THE PURPOSE of the RangeVoting@... group is to serve as a communication and archival medium (bulletin board with archival storage and search capability)...
The decline and fall of the "perfect" voting scheme by CLARKE-TIDEMAN-TULLOCK ... In principle, the ultimate voting scheme would be ``honest utility voting''...
... "Extra powers come if you are a MODERATOR. Initially the only moderator is the creator of this group, Warren D. Smith. However, the moderators may decide...
... This is based on a poor interpretation of the rules. In the example cited, neither Agnew nor Nixon, alone, turned the election, so nobody pays, supposedly....
... fee. ... cited, ... the ... *together* ... each ... would ... --the rules, as you put it, *are* defective. And they are not easily fixed by making "jointly...
One criticism of Range Voting is along these lines: "Nearly everyone will vote strategically (giving each candidate either the minimum or maximum allowed...
11
Warren D. Smith
WDSmith@...
Aug 5, 2005 12:06 pm
Lance Haverkamp raised the possibility that approval voting and range voting winners are "almost always the same" and therefore, it would be pointless to ask...
The findings in my real-world poll (with Quintal & Greene) in which voters were instructed to vote "as they would if this were the real election" were (with...
How often do plurality winners and range-voting winners differ? Let C = #candidates V = #voters F = strategic voter percentage (same among both range and...
... The core concept is that voters bid for the right to name the government. I do find it unlikely that there is no way to implement this. The CTT rules may...
... --it can be implemented, but not in a way which avoids incentive to any bidder to lie. examples: If in the original Vickrey 2nd price auction secret-bid...
How much does the "granularity" of the real numbers in range voting matter? Approval voting = range voting with granularity=2. "{-1, 0, +1}-voting" = range...
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Warren D. Smith
WDSmith@...
Aug 5, 2005 11:36 pm
... --actually, you might want to consider the only known real world attack on Approval Voting, if you want to get into "attacks." Specifically, the IEEE, the ...
This post will probably be rejected by the Approval list because I have been banned, but, of course, anyone who responds to my post using Reply to All will...
19
Warren D. Smith
WDSmith@...
Aug 6, 2005 3:40 pm
... PR is the goal, in a multiwinner election, of electing a "representive" slate of legislators. For example if there are 19% blacks and they all vote for...
20
Warren D. Smith
WDSmith@...
Aug 6, 2005 4:30 pm
Jan Kok: those who claim that RV is more difficult to explain than AV, I ask you, are you saying that from your own experience? I have explained Approval...
Dan Cooper brought this fascinating paper to my attention: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/articles/kolesar.htm Robert J. Kolesar:Communism, Race, and...
... I agree that this is true for official public elections in the U.S., in the short-term. I also think that AV is the most realizable form of range voting,...
... The "range voting" system does not have the advertised property of encouraging honesty. Consider an election with three voters, Andy, Betty, and Chris; and...
... I disagree. The explanation given is true, but is unlikely, I think, to convince. My expectation is that the average voter would consider the speaker...
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Warren D. Smith
WDSmith@...
Aug 7, 2005 1:59 pm
... --sorry, I think that idea is crazy. It would lead to wild random oscillations. However, such voting systems ARE known. Here is one: simply select a...
OK, Warren, I came on this list so you don't have to send me private e- mails. That doesn't mean I won't give you a hard time - in the pursuit of Truth and...
... This got me to thinking. It would achieve the goal of truly proportional representation, averaged over a large number of elections. Is that what we...
28
Reform08@...
Aug 7, 2005 7:38 pm
A major criticism of Range Voting is that the supporters of candidate A who isn't favored or even approved by a majority of voters could defeat a more popular...
... --yes. ... --it sort of already does: the simulation emplyed a mixture of strategic and honest voters. The strategic ones vote all 99s and 0s. ... --well,...
... --yes, it is probably a good idea to recommend in the instructions explicitly that a voter rate his top candidate 99 and his bottom candidate 0. ... --yes...
... --Agreed. Plurality voting CAN have a centrist effect (both parties try to grab the central ground) but can also have an effect of suddenly electing a...
<< --it sort of already does: the simulation emplyed a mixture of strategic and honest voters. The strategic ones vote all 99s and 0s. ... You miss my point....
Suppose I get on the ballot, but I don't campaign and nobody has heard of me so they leave me unspecified. Suppose my friends and family give me a 99. Does...
... yes it does. However, this is not a problem in practice, our polling studies in the real world conclusively show. That is because in practice, a lot of...
