East African nations agree to common market trade deal

Leaders from five East African nations have signed a common market treaty.

BBC News, 20 November 2009

The presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have agreed to the free movement of people and goods across the region.

It is hoped that the deal will lead to greater economic clout for the region. The common market is due to come into effect by July 2010.

The East African Community was launched 10 years ago and has a population of 120 million.

The BBC's Will Ross in Nairobi said there had been fears that Kenya, as the economic heavyweight, would dominate.

So until recently Kenya had still been subject to taxes as a way of helping the other countries' industries catch up.

Some analysts suggest that when the agreement becomes operational, Tanzania could be swamped by the better trained workers from neighbouring Kenya.

Our correspondent says businesses in the region are frustrated with the amount of bureaucracy and are pushing for governments to do more to promote trade.

The signing of this common market agreement coincides with the tenth anniversary of the East Africa Community.

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Crossing into Israel, African migrants dodge Egyptian bullets, Israeli jail threat

Egyptian border guards have shot and killed at least 15 migrants since May, prompting an outcry from human rights watchers. African immigrants increasingly use a path into Israel that goes through Egypt.

from the November 14, 2009 edition

Cairo, Egypt - When Amank decided to attempt to cross the Egyptian border into Israel, he wasn't thinking about the likelihood that Egyptian guards would shoot at him. He knew the danger existed, but his main focus was escaping dire economic prospects and rampant discrimination as an off-the-books housecleaner in Cairo.

"I was thinking [about life] after this danger," explains the Sudanese refugee in the office of refugee legal aid group, AMERA. Dressed in a neatly pressed shirt, the slight man with expressive eyes did not want to use his real name for safety reasons. "If I cross, my life will be better."

Many asylum-seekers are making the same cost-benefit calculations with deadly results. After a six-month respite in fatalities, at least 15 Africans have been shot and killed trying to cross the 160-mile border since May. Hundreds of others are in detention, in what analysts believe is the result of a migration spike from Eritrea and a clampdown on an alternative route into Europe.

The Egyptian government has defended its policy of firing on border-crossers as a matter of national security. It says it warns people before opening fire. A week after the September statement, prompted by the outcry of human rights organizations, another Eritrean was killed.

Legally, "to use live ammunition to shoot people simply because they are leaving has no justification at all," says Michael Kagan, senior international human rights law fellow at the American University in Cairo. He notes that a lack of reported killings since the September statement does not signal a shift in Egyptian policy. "What's most remarkable is that the Egyptians really don't think that they're doing anything wrong," he says.

 Dropped near the border, told to run

Like a river with two branches, African asylum-seekers and migrants are funneled through Sudan seeking safe passage to Israel or Italy. The path to Italy continues through Libya and embarks by boat.

On the other path to Israel, migrants are taken through Sudan, into Egypt, and across the Sinai desert in groups, paying between $300 and $3,000 for the journey, depending on their starting country. Armed Bedouins run the Sinai ring, changing vehicles in the dark and hiding refugees under blankets in truck beds during checkpoints. Asylum-seekers reach the border in the early hours of the morning.

Dropped roughly half a mile from the border, the smugglers tell them to run without slowing. If spotted, they come under fire from border guards.

Amank was spotted. But when the guards shot at him, they didn't aim to kill. Instead, he, his wife, and their two young children cowered on the ground as guards shot circles around their bodies. Charged with "infiltration," he spent the next 15 months in Egyptian prisons. He says he has no idea what happened to his wife and children.

Earlier this summer, the combination of a crackdown on the route through Libya and an increase of Eritrean migration put renewed strains on the Israeli border as desperate Africans sought to cross.

Mr. Kagan, who has done previous work on the protection of refugees in Egypt, says that pressure from either side to stem the inflow of refugees creates an environment "where essentially if they want to deter migrants from coming, they have an incentive to be as harsh as possible."

The harsh measures, reinforced in 2009, were initially adopted in June 2007 after a meeting between Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Israel's then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert at Sharm el-Sheikh. According to a recent Human Rights Watch report, in July 2007, Olmert announced the two countries had reached an "understanding" to handle the increasing numbers of "infiltrators" trying to cross into Israel. For their part, the Israelis instituted a policy of "coordinated returns," in which migrants caught within 72 hours of arriving in their country can be rounded up and pushed back over the border to Egypt. For theirs, the Egyptian border patrol began a shoot-on-sight policy. Both countries claim national security concerns as the basis behind their policies.

Migrant who was shot at would try again

Both Israel and Egypt will put African migrants they catch in their territories in prison, but Israel also returns some to Egypt.

Despite the danger, Amank says he would try the crossing again in a heartbeat, "because living here is like living in hell." Refugees are not legally allowed employment in Egypt.  

"When someone goes there and finds a better life, of course they will call their friends and tell them you have to leave that hell and come here," he says.

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Rwanda: Parliament May Summon Kamanzi Over Nile Pact

Edwin Musoni

20 November 2009

Kigali — Deputy Speaker of Parliament Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo has requested MPs to back his proposal to summon Environment Minister Stanislas Kamanzi, over the failure of Nile Basin member states to sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA).

Ntawukuriryayo made the request while tabling a report he compiled from meeting Speakers of Parliament from the nine riparian countries of the Nile Basin held in Egypt last July.

The meeting aimed at calling on parliamentary speakers to push their respective countries to sign the CFA.

The pact seeks to seal the transition of the basin that has been existing for 10 years and would establish a permanent Nile River Basin Commission through which member countries will act together to manage and develop the resources of the Nile.

"During the meeting, Egypt turned up with a very big delegation that aimed at lobbying Speakers to convince their governments not to sign the agreement; this was their secret strategy," said Ntawukuriryayo.

"Rwanda clearly sent out the message informing the participants that this agreement should be signed in the shortest time possible," he added.

So far, seven out of nine Nile Basin countries have expressed interest in having the pact signed.

However, Egypt and Sudan have deliberately refused and at a certain point, blocked the progress towards the signing of the treaty.

The reluctance to adopt the pact arose from Article 14 (b) in the draft agreement that talks about the Nile water security.

The two governments of Egypt and Sudan fretted over the article and this issue has remained unresolved with both countries insisting on rephrasing it.

Besides, the two upstream countries want the 1929 Nile Treaty signed between the British and the Egyptian governments to be considered.

Recently, Minister Kamanzi said that the seven countries may consider signing the pact without Egypt and Sudan - a move that may deepen the controversy.

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Ethiopia: the enduring food crisis and legal politics of the Nile River

(By Tadesse Kassa, Doctoral Research Fellow, University of Oslo)

The enduring state of deprivation and vulnerability in which the state of Ethiopia placed itself has for decades been the subject of intense media exposure and unenthusiastic reflection. In contrast to civilizations that prospered in a midst of turbulence, for over a century, Ethiopia performed shoddily in nearly all key indexes impinging on the development of the single most vital sector that profoundly affected the lives of millions of its population: agriculture. Its farming remained prehistoric, crops failed regularly, and draught and famine have simply recurred. The portrayal of its image can barely be any worse that today, in all fitting discourses, famine literatures have securely positioned Ethiopia along with the great famines of the mid-20th Century in China, India, Bangladesh, the Biafra province of Nigeria and later, in the Sudan.

The scale and impact of the privation had varied. Since the incidence of the worst episode-the Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1892, the prevalence of hunger, typically absorbed in pockets of northern Ethiopia, has gradually but unabatedly, broadened its horizons. If sporadically, it has claimed the lives of its citizenry, destabilised the demographic composition of its communities, and even more, has gravely challenged the social and economic fabric of its existence.

And decades of an interminable state of food insecurity has exposed the nation to appeal for a progressively more benevolent handout of the international community. As with the preceding regimes, the ethical dilemma and political implications of the misfortune have been dreadfully colossal that only recently, the Federal Government had to engage in contemptible media crusade that merely endeavoured to trim down the count of `millions' affected by the food shortages.

A blend of causes associated with human-ecological imbalance, land degradation and misguided government policies account for the predicament. The subsistence nature of agriculture exclusively relying on the munificence of an erratic rainfall pattern has furthermore exacerbated the trouble.

The distasteful irony of the experience is however that the national challenge has routinely `befallen unto the land of antique civilization' endowed with a unique set of hydrologic configuration and an incredible mass of water resources relative to its human demand. The Blue Nile River basin alone, the unfailing spectacle that sprang from the outlying fountainhead of the Gish Abay stream in Sacala district of Gojjam, and yielded precious waters since the dawn of human history, discharges as huge a volume as 49.5 BCM of annual average at the Rosaries, just across the Ethio-Sudanese border, and swanks more than 2 million hectares of potentially irrigable land. Ethiopian mean contribution to the main Nile's surge through the three head streams, the Sobat, the Abay, and the Atbara-Tekeze has been computed at 68.7 BCM of waters at Aswan, i.e. 82 percent of the entire Nile flow.

In spite of nature's rare bequest and the vast potentials of the river in reinvigorating growth, sadly, the complexion of Ethiopia's irrigational infrastructure and farming practices lagged far behind developments in Egypt and Sudan. While the annual inundations of `our river' presented the foundation of one of the most stable and structured eco-political society of human history in the lower most reaches and unceasingly sustained the world's single-largest agricultural scheme at the Gezira, the state of Ethiopia basically remained a bystander, too feeble to nourish its own people.

Officially and in public opinion, the lasting misfortune has partly been appreciated as a direct corollary of a legal snag instituted by British colonial administration, political vacillation, inert visionary acumen and sheer failure of the successive Ethiopian governments to capitalize on packed prospects of its wealth, including the Blue Nile River. Sequences of policies and strategies designed at different epochs with a view to deflecting hunger and guaranteeing food security at household levels have in point of fact failed.

No doubt, the thwarting state of affairs and the ensuing moral annihilation has confronted the good conscience of its citizenry. Whereas it is for the learned government functionaries to design a national scheme which tenders an immediate and realistic resolution, at least, in so far as part of the key way-out proffered by the Nile River resource and prospective chances of its utilization is concerned, nothing short of an aggressive, astutely considered policy and political subtlety can secure Ethiopia's emancipation.

Developing full potentials of the Blue Nile has never been an easy commission for any of the regimes in Ethiopia. The fragile composition of the Nile basin establishment has continued to impose legal, political and financial constraints, and to impede exploitation of the Nile resources not only in Ethiopia, but also in the East and Central African riparian states. Evidently, the precedent established by British era imperial water diplomacy had inflicted irreparable damage.

Throughout its colonial tenure as overseer of Egyptian and Sudanese concerns, London had assiduously worked on and dismissively deduced from the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 1902 signed with Emperor Menelik II that Ethiopia, `barely endowed with any irrigational interests to defend', was obliged to completely refrain from laying any water control work on or across the Blue Nile and its tributaries, the scale of any such construction notwithstanding. The manipulative legal scheme was part of a broader imperial design that projected to promote its geo-political position in the Suez Canal, and in chorus, meet the craves of its Lancashire textile industries for stable cotton supplies. The dominant thinking at the Foreign Office had then reasoned that the economic prospects of the colonies of Egypt and Sudan as well as the competitive advantages of the British cotton industry, then a dominant pillar of its capitalist enterprise, could not be realized without a treaty stipulation that espouses an exclusive downstream user rights.

Predictably, of course, the independence of Egypt and Sudan came about with an even more reinvigorated monopolistic perception that has to date continued to put the two states at odds with Ethiopia and the rest of the riparian states. Irrigational expansions, colossal land reclamations and industrial developments consuming sizable proportions of Nile waters have been resurrected against rising discontent and confront over rights of water use.

Likewise, nearly all development projections along the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia have routinely instigated a bubbling row in downstream diplomatic front, and occupied a foreward position in regional hydropolitics.

Quite obviously, Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt have historically harboured a perturbed relations. Since the earliest years of Emperor Haileselassie, Ethiopia has in fact espoused an external relations `policy' that did disservice to long standing hydraulic interests of the downstream states.

All the same, camouflaged by political niceties that endeavoured to play down the presence of deep-seated incongruence between the underlying values that steer national policies, the crest of the political leaderships in Egypt and Sudan has untiringly worked on and effectively relegated Ethiopia's positions.

Naturally, this lamentable proprietory perception deeply engrained in the psyche of downstream political establishment can not be expected to falter with out effort and sombre provocation. And the million dollar question has been how precisely Ethiopia shall pursue prospective juridical dealings in the basin.

A new regional arrangement may soon be in place impacting on the customary patterns of use of the Nile river resources. For what it is worth, the pleasant resilience unveiled in contemporary basin-wide diplomacy working on institutional and legal framework, and accompanied by novel thinking over issues of use and allocation of the river's resource, has constituted a hitherto unparalleled forum where time-honoured position of the Ethiopian state can potentially be staked eloquently.

Egypt and Sudan have tended to get to terms with new realities of the global political order. The increasingly international orientation of their water policies, mostly dictated by adoption of a sensible approach that only closer economic and political association would ultimately guarantee their stable water use patterns, and to a measure, by progressive development of the rules and principles governing transboundary rivers, has generally drawn-in a pale optimism over some sort of regional water utilization accord.

With stakes so high and views so divergent, the Nile basin states have vigorously struggled to draw up a charter composing the rights and obligations of the riparian states and regulating collective uses of the resource. Details of this clandestine diplomatic undertaking have largely been kept confidential. A recent Ministerial Conference of the Nile basin countries, only one of such numerous meetings held in the past decade, concluded a landmark gathering in the D.R. Congo adopting a legal framework constituted in 39 articles, and deferring one provision over which the water ministers failed to find a middle ground. In a four months period, the heads of states of the riparian countries are expected to proffer the ultimate verdict on the future of the majestic river.

After one full century of rough treatment, the regional diplomatic discourse appeared to present Ethiopia with an inimitable opportunity of dealing with the legal and political predicaments involving the Nile River, and bid farewell to old accounts of disagreement and mistrust. If judiciously exploited, the occasion can potentially herald novel perspectives where the resource is no longer viewed as causing stacks of nuisance to the nation's security, stability and international association.

For millions of Ethiopians, though, a theme of great speculation remains: if the country's sovereign interest has been constructively represented in the ongoing negotiations and where it does, how.

The Nile River resource is as such too scarce to meet the stoutly competing claims of all the riparian states. It is only natural to assume that the regional initiative has gone through complex and painful political processes thus far.

Yet, when it comes to the composition of the legal framework due to be endorsed in four months time by heads of states, it has to be duly spotlighted that Ethiopia's long term strategic gains and immediate state of agricultural despair would barely call for vaguely constructed political compromises attended by hyperbolical doctrines and pledges. Nothing short of a concrete legal prescription and a modus operandi that indisputably settles or otherwise recognizes Ethiopia's fair share of the Nile inundations can recompense the damage and utter deprivation it has for long sustained.

The political leadership's involvement shall seriously be tapered along this course. In particular, in its final dealings with Egypt, Great Britain's undeviating progeny in convoluted water diplomacy skills, the Federal Government has two or so lessons to draw on.

First, in the interest of transparency, accountability and legitimacy, the Government should endeavour to guarantee that no single provision of the framework agreement will be endorsed before it is subjected to adequate public and professional scrutiny. It only suffices to remind that on two occasions when this requirement had been flagrantly circumvented and Ethiopia was rushed in to tying an accord on the Nile, it had only paid so dearly and found itself in diluted legal and political position.

In the immediate aftermath of conclusion of the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of May 1902, a defectively composed Article III where in Emperor Menelik II purportedly undertook to `refrain from constructing any hydraulic works which shall block the flow of the river' had provided the UK, then a colonial power over Sudan and Egypt, more than an opening for making out a highly contentious case. In deed, in the ensuing decades, the UK successfully marshalled the accord in all diplomatic forums and effectively stifled Emperor Haileselassie's aspirations for irrigational and hydropower development in Ethiopia.

In particular, in the mid 1920's when Ethiopia was engaged in intimate association with an American company, the J G White Engineering Corporation, and was on the edge of realizing the Tana Dam Project through a concessionary bargain, the vast power and influence of Great Britain was more than enough to sway both the US government and the Company's executives that in view of the 1902 Treaty, the White Engineering Corporation could not develop the Tana scheme nor any other water control works along the Blue Nile course with out British sanction and participation. In consequence, Ethiopia missed a great opportunity that could have carved the hydro-political configuration of the basin differently than is noted today.

Of course, the Emperor had constantly been aware that the contemporaneous British perceptions and initiatives solely intended to meet the economic and political necessities of the downstream states, and had in consequence disputed the legal basis on which UK's claims had been formulated.

Yet, in spite of four full-decades of exigent post-Treaty diplomatic wrestle with a domineering colonial neighbor, the agreement's overtone was too sturdy that his efforts to defend his nation's legitimate causes had ended in complete wreck. With the independence of Egypt and the Sudan, attended by a bilateral treaty and a complete set of hydraulic and irrigational developments on the ground, Ethiopia's position has even degenerated.

A similar co-notational qualm recurred shortly after Egypt and Ethiopia, potential woes in prospective Nile waters development claims, hurriedly signed a cooperative accord in July 1991. Under Article IV of the pact, the parties agreed to gear and define their respective rights in accordance with the core principles of international water resources law. In chorus, Article V emphatically required both parties `to refrain from engaging in any activity related to the Nile waters that may cause appreciable harm to the interest of the other party.'
Although the initiative to restructure and reconcile Ethio-Egyptian relations and thereby institute equitable pattern of water uses was a commendable commission, the ensuing developments have simply revealed that in anticipating genuine and swift changes in seasoned Egyptian policies, the Ethiopian Government had in deed displayed an act of naivety and imprudence.
Egyptian authorities disconnected the overall context of the 1991 Agreement, maneuvered to highlight only the fitting parts, and campaigned to read the accord as restricting Ethiopia's rights of undertaking development projects that adversely affect the River's flow down the stream. Two-pronged dialogues foreseen under the deal were never held, nor a joint technical commission projected to work on the details of the arrangement established. If only belatedly, of course, the Ethiopian Government had grasped Egypt's wicked diplomatic machination and furiously snapped against its bad faith and streamlined ploy. If anything, the incident was more than an exemplary lesson that trading with a cunning and intransigent regional power requires a far more subtlety.
Today, where the basin states have found themselves at the crossroads of an important historical juncture where a comprehensive legal regime regulating the Nile River is about to be adopted, the diplomatic and juridical dexterity is even more imperative. With out a display of political prudence and wide-ranging professional scrutiny, there is no guarantee that the proposed regional agreement on future utilization of the Nile River in the ten riparian states would not fall prey to Egyptian veiled plot, and once again distress Ethiopia's interests.
The Nile has always remained a collective jewel of all the riparian states. It is quite evident, however, that in bilateral and international discourses, only Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have genuinely battled for factual and legal control of the resource. It is not therefore astounding that under the regional initiative working on a basin wide framework, Ethiopia alone has constantly found itself at odds with positions advocated by Sudan and Egypt.

One issue of unending contention has been the fate of old colonial agreements. In defense of its legitimate claims, and quite naturally so, Ethiopia has for decades looked to contentiously structured and vaguely defined principles of international law governing the use of trans-boundary water resources. In ordered diplomatic altercation, it has campaigned to obliterate downstream misconception that it is endowed with adequate rainfall, and had repeatedly called for rectification of the inequitable use of the Nile resources. Although the exact setting and prominence of the principle is still contested, it has in multiple forums demanded Egypt and Sudan to unequivocally embrace the principle of equitable utilization. Its Nile related development strategy has generally been premised on the fundamental assumption that if any, limitations against Ethiopia's freedom of use of the river's resources shall only stem from the new international legal order, hence deriding all colonial-era treaty undertakings and `self-proclaimed prescriptive quotas' of any substantive import.

For Egypt, on the other hand, the `sanctity of the established pattern of water use' has simply been as paramount as the question of its own existence. Two water sharing agreements signed with Great Britain in 1929 and the Sudan in 1959 and Ethiopia's utter state of absence from the scene have so far done the job. In fact, beyond the `quota' it has traditionally enjoyed under the 1959 Agreement with Sudan, the execution of new agricultural land reclamation programs in the Toshka and Sinai districts has skyrocketed its total annual water requirements to about 70 BCM, i.e. only slightly lesser than the entire average annual surge of the Nile River. With in the regional initiative, a `clean slate' approach under any guise would therefore leave the extensive irrigation and hydraulic works developed over a century without adequate security. It can barely permit the new framework to supersede the old treaties unless the framework entitles it to water security of at least the volume it has customarily drawn on.

In legal parlance, this can be achieved in several ways, and most notably, by demanding basin states to officially recognize a quantified volume of waters or by inserting in a treaty an express stipulate urging contracting parties `not to cause significant harm' against each other. This downstream conception, invariably employed by states with already established irrigational and hydraulic works, effectively forestalls impending dangers occasioned through unilateral withdrawal of waters by late-coming states situated upstream, including of course, Ethiopia.

Ethiopia's stand on the fate of the old colonial agreements should be unequivocal. It had simply endured enough ill treatment in the past century that the new arrangement shall not be allowed to serve, even obliquely, as instrument of continued legitimacy of downstream stakes at its own expenses. How this can in fact be achieved and what approach is adopted in a particular scenario is simply left for assessment of duly appointed government negotiators who enjoy access to substantive details of the prospective accord.

By way of caution, though, it can be pointed that if Ethiopia's high stakes are to be satisfied and the new document is to represent something more than ostentatious political demonstration, the framework arrangement shall not be stuffed with pompous and controvertible principles which shall call for decades of clarification before the nation can draw on its natural waters.

Whereas it remains a pity that the legal framework will not be structured in a mode that expressly quantifies Ethiopia's equitable shares, future institutional dealings must certainly be geared along this course. If lofty principles are incorporated, and inevitably they would, extensive orientation should be sought beforehand to grasp their precise contents and ramifications in contemporary international water resources law discourse, and most importantly, the imminence of the concept of `equitable utilization' over the principle that advocates the `duty not to cause harm' must be explicitly hammered out.

It is evident that Ethiopia's legitimate share can be guaranteed only if Egypt and Sudan, who currently consume the entire annual flood, consent to proportional reduction of their water uses. If Ethiopia shall evocatively benefit from the scheme, any endeavour that works on equitable shares of the Ethiopian state shall not overplay the relative impact of prior uses and established hydraulic structures down the stream. Without unwarranted prejudice to legitimate water security concerns of Egypt and Sudan, existing facilities and precedents of use shall make out only one of the manifold factors conjointly considered in the process of determining equitable benefits.

And as such, Ethiopia must vigorously advocate a position that would ultimately secure as much water as is practical, in relative terms, and clutch the resource base materially used to rid itself from the cycle of drought and famine that has for long defined its existence.

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The Scent of Money and the Stench of Corruption

Tue, 09/08/2009 - 8:56am

When there is a chance to push a big loan out the door, some people just can't say no. Every World Bank President since James Wolfensohn has committed to fight the cancer of corruption. For more than ten years, the Bank has talked the talk, but has not walked the walk. In April, an internal evaluation gave the institution the lowest possible grade for its anti-corruption efforts. As if to prove the point, the World Bank is now considering support for a multi-billion dollar project which squarely violates its procurement guideline and shows all red flags of corruption: the Gibe 3 Dam in Ethiopia.

With a price tag of $1.7 billion, Gibe 3 is the biggest dam and possibly the largest infrastructure project in Ethiopia's history. According to scientists working in the region, the dam will push the fragile ecosystems of the Lower Omo Valley and Lake Turkana to the brink of collapse and undermine the livelihoods of 500,000 people. In July 2006 the Ethiopian power utility EEPCO awarded the contract for Gibe 3 to Salini Costruttori, an Italian construction company, without any competitive bidding.

According to Transparency International (TI), public works are the world's most corrupt sector, with higher corruption risks than even oil and arms trade. No-bid contracts are an open invitation to bribery in this environment, and international competitive bidding is the most basic measure to curb corruption. "Open, public competition must be the rule and the actual practice for all procurement decisions above a relatively low value threshold; any exceptions should be possible only in truly exceptional circumstances (e.g. natural disasters)", argues Michael Wiehen, a former World Bank director and board member of TI, in a paper on dams and corruption.

Ethiopia's federal public procurement directive requires competitive bidding for large public work contracts. EEPCO argues that the directive allows for no-bid contracts in the case of unforeseen emergencies. This is certainly not the case for Gibe 3. In 2004, the utility already awarded a large contract for the Gibe 2 Dam to the same company without any competitive bidding. Salini had proposed Gibe 2 without as much as a feasibility study, and the project did not figure on EEPCO's priority list. It has since suffered long construction delays.

The Italian export credit agency SACE has refused to lend support for the Gibe 3 Dam. Reason also seemed to keep the upper hand at the World Bank. In January 2009, a Bank manager informed the Bank Information Center: "The Government was also considering a request to the World Bank for its support for the Project. We have indicated to Government of Ethiopia that lending support to the project would not be possible, as the EPC contract has been awarded and the process did not follow the WB guidelines."

Ethiopia has a low rating on Transparency International's corruption index. Yet it is also one of the World Bank's biggest clients in Africa, and has taken up 3 billion dollars in Bank support in the last four years. Have these friendly relations tempted the Bank's management to look the other way? In an about-face, the Bank announced in its Monthly Operational Summary of June 2009 that it was considering an IDA credit of $50 million for the Gibe 3 Dam. When NGOs checked with the responsible Bank manager, he admitted that "at the request of the Government of Ethiopia for IDA support for the project, we have agreed to undertake due diligence to determine whether the Bank can be involved in the project or not. In this context, as we have noted before, we can possibly consider a guarantee to mobilize private capital for the project."

The World Bank's procurement guidelines are less strict for projects supported by guarantees than for loans and credits. The reason for this double standard is not clear, but this is a moot point. The Operational Summary states explicitly that the Bank is considering a credit for Gibe 3, for which open bidding is required. The Bank knows this has not happened. According to a recent update from a manager in its Africa Energy Group, the Bank still considers a credit "for environmental and social aspects of the project".

The World Bank's seal of approval would open the door for support from other lenders which have so far stayed away from the Gibe 3 Dam because of the project's serious social and environmental impacts and corruption risks. Can the Bank ignore its own anti-bribery guideline so blatantly? Will its managers once again ignore the stench of corruption as they smell the sweet scent of money?

Photo credit for the homepage image: Alison M. Jones for www.nowater-nolife.org

Peter Bosshard is the policy director of International Rivers. His blog, Wet, Wild and Wonky, appears at www.internationalrivers.org/en/blog/peter-bosshard

Source

Museveni Hails China Over Aid

9 November 2009

Kampala — President Yoweri Museveni has commended the Chinese government for its aid programme for Africa, which includes $10b in concessionary loans. Meeting Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in Egypt on Sunday, Museveni said China can support projects like the hydro-power dam at Karuma and a toll road from Entebbe Airport to Uganda's business district, Kampala.

He also called for more investments in Uganda's oil sector, especially in a refinery. "The announcement of the eight-measure programme was very welcome," Museveni said, according to a press release from State House.

"In the case of soft loans, China can help support projects like the hydro-power dam on River Nile at Karuma station and the toll road done on a build-and-operate basis. I want to thank the government of China for the investment in the broadband project."

The Chinese premier pledged to support Uganda's development programme, including the toll road and capital with concessionary loans from Exim Bank.

"With regard to other projects, the Chinese government encourages Chinese investments in Uganda's energy sector, infrastructure development, agro-processing and oil refinery," he said.

The two leaders met at the end of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el Sheikh after the premier announced his government's aid package for the continent.

Apart from the $10b in loans, this includes a proposal to form a partnership in addressing climate change, enhance cooperation in science and technology and support Chinese financial institutions in setting up a special loan of $1b for small and medium enterprises on the continent.

China has also offered to open up its market to African products, as well as enhance cooperation in agriculture, medical care, human resource development and education.

During his visit, Museveni also met the vice-president of Huawei Technologies whom he praised for making communication cheaper and more efficient through their broadband and undersea cable.

He said the investment will see the cost of transmission of information and data in Uganda reduce significantly and help promote efficiency in Government departments.

"The cost of using this technology is cheaper than satellite connection. Because of this reduction, we can do more things, including improving the quality of our television services and linking government departments," he noted.

Museveni also took advantage of his visit to meet Egyptian businessmen whom he asked to invest in gas and wind energy, especially around Lake Victoria and the north-eastern part of the country.

"I would like to invite you to come and make transformers and meters in Uganda. We would be interested in the use of wind to make water pumps," he told the boss of Elsewedy Cables, an energy company.

Earlier, at his arrival on Saturday, Museveni had told Egyptian prime minister Ahmed Nazif that the biggest challenge facing Africa and particularly communities living along the River Nile was lack of electricity.

The continent, he said, needed industrialisation so that peasant communities can live and work in industrial cities and ease the pressure on forests and swamps.

"We must reorganise the whole human settlements so that the swamps and forests are left alone," the President told the prime minister.

"Peasants are cutting down trees at an alarming rate due to lack of electricity or alternative energies. If the trees are cut, this affects the amount of rainfall and if the swamps run dry, it becomes even more dangerous."

Nazif said his country was interested in working with all stakeholders to develop a plan for the River Nile.

"It is no longer only about the distribution of the waters on the Nile but also development projects affecting communities here," he said.

Source

Uganda, DR Congo Head Off Dispute As River Alters Border

Halima Abdallah

9 November 2009

Nairobi — The border between Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo is being redrawn -- by a river!

Technocrats from the two countries are quietly working to head off a dispute as River Semliki, which defines part of their common frontier, rapidly changes course.

A joint committee of surveyors is now drawing upon a 1915 agreement between Britain and Belgium to plot a boundary based on geographical co-ordinates instead.

Randomly ceding huge chunks of territory in a wild give and take, the Semliki River has changed course so much over the past half-century that it has transferred as much as 50 square kilometres of Congolese territory to Uganda.

The river flows from Lake Edward to Lake Albert -- with tributaries joining it from the northern slopes of the Rwenzori mountains.

Experts have lately been warning that climate change could see the flaring up of new conflicts around the region as natural features change character.

The recent shifts in the course of the Semliki are being attributed to the melting of glaciers on the Rwenzori.

These have seen new tributaries join the river.

As a result, experts are struggling to keep track of the original borderline.

Speaking at the recent launch in Kampala of a report on climate change by the UK's Department for International Development, a Makerere University zoologist, J.B Kaddu, said besides threats to traditional mountainside livelihoods, climate change also had the potential to provoke new conflicts between countries whose borders were defined by variable natural features such as water bodies.

Equally, border issues like the Migingo island saga that has pitted Uganda against its eastern neighbour, Kenya, could become more complicated if a further fall in Lake Victoria water levels increases the size of the island above water.

Seen as a permanent feature back then, the Semliki, which flows through Semliki National Park in Uganda before draining into Lake Albert, was used to define part of the border between Belgian Congo and Uganda in the late 19th century.

But with its volume and course determined by the amount of runoff from the Rwenzori Mountains, the melting of glaciers as a result of higher temperatures has seen the river vary course in recent times.

According to Prof Kaddu, the glaciers have recessed from four to 1.7 square kilometres during the 40 years to 1996.

The National Environment Management Authority's State of the Environment Report 2008 reveals that the river changed its course in a total of 151 locations -- 84 inside Uganda and 66 inside the DRC, as seen from satellite imagery.

Information from the National Survey and Mapping Department reveals that DRC has lost more territory than Uganda.

"It is a situation of give and take, as the change affects one country at one point and vice versa, but at the delta, the river has given a lot of land to Uganda.

"The biggest effect is that the mouth of the river is some kilometres away. It is about 49 square kilometres," said John Kitaka, acting Assistant Commissioner for Mapping.

Uganda and the DRC have previously clashed over the small island of Rukwanzi in Lake Albert.

In the same year, 2007, the Congolese army occupied a disputed border area in West Nile after moving their border posts four kilometres inside Uganda.

The clashes prompted Presidents Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Joseph Kabila of Congo to meet under Tanzanian mediation, culminating in the Ngurdoto agreement that provided for a joint commission to verify and define the common borderlines.

Although there is a committee with representation from each country that has met thrice, not much progress has been done on this stretch of land.

Ugandan officials said the DRC is yet to raise financing for marking the borders, whose description on paper by the colonial governments was never translated on the ground.

Acting Commissioner for Survey and Mapping Moddy Nsubuga Kajumbula said the marking could be done within 10 months if funds were made available.

Each country, he said would require $3m to fix the water boundary and erect new pillars northwards to a tree junction point with Sudan.

"We shall refer to the 1915 Anglo-Belgian agreement -- a treaty which described the boundary -- and retrace the boundaries from the original point.

"We are proposing to follow that description even where the river changed its course. We have special instruments that can do that," Mr Kajumbula said.

The same agreement is also being used to redefine Uganda's border with Rwanda in the Katuna wetlands.

As a result of severe rainwater shortfalls in recent years, people in the area have resorted to cultivating in the wetlands, impeding the natural flow of the river that separates Rwanda from Uganda.

As a result, the river has also changed course, leading to the dispute over the boundary and the water resources.

Internally, climate change is also affecting the natural boundaries as defined at Independence.

In eastern Uganda, rivers have changed cause, moving the boundaries of Mbale with neighbouring districts as at independence.

Source

This is only part of an article that is mainly about The Copenhagen summit on climate change.

The New Times' Edwin Musoni interviewed Minister of Environment and Natural Resources, Stanislas Kamanzi on Rwanda's position on this subject. Below are excerpts.

November 11^th, 2009

On this issue of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement what is the current state of signing the agreement?

It is unfortunate that it remains a stand still. We had hoped that since May that we would move quickly following the extraordinary meeting of the Nile Council of Ministers that took place in Kinshasa and one that took place in Alexandria, Egypt in July.

From Kinshasa we had decided that we go ahead and sign the agreement as it had been agreed upon by the negotiators and endorsed by the council of ministers except as regards article 14 b that was claimed by Egypt and Sudan.

Kinshasa had provided for a room where by this outstanding issue would be discussed in a way that would accommodate each and everyone's interests.

Unfortunately, later on Egypt and Sudan disassociated themselves with the decision from Kinshasa. Since we are looking forward to a cooperative framework agreement that takes on board all the partners within the NBI, in Alexandria we had given ourselves an additional six months for all the countries to consider ironing out their own issues and see how they can adhere to the general consensus and this came up as Egypt was taking over the new chair of the Nile Council of Ministers.

Unfortunately, what I observed recently is that the initiative or the way leading to concluding the negotiations is splitting into two different directions.

On one hand we have seven downstream countries which believe that we should go ahead and sing the agreement and have the Nile Basin Commission established as a permanent commission. On the other hand we have Egypt and Sudan still stuck on these historical rights.

From Alexandria we had also mandated our technical advisors, together with the negotiators to come up with clear proposals leading to the final signature of the CFA which we had hoped would take place in February. Their team met Kampala sometime last month and unfortunately the same difficulties arose.

Precisely, we are having on one side a group of countries that are willing to proceed with the negotiation and on the other side two countries that are not willing to go by the same direction.

Our hope was that Egypt in their position as the chair on the Nile-Com would actually be cooperative and clear the way towards the signing but there indications that it won't happen easily.

What if these difficulties persist, would the seven countries go ahead and sign without Egypt and Sudan?

It is something that can be considered, why not, provided that it is still in line with the international regulations on trans-boundary water bodies.

It is something that can be considered but we hope we don't go that direction, either way we can think of another arrangement which would be joined later by countries that want to cooperate with those initiating it.

Don't you think it's high time you involve Heads of States to take on the negotiations of this particular agreement?

You see, the nature of the treaty is much more based on technical grounds. It has no political considerations that would involve Heads of States.

When we talk about water resources within the Basin, there is no way you can deal with that through politically based conceptions, it doesn't work.

Its technical and we have to go about it technically. The involvement of Heads of States would come in to bless what technicians have done.

We are pushing so hard to have work done in a more appropriate way and we don't want our Heads of States to handle matters that are supposed to have been solved on a technical point of view.

Source: A Deal on 'Climate Change' is Long Overdue - Kamanzi

China is Welcome But What Are the Terms?

11 November 2009

editorial

President Museveni this week returned from the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt, full of praises for the rising power in the East. The summit will have been watched very closely by other western powers which have traditionally enjoyed the most lucrative trade deals with the continent as well as the political and security deals that underline the trade.

It was also watched very closely by African countries who recognise in China a new partner for development. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao did not disappoint, announcing a $10 billion lending facility to African countries at concessionary rates. China's growth as an economic and military power has the potential to help African countries achieve their own development agendas, especially in financing infrastructure.

In a time of a global credit crunch and nervous investors, China's $10 billion credit facility - which is about as much as the World Bank advanced to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa last year - is a welcome financing opportunity for the continent. News that the Chinese are willing to invest in Uganda's infrastructure, including a toll road from Entebbe to Kampala, should also be applauded, but with a proviso.

China's see-no-evil, hear-no-evil policy means that it can finance projects in African countries without asking questions about human rights or governance as many western donors do. While many African leaders welcome this non-interference in the sovereignty of their countries, it takes away some leverage by external actors to persuade or otherwise compel the leaders in those countries to treat their citizens better.

Furthermore, Chinese contractors in many African countries, to wit Angola, tend to bring along many of their unskilled and semi-skilled workers to do menial work on the projects they fund, denying locals the opportunity to acquire skills. None of these challenges are incurable. We should welcome the Chinese investment but we must clearly define our interests and work towards aligning them with those of the Chinese - and other donors.

For instance, if the Chinese are interested in exploring for oil in the country, let them in, but ensure that the oil is processed locally and not just export as crude. After all, cooperation suggests a win-win situation.

Source

President Kagame Visits Egypt

6 November 2009

Kigali — President Paul Kagame yesterday met and held talks with his Egyptian counterpart, Hosni Mubarak as part of his ongoing visit to the northern African country.

This was on the second day of his four-day state visit to the country.

In a joint press briefing by Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Egypt's Ahmed Abdul Geit reported that talks between the two Heads of State centred on strengthening the already existing bilateral relations which he said was indeed a good step towards stronger ties.

It was also noted that Rwanda and Egypt are looking at establishing cooperation in different areas like agriculture, business and trade.

Also discussed were the mutual benefits both countries stand to gain from the Nile Basin Initiative, a grouping to which the two countries subscribe.

Technical teams from both sides are scheduled to meet soon to pave a way forward, according to the officials.

Meanwhile, the two Heads of State agreed that there is hope that their meeting would lead to a general agreement on how to best use the Nile River for the benefit of both nations.

On arrival President Kagame lay wreaths at the Memorial of the Unknown Soldier in honour of Egypt's fallen soldiers of the October War of 1973 and the late Anwar Sadat who was laid to rest at the site in 1981.

During his 4-day working visit to Egypt, President Kagame, in his capacity as Chair of the EAC Summit, will address the China-Africa Forum to be held in Sharm El Sheikh.

He is also expected to tour several national cultural sites and visit major facilities in the agriculture, energy, industry and commerce sector.

Rwanda and Egypt have enjoyed diplomatic ties since 1970, and the recent 2nd session of the Joint Permanent Commission held in Cairo in September 2009 served to further strengthen this cooperation.

Source

Nile Basin Initiative to Celebrate 10 Years

Edwin Musoni

9 November 2009

Kigali — The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) is set to celebrate its tenth anniversary come next month.

The initiative was inaugurated in 1999 as a partnership between the riparian states of the Nile River through the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin states (Nile-COM).

It seeks to develop the river in a cooperative manner, share substantial socioeconomic benefits, and promote regional peace and security.

The celebrations were announced by the regional coordinator of the Nile Basin Confidence Building and Stakeholder Involvement (CBSI) Gordon Mumbo during a media conference held recently in Nairobi, Kenya.

The celebrations are expected to be held in Tanzania and according to a concept note for the celebrations, the initiative will showcase its achievement in the past ten years.

Rwanda is one of the nine riparian countries of the Nile Basin that also include Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Eritrea currently participates as an observer.

"During the past 10 years, it has been increasingly recognized among the riparian states that, trans-boundary cooperation on development and management of the Nile water resources can yield major benefits from the river on food and energy production, and will underpin many other benefits for the welfare of the basin inhabitants," reads a statement from NBI offices.

This comes at a time when member states are up in arms negotiating the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) of the Nile Basin which seeks to establish a permanent commission.

In a recent interview with The New Times, the Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Stanislas Kamanzi said that the way leading to the conclusion of the negotiations regarding CFA has been split into two factions.

"On one side we have the downstream countries that believe that we should go ahead and sign the CFA and have the Nile Basin Commission taking over from the interim NBI, and on the other hand we still have the two upstream countries Egypt and Sudan still sticking on not only the historical rights but also the issue of prior notification principle be opened which other countries don't agree to reopen," said Kamanzi.

Source

Is it me or is the Minister confusing up- and down-stream?

Nabil

We Did Not Block River Nile Deals - Egypt

Anne Mugisa

4 November 2009

Kampala — EGYPT has never blocked Uganda from undertaking projects on the River Nile, the assistant foreign affairs minister, Mona Omar, has said.

She, however, noted that her country had to be satisfied that the projects would not affect the volume of water.

Omar, who is visiting Uganda to discuss possible investments, was answering queries regarding the disputes over the Nile at the Media Centre in Kampala yesterday.

The Nile basin countries have been complaining what they see as Egypt's domination over the Nile, which makes it hard for them to implement projects.

They say Egypt fronts a colonial agreement that puts other countries at a disadvantage.

She blamed the media for creating an impression of a dispute between Egypt and the Nile basin countries, including Uganda.

She said the countries had agreed on 98% of the issues regarding the Nile.

Egypt's ambassador to Uganda, Sabry M. Sabry, who accompanied Omar, said the countries were trying to create a new framework over the waters.

Omar met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sam Kuteesa, Kahinda Otafiire for trade and industry and Hillary Onek for energy over Egypt's trade and investment plans.

Source

Egypt Speaks Out On River Nile Disagreement

Risdel Kasasira

5 November 2009

The Egyptian government yesterday said it was ready to cooperate with other eight countries under Nile Basin to resolve their disagreements on the usage and access of River Nile water.

The visiting Egyptian Assistant Minister for Foreign and African Affairs, Mona Omar, told journalists in Kampala yesterday that her country has been "unfairly" blamed for blocking efforts to establish a permanent River-Basin Commission that would oversee the implementation of development projects on the Nile.

Six states under Nile Basin have been pushing for the establishment of the commission that would give equal powers to all member-states on its access and usage, rather than 1929 agreement which gives Egypt veto powers on the water-usage of the longest river in Africa.

However Egypt and Sudan, the countries that depend almost totally on river, have objected the amendment saying the establishment of the commission would endanger their people.

Ms Omar said: "I would like to say that there is no dispute. We have a framework that guides us. But there are only three points which we disagree on. But it's not a dispute. We cannot have control over the Nile," she said.

The Nile basin countries include; Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Sudan and Egypt.

The amendment to the 1929 agreement was supposed to be passed in September 2008. They were, however, delayed because of these disagreements before it was pushed to June this year.

Ms Omar said millions of people would die if the flow of R. Nile is tampered with. "Millions of Egyptians depend on the Nile," she said.

Source

A Big Catch Feeds Millions

Cam Mcgrath

1 November 2009

Egypt has built the largest aquaculture industry in Africa, accounting for four out of every fish farmed on the continent. Egyptian fish farms produced over 650,000 tons of finfish last year, or about 60 percent of the country's total freshwater and marine fish production, providing a cheap source of protein for the country's 80 million people.

"The massive growth of aquaculture has kept fish affordable for the majority of Egyptians, so that today fish and poultry prices are more or less similar (cost) per kilo basis," says Malcolm Beveridge, Director of Aquaculture and Genetics at the WorldFish Centre. "It seems the majority of consumers switch between the two, depending on which is cheaper."

Commercial fish farming in Egypt began in the 1960s with mullet-rearing pens in coastal lakes and lagoons. The industry has witnessed explosive growth over the past decade. Total aquaculture production has grown by 500 percent since 1998 due to a shift to intensive rearing methods and faster growing species such as tilapia.

The General Authority for Fish Resources Development (GAFRD) plans to develop the country's aquaculture industry further, and has set a goal of 1.1 million tons of farmed fish, or about 75 percent of total fish production, by 2012. Its two-pronged strategy aims to increase the productivity of freshwater aquaculture operations, while encouraging investment in marine aquaculture, or mariculture.

Egypt's limited freshwater resources are a major constraint to aquaculture development. The populous desert country relies on the Nile River for 95 percent of its water needs, and water usage is considered a national security issue. Priority is given to potable water and crop irrigation, leaving more than 90 percent of the country's fish farms to operate on agricultural run-off.

"It's not the best idea to use agricultural drainage water for producing fish, because although there are a lot of nutrients in it, there are also pesticide residues, and these pose an unspecified risk to consumers," says Beveridge. "It makes more sense to let aquaculture have first use of water, and to allow the drainage from fish farms to be used for agriculture."

Laws passed over a quarter of a century ago prohibit aquaculture projects from drawing surface water, but a loophole permits fish farms to have first use of groundwater. Farmers can pump clean water from aquifers into fish ponds, using the nutrient-rich drainage of these ponds to fertilise and irrigate field crops - a holistic approach to food production known as integrated aquaculture.

The technique is already in practice on an experimental farm in Wadi Natroun, a depression 110 kilometers northwest of Cairo. "The pilot project serves as an example for farmers working in the desert on how they can increase their productivity and income using the same volume of water for two, or maybe even three, purposes," says GAFRD chairman Mohamed Fathy.

The method revolves around nutrient sharing and waste recycling, he says. "First, the farmer pumps underground water into ponds for raising tilapia, and then for catfish. The water from the catfish ponds is used to irrigate alfalfa, and on these fields he lets his sheep and goats graze. The manure of the livestock is used to make biogas, which in turn is used to increase the water temperature of his tilapia hatcheries, or to warm the fish ponds in winter."

Integrated aquaculture currently accounts for a small fraction of Egypt's total fish farm production, but its share is expected to grow quickly. Fathy sees enormous potential for the technique to increase the food productivity of vast tracts of reclaimed desert land.

GAFRD is involved in several projects to increase aquaculture productivity, including hatchery development, genetics research and breeding programmes. It hopes to increase average annual production of freshwater fish farms to 5 tons per acre, up from an average of 1-3 tons per acre.

The agency is also issuing trying to promote mariculture, which currently contributes 5 percent of total fish production. Marine fish farms already produce mullet, sea bass, sea bream, eels, shrimp and mollusks, and GAFRD has earmarked areas of coastline for development of cage culture and offshore fish farms.

Species selection will be critical to the commercial success of these projects, say experts. Mariculture operators must consider a fish's rearing costs, growth rate, space requirements and market demand.

Native plant-eating fish like mullet are in high local demand, but must be reared in shallow ponds with large surface area. By contrast, sea bass and sea bream can be cultured intensively in cages or tanks, but require enriched fish feeds that drive up costs.

"Getting land in Egypt is not so easy now because of competition with tourism and agriculture, which is why mariculture usually favours sea bass and bream," says Sherif Sadek, a local aquaculture consultant. "What we need is a popular fish that we can culture in marine environments without the need for high-protein feed. Otherwise I'm afraid the fish will be exclusively for export or rich people."

The expansion of tilapia hatcheries, which supply nearly all the fry and fingerlings used by Egyptian tilapia farms, has decreased the price of stocking freshwater fish farms to a tenth over the past decade. GAFRD is now licensing hatcheries for several marine species, which - along with expanded fish feed manufacture - is expected to reduce production costs.

The real winner, say experts, is the Egyptian consumer. The growth of the aquaculture sector has resulted in lower retail fish prices, which has in part encouraged Egyptians to add more fish to their diet. Per capita fish consumption has doubled since 1995 to reach nearly 14 kilograms, and fish now accounts for over 20 percent of animal protein intake.

Aswan High Dam Controls The Nile River

By Matt Rosenberg, About.com

Jul 27 2009

Just north of the border between Egypt and Sudan lies the Aswan High Dam, a huge rockfill dam which captures the world's longest river, the Nile River, in the world's third largest reservoirs, Lake Nasser. The dam, known as Saad el Aali in Arabic, was completed in 1970 after ten years of work.

Egypt has always depended on the water of the Nile River. The two main tributaries of the Nile River are the White Nile and the Blue Nile. The source of the White Nile are the Sobat River Bahr al-Jabal (The "Mountain Nile") and the Blue Nile begins in the Ethiopian Highlands. The two tributaries converge in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan where they form the Nile River. The Nile River has a total length of 4,160 miles (6,695 kilometers) from source to sea.

Before the building of a dam at Aswan, Egypt experienced annual floods from the Nile River which deposited 4 million tons of nutrient-rich sediment which enabled agricultural production. This process began millions of years before Egyptian civilization began in the Nile River valley and continued until the first dam at Aswan was built in 1889. This dam was insufficient to hold back the water of the Nile and was subsequently raised in 1912 and 1933. In 1946, the true danger was revealed when the water in the reservoir peaked near the top of the dam.

In 1952, the interim Revolutionary Council government of Egypt decided to build a High Dam at Aswan, about four miles upstream of the old dam. In 1954, Egypt requested loans from the World Bank to help pay for the cost of the dam (which eventually added up to US$1 billion). Initially, the United States agreed to loan Egypt money but then withdrew their offer for unknown reasons. Some speculate that it may have been due to Egyptian and Israeli conflict. The United Kingdom, France, and Israel had invaded Egypt in 1956, soon after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal to help pay for the dam.

The Soviet Union offered to help and Egypt accepted. The Soviet Union's support was not unconditional, however. Along with the money, they also sent military advisers and other workers to help enhance Egyptian-Soviet ties and relations.

In order to build the dam both people and artifacts had to be moved. Over 90,000 Nubians had to be relocated. Those who had been living in Egypt were moved about 28 miles (45 km) away but the Sudanese Nubians were relocated 370 miles (600 km) from their homes. The government was also forced to develop one of the largest Abu Simel temple and dig for artifacts before the future lake would drown the land of the Nubians.

After years of construction (the material in the dam is the equivalent to 17 of the great pyramid at Giza), the resulting reservoir was named for the former president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who died in 1970. The lake holds 137 million acre-feet of water (169 billion cubic meters). About 17 percent of the lake is in Sudan and the two countries have an agreement for distribution of the water.

The dam benefits Egypt by controlling the annual floods on the Nile River and prevents the damage which used to occur along the floodplain. The Aswan High Dam provides about a half of Egypt's power supply and has improved navigation along the river by keeping the water flow consistent.

There are several problems associated with the dam as well. Seepage and evaporation accounts for a loss of about 12-14% of the annual input into the reservoir. The sediments of the Nile River, as with all river and dam systems, has been filling the reservoir and thus decreasing its storage capacity. This has also resulted in problems downstream.

Farmers have been forced to use about a million tons of artificial fertilizer as a substitute for the nutrients which no longer fill the flood plain. Further downstream, the Nile delta is having problems due to the lack of sediment as well since there is no additional agglomeration of sediment to keep erosion of the delta at bay so it slowly shrinks. Even the shrimp catch in the Mediterranean Sea has decreased due to the change in water flow.

Poor drainage of the newly irrigated lands has led to saturation and increased salinity. Over one half of Egypt's farmland in now rated medium to poor soils.

The parasitic disease schistosomiasis has been associated with the stagnant water of the fields and the reservoir. Some studies indicate that the number of individuals affected has increased since the opening of the Aswan High Dam.

The Nile River and now the Aswan High Dam are Egypt's lifeline. About 95% of Egypt's population lives within twelve miles from the river. Were it not for the river and its sediment, the grand civilization of ancient Egypt probably would have never existed.

Source

East Africa: 20 Million People At Risk of Famine

Dr. Akinwumi Adesina

22 October 2009

opinion

Kampala — IN the 50 years since the era of independence began, Africa has come a long way. Our freedom is enshrined in law. Embassies of African nations operate around the world but we are not fully free and cannot be until we end the chronic hunger that afflicts nearly 220 million Africans every day.

We must grow the food that will free us from hunger and from unsustainable food aid and imports. To do so, we need a policy revolution in Africa.

African smallholder farmers, who grow the majority of Africa's food, face enormous challenges which are now being compounded by the impacts of climate change. The impacts are not only in the future. They are now, in the floods that have devastated Burkina Faso and the droughts that have put nearly 20 million people at risk of famine in eastern Africa.

Africans cannot wait for solutions from outside to address these challenges.

Now is the time for Africa to lead its own development through home-grown policies that correspond to its priorities.

Only in this way can we achieve economic growth needed to lift millions out of poverty. Change must come from the halls of parliament from Abuja, Nairobi, Addis-Ababa, Kampala, Maputo and Dakar, all the way down to the small farms on the lush hills of Rwanda to the sweltering lands of the Sahel.

While the majority of our political leaders come from rural areas, including many of our ministers and heads of state, the misery of the African farmer has continued. It is time for African leaders to lead the way and they have begun to do so. They have committed to achieving 6% annual agricultural growth and to allocating 10% of national budgets to agriculture, under the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme.

International partners are increasing their support for such efforts. But African governments remain handicapped by a policy-making infrastructure decimated by decades of neglect. Africa's policy-making capacity must be reinvigorated and revamped. Honing homegrown policies, no nation can develop unless it takes full control of the policy space and maps its own development.

To spark this effort, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) launched this week a major policy capacity-building initiative.

Its goals are straight forward. We must train a new generation of policy analysts for Africa to shape policy dialogues at national, regional and international levels.

We must strengthen the capacity of parliaments across Africa to engage on evidence-based policy dialogues that will help expand public investments for agriculture. We must strengthen the policy analytical capacity of ministries of agriculture, finance and environment. And we must build the capacity of farmers to engage on effective policy advocacy. We must implement concrete policies that will revitalise African agriculture.

This is the time to replace the old "Washington Consensus" with a new "African Consensus", one that puts the interest of African farmers and economies first. For too long, Africa's lack of internal capacity has kept it reliant on policy analysis generated outside of the continent and often imposed as conditions for receipt of development aid.

Well-intentioned outside advice often fails to respond to the realities of African farmers. Perhaps the most tragic example is the structural adjustment programmes, initiated in the 1980s, that eliminated support systems for African farmers. Today, African farmers are the least supported in the world.

AGRA is working with African and international partners to transform the subsistence farming of smallholders into a productive, efficient, economically viable and sustainable system that can lift millions out of poverty.

This will take comprehensive change, a key part of which is increasing farmers' access to new technologies, such as improved seeds of African staple crops, as well as fertilisers and other inputs.

But technology alone will not bring about food self-sufficiency. A bumper crop of maize is a good thing. But if there is no road to bring it to the market or the market is glutted with maize and prices crash, then it will rot in the fields.

Farmers need access to extension systems, markets and trade. They need access to finance to purchase agricultural technologies. They need tools to adapt to climate change and incentives to mitigate its effects. Women farmers need access to secure land and property rights. Farmers across the continent cannot pull themselves up by their bootstraps. Many do not have boots to start with.

Africa desperately needs to replace policies of abandonment of farmers with comprehensive policies of support, including subsidies where appropriate. This is the only way to unlock the power of agriculture in Africa. And the time for action is now.

To drive the new African Consensus, AGRA will work closely with NEPAD, Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank, regional economic communities and national and regional policy networks. Our goal is not to produce papers that collect dust on shelves. Farmers do not eat policy papers.

What they need, and what we will help them to achieve, are practical and sound policies that will change their lives and enable them to help turn Africa into a breadbasket for the world.

The writer is the vice-president of policy and partnerships at the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa

Source

The following is an old article dating back to May 2003, but newly discovered.

Nabil

The Nile: water conflicts

IRIN

From its major source at Lake Victoria in east-central Africa, the White Nile flows north through Uganda and crosses the border into Sudan. After a journey of several thousand kilometres, and in the dusty heat of Khartoum it eventually meets the Blue Nile which, by that time, has made the precipitous descent from the Ethiopian highlands. From the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, the river then continues to flow northwards through the desert, into Egypt and on to the Mediterranean Sea.

Colonial-era agreements outdated

Contained within those voluminous waters, stretching some 6,000 km through some of Africa's most arid lands, is a still largely untapped potential for the development of large swathes of the continent.

According to the World Bank, the Nile River Basin is home to an estimated 160 million people, while almost 300 million live in the ten countries that share the Nile's waters. Within the next 25 years, population within the Basin is expected to double, adding to the increased demand for water generated by growth in industry and agriculture.

In recent years, however, the use of the Nile's waters for development has become something of a bone of contention among the 10 countries that share its basin - Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt.

The contention partly arises from two agreements signed during the colonial era - the 1929 Nile Water Agreement and the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilization of the Nile - that gave Egypt and Sudan extensive rights over the river's use.

The upstream countries, including the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, have expressed concern over the long-standing arrangements, arguing the treaties have served to give Egypt unfair control over the use of the river's waters. None of the colonial treaties involved all the riparian countries and therefore, did not deal equitably with the interests of the upstream countries, they say.

Regional analysts say that Egypt and Sudan, on the other hand, have been reluctant to renegotiate the treaties and this has, at times, strained relations between the upper- and lower-riparian nations.

Recent UN figures highlight the problems of water scarcity in the region. Of 180 countries listed for water availability per person per year in the recently released World Water Development Report, Kenya is ranked 154th, Uganda 115th and Ethiopia 137th. The upstream countries of Egypt and Sudan are ranked 156th and 129th respectively.

During the 1990s, attempts to resolve disagreements surrounding the Nile Basin and develop a regional partnership within which countries of the basin could equitably share the Nile's waters, got under way.

However, real progress has been slow, and Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian legislators have recently sparked fresh debate over the legitimacy of the colonial-era agreements.

Ugandan Members of parliament in particular have demanded compensation from Egypt, which they claim has been able to industrialise by using the Nile's resources to generate electricity and irrigate crops, whereas Uganda has not had this freedom.

Ugandan MP Amon Muzoora in 2002 proposed a motion in parliament for Uganda to renounce the pre-independence Nile water agreements, and made claims for annual compensation of some US $1.2 million.

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) 

In the last decade efforts towards cooperation on the Nile have intensified and, in 1993, the Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) was established with the aim of promoting a development agenda.

During that same year, the first in a series of 'Nile 2002 Conferences', supported by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), took place. Within the framework of TECCONILE, the Nile River Basin Action Plan (NRBAP) was prepared in 1995, and in 1997 the World Bank, UNDP, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) began working as 'cooperating partners' to facilitate further dialogue among the riparian states.

In 1998, all the riparian states except Eritrea, began discussions with a view to creating a regional partnership to better manage the Nile. A transitional mechanism for cooperation was officially launched in February 1999 in Dar-es-Salaam by the Council of Ministers of Water Affairs of the Nile Basin States (Nile-COM).

The process was officially named the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) later in the same year, and in November 2002 a secretariat was established in Entebbe, Uganda, with funding from the World Bank. Burundi, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and Rwanda are all involved in the NBI, with Eritrea participating as an observer.

According to Antoine Sendama, one of the Nile Basin Initiative's regional coordinators, the 10 countries which share the Nile and its sources met to find a way of cooperating on using the Nile "sustainably and effectively towards development".

Most countries in the region, according to Sendama, share a similar history of poverty, high population growth, environmental degradation, unstable economies and insecurity. "We need to utilise the existing opportunities to have a cooperation where actors will have a win-win gain towards development," he told IRIN recently.

Within the NBI are plans designed to harness the basin's waters for irrigation, and also the establishment of an energy policy to provide power for all the countries in the region, according to Sendama. Some NBI projects, including ones aimed at harnessing energy, and also some designed to make the best use of fisheries resources, are nearing their implementation stage, he said.

It is vital to the success of future developments on the Nile that both Egypt and Sudan are involved in the NBI, Sendama said. "Sudan and Egypt are among the 10 member countries which make up this initiative. By being part of this initiative means they are interested in seeing that it works. They are part of the process," he added.

Geoffrey Howard, who is in charge of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) [Http://www.iucn.org] Eastern Africa programme, told IRIN the main challenge for the region was for upstream countries to find sustainable ways of harnessing the Nile that would not hinder its flow downstream to Egypt. "The real issue here is that Egypt has no other supply of water. Cairo is a major city but depends solely on the Nile," Howard told IRIN.

Philip Kassaija, a lecturer at the Makerere University in Kampala, is full of praise for the Nile Basin Initiative.

He told IRIN that the NBI initiative would help open up negotiations on the equitable use of the Nile, and reduce conflicts over the use of its waters. "At least there is a framework now for negotiations. This is a positive case in which conflict is being arrested before it flares up. The NBI is reducing the potential for conflict," Kassaija told IRIN.

"It is important to renegotiate the colonial treaties. They do not reflect the circumstances that exist today," he added.

Ordinary people ignored

However, critics of the NBI have argued that the initiative has been a closed affair in which only the states involved and the World Bank have had input into decision making, largely ignoring the voices of ordinary people whose livelihoods depend on use of the Nile basin's resources.

Elizabeth Birabwa, a writer on environmental issues, told IRIN there was hardly any information flowing between the NBI secretariat and the media, because the language used by the secretariat was "too technical and distanced from us". "Few journalists know what is happening as far as the Nile is concerned. If you go there, they just give you the colonial treaties and some difficult-to-understand documents. We are hitting a wall," she said.

"Ugandan MPs have raised an issue that affects ordinary people. But the issues are shrouded in secrecy, big moneys being spent, some of it to be repaid by the people who live along the Nile, but the people know nothing," she added.

Civil society groups like IUCN have also criticised the running of the NBI and have formed a parallel initiative they say would enable them to participate in the NBI process.

Howard told IRIN the formation of the Nile International Discourse Desk [http://www.nilediscourse.org], as the initiative is known, did not come easy because governments were initially cautious over the inclusion of civil society groups in the process.

"It has been clear to some of us that decisions made by government are implemented without the actual consultation with the people who live in the Nile Basin," Howard said.

The Nile International Discourse Desk is a loose coalition of non-governmental organisations and civil society groups, and is hosted by the IUCN.

"We are just going to facilitate and organise civil society. We are drafting a social pact to facilitate the work of the civil society," Jean Bigagaza, head of the discourse desk, told IRIN.

"We are trying to get representation from every country. We are talking about a huge investment that will have great impact on people who live on the Nile Basin. We need to get them involved in the process," Bigagaza said.

[This Item is Delivered to the "Africa-English" Service of the UN's IRIN
humanitarian information unit, but may not necessarily reflect the views
of the United Nations. Copyright (c) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2003]

Source

River Semiliki Might Also Become an Area of Dispute

Naomi Karekaho

15 October 2009

opinion

Kampala — Environment degradation is self-avenging. When the environment is degraded it often avenges with fury. In Uganda there have been cases of flooding of homes located where wetlands used to be, relentless droughts due, in part, to cutting of trees indiscriminately and invasive plant and animal species which are dangerous to indigenous ones.

There is another form of environment degradation that has potential to cause animosity among neighbouring countries. This is because most colonial boundaries were drawn using physical features like mountains, lakes and rivers that are currently experiencing degradation.

Uganda is demarcated by natural features like Mount Elgon to the east, in the South east is Lake Victoria and River Kagera, western, lakes Edward, Albert, River Semiliki, Mount Rwenzori and to the South west, Mount Muhabura.

The features which mark Uganda's geographical boundaries are also a natural source of livelihood to the surrounding communities. With recent economic and population pressure, these resources have been excessively used which has led to some of the lakes and rivers being silted and polluted by deposits from surrounding catchment areas and wearing away of the river banks.

River Semiliki particularly forms a geographical boundary between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The river banks have been degraded by overstocking leaving the ground bare, prone to agents of soil erosion and hence the banks of the river collapsing in the river waters.

Consequently, Uganda has lost territory to DRC and altered the previously defined territorial boundary of the two countries.

The change caused conflict among the communities and it took the intervention of the Government through NEMA, Nile Transboundary Environmental Action Project (NTEAP) together with Bundibugyo District Authorities, local NGOs and communities to put in place measures to reverse the situation using the ecosystems approach.

The ecosystem concept is based on the premise that the earth operates in a series of interrelated systems within which all components are linked, so much so that a change in any one component may bring about some corresponding change in other components and in the operation of the whole system.

In the case of River Semiliki, a number of activities were undertaken to restore the river banks in accordance with the Constitution.

It requires that the Government holds natural resources in trust for the people and protect wetlands, rivers and lakes for the common good. This should be consistent with the national environment (wetlands, riverbanks, and lakeshores) 2000, regulations.

Restoration activities to restore River Semiliki's banks included; conducting community sensitisation and education on the management of the fragile river banks. Developing and operationalising an ecosystem management action plan through a participatory approach. Fencing off 100m from the river bank as a no-grazing zone. Establishing functional natural resource management by-laws and enforce the national policies on the Ugandan side of the river.

Other interventions on River Semiliki included documenting lessons learnt packaged for replication on other rivers. Identifying animal watering points, landing sites and other active centres along the river through participatory approaches and zoning off the fenced area into user and non-user zones has been completed.

Other water systems which have suffered degradation include Lake Victoria due to soil erosion from River Kagera which deposits massive silt into the lake.

Satellite images indicate heavy deposits into the lake have caused development of an island like feature at the entrance of the river. There is a possibility that this may become solid ground which would cause ownership misunderstandings.

The writer is the public relations officer NEMA

Source

Dear all:

It seems that the NBI process will never resolve the dispute regarding the Nile water agreements. So what are the possible parallel lines of action open?

1.   International Court of Justice

I have suggested before and here suggest again that the International Court of Justice may be the place to settle this, at least as it comes to the legibility of the old Nile agreements. If any – or better all – of the Upper riparian countries take this to the court, progress will be made. I am not suggesting this as a substitute to the NBI process, but rather as a parallel course of action.

Here is some information from the International Court of Justice web site:

Who may submit cases to the Court?

Only States are eligible to appear before the Court in contentious cases.  At present, this basically means the 192 United Nations Member States. 

The Court has no jurisdiction to deal with applications from individuals, non-governmental organizations, corporations or any other private entity.  It cannot provide them with legal counselling or help them in their dealings with the authorities of any State whatever.

However, a State may take up the case of one of its nationals and invoke against another State the wrongs which its national claims to have suffered at the hands of the latter;  the dispute then becomes one between States.

Why are some disputes between States not considered by the Court?

The Court can only hear a dispute when requested to do so by one or more States.  It cannot deal with a dispute of its own motion.  It is not permitted, under its Statute, to investigate and rule on acts of sovereign States as it chooses.

The States concerned must also have access to the Court and have accepted its jurisdiction, in other words they must consent to the Court's considering the dispute in question.  This is a fundamental principle governing the settlement of international disputes, States being sovereign and free to choose the methods of resolving their disputes.

A State may manifest its consent in three ways:

-     A special agreement:  two or more States in a dispute on a specific issue may agree to submit it jointly to the Court and conclude an agreement for this purpose;

-     A clause in a treaty:  over 300 treaties contain clauses (known as compromissory clauses) by which a State party undertakes in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court should a dispute arise on the interpretation or application of the treaty with another State party;

-     A unilateral declaration:  the States parties to the Statute of the Court may opt to make a unilateral declaration recognizing the jurisdiction of the Court as binding with respect to any other State also accepting it as binding.  This optional clause system, as it is called, has led to the creation of a group of States each having given the Court jurisdiction to settle any dispute that might arise between them in future.  In principle, any State in this group is entitled to bring one or more other States in the group before the Court.  Declarations may contain reservations limiting their duration or excluding certain categories of dispute.  They are deposited by States with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Are decisions of the Court binding?

Judgments delivered by the Court (or by one of its Chambers) in disputes between States are binding upon the parties concerned.  Article 94 of the United Nations Charter lays down that "each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of [the Court] in any case to which it is a party".

Judgments are final and without appeal.  If either of the parties challenges their scope or meaning, it has the option to request an interpretation.  In the event of the discovery of a fact hitherto unknown to the Court which might be a decisive factor, either party may apply for revision of the judgment.

As regards advisory opinions, it is usually for the United Nations organs and specialized agencies requesting them to give effect to them or not by whatever means are appropriate for them.

2.   Ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses:

Meanwhile, the upper riparian countries should seriously consider ratifying the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). Not a single Nile Basin country ratified it

The objectives of the UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses inter alia are to:

·         address the problems affecting many international watercourses resulting from, among other things, increasing demands and pollution,

·         create a framework convention that will ensure the utilization, development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilization thereof for present and future generations

·         affirm the importance of international cooperation and good neighbourliness in this field

·         raise awareness of the special situation and needs of developing countries.

Following is its annex on Arbitration.

ANNEX

ARBITRATION

Article 1

Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention shall take place in accordance with articles 2 to 14 of the present annex.

Article 2

The claimant party shall notify the respondent party that it is referring a dispute to arbitration pursuant to article 33 of the Convention. The notification shall state the subject matter of arbitration and include, in particular, the articles of the Convention, the interpretation or application of which are at issue. If the parties do not agree on the subject matter of the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall determine the subject matter.

Article 3

1. In disputes between two parties, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the parties to the dispute shall appoint an arbitrator and the two arbitrators so appointed shall designate by common agreement the third arbitrator, who shall be the Chairman of the tribunal. The latter shall not be a national of one of the parties to the dispute or of any riparian State of the watercourse concerned, nor have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties or such riparian State, nor have dealt with the case in any other capacity.

2. In disputes between more than two parties, parties in the same interest shall appoint one arbitrator jointly by agreement.

3.Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.

Article 4

1. If the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal has not been designated within two months of the appointment of the second arbitrator, the President of the International Court of Justice shall, at the request of a party, designate the Chairman within a further two-month period.

2. If one of the parties to the dispute does not appoint an arbitrator within two months of receipt of the request, the other party may inform the President of the International Court of Justice, who shall make the designation within a further two-month period.

Article 5

The arbitral tribunal shall render its decisions in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and international law.

Article 6

Unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree, the arbitral tribunal shall determine its own rules of procedure.

Article 7

The arbitral tribunal may, at the request of one of the parties, recommend essential interim measures of protection.

Article 8

1.The parties to the dispute shall facilitate the work of the arbitral tribunal and, in particular, using all means at their disposal, shall:

(a) Provide it with all relevant documents, information and facilities; and

(b) Enable it, when necessary, to call witnesses or experts and receive their evidence.

2.The parties and the arbitrators are under an obligation to protect the confidentiality of any information they receive in confidence during the proceedings of the arbitral tribunal.

Article 9

Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the case, the costs of the tribunal shall be borne by the parties to the dispute in equal shares. The tribunal shall keep a record of all its costs, and shall furnish a final statement thereof to the parties.

Article 10

Any party that has an interest of a legal nature in the subject matter of the dispute which may be affected by the decision in the case, may intervene in the proceedings with the consent of the tribunal.

Article 11

The tribunal may hear and determine counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute.

Article 12

Decisions both on procedure and substance of the arbitral tribunal shall be taken by a majority vote of its members.

Article 13

If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or a failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings. Before rendering its final decision, the arbitral tribunal must satisfy itself that the claim is well founded

in fact and law.

Article 14

1.The tribunal shall render its final decision within five months of the date on which it is fully constituted unless it finds it necessary to extend the time limit for a period which should not exceed five more months.

2.The final decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be confined to the subject matter of the dispute and shall state the reasons on which it is based. It shall contain the names of the members who have participated and the date of the final decision. Any member of the tribunal may attach a separate or dissenting opinion to the final decision.

3.The award shall be binding on the parties to the dispute. It shall be without appeal unless the parties to the dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure.

4.Any controversy which may arise between the parties to the dispute as regards the interpretation or manner of implementation of the final decision may be submitted by either party for decision to the arbitral tribunal which rendered it.

_________________

Even if Egypt and Sudan do not abide by any of these, it makes their position weaker,

Sincerely,

Nabil

To test the vulnerability of runoff to changes in precipitation, Gleick (1991), combined meteorological information on future climate changes with the use of a regional hydrological model. In a first step, he developed a simple annual water balance model by splitting the Nile Basin into six sub-basins. Three of these (the Sudd swamp, the White Nile between the Sobat river and Khartoum, and the lower Nile from Aswan to Delta) generate very little runoff, but the other three (the Upper White Nile, the Sobat river, and the Blue Nile/Atbara regions) produce substantial runoff. In a second step, using the estimates of changes in temperature and precipitation given by the GFDL model, Gleick (1991) found a 30% increase in runoff over the Upper White Nile region due to increased precipitation in the basin, whereas in the Blue Nile/Atbara he found a 50% decrease in runoff due to a 20% decrease in precipitation. For the whole of the Nile Basin, he found a 25% decrease in runoff.

As noted by Conway (1994), it is not yet possible to produce reliable estimates of future Nile flows taking into accounts the effects of climate change. However, the studies undertaken in the last decade have improved our understanding of the behaviour of the Blue Nile and Lake Victoria sub-basins. The sensitivity analyses indicate that the Nile Basin is very sensitive to any change in climate, but the results obtained so far may not be realistic because the models do not incorporate changes in vegetation or soil properties.

Source: Jan C. van Dam (1999): Impacts of climate change and climate variability on Hydrological regimes: Impacts of climate change on hydrology of Africa. Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom, page 83.

Comment:

Gleick's research proves the importance of the White Nile on the total runoff of the Nile will gain even more importance – than the Blue Nile - with climate change.

With such variations, it is totally unfair for Egypt and Sudan to insist on a `quota' of the Nile water. The best way is to decide the share of each country as a percentage of the varying yield/runoff the Nile Basin.

Sincerely,

Nabil

Conclusion:

A Regional Atmospheric Climate MOdel RACMO has been applied to the Nile Basin to evaluate the impact of draining the Sudd wetlands. The comparison of the two scenarios (present climatology, and drained wetland) shows that draining the entire Sudd has negligible impact on the regional water cycle owing to the relatively small area covered by the wetland. The simulated runoff gain by complete draining of the Sudd wetland was computed to be slightly higher than observed Nile losses over the Sudd of 29 Gm3 year-1. However, the impact of draining the Sudd wetlands on the microclimate is large. The reduced evaporation in the drained scenario causes a reduction of the screen level relative humidity by 30–40%, and an increase of the temperature by 4–6°C during the dry season. During the wet season the impact of the

Sudd drainage is small.

Source: Mohamed et al (2006): Moisture recycling over the Nile basin. Reducing the Vulnerability of Societies to Water Related Risks at the Basin Scale (Proceedings of the third International Symposium on Integrated Water Resources Management, Bochum, Germany, September 2006). IAHS Publ. 317, 2007.

Comment:

This research looks from the narrow perspective of `water', it does not concern itself by the environmental impacts on wild life, migratory birds or local communities and the role of the Sudd on the quality of the Nile water. This study may be aiming to justify the Jonglei Canal under the NBI.

Nabil

No progress in Nile Basin negotiations

The First Joint Meeting of the Nile-Technical Advisory Committee (Nile-TAC) and the Negotiating Committee of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was held in Kampala this week, on September 28 and 29. It was convened following a decision of the NBI Council of Ministers at their 17th Ordinary Session held July 27 and 28 in Alexandria, Egypt. Participants were drawn from the nine Nile Basin countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, and opening remarks were made by Minister Dr. Mohamed Nasr El-Din Allam, Minister of Water and Irrigation of Egypt and Chairperson of the Nile Council of Ministers, Minister Maria Mutagamba, Minister of Water and Environment of Uganda and Ms. Henriette Ndombe, Executive Director of the Nile Basin Initiative. Deliberations covered details of the mandate of the joint meeting, the rules of procedure and dates for further meetings to be held to finalize submissions to the NBI Council of Ministers.  

However, the meeting was unable to provide the basis for moving forward together in an inclusive manner on the main area of contention. The upper riparian countries of Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda take the view that the decisions of the Council of Ministers at their extraordinary meeting on 22 May 2009 in Kinshasa, and the cleaning-up of the text of the Cooperative Framework Agreement at the meeting of the Negotiating Committee on 3 July 2009 in Nairobi, Kenya, provide the foundation to move forward together. Egypt and Sudan, however, argued that the 17th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Alexandria in July had reversed the decisions taken in Kinshasa and Nairobi. As a result of these differences, this week's meeting could do no more than draw up draft Rules of Procedure, leaving one pending addition to be added, and agree to hold their next meeting in Dar es Selaam, Tanzania, in December.

The central point of the sharp divergences goes to the heart of longstanding differences on whether `existing agreements' on the Nile River should be taken into account in the new Cooperative Framework Agreement. The upper riparian states ( Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda) want to start with the new legal regime of the Cooperative Framework Agreement based on the principles of equitable utilization of water and of avoiding significant harm to any riparian states. Sudan and Egypt say that they also accept these principles. However, they also want the highly unequal `existing agreements' or `rights' to remain effective. Ethiopia and the upper riparian states firmly reject this contention, hoping that the two downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan will reconsider their position and join with the majority of the Nile riparian states in implementing the Cooperative Framework Agreement.

Under this circumstance, it is becoming obvious that it might not be all that likely that the two divergent positions would be reconciled very soon. Some might wonder if the Nile riparian countries have been aiming at something which is not doable now. Perhaps, what is being aimed at requires a lot more psychological preparation, a lost more wisdom and a higher level of readiness for a win-win arrangement which no doubt would be in the interest of the present and succeeding generations. Ethiopia has both the necessary patience and prudence and the resolve not to compromise on principles that should underpin any equitable arrangement on issues relating to transboundary rivers such as the Nile. 

Last Updated ( Saturday, 03 October 2009 )

Source

Colonial Treaties Effecting Nile Water Use

Colonial treaties have resulted in inequitable rights to the use of Nile water between the countries of the Nile Basin.

• April 15, 1891 – Article III of the Anglo-Italian Protocol. Article III states that "the Italian government engages not to construct on the Atbara River, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile". The language used in this article was too vague to provide clear property rights or rights to the use of water.
• May 15, 1902 – Article III of the Treaty between Great Britain and Ethiopia. Article three states "His Majesty the Emperor Menilik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, engages himself towards the Government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Sudan" This agreement has become one of the most contested agreements over the use of the Nile waters.
• May 9, 1906 – Article III of the Agreement between Britain and the Government of the Independent State of the Congo. Article III states "The Government of the independent state of the Congo undertakes not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work over or near the Semliki or Isango river which would diminish the volume of water entering Lake Albert except in agreement with the Sudanese Government". Belgium signed this agreement on behalf of the Congo despite the agreement favoring only the downstream users of the Nile waters and restricting the people of the Congo from accessing their part of the Nile.
• December 13, 1906 – Article 4(a) of the Tripartite Treaty (Britain-France-Italy). Article 4(a) states "To act together... to safeguard; ... the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, more especially as regards the regulation of the waters of that river and its tributaries (due consideration being paid to local interests) without prejudice to Italian interests". This treaty, in effect, denied Ethiopia its sovereign right over the use of its own water. Ethiopia has rejected the treaty their military and political power was not sufficient to regain its use of the Nile water.
• The 1925 exchange of notes between Britain and Italy concerning Lake Tana which states "...Italy recognizes the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan... not to construct on the head waters of the Blue Nile and the White Nile (the Sobat) and their tributaries and effluents any work which might sensibly modify their flow into the main river." Ethiopia opposed the agreement and notified both parties of its objections:

"To the Italian government: The fact that you have come to an agreement, and the fact that you have thought it necessary to give us a joint notification of that agreement, make it clear that your intention is to exert pressure, and this in our view, at once raises a previous question. This question which calls for preliminary examination, must therefore be laid before the League of Nations."

"To the British government: The British Government has already entered into negotiations with the Ethiopian Government in regard to its proposal, and we had imagined that, whether that proposal was carried into effect or not, the negotiations would have been concluded with us; we would never have suspected that the British Government would come to an agreement with another Government regarding our Lake."

• May 7, 1929 – The Agreement between Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This agreement included:
• Egypt and Sudan utilize 48 and 4 billion cubic meters of the Nile flow per year, respectively;
• The flow of the Nile during January 20 to July 15 (dry season) would be reserved for Egypt;
• Egypt reserves the right to monitor the Nile flow in the upstream countries;
• Egypt assumed the right to undertake Nile river related projects without the consent of upper riparian states.
• Egypt assumed the right to veto any construction projects that would affect her interests adversely.

In effect, this agreement gave Egypt complete control over the Nile during the dry season when water is most needed for agricultural irrigation. It also severely limits the amount of water allotted Sudan and provides no water to any of the other riparian states.

• The 1959 Nile agreement between the Sudan and Egypt for full control utilization of the Nile waters. This agreement included:
• The controversy on the quantity of average annual Nile flow was settled and agreed to be about 84 billion cubic meters measured at Aswan High Dam, in Egypt.
• The agreement allowed the entire average annual flow of the Nile to be shard among the Sudan and Egypt at 18.5 and 55.5 billion cubic meters, respectively.
• Annual water loss due to evaporation and other factors were agreed to be about 10 billion cubic meters. This quantity would be deducted from the Nile yield before share was assigned to Egypt and Sudan.
• Sudan, in agreement with Egypt, would construct projects that would enhance the Nile flow by preventing evaporation losses in the Sudd swamps of the White Nile located in the southern Sudan. The cost and benefit of same to be divided equally between them. If claim would come from the remaining riparian countries over the Nile water resource, both the Sudan and Egypt shall, together, handle the claims.
• If the claim prevails and the Nile water has to be shared with another riparian state, that allocated amount would be deducted from the Sudan's and Egypt's and allocations/shares in equal parts of Nile volume measured at Aswan.
• The agreement granted Egypt the right to constructs the Aswan High Dam that can store the entire annual Nile River flow of a year.
• It granted the Sudan to construct the Rosaries Dam on the Blue Nile and, to develop other irrigation and hydroelectric power generation until it fully utilizes its Nile share.
• A Permanent Joint Technical Commission to be established to secure the technical cooperation between them.

Source

Khartoum Statement on Future Dams and Development on the Nile
Date: Saturday, February 02 @ 14:28:27 GMT

Preamble
Upon invitation by the Sudan National Discourse Forum we, representatives of civil society, private sector, NBI institutions and governments met in Khartoum, Sudan from 19th-21st January 2008.

After extensive deliberations, as citizens of the Nile basin, we were unanimous in agreeing the urgent need to address effectively the future challenges posed by large dams projects on the Nile. This would help to ensure more sustainable development, optimise benefits from the utilisation of Nile resources for all riparians, and enhance poverty reduction in the basin.

In this regard, we state the following:-

1. Lessons learnt

a. The Nile basin is one system and future dams development should take cognizance of this fact.
b. The experience of over a century of dams and development on the Nile should be reflected in new dams projects. Some of these dams are underperforming or nearing obsolescence, others continue to function as designed.
c. There are many different beneficial and negative impacts of large dams in the basin.
d. Understanding the nature of these impacts and acting upon them is an urgent priority.
e. A key first step is the clear and efficient sharing in the public domain of as much information as possible on past and present project impacts.

2. Towards basin-wide consultation guidelines

a. While recognizing the developmental role of dams, there is nevertheless a need to establish more effective guidelines and consultation processes at a basin level. This can ensure that positive impacts are accentuated and negative impacts mitigated, including through the establishment of more consultative impact assessments.
b. Guidelines should, in particular, seek to strengthen the participation of stakeholders at all levels in the decision making processes.
c. These guidelines and consultation processes should be set up as soon as possible.
d. We call upon the NBD and CBSI to work together to establish such a process.

3. Engaging civil society and local communities

a. A critical element in these guidelines is to provide advice and direction on engaging civil society and local communities in dams and development processes. This should take place from the conception of all proposed projects.
b. Key written guidelines and briefings should be provided on each NBI project to assist in consultation at a local level.
c. Suitable forums in which to share information effectively and receive feedback from civil society should be established.

4. Selecting future dams projects

a. Careful selection of future dams projects is very important. This should be on the basis of several criteria, chief amongst which is the maximization of benefits and sharing opportunities.

b. Criteria for selection should be based on the principles of sustainable development, taking into consideration concerns including future climate change scenarios.

Source: Sudan Vision

DAMS

A groundbreaking workshop was convened by the SNDF in January on the issue of developing future large dams on the Nile. Bringing together stakeholders from all Nile countries and many different sectors—including civil society, the government and international agencies—the workshop led to a very important output in the form of a Khartoum Statement on future dams development. This statement, endorsed by all present, will be taken forward to the Nile-TAC and Nile-COM later this year. It is a powerful statement of cooperation between sectors to ensure that future dams development is both sustainable and well-planned with the needs of affected communities becoming central to the decision making process.

While seen originally as a relatively straight forward solution to many development needs, the history of dams over the last century has shown that their benefits to society are invariably accompanied by an array of environmental and social impacts. Many of these issues were presented—and debated—at the meeting.

There is widespread recognition by government, industry, development partners, NGOs, community groups, and many others concerned, that the approach taken to dams development needs to pay greater attention to environmental and social issues. Different environmental and social guidelines now exist and are increasingly applied, yet often there are different judgments on the construction of dams based on different value systems, development paradigms, options analysis and practical actions. Frequently the dilemma focuses on whether environmental conservation and development are antagonistic. The three-day regional meeting brought together representatives across the Nile Basin, governments and civil society and was supported by the NBI â– 

Source: Nile Voices, Issue 4, April 2008

Comments:

From my understanding this "very important' Khartoum Statement was never "approved" by the NBI. In fact, according to Frank Habineza, Rwanda's national coordinator of the NBD, "For instance, the capacity building workshop on the viability of hydro power dams and alternative sources of power or energy was later found faulty in many ways, yet there were no funds allocated to restart the capacity building." Source

This leads to the question that I shall not get tired of asking, why is NGO involvement is under strict control – indoctrination – of the NBI and its funding agencies?

From the fact that the NBD web site is up and running again, it seems that the NBD had received new funding.

Sincerely,

Nabil

Nile Basin States Seek 'Collective' Negotiations

Mathias Ringa

12 October 2009

Nairobi — Peaceful and collective negotiations must be encouraged in the quest for a comprehensive legal framework that can allow all the 10 states to equitably utilise the River Nile basin.

According to Uganda's deputy head of mission Idule Amoko, the 1929 treaty between Egypt and United Kingdom that gave the North African country a monopoly over the use of Nile water resources does not rise to the challenges of the present day.

"We are for the revision of the agreements through peace and collective negotiations by all states," he said.

"A comprehensive legal framework for equitable and just utilisation of the Nile resources by riparian states has to be put into place," he added.

Mr Amoko was speaking to The EastAfrican at Kilifi on the sidelines of a recent Climate Change and Transboundary Water Conflicts in Africa workshop.

Participants were drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Niger, Zambia, Egypt, South Africa among other countries.

But an official from Egypt's Ministry of International Co-operation, Marawan Badr, when reached for comment said Egypt may relax its hard stance on the utilisation of River Nile water resources if its historical and natural rights are guaranteed by other riparian countries.

"Egypt is not opposed to the sharing of the water resources provided that the other riparian countries guarantee us of water security.

"There is no way we can continue to maintain a monopoly since the waters originates from other riparian countries and later ends in our country. We don't have to quarrel as the water resources are enough for all of us."

Mr Badr said though there have been long negotiations geared towards the sharing of the Nile basin resources, there are still some pending issues to be resolved.

He added that the upstream riparian countries must assure downstream countries of water security before an agreement on sharing the Nile resources was reached.

He said: "We need more time to negotiate on the utilisation of the Nile Basin resources; hurrying up the matter might cause us major problems in the future."

A senior researcher from Ethiopian, Dr Debay Tadesse, called for the preparation of a general framework for co-operation in the Nile River basin with specific reference to equitable utilisation of the water resources.

Dr Tadesse said approaches to conflict resolution and resource management would develop the upstream riparian countries, which are faced with high poverty levels and food insecurity.

The researcher asked for the revision of the status quo through the generation of options to avoid potential confrontation and enhance stability and conservation of the water resources.

The first logical step is to discuss the issue of the Nile with a desire to finding a lasting solution.

The degree of mistrust characterising the riparian countries has to be avoided through mutual agreement," Dr Tadesse said.

The researcher said unless the water resources were shared equally among the concerned states a conflict might occur.

Kenya's Minister for Water Charity Ngilu noted that the protracted consultations on the Nile Basin collaborative framework were causing anxiety and displeasure among riparian countries.

Mrs Ngilu said: "We want the legal framework swiftly concluded and operationalised to save Lake Victoria and reassure the livelihood of 15 million people bordering the basin."

The Nile is the world's longest river at 6,700km and has long been one of the world's greatest natural assets.

It is a trans-boundary river shared by 10 African countries namely Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda.

Its catchment area covers 10 per cent of Africa's landmass and faces challenges of poverty with five riparian countries being among the 10 poorest in the world.

The basin also is faced with the challenge of environmental degradation.

Mrs Ngilu said it was unfair for Egypt and Sudan to maintain a status quo on the usage of the Nile water resources at the expense of other states.

The minister said the 1929 agreement between Egypt and the United Kingdom has been viewed as protecting the interests of the developed downstream riparian states at the expense of the underdeveloped upstream states.

"Kenya expects Egypt and Sudan to co-operate since their needs are best served through the conservation of the Lake Victoria basin.We would like the downstream riparian states to assist in conserving the lake."

He noted that both the 1929 and 1959 agreements were only bilateral and did not include the other of riparian countries despite that it portioned out all of the river's waters.

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Signs of Conflict Emerge Over the Nile's Waters

Paul Goldsmith

5 October 2009

Nairobi — The signs are there for all to see. There are the dead cattle, the rivers reduced to rivulets, the loadshedding, and long queues at water points.

Tankers have replaced the role of pipelines in many urban areas.

And as the sun beats down on the dry landscape with renewed intensity each day, the flow of the Tana River has decreased to less than 10 per cent of the peak volume recorded in 1998.

Desiccated landscapes across the Kenya highlands are beginning to resemble the parched savannas of Mali and Burkina Faso.

Articles in the Economist and New York Times underscore the long-term implications of the famine in Kenya; the even higher number of Somali civilians facing starvation have yet to silence the Kalashnikovs, mortars, and RPGs in war-torn Mogadishu.

These prevailing conditions reinforced the urgency of the Institute for Security Studies meeting on Climate Change and Transnational Water Management held in Mombasa this past week.

The meeting was told that a host of statistical measures support predictions that water will soon replace oil as a source of war across the world, and an emerging driver of conflict for large swathes of Africa.

Where the average American uses 600 litres of water per day, sub Saharan Africans' average consumption falls between 5 and 20 litres.

The international mean per capita availability of water is 1,000 cubic metres; in this region, the per capita average of 647cm is expected to drop to 374 cm over the coming years.

The problem of unequal availability is further skewed by temporal and spatial variables affecting access and distribution.

Climate change intensifies the problem through its impact on the timing, intensity and variability of rainfall, droughts and flooding.

These factors are part of the complex matrix of issues making the 1929 and 1959 Agreements on the use of the Nile River Basin waters an increasingly visible source of regional friction.

These pacts allocate a large majority of the Nile's water for Sudan (17 per cent) and Egypt (67 per cent).

The opening presentation by Debay Tadesse of the ISS outlined the parameters that make the current status quo a potentially explosive equation: 839 million people depend upon the greater Nile water system, but some 300 million do not benefit from the system's lake and riparian resources.

A situation where "those who contribute most of the water but use almost none of it and those who use most of it but contribute none," he observed, "is a recipe for conflict."

Tanzania unilaterally abrogated the colonial era agreements when it established a pipeline supplying water from Lake Victoria to support a new irrigation scheme in 2004.

The Kenya government's representative at the meeting reiterated the position that the country will no longer feel obligated to strictly abide by the conditions of treaties negotiated by Great Britain before Independence in 1963.

If these revisionist actions appear to be a simple case of states acting in their national interest, the larger picture is qualified by the fact that the upstream riparian states feeding the White Nile (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda) provide a relatively minor portion of the water flowing through Sudan to Egypt.

Ethiopia's Blue Nile supplies the lion's share of the Nile's water: Over 60 billion cubic metres of the annual average of 84 billion cubic metres of water reaching the Aswan Dam in upper Egypt originate in the Ethiopian highlands.

On the surface, these hard figures appear to harden the future prospects of upstream-downstream conflict, but they also conceal forces that run deeper than the interests of individual nations.

The Nile Basin Initiative was launched in 1992 to mitigate the accumulating demographic and developmental pressures on the system's finite water resources.

The NBI brought all the riparian states under one umbrella to address the transnational issues of managing the Nile system's water, and to develop win-win solutions for negative scenarios, including the potential impact of climate change.

While the NBI presenter argued that significant progress has been achieved on many fronts, the revision of upstream riparian rights remains unresolved.

The question of statistical measures of water flows and per capita consumption sparked acrimonious debate during the first day of the meeting.

The presentation by Egypt's spokesman, Marwan Badr, generated the most heated exchanges during the final session of the day.

For this participant, however, even these flare-ups were a healthy aspect of what is arguably emerging as an important exemplar of adaptive governance.

If I formerly thought the Egyptian position to be rigid and untenable, I also found most of Mr Badr's arguments convincing.

He claimed that Egypt's role in the NBI is subject to misinformation and misunderstanding.

Water, he stressed, is not an issue of national security, but a question of national survival.

Egypt's large and growing population is wholly dependent on the country's upstream neighbours; recognition of this position has conditioned a policy of active co-operation, and not coercion.

Promoting holistic management of the Nile Basin's water, and not negotiating bilateral arrangements is the fulcrum of its regional policy.

In the case of Tanzania's irrigation scheme, Egypt offered to help develop groundwater sources in place of the pipeline, and did not interfere when this option was not exercised.

Although Egypt does not contribute a single drop to the flow of the Nile, it can claim to be the region's most responsible manager of the precious resource: In the past, the annual water flow could fluctuate between 50 billion cm and 150 billion cm; constructing the Aswan dam has allowed it to regulate its annual allocation while rescuing many billions of cubic metres lost before flooding was controlled.

Moreover, the government has managed to cope with population growth by developing technologies for recycling water -- some 10 billion of Egypt's annual allocation of 67 billion cubic metres is reused.

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