Skip to search.

Breaking News Visit Yahoo! News for the latest.

×Close this window

RangeVoting · Range Voting

The Yahoo! Groups Product Blog

Check it out!

Group Information

  • Members: 178
  • Category: Other
  • Founded: Aug 4, 2005
  • Language: English
? Already a member? Sign in to Yahoo!

Yahoo! Groups Tips

Did you know...
Message search is now enhanced, find messages faster. Take it for a spin.

Home

 

Activity within 7 days:

Description

RANGE VOTING selects the winner of an N-candidate election:
(a) Each vote consists of assigning a point value from 0 to 99 to each candidate (for example, 30 points for candidate A, 64 for B etc.) The voter might give her favorite candidate a 99 and her least-favorite zero.
(b) If a voter desires to express no opinion about any particular candidate, she may assign an X instead of a point value, indicating "intentional blank."
(c) A candidate's "total score" is the average of all his non-blank scores (average = sum of points voters cast for that candidate divided by the number of voters who did not vote an X for him).
(d) Candidate with highest average wins.
(e) Candidates with too few non-X votes (even though they might have high scores) are not permitted to win.

Range voting has properties superior to other single-winner voting systems:

1) Simplicity;
2) Encourages voter honesty instead of strategy;
3) Can be done on plurality-type "dumb" voting machines;
4) Unaffected by candidate cloning;
5) Best by test in computer simulation experiments measuring Bayesian regret of different voting systems;
6) Reduces spoiled ballots and 2-party domination.

For more information please go to the Center for Range Voting. This bulletin board is the CRV's communication medium. WARNING: for many purposes, we now are trying to MIGRATE to the election science foundation GoogleGroup instead. (Also try clicking "links" or text-searching our archive.)

Most Recent Messages

  (View All)
Re: Who are the range voting (& GMJ) winners with strategic voting?
2013/5/19 WarrenS <wds@...> ... the "0 score" being an "irrational attractor" but, well, seems to me you ... I believe: 1. MJ's lower result for Le
Posted - Mon May 20, 2013 3:35 am
Jameson Quinn
homunq
Send Email Send Email
Re: Who are the range voting (& GMJ) winners with strategic voting?
2013/5/19 WarrenS <wds@...> ... Unlike with "0", we have no evidence that the attractor for bottom-rating is irrational. The numbers for "reject"
Posted - Mon May 20, 2013 3:20 am
Jameson Quinn
homunq
Send Email Send Email
Re: Who are the range voting (& GMJ) winners with strategic voting?
http://www.rangevoting.org/OrsayTable.html also discusses Balinski & Laraki's France 2007 MJ poll experiment. The "irrational attractor" for 0 score still
Posted - Sun May 19, 2013 7:49 pm
WarrenS
warren_d_smi...
Send Email Send Email
Re: Who are the range voting (& GMJ) winners with strategic voting?
... --Re David Duke, see http://www.rangevoting.org/LizVwiz.html Among {Roemer, Edwards, Duke}, Duke was the average-based-range and approval loser. Roemer was
Posted - Sun May 19, 2013 6:54 pm
WarrenS
warren_d_smi...
Send Email Send Email
Re: Who are the range voting (& GMJ) winners with strategic voting?
2013/5/19 WarrenS <wds@...> ... GMJ can also be better if the lesser strategic incentive leads to less strategy. I guess this will be the case, but
Posted - Sun May 19, 2013 5:35 pm
Jameson Quinn
homunq
Send Email Send Email
Add RangeVoting to your personalized My Yahoo! page Add to My Yahoo! XML What's This?

Message History

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2013 61 30 94 122 71
2012 12 27 13 6 4 5 5 47 11 12 48 69
2011 40 37 55 40 102 80 42 45 56 37 6 37
2010 74 208 149 193 149 156 153 131 154 73 157 151
2009 255 191 328 169 216 258 192 336 217 258 309 177
2008 195 315 341 302 330 411 174 168 154 300 349 390
2007 458 329 388 412 226 505 413 255 309 139 121 123
2006 8 4 24 5 28 129 66 98 76 446 598 482
2005 323 288 194 52 116

Copyright © 2010 Yahoo! Inc. All rights reserved.
Privacy Policy - Terms of Service - Guidelines NEW - Help