The Center for Defense Information
The Weekly Defense Monitor

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VOLUME 4, ISSUE #47 November 30,
2000
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1. Losing the Forest for the Trees
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research,
dsmith@...

Like "K" in Franz Kafka's "The Castle," we may wonder if there's
someone real -- and really in charge of missile defense -- in the
castle called the Pentagon.

One of the central themes of Franz Kafka's "The Castle" is the
discovery that there is no reliable, solid communications link
between the real world and the occupants of the Castle to which he
believes he has been summoned to work as a land surveyor.

Surveying the landscape that is the U.S. missile defense program,
the same aura of insubstantial whimsey seems to pervade. And
even when a soul from the "real" world seems to get a line that
connects to the Castle, what one finally gets is a busy signal,
static, or a recording that simply recycles the caller through
endless connections and reiterations of choices that lead to
frustration.

A perfect example is the Pentagon's response to a letter from MIT
physicist Theodore Postol. Dr. Postol presented evidence that
called into question the interpretation of the results of an early
national missile defense test designed to tell the difference
between a real warhead and a decoy. The first response from the
Pentagon was, "We wouldn't be spending a billion dollars -- billions
of dollars on developing a National Missile Defense System unless
we had some degree of confidence that we can make that
discrimination and make it in time to be useful." The second
response was to classify Dr. Postol's letter and the
scientific/mathematical enclosures he submitted to buttress his
position.

Even the third try was only partially successful. Philip Coyle, who
as Director of the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and
Evaluation has been unafraid to criticize NMD, said in an interview
with PBS' "Newshour With Jim Lehrer" that there is no evidence
that tests were rigged. But he also acknowledged that while
"testing has been as realistic as we know how at this point of the
program...tests to date have not been operationally realistic."

The "who's in charge" question is more evident when one surveys
the multiplicity of theater missile defense systems. The Army has
the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and the Theater High
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The Navy has the Theater
Wide (NTW) and Area Theater Missile Defense (NAD) programs.
The Air Force contribution is the Airborne Laser (ABL) and, with
BMDO, the Space-Based Laser (SBL). PAC-3 and NAD are being
developed to knock out shorter range, lower flying ballistic missiles
such as Scuds. THAAD and NTW are designed essentially to take
on longer range, higher trajectory missiles in mid-flight or even in
the descent phase. The ABL and SBL are oriented against rockets
still in the ascent (boost) phase.

The Navy, however, believes that it will be able to get its NTW
system closer to enemy missile launch points and thus will also be
able to knock down missiles during boost phase before higher
speeds are achieved. In this role, NTW becomes a rival for ABL
and SBL. But the Navy programs suffered a double hit in July. In a
test of the NTW's Standard Missile 3, a "complication" occurred
when the third stage did not separate. Projected purchases of NAD
missiles reportedly will be virtually halved -- to 134 instead of last
year's programmed 240 missiles -- over the Future Years Defense
Plan (FYDP -- FY2001-2007). The longer range plan does provide
for purchasing the planned 1,500 missiles, but this is still short of
the 2,100 the Navy wants.

How much are these programs costing the taxpayer? Before
answering that question, one should note that, in March of this
year, General Ronald Kadish, the current head of the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization, said something his predecessors
never did -- that more money (he advocated over half a billion
dollars for Fiscal Year 2001) might speed the deployment of the
Army and Navy systems.

In May the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the
House of Representatives each passed a $310 billion authorization
bill for military programs for Fiscal Year 2001. For the tactical
missile defense programs mentioned above, the committees'
actions pushed funding to over $2.1 billion. The Administration's
request, General Kadish's recommendations, and the committees'
work break out as follows (in millions):


Request BMDO Senate House
Add On Authorized Authorized
PAC-3 $446.5 $112.2 $446.5 $511.7
NAD $274.2 $103 $274.2 $274.2
THAAD $549.9 $150 $549.9 $549.9
NTW $382.7 $160 $442.7 $407.7
ABL $148.6 -- $241.0 $231.0
SBL $137.7 -- $167.7 $137.7

TOTALS $1,939.6 +$525.2 $2,122.0 $2,112.2

BMDO appropriations follow a similar pattern. The Administration
request compared to the Senate-House conference committee
report is (in millions):

Request Conference Report

PAC-3 $446.5 $446.5
NAD $274.2 $274.2
THAAD $549.9 $549.9
NTW $382.7 $462.7
ABL $148.6 $233.6
SBL $137.7 $147.7

TOTALS $1,939.6 $2,114.6

In addition, the FY2000 supplemental provided $125 million for PAC-
3 "unfunded requirements."

But there is more to the story. The Army has or is involved in a
total of six anti-ballistic missile programs:

* Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2). PAC-2, already deployed
and sold to a number of U.S. allies, recently was discovered to
have a major operational defect: leaving it on active alert status for
long time periods causes failure in a radio frequency data link. How
extensive the problem is -- and thus the cost of fixing it -- is still
being assessed. Taiwan plans to test fire its PAC-2 next year to
see how it performs in a subtropical climate.

* Guidance Enhanced Missile-Plus or GEM+, an upgrade to PAC-
2. The Army is spending at least $47 million on GEM+ to improve
the PAC-2 missile guidance system.

* PAC-3. The sixth PAC-3 test, a success, finally occurred in late
July after being postponed for safety reasons. It featured a cruise
missile target flying below 40,000 feet. (Cruise missiles typically fly
well under 1,000 feet, but the exact test altitude is classified.) The
follow-on test now set for September will pit a PAC-3 against a
ballistic missile type target and a PAC-2 against a simulated
cruise target. The Army has already bought 52 PAC-3 missiles,
including 32 in FY2000 for just under $154 million ($4.8 million
each), and was to buy 40 more in FY2001. But rising program
costs -- the General Accounting Office last summer put the
increase at 77% to $6.9 billion compared to the 1994 projected
price tag of $3.9 billion -- may cut the FY2001 buy to 32 missiles
and slice the number of launchers from 22 to six.

Originally, the Army wanted 1,200 missiles. By FY2000 this had
been scaled back to 1,012. Now, according to the trade publication
Defense Week, BMDO's latest budget roadmap funds a mere 240
missiles (instead of an anticipated 528) over the FYDP and a
program total of only 724. Meanwhile, the head of the Army's
missile program predicts that "cost reduction incentives" will lower
the per missile price to roughly $2.3 million, allowing the Army to
buy as many as 500 more missiles which, with the original 1,200,
would have put the Army within striking distance of the number
they really want -- 2,200. Taiwan wants to buy six PAC-3 batteries
which, if approved, could lower costs further. When operational, the
U.S. system will control both the PAC-2 interceptors targeted
against aircraft and PAC-3 missiles targeted against cruise and
ballistic missiles. Deployment of the first complete system is
scheduled for late summer 2001.

* The Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). A
multinational effort, MEADS is more mobile, transportable, and
versatile than PAC-3. MEADS features 360 degree radar coverage
and defense against aircraft, cruise, and theater ballistic missiles.
MEADS is touted as the mid-range air defense system for the
Army's new medium weight combat brigade being tested at Fort
Lewis, Washington. Yet only two years ago the program almost
died because the U.S. was unwilling to provide its share of the
money to keep development going. A technology risk-reduction
contract (for $220 million) was due to be signed this autumn but at
last word is still being held up over Defense and State Department
clearances for Lockheed Martin to transfer technology to its
European partners. For FY2001 the Administration requested $63.2
million but only $53.5 million was authorized. The target date for
initial fielding using the PAC-3 missile is 2008.

* HUMRAAM (medium range air-to-air missile on a high mobility
multipurpose vehicle). The HUMRAAM is also being advertised as
a "new" air defense concept that complements the short range
heat-seeking anti-aircraft Stinger missile and MEADS. The radar
guided HUMRAAM would be used against cruise missiles,
helicopters hovering beyond range of the Stinger, and unmanned
aircraft, thereby freeing MEADS to counter ballistic missile threats.
Interestingly, while the Army is just starting to mount a modified air-
to-air missile on a ground vehicle, the Marines have been
developing a similar concept and Egypt is planning to buy ground
vehicles for mounting anti-missile missiles. The Army has not yet
said how much it is willing to commit to start its program.

* Arrow, a joint U.S.-Israeli project. Arrow is the first specifically
designed anti-missile system to be fielded. The Arrow 2's effective
range of 16 to 48 km from its launch point at altitudes between 10
to 40 km overlap the PAC-3 and THAAD. The system achieved full
operational status in March, but the U.S. remains involved in
system improvements. In FY2000 the U.S. allocated $82.7 million
with another $53 million authorized for FY2001. Overall, some 60%
of the program's $1.3 billion cost to date has been paid by the
United States, which expects to use data and technology from the
Arrow program for THAAD and NTW.

To all the above must be added the Army's kinetic energy anti-
satellite technology program, the Space-Based Laser, and the U.S.-
Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) program to counter low
flying rockets such as the Russian built 122mm Katyushas. In
July, at White Sands Missile range, THEL hit a target rocket in
flight for the first time. But the U.S. will not procure THEL, mainly
because it is too difficult to transport -- it requires 6 vans. The
United States, which has agreed to pay two-thirds of the cost, has
already contributed $145 million while Israel has put in $70 million.
Raytheon, the system manufacturer, is obligated to pick up 50% of
any cost overruns. So far the system has cost $250 million, and
Israel has added $7 million for the next test against multiple
targets. The FY2000 supplemental provided $5.7 million for THEL,
and the FY2001 Authorization bill provided an additional $30 million
for U.S. Army High Energy Laser research.

So what does it all come to? Adding National Missile Defense (at
$1.875 billion), associated sensors (Space Based InfraRed
Systems -- Low and High at $810 million), and Air Force TMD and
BMDO "technical operations" (at $311 million) to the theater
missile defense programs detailed above, brings the total ballistic
missile defense effort in the FY2001 Authorization Bill (PL 106-398)
$5.112 billion.

Is anybody listening?




Bruce K. Gagnon
Coordinator
Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space
PO Box 90083
Gainesville, FL. 32607
(352) 337-9274
http://www.space4peace.org
globalnet@...