Hello all; sorry for my long absence. Before I resume my commentary
on BGE (maybe one post a month) I would like to say a few words on
what I am doing. (Perhaps I should say on what I think I am doing?)
The reason for this is that my commentary (and my understanding of
said commentary) has been, here and elsewhere, compared to Derrida,
Foucault, and Strauss. I assure you that they are all quite innocent
of my speculations. I should add that far worse has been (and can be)
said of my commentary. Another reason to discuss the genesis and
direction of my commentary is to let new list members know what they
are in for.

These names (Derrida, Foucault, and Strauss) represent the post-
modern left and post-modern right. The only significant post-modern
missing (from these characterizations of my commentary) is Deleuze.
His absence is easily explained in that I have taken, in this
reading, a militantly agnostic (if not hostile) position on the
questions of cosmos and genesis. (As an aside I should note that this
has annoyed more than one intelligent person.) Deleuze is among the
greatest thinkers (thus far) to take up and perhaps deepen some of
Nietzsche's key notions - such as chaos, power and recurrence.
(Which nicely explains why my reading does not bring him at all to
mind.)

Chaos, power, recurrence, I largely ignore all this. But why this
strange reading of Nietzsche? I say strange because there really is
no other word for it. Some of the most intelligent books on Nietzsche
that we (I mean any of us) have ever read have swirled around these
issues. But if I am not interested in cosmos/genesis then am I, for
example, giving a deconstructionist or an esoteric reading?

Upon sober, or nearly sober, consideration I don't think so. For
instance I most emphatically do not believe that words refer just to
other words. Words, especially the words of genuine philosophers,
result in actions. It isn't clear to me how the texts of
deconstruction result in anything - except other texts. As for
esotericism, I continue to think that this notion in practice has led
to the mistaken impression that there are only two levels of a text.
And it tends, in practice, to equate the esoterical reader with the
philosopher. While this flatters the exceptions of all camps I remain
unconvinced.

In a sense my reading, the genesis of this reading, can be seen as
beginning with a meditation on some of the remarks made by Nietzsche
in Ecce Homo. In Ecce Homo our philosopher says some very remarkable
things about BGE on the one hand and Z on the other. The chapter on
BGE is very short, only 2 sections, so I will include it here:


1.
The task for the years that followed was delineated as sharply as
possible. After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, there
came the turn of the No-saying, No-doing part: the revaluation of all
values hitherto, the great war, -conjuring up a day of decision. This
included the slow search for those related to me, those who, out of
strength, would offer me their hands for destroying. - Thenceforth
all my writings are fish hooks: perhaps I know how to fish as well as
anyone? ... If nothing was caught, I am not to blame. There were no
fish ...

2
This book (1886) is in all essentials a critique of modernity, not
excluding modern sciences, modern arts, even modern politics, along
with some indications as to a contrasting type that is as little
modern as possible, a noble, a Yes-saying type. In the latter sense
the book is a school for gentilhomme [nobleman, gentleman], taking
the concept in a more spiritual and radical sense than has ever been
done. One must have guts merely to endure it, one must never have
learned fear ... All those things of which the age is proud are felt
as contradictions to this type, almost as bad manners, for
example "objectivity," "pity for all that suffers," the "historical
sense," with its submission to foreign tastes, with its lying on its
belly before petits faits [small facts], and "being scientific."-
When you consider that this book followed after Zarathustra, you may
perhaps also guess the dietetic régime [regimen] to which it owes
its origin. The eye which has been spoiled by a tremendous need for
seeing far-Zarathustra is even more far-sighted than the Czar-, is
here forced to focus on the nearest, the age, the around-us. In every
detail, above all also in the form, one will find the same voluntary
turning away from the instincts that had made possible a Zarathustra.
Refinement in form, in intention, in the art of silence, is in the
foreground, psychology is handled with admitted hardness and
cruelty, -the book is devoid of any good-natured word ... All this is
a recuperation: who could guess at last what kind of recuperation
makes necessary such a squandering of goodness as Zarathustra
represents? ... Theologically speaking-listen closely, for I rarely
speak as a theologian-it was God himself who at the end of his day's
work lay down as a serpent under the tree of knowledge: thus he
recuperated from being God ... He had made everything too
beautiful ... The devil is merely idleness of God on that seventh day.


I should mention that I got the above at
<http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/eh12.htm> which is part
of the Nietzsche Channel website.

Our philosopher begins by saying that his task for the years that
followed was clear as could be. (Note that I will also be following
Hollingdale's translation. The above is provided as a convenient
reference.) Years that followed what? - we are forced to wonder. Ah
yes, the chapter that precedes this one is the one on Zarathustra.
Now he says that the affirmative part of his task was done. Also
Sprach Zarathustra is, by all accounts, an affirmative book. After
this (after Zarathustra) comes the denying, no-saying, no-doing part
of his task. This no-doing is meant to evoke or conjure up a day of
decision. One wonders if what was conjured would (or even could)
occur without this conjuring. Perhaps no-doing is also a doing. And
one wonders about the decision. What does the decision entail? What
exactly is a revaluation of all values?

In any case he goes on to say that this no-doing includes the search
for those related to him who would help him in his work of
destruction. Remember that we have understood the preceding to mean
that Z was not a destructive work. Has Nietzsche just indicated that
the readers of Z are not related to him? No? How? Ah yes, we then
notice that when he says `this includes the slow search' he
may mean to indicate that what follows Z isn't only meant for
those mighty destroyers that he now hunts. He means that there is
more to the post-zarathustrian writings then the slow search for the
destructive.

We now believe that this new period is also for the readers, those
wonderfully affirmative readers, of Z. But then we note again that
these destroyers are related to him. But being related to is
certainly not to be interpreted as being the same as. One can have
several relations each similar to oneself but not similar to each
other. In this case we can ask aren't those affirmative souls,
the readers and enthusiasts of Zarathustra, also related to him? But
they would be related to him in a different manner than the
destructive ones. In other words it is not impossible that the
affirmative and destructive types aren't similar to each other at
all. They are both however similar to Nietzsche. Similar here may
mean little more than useful for his task. We find ourselves
wondering who else is related to him...

But we really haven't said a word about his task! Tsk. It seems
to be composed of two parts - the affirmative and the denying. In
order to know Nietzsche's task we would (at the very least!) need
to put these two parts together. Otherwise the parts will not seem to
make a whole. A general, for instance, may order some commandos to
destroy a bridge while telling some engineers only a few miles from
that bridge to build a new bridge. Destroying and building bridges is
certainly contrary behavior! And the engineers aren't part of the
commando operation and vice versa. Yet they are both part of an
overall plan. They are both part of the general's strategy or
task, which of course, is to win the battle or war. Even if some of
the parts of this task have nothing to do with each other. Now we
see, or think we see, that it is perfectly possible that his post-
Zarathustrian task no longer includes the readers of Z. This still
leaves us wondering how the books differ. And this also leaves us
wondering exactly what is his task.

In any case he says that from now on (what!) all his writings are
fish-hooks. What causes us such a shock when we read this is these
three little words - from now on. The phrase `from now on'
here means post-Zarathustra. But wasn't Nietzsche also searching
for those related to him with Z? Or is he really denying here that
the enthusiasts of Z are related to him? He goes on to say that
perhaps he understands fishing better than anybody. This strangely
reminds us of Plato who, in The Sophist, has his Stranger compare
fishermen and sophists - with results that are not exactly clear to
everyone. Also, and this should be clear to everyone, for Nietzsche
fishing and fishhooks is meant to make us think of the gospels and
Jesus and his apostles. They are the most famous, and perhaps most
successful, fishers of men.

He finishes this first section by saying that if nothing was caught
he is not to blame. There were no fish. Apparently the art of fishing
is not entirely knowable. Just as the fisherman can, for various
reasons, catch no fish, so too the philosopher may fail to find the
specific type (in this case a destructive type) he fishes (or
searches) for. Perhaps this can explain why Z wasn't a
`fish-hook' book. The destructive types might not be where
Nietzsche thinks they are or they may not feed on the bait he happens
to use. Which isn't to say they aren't anywhere or that they
don't take (to another type of) bait. Fish are always biting;
unfortunately they aren't always biting where and when one
expects to find them biting. But what of the enthusiastic readers of
Z? Why no fishhooks for them? Perhaps Nietzsche is indicating that he
isn't searching for them - he is making them. And that is why
only the post-Zarathustrian books are fishhooks - and Nietzsche is
uncertain of his success. Perhaps Nietzsche and Plato's Stranger
agree on this much - it is easier to make than it is to know. Why
make affirmative types, why find destructive types?

Section 2 of this small chapter begins by saying that BGE is a
critique of modernity, of modern sciences, arts and politics. He
quickly adds that it is also an indication, signposts to an
antithetical type who is not modern - who is noble and affirmative.
Interesting. This post-Zarathustrian book isn't only critical and
destructive, or bait for critical and destructive fish. It is also an
indication (better, indications, signposts) to a noble, Yes-saying
type. How is this affirmative type different from the zarathustrian
affirmative type? He calls this magnificent book a school for
gentlemen. Indeed. It would seem that the BGE affirmative type is
educated while the Zarathustrian affirmative type is found. It also
seems that one hunts (fishes) for the destructive while one makes (or
educates) for the affirmative human types. It is almost enough to
make one think that destruction is natural while it's opposite is
...what? An artifact? What?

Nietzsche continues by saying that the concept (gentlemen, school for
gentlemen) is taken more spiritually and radically then before.
Indeed. He adds that one has to have courage even to endure it - one
must never have learned fear. A pity that our philosopher didn't
live in our post-modernity - in which one can criticize anything,
God, Government, Revolution and Texts without the slightest
consequences, except, if one is lucky, some small fame or, if one is
even luckier, some slightly less small notoriety. There is no fear
here. We have invented happiness! - don't blink.

Among the things these fearless types feel as contradictions is
objectivity, pity, historical sense, little facts and
scientificality. He says these are the things of which the age is
proud. The age he is speaking of is the modern age. I have read that
we live in a post-modern age. This post-modern age has been made (or
defined) by disciples of Nietzsche, by artifacts of the various
Nietzschean texts and their various intentions and tactics. It would
seem that these tactical maneuvers could be successfully achieved by
using the methods of making, finding, and educating. In any case
there are a great many Nietzscheans. This means that some of the
items on this list may no longer have the power they once had.
Objectivity, for instance, seems to be on the run everywhere - from
the university to the media. Pity, on the other hand, seems to be as
strong as ever...

Perhaps we have yet to entirely leave modernity. What Nietzsche says
next takes us by surprise. He mentions Zarathustra for the first time
in this chapter. He says that this book (BGE) comes after Z and that
it required a certain dietetic regime. He says that Z is more
farsighted then BGE. He even says that Z is more farsighted then the
Tsar. What does this mean? He then adds that BGE is constrained to
look at what is around us, the present age. Now we see what he means.
Z is a book about the future while BGE is a book about the present -
a book about destroying the present, a present that is still, at
least in part, our present age. One also imagines that one destroys
the present in order to get to the Zarathustrian future. In order to
make a temple a temple must be destroyed.

But how is Z farsighted? Nietzsche has Z somewhere say
"Blessedness to write on the will of millennia as on
bronze-harder than bronze, nobler than bronze. Only the noblest is
altogether hard." Yes, we suspect that to be far-sighted is to
have great tasks, tasks that take longer than today to complete.
Z's task will be completed the day after tomorrow, the day after
many tomorrows - many millennia. The task of BGE, however, is right
in front of us. This is why the comparison of Z with the Tsar is
appropriate. The tsar doesn't live in a democracy - he
doesn't need to check an opinion poll to find out what he
believes today. He doesn't worry about constitutional niceties.
He can plan like no modern leader can ever plan. It amuses us to note
also that the Tsar rules over a Christian nation and that he has
ceremonial responsibility in the Orthodox Church. Will Tsar
Zarathustra have similar ceremonial responsibilities?

We had wanted to find out the difference between Z and BGE and now he
tells us. "In every aspect of the book, above all in its form,
one will discover the same intentional turning away from the
instincts that had made possible a Zarathustra." It would seem
that BGE and Z aren't as close as one might have hoped. Every
aspect is different! Are they opposites? What is the difference
between BGE and Z? Now he tells us - "Refinement in form, in
intention, in the art of silence, is in the foreground, psychology is
handled with admitted hardness and cruelty, -the book is devoid of
any good-natured word." Refinement in art, intention and silence
is in the foreground? BGE is indeed a school for gentlemen! But then
is Z a refined work? Does it appeal to refined readers?

All this refinement and silence in BGE is in the foreground. Silence
in the foreground? Does the form of BGE shroud the intention in
silence? How? This makes us wonder, should make us wonder, what
Nietzsche is only hinting at in the text of BGE. Psychology is
handled with hardness and cruelty. Ah yes, we think, hardness and
cruelty, obviously the critique of pity and the herd. But this is no
different than Z! In Z Nietzsche attacks both the last man and pity.
Who is Nietzsche cruelly attacking in BGE? Certainly not the sainted
exceptions - one trembles and then gasps for air! But aren't the
exceptions, and let's for once admit that all we readers of
Nietzsche imagine ourselves to be exceptions - I ask aren't they
the Nietzscheans who are doing our philosophers work for him? There
isn't a single good word in the entire book. One suspects that
whereas Z flattered, sought to flatter, seduce, remake, a certain
type with a worldview congenial to it, BGE isn't written to
flatter anyone. Unlike Z (and, in a different manner, A) BGE
isn't a book one should enthuse, or drool, over. BGE should make
us all very uncomfortable...

Nietzsche now says that all this is recuperative - for him. Is there
anything that is recuperative for us? One imagines that one
recuperates, needs to recuperate, from either a disease or an
accident. But we are wrong. He is recuperating from an expenditure of
goodness. The expenditure of goodness was the writing of Z. The
recuperation from this for Nietzsche is BGE. Then Nietzsche does
something most remarkable. He speaks theologically. He performs an
exegesis on scripture for us. "It was God himself who at the end
of his day's work lay down as a serpent under the tree of knowledge:
thus he recuperated from being God ... He had made everything too
beautiful ... The devil is merely idleness of God on that seventh
day."

God and the devil one and the same? Nietzsche intends his readers to
be shocked by this, but we late moderns aren't shocked by
anything. So, let's see, God creates light, the heavens, earth,
flora, fauna and then man. By any account a busy week. He then lies
down beneath the tree of knowledge in the midst of a paradise, a too
beautiful paradise that He made with his own hands. I say again that
He lays down as the serpent, note that the tree of knowledge is not
part of the recuperation of God. It is a legitimate part of paradise -
a silent but legitimate part. God, as serpent, draws the attention of
Eve to the tree that was prior to this intervention unnoticed. This
sharing of knowledge, this manifesting of the silent, resulted in the
permanent expulsion of humanity from paradise.

Knowledge destroys all paradises. This cannot be over-emphasized. It
is the enemy of everything beautiful. And if anyone should say that
the true is the beautiful - he should be beaten! BGE is
Nietzsche's most thoughtful book. The serpent (God) uses the tree
of knowledge to destroy paradise. Does Nietzsche (as God/serpent) use
BGE (his tree of knowledge) to destroy his Zarathustrian paradise
that has yet to be made? And if so why? What is this destruction of
the not yet Nietzschean paradise for? Hmmm... Let's review. After
the fiasco in Paradise humanity was expelled and had to build a new
world. After the destruction of modernity - what? We get to build and
live in a new Nietzschean/Zarathustrian world, a new paradise. After
BGE, the tree of knowledge in the Nietzschean/Zarathustrian paradise,
finally destroys that paradise - WHAT? Can you say Eternal Return of
the Same? I knew you could...

It was considerations similar to those above that led to my quirky
reading of BGE. What exactly is the decision the no-doing of the post-
zarathustrian books are meant to conjure up? What is the revaluation
of values and why is it necessary? What exactly is Nietzsche's
task? - a task that includes affirmative and destructive types and
perhaps other things as well. How does Nietzsche understand the dance
of making and knowing? What is the relation of education to
making/knowing? What is a philosophical artifact? What is the
relation of philosophy to religion, to politics? What exactly are the
differences between Z and BGE? There is not a single good-natured
word in the entire book Nietzsche says of BGE! My disagreeable
reading is meant to bring this out. Why Psychology - why silence? How
is knowledge dangerous? If it is how does one speak of it? Is the
destruction of paradise, any paradise, inevitable? These are some of
the questions that led to my reading.

It will be, and perhaps it should be, objected that by not seeing the
playfulness of Nietzsche, his fearlessness and love of danger, I
overstate his purposefulness. This is not entirely unfair and would
be a typical post-modern objection. I would say that the playfulness
and the purpose are always present. And I would add that while there
are a great deal of books written about the playfulness there are not
nearly as many on the purposefulness. Since I have Ecce Homo in front
of me let me give an example of what I mean by the playful and the
purposeful being present together. This excerpt is from the end of
the fourth section of the chapter called "Why I am so clever."


Seeking for my highest formula for Shakespeare, I invariably find
only this: he conceived the type of CTsar. Such things a man cannot
guess-he either is the thing, or he is not. The great poet draws only
from his own experience-to such an extent that later he can no longer
endure his own work. After glancing at my ZarathWtra, I pace to and
fro in my room for a half hour, unable to control an unbearable fit
of sobbing. I know of no more, heart-rending reading than
Shakespeare: what he must have suffered to be so much in need of
playing the clown! Is Hamlet understood? Not doubt but certainty
drives one mad. But to feel this,. one must be profound, abysmal, a
philosopher. We all fear the truth. And, to make a confession: I feel
instinctively certain that Lord Bacon is the originator, the self-
torturer, of this most appalling literature: what do I care about the
wretched gabble of American fools and half-wits? But the power for
the greatest realism in vision is not only compatible with the
greatest realism in deeds, with the monstrous, with crime-it actually
presupposes the latter. . . . We hardly know enough about Lord Bacon-
the first realist in the, highest sense of the word-to be sure of
everything he did, everything he willed, and everything he
experienced in himself. To the devil with the critics! Suppose I had
christened my Zaratkustra with a name not my own-with Richard
Wagner's, for instance -the insight of two thousand years would not
have sufficed to guess that the author of Human, all-tooHuman was the
visionary of Zaratkustra.


I found the above at The Pirate Nietzsche Page
<http://www.cwu.edu/~millerj/nietzsche/eh2.html> about halfway down
the page. Again, I will be using the Hollingdale translation. The
above is only meant as a convenience. The above represent about 60%
of section 4. The highest formula Nietzsche can conceive of
Shakespeare is that he conceived Caesar. He then adds that one cannot
guess at this. One either is it or one is not. The great poet
creates out of his own reality we are told and then he adds to the
point at which he can no longer endure his work. When we look at the
above we are tempted to say this is Nietzsche playing with masks and
creativity and subjectivity - the joyous vertigo one experiences when
one finds (or makes) new identities for oneself. And it is - but what
else is it? Read on...

Why can't the poet any longer endure his work? Nietzsche then
adds that after stealing a glance at Z. he walks the room sobbing for
half an hour. Are these tears of joy, or tears of disgust and rage?
All we know is that he can no longer endure his work. We turn again
to Shakespeare. He says he knows of no more heartrending reading.
Nietzsche wonders of Shakespeare what he must have suffered to be a
buffoon to this extent. Nietzsche cannot endure Z - are we to
understand this to mean that it is a buffoonish work? Is he ashamed?

Nietzsche continues by saying that it is not doubt; it is certainty
that makes one mad. He refers us to Shakespeare's Hamlet. If
Hamlet is indeed certain from the first act that his uncle (?)
murdered his father and married his mother our reading of Hamlet is
substantially changed. What we once thought of as maneuvers to buy
time because no decision was made are turned into circuitous ruses
whose purpose is to destroy the king and queen. Is Nietzsche a
skeptical doubting playful postmodern entertaining himself - and us,
by killing time while time is killing him? Or is Nietzsche a most
purposeful thinker, whose motives, whose purpose, lead relentlessly
on to the bloody final act? Typically, post-moderns don't speak
of this. But Nietzsche speaks of purpose everywhere - what is the
purpose of ignoring it?

He says that only the philosophers feel this - that certainty leads
to madness. We all fear truth he says. By this he means that
`we' philosophers all fear truth. One can understand all this
to be a subtle reminder that the various philosophical artifacts - by
this I mean priests and politicians, scientists and scholars -
emphatically don't fear truth at all. Do you fear the truth?

Now Nietzsche drags Lord Bacon into this. A most remarkable maneuver.
He says that Bacon is the originator, the self-tormenter, of this
uncanniest species of literature. There is, for those that don't
know it, a school of thought that denies that Shakespeare wrote the
plays and maintains that Bacon secretly did so. It would seem we are
back to the theme of the fluidity of subject/author, the endless
dance of masks. Nietzsche then writes, "what do I care about the
pitiable chatter of American shallow-pates and muddle-heads?"
These muddle-heads and shallow-pates are, of course, believers in the
theory that Lord Bacon penned the writings of Shakespeare.

So what is Nietzsche saying? What if the `uncanniest species of
literature' refers to philosophy - and not drama as we first
thought? (As an aside I want to mention that Professor Lampert has
something on this particular discussion by Nietzsche of Bacon
somewhere - I forget what, I forget where, but I remember agreeing
with it. Don't snicker; you too will one day be old. Perhaps it
is in Philosophy and Modernity?) Is Lord Bacon a philosopher?

Nietzsche continues by saying "that the power for the mightiest
reality of vision is not only compatible with the mightiest power for
action, for the monstrous in action, for crime - it even presupposes
it." Now, if we take this to be a reference to the drama Hamlet
the crime in question is the murder of the king and queen, the vision
is the authors, and the power is the power of great literature over
us all. But if this sentence refers to philosophy - what then? What
does philosophy do, what does it have the power to do - what are its
actions? What does it mean to say that the actions of philosophers
are monstrous, criminal?

Nietzsche continues, "We do not know nearly enough about Lord
Bacon, the first realist in every great sense of the word, to know
what he did, what he wanted, what he experienced within himself."
What is remarkable about this sentence is how one can take it to be a
continuation of the discussion about play and masks and drama and
danger or one can understand it to be referring to Lord Bacon's
career as political man and philosopher, and the relationship between
politics and philosophy. Are philosophers Princes and legislators?

Nietzsche finishes this section by speaking of Z. He says, "To
the devil with the critics! Supposing I had baptized my Zarathustra
with another name, for example with the name of Richard Wagner, the
perspicuity of two millennia would not have sufficed to divine that
the author of Human, All Too Human is the visionary of
Zarathustra."

Again one can easily take this paragraph to be another example of the
play of masks, the fluidity of identity, and the instability of
authorship. On the other hand, following up the suggestions we made
on philosophy and power above, it could make us wonder why Nietzsche
wrote such an uncharacteristic work. What was the purpose of this?
Does he indeed want to change the real world? What results does
Nietzsche expect from writing a book that a Richard Wagner could have
written? What was the purpose of Z?

There is much more that can be said about this small selection but I
have spoken of it, Wagner and Nietzsche elsewhere. The point I made
there is that by saying that Z could be legitimately understood to
have been written by Wagner Nietzsche is making a not so veiled
attack on Z. Go read what Nietzsche says of Wagner, his art and his
followers. I won't rehearse it all once again here. Be that as it
may, there are always several threads, several lines of thought, in
any genuine philosophical work. It is a mistake to understand this,
that, or some other thread as the true text. One considers all the
threads in order to catch a glimpse of the garment - the overall
purpose of a given philosopher. In my reading of BGE one can say that
I am trying to tease out a thread that is a genuine part of the text
that isn't often discussed.

Now, don't any of you dare ask the difference between thread and
garment, tactic and strategy!

Joe