Nobody recorded it. We had a camcorder but without enough
"memory" for actual use...
and I *FOOLISHLY* advised a certain other guy, who was
going to bring his camcorder, that we "didn't need him to bring
it" anymore. Damn it.

VoComp was actually a lot better than I expected in term sof the
talks. (Though I had to go thru transportation hell to get there &
back. Would you believe 22 hours total travel time on the return
trip?! Just kill me now.)

Some highlights:
Doug Jones (U. of Iowa)
spoke on being an election observer for international
election treaties. Described Kazakstan and Netherlands systems.

In some ways these systems way better than the USA's but
the Kazakstan system is kind of a total "trust us please"
system with crypto designed by the KGB. If it is doing
something fraudulent, I see no way anybody would know.

WDS spoke on Range Voting, apparently highly successfully.

David Chaum spoke on "scantegrity", an impressive new framework for
secure secret-ballot voting which is in at least some ways superior
to Rivest+Smith's approaches. www.scantegrity.org .

Arthur M. Keller (UC Santa Cruz), ripped Michael Shamos a much
deserved new one about the latter's stances on how
DRE (direct recording electornicn) voting machines were all fine, so
don't worry, be happy.

Shamos himself did not show up, though he supposedly was going to.

Ron Rivest (MIT) spoke on the Rivest-Smith low-tech secure voting
protocols.

Anwar Adi (BlackBoxVoting.org) developed and demonstrated a prototype
system something like Adb Lomax's "Fax Machine + publicize the ballot
images" idea but maybe better. The idealization of voting
now is: ballots are counted, and looking over the counter's shoulder
are observers from the Dem, Repub, etc parties to make sure nothing
funny happens and they get the right totals. Adi says:
replace the observers with cheap video cameras and the counter with a
sheet feeder. The video cameras can look at everything from
10 feet away. The Dems have got their camera, the Repubs have got
theirs. Software attached to the cameras counts the votes. The
videotapes could be made public.
If for any batch of votes the Dem & Repub cameras disagree on the
totals, that batch can be recounted manually.
It works - at least if the voters fill out the ballots
nicely and don't try to mess it up, and if especially
camera-friendly ballot formats are used.

WDS also spoke on "election fraud" at the "rump session" but
had to leave to catch a plane and also they chopped the rump session
talks down to 50% of the length I'd been expecting, causing
big damage. So that part wasn't so good. I did not see the other
talks at that session since I had to run for my plane so I could
spend 22 solid hours being screwed by transportation provider mess ups
that were beyond belief.

The whole VoComp thing made it more publicly known that
secure voting protocols do exist, and are just light years ahead
of what the USA uses now in terms of guaranteed security properties.

I talked a little with a reporter but had to run for my plane and the
reporter missed the best stuff since she only came for the "rump
session." We may have made a bunch of new recruits and contacts.