Haaretz Wed., Sat., December 27, 2008
Last update - 22:42 27/12/2008

Disinformation, secrecy, deception: How the Gaza offensive came about
By Barak Ravid, Haaretz Correspondent

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050426.html

Long-term preparation, careful gathering of information, secret
discussions, operational deception and the misleading of the public -
all these stood behind the Israel Defense Forces "Cast Lead" operation
against Hamas targets in the Gaza Strip, which began Saturday morning.

The disinformation effort, according to defense officials, took Hamas by
surprise and served to significantly increase the number of its
casualties in the strike.

Sources in the defense establishment said Defense Minister Ehud Barak
instructed the Israel Defense Forces to prepare for the operation over
six months ago, even as Israel was beginning to negotiate a ceasefire
agreement with Hamas. According to the sources, Barak maintained that
although the lull would allow Hamas to prepare for a showdown with
Israel, the Israeli army needed time to prepare, as well.

Barak gave orders to carry out a comprehensive intelligence-gathering
drive which sought to map out Hamas' security infrastructure, along with
that of other militant organizations operating in the Strip.

This intelligence-gathering effort brought back information about
permanent bases, weapon silos, training camps, the homes of senior
officials and coordinates for other facilities.

The plan of action that was implemented in Operation Cast Lead remained
only a blueprint until a month ago, when tensions soared after the IDF
carried out an incursion into Gaza during the ceasefire to take out a
tunnel which the army said was intended to facilitate an attack by
Palestinian militants on IDF troops.

On November 19, following dozens of Qassam rockets and mortar rounds
which exploded on Israeli soil, the plan was brought for Barak's final
approval. Last Thursday, on December 18, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and
the defense minister met at IDF headquarters in central Tel Aviv to
approve the operation.

However, they decided to put the mission on hold to see whether Hamas
would hold its fire after the expiration of the ceasefire. They
therefore put off bringing the plan for the cabinet's approval, but they
did inform Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni of the developments.

That night, in speaking to the media, sources in the Prime Minister's
Bureau said that "if the shooting from Gaza continues, the showdown with
Hamas would be inevitable." On the weekend, several ministers in
Olmert's cabinet inveighed against him and against Barak for not
retaliating for Hamas' Qassam launches.

"This chatter would have made Entebe or the Six Day War impossible,"
Barak said in responding to the accusations. The cabinet was eventually
convened on Wednesday, but the Prime Minister's Bureau misinformed the
media in stating the discussion would revolve around global jihad. The
ministers learned only that morning that the discussion would actually
pertain to the operation in Gaza.

In its summary announcement for the discussion, the Prime Minister's
Bureau devoted one line to the situation in Gaza, compared to one whole
page that concerned the outlawing of 35 Islamic organizations.

What actually went on at the cabinet meeting was a five-hour discussion
about the operation in which ministers were briefed about the various
blueprints and plans of action. "It was a very detailed review," one
minister said.

The minister added: "Everyone fully understood what sort of period we
were heading into and what sort of scenarios this could lead to. No one
could say that he or she did not know what they were voting on." The
minister also said that the discussion showed that the lessons of the
Winograd Committee about the performance of decision-makers during the
2006 Second Lebanon War were "fully internalized."

At the end of the discussion, the ministers unanimously voted in favor
of the strike, leaving it for the prime minister, the defense minister
and the foreign minister to work out the exact time.

While Barak was working out the final details with the officers
responsible for the operation, Livni went to Cairo to inform Egypt's
president, Hosni Mubarak, that Israel had decided to strike at Hamas.

In parallel, Israel continued to send out disinformation in announcing
it would open the crossings to the Gaza Strip and that Olmert would
decide whether to launch the strike following three more deliberations
on Sunday - one day after the actual order to launch the operation was
issued.

"Hamas evacuated all its headquarter personnel after the cabinet meeting
on Wednesday," one defense official said, "but the organization sent its
people back in when they heard that everything was put on hold until
Sunday."

The final decision was made on Friday morning, when Barak met with Chief
of Staff General Gabi Ashkenazi, the head of the Shin Bet Security
Service Yuval Diskin and the head of the Military Intelligence
Directorate, Amos Yadlin. Barak sat down with Olmert and Livni several
hours later for a final meeting, in which the trio gave the air force
its orders.

On Friday night and on Saturday morning, opposition leaders and
prominent political figures were informed about the impending strike,
including Likud chairman Benjamin Netanyahu, Yisrael Beuiteinu's Avigdor
Liebermen, Haim Oron from Meretz and President Shimon Peres, along with
Knesset Speaker Dalia Itzik.