and anger² and the overall
political conditions prevailing in the Middle East. Taken at face
value, the proposed plan appears to depart from the understanding
that the growing manifestations of despair and discontent amid
Middle Eastern populations are inextricably linked to the political
and social conditions that have resulted from decades of
undemocratic rule in some parts of the region. In other words, the
plan clearly recognises that the widespread and deep-rooted
authoritarian structures in the Middle East are the major causes of
despair and anger among the populations of the region. In the end,
it is this situation of deep-seated desperation that has gradually
proved a fertile soil for the emergence of all sorts of radicalism.
In the context of trying to deal with the root causes of this
volatile situation, the US Administration seems to have chosen to
step in with a plan of global reforms that would involve the whole
region.

Ever since it took office in January 2001, the present US
Administration has made no secret of the fact that it has a security
interest in countering radical movements that could put in jeopardy
the US interests in the Middle East, including the stability of its
allies. It has moreover shown its keen interest in fostering
democracy and supporting adherence to internationally accepted
standards of human rights and good governance in the region. The
challenge that will face the US Administration will thus be keeping
these two interests in balance, when contemplating any reforms in
the Middle East.

In this sense, one key question that could be raised in connection
with the ³reform plan² is whether the US Administration is ready to
tackle head on the compelling fact that fostering genuine democratic
reforms in the Middle East must also involve a rigorous re-thinking
of its traditional policies in the entire region. In other words,
the US Administration will have to realise that, for its plan to
bring forth any meaningful democratic reforms in the Middle East,
the reforms must also involve the political structures sustaining
certain regimes in the region (who are allies of the USA) that have
traditionally proved unwilling to engage in any real reforms.

In practical terms, this means that the US Administration will have
to take bold measures as regards those regimes by urging them to set
in motion genuine major structural reforms, and to be accountable to
their respective populations regarding the rule of law and respect
for fundamental liberties. If the US Administration fails to go that
far, the proposed ³reform plan² will certainly be doomed to failure,
leading to more disappointment among millions across the Middle
East, and less credibility for the US policies in the region. It is
hard to believe that the US Administration would allow its
credibility to be further compromised in the Middle East,
particularly at a time when that credibility is needed more than
ever.

The kingdom of Morocco: the impossible reform

A prime example of those regimes described often as ³strategic
allies² of the United States in the Middle East is the monarchical
regime of the Kingdom of Morocco, which has been ruling the country
as a medieval absolute monarchy for centuries. Describing the
Moroccan regime in such terms, however, may not resonate with the
predominant, albeit erroneous, perception that many (especially in
Europe and the USA) have of Morocco as an exemplary case of a
³moderate regime² in the region, steadily moving towards modernity
and democracy.

As will be demonstrated later, this perception of Morocco as a
³moderate regime all in favour of reform² is indeed symptomatic of a
vision that has a major blind spot. On the one hand, it tends to see
the sporadic cosmetic reforms, carried out by the regime under
certain circumstances, as impressive achievements. On the other, it
fails, wittingly or unwittingly, to engage rigorously the regime¹s
widely recognised crisis of legitimacy and its deplorable conduct as
regards human rights and democratic rule. It is therefore in the
broad context of unpacking this lopsided vision that the present
paper sets out to demonstrate that what lies behind that
self-ascribed mask of a reformist regime is a grim face of a
tyrannical monarchy that owes its legitimacy (and hence longevity)
to sheer absolute rule and state terrorism.

Evidently, the self-legitimating discourses of the Moroccan
monarchical regime have already been challenged and unsettled in
many ways by critical minds inside and outside of Morocco, and
therefore the present paper does not claim much novelty in this
respect. However, what it may claim as its own contribution is to
look into the nature of the regime in Morocco against the backdrop
of the underlying idea of the proposed ³reform plan² in order to
demonstrate that, before contemplating any reforms in the country,
the US Administration will inescapably have to tackle the compelling
fact that the monarchy existing in Morocco represents a regime that
owes its longevity to absolute monarchical rule and state terrorism.
As such, it is inherently averse to any tangible systemic reforms,
which the regime has always seen, quite understandably, detriment of
its own existence.


The United States and Morocco: a long history of friendly relations

Needless to say that United States and Morocco have a longstanding
special relationship. Although the purpose here is not to dwell upon
this long history of American-Moroccan relationship, suffice it to
say that the two countries have always enjoyed privileged relations
ever since Morocco recognised the Government of the United States in
1777. A milestone in the establishment of formal relations between
the two nations was the Treaty of Peace and Friendship that was
negotiated in 1787. Renegotiated in 1836, the treaty is still in
force, constituting the longest unbroken treaty relationship in US
history. A testament to the special nature of the US-Moroccan
relationship, for instance, is the fact that Tangier (north of
Morocco) is home to the oldest US diplomatic property in the world,
and the only building on foreign soil that is listed in the USA.

Described often by American officials as ³a strategic partner of the
USA², Morocco continues to enjoy a privileged place in the American
cross-Atlantic relations, and it is unlikely that there will be any
change of this privileged status in the foreseeable future. An
indication to how the US-Moroccan relationship would continue in the
future, for instance, can be deduced from the speech given by the US
Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to Morocco in
December 2003. Outlining his country¹s support for Morocco¹s
political and economic reforms, the Secretary of State made it clear
that the US Administration would be increasing its economic
assistance to Morocco four-fold over the next several years, and
that it would double the support it used to provide to military
efforts.(3) It is in this context of increased cooperation that the
United States concluded with Morocco, in March 2004, a comprehensive
and ground-breaking Free Trade Agreement (FTA) designed to strip
away barriers and facilitate trade and investment between both
countries.

Indeed, the long history of American-Moroccan special relationship
has had a direct bearing on how Morocco has always been perceived in
the United States. This, however, should not hinder the US
Administration from trying to look critically into the realities on
the ground in Morocco, and into the nature and conduct of the ruling
regime there. Therefore, the acid test of the US ³reform plan², as
far as Morocco is concerned, is whether the US Administration will
be prepared to press the authoritarian regime in Morocco to
introduce genuine overall reforms in its political institutions
including the inherently antidemocratic monarchical system. Closely
related to this is the issue of whether the Administration will also
be willing to uphold its own democratic principles, when it comes to
respect for human rights, and then hold the Moroccan regime
accountable for the gross violations of human rights that it has
perpetrated against its own people and others.

After all, whatever way the US Administration may choose to go
forward with its ³reform plan², it must not lose sight of the fact
it will confront in Morocco a despotic regime controlled by a
political class with a medieval mind-set that is inherently averse
to modern, secular and democratic rule. The US Administration (and
the American people for that matter) cannot certainly afford being
associated with a regime with such qualities.


Absolute monarchy in disguise

As indicated earlier, one purpose of this paper is to demonstrate
that the Kingdom of Morocco is an epitome of an absolute monarchy
that owes its existence to a mix of absolute rule and state
terrorism. To this end, the paper will now focus on investigating
rigorously the series of claims that the regime has been promoting
right from the start, at the heart of which lies the recurring claim
that Morocco is a ³democratic, constitutional monarchy². In order to
set the record straight, it is perhaps useful to start by looking
briefly at the concept of ³constitutional monarchy² and its
evolution as a form of government.

In general terms, a constitutional monarchy is a form of government
that is established under a constitutional system which
acknowledges an hereditary or elected monarch as head of state.
Although the king or queen may be regarded in modern constitutional
monarchies as the government¹s symbolic head, it is the prime
Minister, whose power derives directly or indirectly from elections,
who actually governs the country. Historically, the concept of
constitutional monarchy owes its origin to the absolute monarchies
of the later Middle Ages in Europe, where governmental authority was
exercised by the monarch and his (or in rare occasions her)
government. The development of popular participation in democracy
saw power shifting to governments selected from and answerable to
legislative assemblies and parliaments, producing more democratic
systems of governments in which the monarch ³reigns but does not
rule.²

Closely linked to the development of constitutional monarchy was the
idea that the will of the people, instead of divine rights, would be
the ultimate source of legitimate authority. Therefore, as an
immediate legacy of the revolutionary wars and domestic struggles
during the late eighteenth century, the idea of popular
sovereignty the notion that legitimacy must come from the will of
the people marked a far-reaching shift from dynastically legitimated
monarchical sovereignty to popularly legitimated national
sovereignty (Bukovansky 2002).

Brief as it is, the foregoing conceptual framework can clearly serve
to provide a useful backdrop against which the Moroccan claims can
be investigated, especially those related to the constitutional
quality of the monarchy and its alleged popular legitimacy. A good
point of departure in this sense will necessarily be an analysis of
the Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco, in its latest version
that was approved in a referendum held on 13th September 1996. It is
perhaps interesting to point out that this referendum resulted,
according to official figures, in 99.56% of the population voting
yes and 0.44 voting no(4) --a fact that was particularly astonishing
for many inside and outside of Morocco.

In its article 1, the Constitution declares solemnly that, ³Morocco
shall have a democratic, social and constitutional Monarchy². Taken
at face value, this provision indicates that Morocco is a country
where the overall authority is supposed to be vested in a prime
Minster who is elected by the people and thus answerable to them,
the same as in all modern constitutional monarchies. In fact, this
is not the case since the institution of the King has been
constitutionally accorded an Olympian vantage point from which the
sovereign can wield his supreme power that overrides that of all
other institutions.

According to the Constitution, the King, Amir Al-Muminin (Commander
of the Faithful), who is ³the guarantor of the perpetuation and the
continuity of the State² (art. 19), ³shall appoint the Prime
Minister. Upon the Prime Minister¹s recommendation, the King shall
[also] appoint the other Cabinet members as he may terminate their
services² (art. 24). Furthermore, the King, who ³shall, by Royal
Decrees, exercise the statutory powers explicitly conferred upon him
by the Constitution² (art. 29), ³may dissolve the two Houses of
Parliament or one thereof by Royal Decree² (art. 27). In case these
provisions give the impression that the King is an executive
institution (which is indeed the case) and, as any executive
institution, he could be answerable to other institutions, the
constitution states, in article 23, that ³the person of the King
shall be sacred and inviolable.²

What the foregoing articles clearly indicate is that the king is the
ultimate authority for each branch of the government as well as for
all things religious, a fact which clearly undermines the principle
underpinning true constitutional monarchies, i.e., monarchs reign
but do not rule. The late King Hassan II was quoted, in 1992,
elaborating on the kind of monarchy existing in Morocco. He said,
³Islam forbids me from implementing a constitutional monarchy in
which I, the king, delegate all my powers and reign without
governing . . . I can delegate power, but I do not have the right,
on my own initiative, to abstain from my prerogatives, because they
are also spiritual.²(5) Indeed, one cannot help but wonder why the
regime keeps on marketing itself as a constitutional monarchy when
it recognises at the same time that a monarchy of this type cannot
be instituted in the country allegedly on some religious grounds.

As far as amending the Constitution is concerned, article 103 states
that ³the King, the House of Representatives and the House of
Counsellors shall have the right to initiate a revision of the
Constitution. The King shall have the right to submit, directly for
referendum, the revision project he may initiate.² Nonetheless,
there are red lines that should never be crossed when it comes to
revising the Constitution. These are provided for in article 106,
which states that, ³Neither the State system of monarchy nor the
prescriptions related to the religion of Islam may be subject to a
constitutional revision.² Given that the Constitution was approved
allegedly by a landslide majority, the provisions of article 106
seem to indicate that practically the entire Moroccan people have
voluntarily chosen to institute the monarchical system as their
timeless system of government. But since this is an assumption that
many Moroccans will dismiss out of hand, this particular article
(along with all other articles) can only be construed as an
indication more of how the referendum in question was in fact
conducted than of the real wishes of the Moroccan people.

It is also interesting to read the above article in relation to
article 7 relating to the motto of the Kingdom which is ³God, the
Country, the King². As can be seen clearly, the hierarchical order
implied in this article seems to have been inverted in article 106
in such a way that the monarchical system (the King) seems to take
precedence over the religious basis of the Kingdom. In short, what
all this means is that the monarchy lies at the heart of the
³restricted zones² that should never be considered subject to
revision, which, when read in political terms, means that the
monarchy is not susceptible of reform or change an absolute monarchy
proper.

When confronted with this compelling fact about the real nature of
its monarchy and that it is incompatible with the democratic
principles of modern constitutional monarchies, the Moroccan regime
frequently resorts to the argument that it has its own idiosyncratic
form of a democratic constructional monarchy that is grounded in the
country¹s historical and cultural specificity. Here is where the
peculiar formula sustaining the regime¹s assumed legitimacy is
evoked in order to bear out this contention. As will be shown, this
argument is however much stronger in assertion than in proof.

It is recognised, by common consent, that all democratic systems of
government derive their legitimacy from the will of people and that,
by contrast, undemocratic regimes lack popular legitimacy. For that
reason, in order to endow themselves with legitimacy, undemocratic
regimes tend to invent new ideologies or traditions and try to
indoctrinate the population with their legitimating discourses
through various forms of socialisation and propaganda, thus creating
moral incentives for the people to obey their rule.

The kingdom of Morocco is indeed an excellent example of a regime
that has firmly established its legitimacy on the invention and
reinvention of tradition. What underpins this tradition is a major
claim that the holders of the title of the King are descendants of
the Prophet, and thus have impeccable shurafa¹ ancestry, which can
be traced back through the present Alawite dynasty until the
Idrissides, the first Islamic dynasty of Morocco established in the
eighth century. It is in effect the Alawite dynasty, which has ruled
Morocco since the 17th century, that has transformed that tradition
into a complex set of myths, religious and psychological concepts,
which partly explains its longevity and the ³stability² of its rule.

Much has been written about the nature of the Moroccan regime and
its self-legitimating discourses. One important historical study on
this subject, for instance, has been presented by Abdellah Hammoudi.
In his book, Master and Disciple, which offers a penetrating insight
into the nature of the authoritarian rule in Morocco, Hammoudi
(1997) explores the ideological and cultural foundations of the
persistent authoritarianism in his native country. Building on the
work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault, he argues that at
the heart of Moroccan culture lies a paradigm of authority that
juxtaposes absolute authority against absolute submission. In
conflict with other cultural forms, and re-elaborated in colonial
and postcolonial circumstances, this paradigm informs all major
aspects of Moroccan personal and political relations. Its influence
is so pervasive and so firmly embedded that it ultimately
legitimises the authoritarian structure of the existing power.

At the heart of this paradigm lie the sharifian principle, which
suggests that all Moroccan rulers are direct descendants of the
Prophet, and the act of bay¹a (oath of allegiance to the
sultan/king), whereby people allegedly reaffirm their loyalty to the
King and the Crown. In reality, the bay'a refers both to the act of
delegating power to a new sultan or king and to the annual, symbolic
renewal of allegiance (tajdid al-wala'), where religious scholars
and other dignitaries, who are supposed to represent the community,
renew their allegiance to the crown (Maghraoui 2001). The legitimacy
of the Moroccan regime lies thus in these direct religious ties
forged between the king-sultan-caliph and the
subject-believer-citizen, which creates what Waltz (1995) has called
a psychological contract¹.

To ensure its longevity and promote its legitimacy, the Moroccan
monarchy has relied on a series of myths and symbols encouraged and
often created by the monarchy itself (Campbell 2004). An example of
the monarchy¹s role in reinventing tradition, according to the
author, is the case of Ahmad al Mansur of the Sa¹di dynasty
(1548-1641) who, feeling vulnerable to the powers of other religious
groups, seized the Prophet¹s birthday as a chance to increase the
monarch¹s legitimacy and staged huge celebrations to which only
certain people were invited. This tradition has eventually been
converted into an important tool to maintain the social order in the
country and to publicise the Monarch¹s lineage from the Prophet,
which continues to function in this way to this day. The late King
Hassan II explained this to a reporter from Newsweek to whom he was
displaying a gold-plated ceiling which contained a series of names:
³Those are the names of my ancestors, every one of them dating back
to the Prophet . . . Do you know what that means? That means I have
legitimacy. I am both temporal and spiritual ruler of my people.²(6)

Therefore, by linking themselves to the Prophet, and through him to
God, the Moroccan monarchs ensure that challenges to their divine
right to rule are indeed challenges to God. As Hammoudi (1997:13)
notes, ³[A]ttacking him [the King] would be both a crime and a
sacrilege inseparable notions in this logic at once a violation of
divine law and the desacralisation of a figure of Islamic piety.²
The fact, however, is that identification with the leader is not
only based on divine authority and sharifian descent, but also
derived from the fear instilled into the heart and minds of the
subjects throughout years of schooling and sheer terrorist
practices a theme that will be elaborated on later.

To tighten its grip on everything temporal or spiritual in the
country, the Moroccan regime has also relied on the Makhzen, which
is the expression of the group including businessmen and generals
who constitute the ³power behind the throne² and which are generally
perceived as the conservative and corrupt class traditionally
controlling Morocco's politics and economy. In this sense, Makhzen
is a specific form of authority that is present throughout the
governing class with the king as its linchpin. As Abderrahman
Youssoufi, the former Moroccan Prime Minister, wrote more than 20
years ago, ³The key to the makhzen system is the sultan, a
hereditary, dynastic autocrat ... whose enthronement is accompanied
by a ceremony of allegiance in which tame dignitaries act out their
submission. This absolute power is aggravated by the pseudo-function
of [the king as] ¹representative of God on earth¹, which has been
instituted and handed down by generations of oriental despots but
has no real religious or legal basis. This power structure acts in
two ways: first, through the mahalla, which is a sort of mercenary
army in the service of the sultan to which it is tied by bonds of
privilege or slavery; and second, through the makhzen itself, which
is a body of agents, generally recruited among rural and urban
notables, of which the most enduring characteristic is its
corruptness².(7)

Let us now assume for the sake of argument that the sharifian
descent and the act of bay¹a (oath of allegiance) could serve as a
basis upon which a certain ruler of an Islamic country could claim
legitimacy for his or her rule. However, the line of reasoning that
the Moroccan regime employs in order to justify its absolute rule on
this basis is completely flawed. First, the bay'a is questionable as
it is practiced now in Morocco because those who partake in the act
(ahl al-hall wal-'aqd) are not true representative of the community,
and hence cannot speak on its behalf. As Maghraoui (2001) points
out, the notables, dignitaries, religious scholars, political and
state officials who swear allegiance to the Crown are either
co-opted by the Makhzen, or are directly in the service of the
palace. Their allegiance is therefore nothing but a ceremonial
consecration of existing, unequal power relations, and has nothing
to do with the real wishes of the people.

Furthermore, according to the Islamic tradition, the system of the
bay¹a to the head of state is meaningful only as long as the leader
works for the interest of the society. In this sense, Islam has laid
down the concept of checking the leader, holding him accountable and
putting him aright if he falters or even deposing him. In Morocco,
while people there are obligated to swear allegiance to the King,
they have no recourse whatsoever to hold him accountable for their
security and wellbeing. What follows from this is that the kind of
bay¹a, upon which the assumed legitimacy of the Moroccan regime is
predicated, is in fact a perverse interpretation of bay¹a as
construed in Islamic established tradition.

To grant itself some illusion of democratic legitimacy and of public
support to its institutions, the regime has also been known of
orchestrating all types of ³elections². As has been demonstrated on
many occasions, coercion and corruption always plague such phoney
elections and the interioir minisrty has always be charged with
fabricating high voter turnouts and seemingly fair results.
Furthemore, instead of serving to consolidate a fair political game,
the so-called multi-party electoral system in Morocco is used
essentially as a means to select, control and reproduce a docile and
corruptible political elite. As the US embassy in Rabat has pointed
out, some of the main obstacles in stabling the rule of law in
Morocco ³include a general lack of transparency, inadequate material
resources, excessively lengthy court proceedings, and widespread
corruption.²(8)

The overall conclusion that could be drawn from the above analysis
of the Moroccan Constitution and of the basis underpinning the
regime¹s legitimacy is that it does take more than a constitution,
written or otherwise, for a monarchy to claim being constitutional.
In this sense, what the Moroccan Constitution shows, in effect, is
that the constitutional monarchy à la marocaine is just a euphemism
of an absolute monarchy in disguise. As Wesson (1987) affirms, there
is no more reason to credit dictators with being democratic, however
much they use the word, than to assume that libertines are chaste
because they claim chastity.

To fully grasp the implications of the preceding conclusion, let us
look briefly into the kind of arguments that were traditionally
marshalled for justifying absolute rule, in order to see that they
do resonate with the same arguments used by the Moroccan regime to
justify its own rule. As it is known, the idea that monarchs held
their position by the grace of God and were therefore not answerable
to mortals but only to God dates back historically to the
seventeenth century in Europe when many theorisations on the nature
and justification of absolute monarchy began to flourish. One of the
principle theorists of absolutism, for instance, was Jacques-Benigne
Bossuet (1627-1704). In his work, Politics, Bossuet (1990) argued
that monarchs are placed in power by God, and thus respect for the
king is ³bound together² with service of God; disobedience to a
monarch is equivalent to disobeying God. Since monarchs are placed
in power by God, that also meant that monarchs are answerable to
no-one except God in matters of ruling the state. Bossuet also
underlined that the office of king should be sacred in itself and
should be honoured, for he is God¹s ³lieutenant on earth.²

In view of the foregoing, it is easy to discern how strikingly
similar is the line of reasoning employed by the Moroccan regime in
order to justify its absolute rule and that of an absolutist
theorist such as Bossuet, especially when it comes to divine rights
and the inviolability of the person of the sovereign. What this
indicates, on the whole, is that the kingdom of Morocco is in effect
one of the few regimes in the world that has long outlived its own
time. While traditional absolute monarchies, as indicated earlier,
have long given way to genuine constitutional monarchies and
democracies, the Kingdom of Morocco of the 21st century is still
ruled by a medieval monarchical regime where the monarch makes no
secret of the fact that he is destined by some divine will to ³reign
and rule² forever and at any cost.


State terrorism

In her analysis of the nature of the monarchy in Morocco, Patricia
Campbell (2004) points out that, in order to promote its own
legitimacy, the Moroccan monarchical regime has relied on a series
of myths and symbols encouraged and often created by the monarchy
itself. If these reinvented traditions represent the discursive
legitimation of the regime, the practical bases of its authority are
actually embedded in a long history of state terrorism and use of
ruthless force.

In view of the inherently unsustainable bases of the regimes¹
authority and of their concomitant legitimating discourses (which
are too irrational for a secular democratic mind to tolerate), it is
little wonder therefore that the regime has long opted for state
terrorism as an essential means to promote its assumed legitimacy.
This explains, for instance, why it has long declared the shaky
bases of its legitimacy off limits, along with other taboo-issues
that are considered highly vital for the survival of the kingdom,
such as Islam and the Moroccan claims to Western Sahara. Whoever
dares to cross the line will be severely punished. The recent
imprisonment of the Moroccan journalist, Ali Lambrabet, on account
of having ³insulted the person of the king² is a case in point.

As Mcionis (1996) has pointed out, terrorism is not only used by
groups but also by governments in what he calls state terrorism,
which refers to violence used by officials of the state against
their own citizens. In the Moroccan case, state terrorism is
practiced by the state¹s notoriously oppressive security apparatus
that involves several overlapping police and paramilitary
organisations. The National Police (which includes the Border Police
and the Mobile Intervention Corps), and the country¹s intelligence
service (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire - DST) and the
Auxiliary Forces are departments of the Ministry of Interior. In
addition to the Judicial Police, which is under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Justice, and the Royal Gendarmerie that reports to
the Palace, all this security apparatuses constitute a gigantic
security network that has over time permeated all private and public
spheres of society, thus turning Morocco into an effectively police
state.

Indeed, the raison d'être for the existence of such huge security
machinery is solely to defend the monarchy by containing and
eliminating, if necessary, any from of opposition to its rule. Right
from the start, no sooner had Morocco gained its independence in
1956 than the regime started devising all sorts of strategies in
order to contain and counter the mounting opposition of many
Moroccans who had no faith in the absolute monarchical system. Those
were Moroccans that felt bitterly disappointed at seeing the fruit
of their anti-colonial struggle for instituting a democratic
republican rule in the country abusively appropriated by a monarchy
that they had long fought to abolish. One of the most disturbing
examples of the regime¹s intolerance of opposition was the 1965
riots in which hundreds of protesters were killed by government
forces.(9) The riots symbolised the growing rift between the
monarchy and the opposition groups who were calling for an end to
monarchical rule in Morocco. Furthermore, opposition to the monarchy
has boiled over into other riots as well in 1981, 1984, 1990,
1999 each effectively crushed by the security forces. This clearly
shows how the Moroccan regime has always resorted to sheer brutal
force and repression in order to bolster its imposed legitimacy, and
it is no wonder that the regime has been listed among the world¹s
most repressive regimes.(10)

As far as human rights in Morocco are concerned, the security
apparatus is notorious for having been involved in unspeakable
practices of terror, assassinations, summary executions, arbitrary
detention and gross violations of human rights. A cursory glance at
the successive reports released by Amnesty International and other
human rights organisations will clearly reveal the gravity of the
situation of human rights in Morocco. In its report regarding human
rights practices in Morocco in 2003, the US Department of State, for
instance, notes that the human rights record of the country remains
poor in many areas. Moroccan authorities, at times, arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons, and infringed on citizens¹ privacy
rights. Freedom of the press was restricted. The police violently
dispersed several peaceful demonstrations, while police impunity
remained a problem. Although the Moroccan constitution provides for
an independent judiciary, the courts were subject to extrajudicial
pressures including government influence.

The terrorist practices of the Moroccan regime have not been
confined only to Morocco but have also involved the occupied
territories of Western Sahara, where the human rights of the
Saharawi civil population there continue being violated on daily
basis by Moroccan administrative and security apparatus. Ever since
the invasion of the country in 1975 and the campaign of terror
unleashed by the invading forces against the Saharawi civilians,
whose towns and villages were bombed by napalm and cluster bombs,
the Moroccan state has been pursuing an unprecedented repressive
policy against the Saharawis living in the occupied territories.
While the fundamental freedoms of the entire population there remain
severely circumscribed, many Saharawis were arrested arbitrarily and
jailed in Moroccan secret detention centres, where they were
subjected to all sorts of torture and to inhuman and degrading
treatment; hundreds have disappeared, while the Moroccan state
remains silent about their whereabouts. What adds to the plight of
the Saharawis there is that the Moroccan state has long imposed a
total blackout on the territory in order to ensure that its
terrorist practices remain unknown to the international public
opinion.

Despite his declared commitment to protect human rights and promote
democracy, the regime of the new King, Mohammed VI, has not
officially admitted responsibility for past human rights violations
nor showed the slightest interest in bringing to book those
officials involved in perpetrating gross abuses of human rights.
That is why many observers have already noted that the regime would
never try these officials, since that would imply a trial of the
entire regime of the King¹s father, the late King Hassan II. This is
for the simple reason that those officials were acting upon the
king¹s direct orders.

One prime example of the officially protected torturers is the
long-term Minister of Interior, Driss Basri, whose power was second
only to the late King Hassan¹s for more than 20 years, who has been
personally responsible for the country¹s horrible human rights
record. This is why the new King¹s move to oust him in November
1999, which was viewed as a ³courageous act², did not bring any real
change in the regime¹s handling of the situation, since it has left
intact and operational the entire repressive system that Basri put
in place and ruled for years.

As has widely been indicated, the embracing by the Moroccan regime
of terrorism as a state policy, which has drained almost all the
country¹s meagre resources, has already plunged the country into a
deep socio-economic and political crises of which repercussions are
felt throughout the country, especially among the most vulnerable
classes of society. In the UN¹s recently released annual Human
Development Report, Morocco was placed number 126 in terms of human
development out of 175 countries worldwide (11) only 50 steps from
the absolute bottom (Sierra Leone). In addition, Morocco was also
rated most corrupt country in the Maghreb in a survey by the
Swiss-based World Economic Forum.(12) The ranking was based on
questionnaires among each country¹s citizens, ranking their own
government and thus reflecting the population¹s discontent. What
these indices reveal is that Morocco is really going through a deep
crisis that has exacerbated the already difficult situation of the
majority of Moroccans, especially the young generation of who many
have began turning to the Islamists moderate and radical searching
for some sense of belonging and a forum for airing their grievances.

The suicide bombings that took place in Casablanca on 16th May, 2003
that killed more than 40 people bears witness to this increasingly
unbearable situation in Morocco. These terrorist attacks (which
could unfortunately still happen there or elsewhere) were indeed an
abhorrent and condemnable crime. Nevertheless, there were neither
novel nor spontaneous, and this is a fact that seems to have been
overlooked, wittingly or unwittingly, by some commentators in their
readings of this event.

As proved beyond doubt, the terrorist attack was a Moroccan
phenomenon arising out of local conditions, despite the regime¹s
initial attempt to blame foreign quarters for having instigated and
perpetrated the bombings. The 15 terrorists involved in the bombings
were Moroccans belonging to the Sirrat al-Mustaqim (the straight or
right path in English) fundamentalist group who grew up and trained
in the desperately poor neighbourhood of Sidi Moumen in eastern
Casablanca, one of many shanty towns that ring Moroccan cities; they
had no direct link to any international terrorist group despite the
regime¹s unrelenting efforts to prove otherwise. As the Moroccan
journalist, Aboubakr Jamai, editor in chief of the newsweekly, Le
Journal Hebdomadaire, affirms ³this time, all the attackers were
Moroccans. All grew up in poverty; none had been outside the
country.²(13)

Ignacio Ramonet (2000) has also observed that such violence,
unprecedented in Morocco, is the product of a mix of economic,
political and social problems that has created a deep malaise among
the country¹s young people. Many young people would now join the
Islamists who represent the only political alternatives to the
political parties in power who no longer dare protest or offer
proposals for reform. What all this means, in a few words, is that
the deplorable act of the terrorist group was in effect an
expression of the deep-seated feeling of ³despair and anger² amid
many Moroccans and, as such, a desperate reaction to the diversified
terrorist practices employed the regime for many decades against its
own people, which has eventually taken many of them to extremes.

In the aftermath of Casablanca¹s bombings, the Moroccan parliament
was reported to have passed, on 27th May 2003, a broad
anti-terrorism bill. Those familiar with the ins and outs of the
Moroccan regime did not see anything extraordinary in the bill,
simply because Morocco is not short of declared and undeclared bills
that have always given the security apparatus of the Makhzen a free
hand in detaining, torturing and executing, in extrajudicial way,
any ³suspect² of threatening the national security. In this sense,
since defining what could be ³threats to national security² is an
exclusive royal prerogative, no wonder that the palace has rushed to
impel the legislature to pass such bill that will only serve as an
additional means whereby the regime can buttress its rule.

In this sense, the so-called anti-terrorist bill, apart from its
being a mere public relations exercise, shows clearly how determined
is the regime to continue bolstering the foundations of its absolute
rule by devising further strategies to ensure its longevity and
thwart any attempts hostile to its imposed legitimacy. Nevertheless,
the fact remains that Morocco does not need more security measures,
but rather structural reforms of its political system starting from
the very monarchical regime itself. As the journalist Aboubakr Jamai
further notes, ³To fight terrorism, Morocco needs more democracy,
not less.²(14)

The state terrorism of the Moroccan regime has been a policy pursued
not only at home but also abroad. The expansionist ideology of the
³Greater Morocco² (which allegedly includes Western Sahara,
Mauritania, and parts of Algeria and Mali), was in effect the
legitimate offspring of a regime in lack of solid and
people-supported legitimacy. As a testament to the regime¹s
insatiable expansionism, Morocco launched, in 1975, an illegal and
brutal invasion of Western Sahara, which it continues to occupy in
defiance of a ruling by the International Court of Justice and a
series of UN resolutions. Having always entertained territorial
claims to its neighbours as was the case with Mauritania and parts
of Algeria (the sixties), and even Spain (the invasion of the islet
of Perejil in July 2002, to say nothing of other Spanish
territories), Morocco is the only country in the region that
considers its borders open-ended. More seriously is the fact that
the Moroccan homemade terrorism could still spill over and threaten
the stability of the entire region. (15)

It is indeed an irony that the Moroccan regime, which has been long
associated with horrendous terrorist practices against its own
people and neighbours, is seen now leaving no stone unturned to
demonstrate its credentials for joining the international
anti-terrorist campaign. What should be borne in mind, however, is
that the Moroccan regime is joining the campaign not necessarily for
the sake of any international peace and security (which the regime
has violated repeatedly), but mainly for its own sake.

First of all, the regime has never been interested in establishing
any basis for stability and security in the region let alone
somewhere else; it is still occupying illegally Western Sahara and
rejecting any peaceful solution to the conflict; furthermore, it
continues entertaining expansionist claims to the territories of its
neighbours. Secondly, since charity begins at home, the regime
should first demonstrate its interest in dealing with the root
causes of the terrorism emanating from the Kingdom itself, which is
a direct consequence of its own terrorist practices. On the whole,
what the regime is seeking, in fact, is to try to make the best use
of the anti-terrorist card in order to buttress the shaky
foundations of its rule, exactly as it did with the anti-Communist
card during the Cold War era.

The fact remains however that all measures that the regime may
choose to take in order to address the symptoms of its deep
legitimacy crisis will all be of little avail. The reason is that it
is the regime¹s inherent anti-democratic nature and state terrorist
policies that are breeding all sorts of hopelessness and despair
amid Moroccan population, especially the growing number of the
have-nots of whom many would prefer to risk their lives crossing the
Mediterranean than live under this dictatorial regime.


Conclusion

This paper has sought to look into the nature of the regime in
Morocco against the backdrop of the underlying idea of the proposed
US ³reform plan² is order to demonstrate that, before contemplating
any reforms in the country, the US Administration will necessarily
have to tackle the compelling fact that the monarchy existing in
Morocco represents a regime that owes its longevity to absolute
monarchical rule and state terrorism and that, as such, it is
inherently averse to any tangible democratic reforms.

The analysis has also shown that, despite the fact that Morocco
nominally possesses a constitution that provides for modern
institutions such as the parliament and multiparty system, the
country is still a feudal absolute monarchy underpinned by a complex
set of myths, religious and psychological concepts, which partly
explains its longevity and the ³stability² of its rule. As a result,
bearing in mind that the Moroccan society has persistently been
socialised and coerced into accepting the monarchy¹s absolute rule,
it is unlikely that the country will experience any genuine
democratic change, not least under the existing political structures
that are being used for the sole purpose of perpetuating the
monarchical system and thwarting the prospect of any real systemic
change. This is indeed a crucial issue that the Moroccan people will
have to tackle before hoping for any real change in their political
situation.

It is against this backdrop that the US Administration must realise
that, for its proposed ³reform plan² to bring forth any tangible
reforms in Morocco, it should be willing to press the authoritarian
regime there to embrace genuine structural reforms and be
accountable for the gross violations of human rights that it has
perpetrated against its own people and others. In this sense, the
regime should also be compelled to accept the holding of a
referendum in Western Sahara as the only viable democratic means
whereby the Saharawi people can exercise their internationally
recognised right to self-determination.

After all, as a democratic nation, the USA will gain nothing from
being associated with the Moroccan despotic regime, for its real
interests lie in promoting democracy, freedom, human rights and
economic development. As President Bush said, as part of the speech
mentioned at the beginning of this paper, ³American policy looked
away while men and women were oppressed, their rights ignored and
their hopes stifled. That era is over ² (16) (emphasis added). The
burden of proof clearly rests on the US Administration to
demonstrate its steadfast support to all oppressed peoples and its
zero tolerance towards all dictatorial regimes, such as the Moroccan
one, because only then can one say that the era indicated by
President Bush is really over.


Notes:

(1) See Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War on
Terror, Library of Congress, located at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html>
(retrieved 1st March 2004)

(2) Ibid.

(3) See the transcript of the speech delivered by US Secretary of
State in Marrakech, Morocco, on 3rd December 2003 located at:
<http://rabat.usembassy.gov/U.S.-Moroccan%20Relations/
transcript_Powell_Says_U.S._Supports_Morocco's_Reforms.htm>
(retrieved 4th March 2004)

(4) See ³RESULTATS DU REFERENDUM DU 13 SEPTEMBRE 1996², Moroccan
Ministry of Communication, located at
<http://www.mincom.gov.ma/french/PRC/Resultat.html> (retrieved 5th
April 2004)

(5) Cited in Campbell ³Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the
Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II.² African
Studies Quarterly 7, no.1, located at:
<http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i1a4.htm> (retrieved 2nd March
2004)

(6) Ibid.

(7) Abderrahman Youssoufi quoted in Ignacio Ramonet ³New Hope, old
Frustrations: Morocco: The Point of Change², Translated by Harry
Forster (Le Monde diplomatique) july 2000, located at:
<http://mondediplo.com/2000/07/01ramonet> (retrieved 29th March
2004)

(8) See ³Democracy and Human Rights², Embassy of the United States
of America in Morocco, located at:
<http://rabat.usembassy.gov/Themes/CivilSociety/
democracy_and_human_rights.htm>
(retrieved 9th March 2004)

(9) See Patricia Campbell ³Morocco in Transition: Overcoming the
Democratic and Human Rights Legacy of King Hassan II.² African
Studies Quarterly 7, no.1, located at:
<http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v7/v7i1a4.htm> (retrieved 2nd March
2004)

(10) See ³Freedom in the World 2003: The Annual Survey of Political
Rights & Civil Liberties², A Special Report to the 59th Session of
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Geneva, 2003

(11) See ³Human Development Reports: Morocco², located at
<http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_MAR.html> (retrieved
15th April 2004)

(12) See ³What is rotten in the Kingdom of Morocco?² Afrol News,
located at <http://www.afrol.com/articles/10331> (retrieved 15th
April 2004)

(13) See Aboubakr Jamai, ³Morocco's Choice: Openness or Terror², The
New York Times, located at:
<http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/31/opinion/
31JAMA.html?ex=1083211200&en=d5c750e641ee311b&ei=5070>
(retrieved 7th March 2004).

(14) Ibid

(15) The author would like to point out that this paper was already
in the process of elaboration when the terrorist bombings took place
in Madrid on 11th March, of which perpetrators were later identified
to be mostly of Moroccan origin.

(16) See Remarks by the President on Winston Churchill and the War
on Terror, Library of Congress, at
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html>
(1st March 2004)



Other works cited:

Bossuet, Jacques Bénigne, (1990) Politics drawn from the very words
of Holy Scripture, translated and edited by Patrick Riley, Cambridge
[England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press

Bukovansky, Mlada (2002) Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American
and French Revolutions in International Political Culture, Princeton
University Press

Hammoudi, Abdellah (1997) Master and Disciple: The Cultural
Foundations of Moroccan Authoritarianism, University of Chicago
Press

Macionis, John (2001) Society: The Basics, Upper Saddle River:
Prentice Hall. 6th edition.

Maghraoui, Abdeslam, ³Political Authority in Crisis: Mohammed VI's
Morocco² (Middle East Report 218, Spring 2001), located at:
<http://www.merip.org/mer/mer218/218_maghraoui.html> (retrieved 2nd
March 2004)

Monod, Paul Kleber, (2001), the Power of Kings: Monarchy and
Religion in Europe (1589 -1715), Yale University Press

Waltz, Susan (1995), Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of
North African Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California

Wesson, Robert (eds.) (1987), Democracy: A Worldwide Survey, New
York: Praeger Publishers.

The Constitution of Morocco adopted on September 13th, 1996.
(Moroccan Ministry of Communication¹s homepage)
<http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/state_st/constitution.htm>
(retrieved 22nd March 2004)

Morocco: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003, Released
by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 25,
2004, located at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27934.htm (retrieved 17th
March 2004)

³Background Note: Morocco², US Department of State, located at:
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431pf.htm> (retrieved 24th March
2004)

© Sidi M. Omar, 2004


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Forwarded by:
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