South Asians Against Nukes
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/SAAN_/message/924

truthout.org
12 July 2006

THE "DEAL" AND NEW DELHI'S NUCLEAR DREAMS
by J. Sri Raman

On the eve of the first anniversary of the nuclear deal between
President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, official
India has served notice of what this signified for peace and
stability in Asia. On July 9, New Delhi also provided the region and
the world unmistakable evidence of an unstated nuclear dimension of
the deal supposedly pertaining to civilian nuclear energy.

The day saw the test-firing of Agni III. Named after the Fire God
of Vedic vintage, this was to be the most advanced of India's
missiles capable of carrying and delivering nuclear warheads. The
media hype, doubtless based upon official briefing, made the repeated
claim that the successfully tested missile could target China's
Beijing and Shanghai.

The stress on the claim was in striking contrast to disclaimers
accompanying earlier tests of missiles, including the first two in
the Agni series. Particularly dismissed was the idea of Agni I and II
including - very plausibly, to say the least - targets in neighboring
Pakistan.

The range of the surface-to-surface Agni III, placed now between
3,500 and 5,000 km, was thus reported in the form of a statement of
strategic intent. The increase in the range from the 800 km of Agni I
and the 2,000 km of Agni II, both of which are already being inducted
into the Indian Army, is supposed to be qualitative as well as
quantitative. The capability of Agni III was expected to qualify
India's nuclear arsenal for description as a "credible minimum
nuclear deterrent."

What utterly lacked credibility was another claim that
accompanied the announcement of the event. The test, once scheduled
for 2004, has been postponed several times. The media, officially
briefed again, sought to make out that the postponements were due to
" US pressure" and that New Delhi was now going ahead with the test
as the deal had passed muster in Congressional committees. The
reality, however, would clearly appear to have been quite the reverse.

Only in June, it was reported that the US chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, on his visit to New Delhi, had
given India "the green signal" for the Agni III test in August, with
the "assurance" that it would not affect the US-India nuclear deal.
From the tenor of his reported response to the issue, it would not
have mattered to him unduly that the test was being conducted a month
ahead of schedule.

A series of reports, earlier and subsequent, have made it clear
that the consideration of bringing up India as a "counterweight" to
China in the region had helped consolidate opinion in the Bush
administration as well as in bipartisan forums in Congress in favor
of the deal.

The Agni III test failed, with the missile crashing into the Bay
of Bengal after a 1,000-km journey - followed, the very next day, by
the even more spectacular failure of the rocket launch of India's
communication satellite, INSAT 4C. Security analysts lamented the
failures, which they admitted were linked, though some of them had
laughed out of court peace activists who had dared to suggest that
India's space program also camouflaged its missile project. The
experts wanted India's tenacious return to the test - and none of
them anticipated any US objection.

Indeed, just two days after the test, US Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice said that "our work [on the deal] is not yet done"
and called for enabling legislation by the full bodies of both the
houses of US Congress before its summer recess scheduled to begin on
August 1. The strategic intent of the test had and continues to have
the sanction of the "strategic partnership" by which both Singh and
Bush have sworn ever since the signing of the deal.

If China was mentioned as a target in the announcement of the
missile test, the northern neighbor was also cited as the provocation
for India's nuclear-weapon tests of 1998 in one of the first official
pronouncements. Then-Defense Minister George Frernades created a
near-diplomatic situation with his observations on the "threat" from
China, and an indignant response from Beijing forced an intervention
from former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (who had raised the
first demand in the country's parliament for an Indian "answer" to
the Chinese Bomb decades earlier).

The deal has elicited vocal opposition from Vajpayee and others
of his far-right political "family." They oppose it on the ground
that it is an alleged US attempt to cap and control India's
nuclear-weapon program. If the test was meant as (among other things)
an answer to this allegation, it could not have made its point more
tellingly.

On July 18, as they celebrate the first anniversary of the deal,
New Delhi and Washington can pride themselves on the fact that they
have demonstrated its capacity to accelerate the nuclear arms race in
a continent that cries out for peace and progress.

A freelance journalist and a peace activist of India, J. Sri
Raman is the author of Flashpoint (Common Courage Press, USA). He is
a regular contributor to t r u t h o u t.

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

SOUTH ASIANS AGAINST NUKES (SAAN):
An independent information platform for
activists and scholars concerned about
Nuclearisation in South Asia
South Asians Against Nukes Website (URLs):
<http://www.s-asians-against-nukes.org>www.s-asians-against-nukes.org
http://perso.wanadoo.fr/sacw/saan/

To subscribe send a blank message to:
<saan_-subscribe@yahoogroups.com>

Disclaimer: Materials posted on this list
do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
the SAAN list admin