U.S. Army report on Iraqi prisoner abuse
Complete text of Article 15-6 Investigation of the
800th
Military Police Brigade by Maj. Gen. Antonio M.
TagubaNBC News
Updated: 8:59 p.m. ET May 04, 2004The following is
the text of the Taguba report with only the names of
some witnesses removed for the sake of privacy.

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The report was prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba
on alleged abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th
Military Police Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Prison in
Baghdad.

It was ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander
of Joint Task Force-7, the senior U.S. military
official in Iraq, following persistent allegations of
human rights abuses at the prison.

Editor’s note: The report includes graphic
descriptions of events some readers may find
objectionable.

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE


TABLE OF CONTENTS

References ………………………………………………………… 3

Background ……………………………………………………… 6

Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention Operations In Iraq
(MG Miller’s Assessment).……….…………........... 8

IO Comments on MG Miller’s Assessment..……… 8

Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq
(MG Ryder’s
Report).................................... 9


IO Comments on MG Ryder’s Report…...………… 12

Preliminary Investigative Actions ……………….. 12

Findings and Recommendations

Part One (Detainee Abuse). ………………………… 15


Findings …………………………………………. 15

Recommendations …………………………… 20

Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) …….. 22

Findings …………………………………………. 22

Recommendations. ………………………… 31

Part Three (Command Climate, Etc…). ……… 34

Findings ……………………………………… … 36

Recommendations …… …………………… 44

Other Findings/Observations ……………………… 49

Conclusion ………………………………………… ………… 50

Annexes ………………………………………………………… 51




References

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the
Status of Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of
Refugees, 1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War
Victims, 12 August 1949

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949DOD
Directive 5100.69, “DOD Program for Prisoners of War
and other Detainees,” 27 December 1972DOD Directive
5100.77 “DOD Law of War Program,” 10 July 1979STANAG
No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War
(PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994STANAG No. 2033,
Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 6), 6
December 1994AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other
Detainees, 1 October 1997AR 190-47, The Army
Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force
for Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition
and Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30
September 1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30
September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9
September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information
Security, 31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms
and Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November
1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers
and Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29
June 2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April
1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29
October 1999

FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement
Operations, 1 August 2001FM 3-19.1, Military Police
Operations, 22 March 2001FM 3-19.4, Military Police
Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002 FM 3-05.30,
Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000FM 33-1-1,
Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5
May 1994FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28
September 1992FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25
November 198538. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23
May 1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for
Military Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for
Military Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for
Military Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier’s Manual, MOS 95B,
Military Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier’s Manual and
Trainer’s Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement
Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist,
Skill Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections
Specialist, Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and
Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D.
Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9
September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections
Operations in Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost
Marshal General), 6 November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8
& 3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR
Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement
Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and
Evidence-Led Detention Operations Relating to
Detainees, 24 August 2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of
Engagement, 26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and
Counter-Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While
Conducting Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for
Courts Martial, 2002 Edition


ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE800th MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG)
Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task
Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US
Central Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO)
in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to
investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th
Military Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested
an investigation of detention and internment
operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to
present. LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee
abuse, escapes from confinement facilities, and
accountability lapses, which indicated systemic
problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of
clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG
Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing
inquiry to make findings and recommendations
concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US
Central Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on
behalf of the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the
Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an
investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention
and internment operations from 1 November 2003 to
present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation
should inquire into all facts and circumstances
surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee abuse
in Iraq. It also directed that the investigation
inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more
comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the
fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC,
appointed MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding
General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this investigation.
MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal
investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP
Brigade’s detention and internment operations.
Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:

a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances
surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu
Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF));

b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7,
specifically allegations concerning these events at
the Abu Ghraib Prison;

c. (U) Investigate the training, standards,
employment, command policies, internal procedures, and
command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as
appropriate;

d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all
aspects of the investigation, and make any
recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate.
(ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez’s request to investigate the 800th
MP Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal
investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of
detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP
Company, 320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are
part of the 800th MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq
Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at
the time this investigation was initiated. In
addition, CJTF-7 had several reports of detainee
escapes from US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in
Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp
Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value
Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP
Brigade operated these facilities. In addition, four
Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally
charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater
Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq.
(ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior
to the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I
assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC
Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge
Advocate (SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate,
CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy for this
investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal
General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the
support of MP subject matter experts in the areas of
detention and internment operations. (ANNEXES 4 and
19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and
Detention Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey
D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo
(JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG
Miller led a team of personnel experienced in
strategic interrogation to HQ, CJTF-7 and the Iraqi
Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater
ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable
intelligence. MG Miller’s team focused on three
areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and
fusion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller’s team used JTF-GTMO procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with
an in-depth analysis of the Report on Detention and
Corrections in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted
by MG Ryder and a team of military police, legal,
medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7
Commander, LTG Sanchez, had previously requested a
team of subject matter experts to assess, and make
specific recommendations concerning detention and
corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November
2003, MG Ryder personally led this
assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)




ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller’s team was
on the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees
in Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive
Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and
procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to
detain, interrogate, and report information from
detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary
also stated that detention operations must act as an
enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller’s
Team recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a
detention guard force subordinate to the Joint
Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that
“sets the conditions for the successful interrogation
and exploitation of internees/detainees.” Regarding
Detention Operations, MG Miller’s team stated that the
function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the
expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it
also stated “it is essential that the guard force be
actively engaged in setting the conditions for
successful exploitation of the internees.” (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also concluded that Joint
Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are
hampered by lack of active control of the internees
within the detention environment. The Miller Team
also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint
Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) will consolidate both detention and
strategic interrogation operations and result in
synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated,
synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation
effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team also observed that the
application of emerging strategic interrogation
strategies and techniques contain new approaches and
operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that
a legal review and recommendations on internee
interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge
Advocate is required to maximize interrogation
effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER’S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller’s team recognized that they were
using JTF-GTMO operational procedures and
interrogation authorities as baselines for its
observations and recommendations. There is a strong
argument that the intelligence value of detainees held
at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different than that of the
detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and
other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there
are a large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). These are not believed to be
international terrorists or members of Al Qaida, Anser
Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist
organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller’s team
that the “guard force” be actively engaged in setting
the conditions for successful exploitation of the
internees would appear to be in conflict with the
recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team and AR 190-8 that
military police “do not participate in military
intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.” The
Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby
military police actively set the favorable conditions
for subsequent interviews runs counter to the smooth
operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 20)



REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS

IN IRAQ (MG RYDER’S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a
comprehensive review of the entire detainee and
corrections system in Iraq and provided
recommendations addressing each of the following areas
as requested by the Commander CJTF-7:

a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management

b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee
movement, segregation, and accountability

c. (U) Means of command and control of the
detention and corrections system

d. (U) Integration of military detention and
corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an
Iraqi-run corrections system

e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management

f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required
health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

g. (U) Court integration and docket management for
criminal detainees

h. (U) Detainee legal processing

i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including
integration with law enforcement and court databases
(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG
Ryder’s team are beyond the scope of this
investigation. However, several important findings
are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are
summarized below (emphasis is added in certain areas):

A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement,
segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and
approaches at the various detention facilities.
Several Division/Brigade collection points and US
monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
detailed use of force and other standing operating
procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
etc.) Though, there were no military police units
purposely applying inappropriate confinement
practices. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi
facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
crimes) are detained with security internees
(generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in
the same facilities, though segregated in different
cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of
detained people in a single location by members of the
same unit invites confusion about handling,
processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates
the transfer of information between different
categories of detainees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific
training during their mobilization period.
Corrections training is only on the METL of two MP
(I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one
currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the
other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units
supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in
detention facility operations, to include two days of
unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal
communication skills, forced cell moves, and
correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention
and Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task
organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of
both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to
force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP
Battalion and the 324th MP Battalion. In December
2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of its
mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP
Battalion redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the
remainder is scheduled to redeploy in March and April
2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP
Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
The units that remain are generally understrength, as
Reserve Component units do not have an individual
personnel replacement system to mitigate medical
losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that
have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a
five-year period. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC
asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;
Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a
separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)


3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced
challenges adapting its task organizational structure,
training, and equipment resources from a unit designed
to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ
(Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP
Soldier-to-detainee population ratio and facility
layout templates are predicated on a compliant,
self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or
high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the
full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the
denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES 19 and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM
3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection
of intelligence within a facility, do not participate
in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support
of Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template
whereby military police actively set favorable
conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions
generally run counter to the smooth operation of a
detention facility, attempting to maintain its
population in a compliant and docile state. The 800th
MP Brigade has not been directed to change its
facility procedures to set the conditions for MI
interrogations, nor participate in those
interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)

6. MG Ryder’s Report also made the following, inter
alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding
the command and control of detainees:

a. (U) Align the release process for security
internees with DoD Policy. The process of screening
security internees should include intelligence
findings, interrogation results, and current threat
assessment.

b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence
collection that will occur at Camp Vigilant.
Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the
screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central
Correctional Facility. Establish procedures that
define the role of military police Soldiers securing
the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence
personnel.

c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations,
except the MEK security mission, under a single
Military Police Brigade Headquarters for OIF 2.

d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate
into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct
internment and confinement operations in support of
OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER’S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder’s Team was to
observe detention and prison operations, identify
potential systemic and human rights issues, and
provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term
recommendations to improve CJTF-7 operations and
transition of the Iraqi prison system from US military
control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional
Authority and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The
Findings and Recommendations of MG Ryder’s Team are
thorough and precise and should be implemented
immediately. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems
that surfaced during MG Ryder’s Team’s assessment are
the very same issues that are the subject of this
investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered
by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of
that assessment. As will be pointed out in detail in
subsequent portions of this report, I disagree with
the conclusion of MG Ryder’s Team in one critical
aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th MP
Brigade had not been asked to change its facility
procedures to set the conditions for MI interviews.
While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and its commanders
were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for
subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a
review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and
witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX
19)

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder’s conclusion
regarding the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police,
though adept at passive collection of intelligence
within a facility, should not participate in Military
Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions.
Moreover, Military Police should not be involved with
setting “favorable conditions” for subsequent
interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in
this investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth
operation of a detention facility. (ANNEX 19)



PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder’s Report and
MG Miller’s Report, my investigation team immediately
began an in-depth review of all available documents
regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail
the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged
detainee abuses at detention facilities in Iraq,
particularly the Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility.
We analyzed approximately fifty witness statements
from military police and military intelligence
personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We
reviewed numerous photos and videos of actual detainee
abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are
now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team.
The photos and videos are not contained in this
investigation. We obtained copies of the 800th MP
Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal
investigations and disciplinary actions involving that
command for the past several months. (All ANNEXES
Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal
officers from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also
obtained the services of two individuals who are
experts in military police detention practices and
training. These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee,
Commander, 705th MP Battalion, United States
Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and SFC
Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army
Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also
requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry
Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned
to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder’s and MG Miller’s
Reports, the team reviewed numerous reference
materials including the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR
15-6 Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib
on 24 November 2003, the 205thMI Brigade’s
Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), facility
staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6
investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on
detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters
from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and
94)

4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad
for a one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison
(BCCF) and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in
order to become familiar with those facilities. We
also met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP
Criminal Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock,
Commander, 16th MP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips,
Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed Sannwaldt,
CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team
visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to
familiarize itself with the facility and operating
structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February 2004, at
Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training
sessions on approved detention practices. We
continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in
Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on
the applicable reference materials within each team
member’s area of expertise, and practiced
investigative techniques. I met with the team on
numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness
lists, review existing witness statements, arrange
logistics, and collect potential evidence. We also
coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness attendance,
force protection measures, and general logistics for
the team’s move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004.
(ANNEXES 4 and 25)

5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of
Authority on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V
Corps, and the upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP
Brigade Command, I directed that several critical
witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater
remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be
interviewed (ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad
on 8 February 2004 and conducted a series of
interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We
returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On
14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February
we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews
of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru
28 February we collected documents, compiled
references, did follow-up interviews, and completed a
detailed analysis of the volumes of materials
accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29
February we finalized our executive summary and
out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted the AR
15-6 written report with findings and recommendations
to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal
sufficiency review. The out-brief to the appointing
authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on 3 March 2004.
(ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)




FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the
facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations
of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of
maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central
Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command
(CID), led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly
trained professional agents have done a superb job of
investigating several complex and extremely disturbing
incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison.
They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses,
potential criminal suspects, and detainees. They also
uncovered numerous photos and videos portraying in
graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police
personnel on numerous occasions from October to
December 2003. Several potential suspects rendered
full and complete confessions regarding their personal
involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in
this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their
rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive
review of all of these statements and documentary
evidence, we also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs,
and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade,
as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade working at the prison. We did not believe it
was necessary to re-interview all the numerous
witnesses who had previously provided comprehensive
statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements
for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26,
34, 35, and 45-91)

REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) provides security of both criminal and security
detainees at the Baghdad Central Correctional
Facility, facilitates the conducting of interrogations
for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the
prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of
life of Soldiers assigned in order to ensure the
success of ongoing operations to secure a free Iraq.
(ANNEX 31)

2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the
Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19
November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts
operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7.
That from 19 November 2003 until Transfer of Authority
(TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL Thomas M. Pappas was the
Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the Commander of
FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of
the 800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard
Force at Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of
FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to
until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January
2004, LTC Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion
Commander of the 320th MP Battalion. That from
December 2002 until he was suspended from his duties,
on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the
Company Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in
charge of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I
further find that both the 320th MP Battalion and the
372ndMP Company were located within the confines of
FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG
Janis L. Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEX 45)

5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the
Abu Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous
incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal
abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This
systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was
intentionally perpetrated by several members of the
military police guard force (372nd Military Police
Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP
Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib
Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse were
substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX
26) and the discovery of extremely graphic
photographic evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive
nature of these photographs and videos, the ongoing
CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal
prosecution of several suspects, the photographic
evidence is not included in the body of my
investigation. The pictures and videos are available
from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7
prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned
crimes, there were also abuses committed by members of
the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade, and Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).
Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana
Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a
detainee by having him strip and returned to cell
naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees
by military police personnel included the following
acts:

a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
jumping on their naked feet;

b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees;

c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing;

d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
keeping them naked for several days at a time;

e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s
underwear;

f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to
masturbate themselves while being photographed and
videotaped;

g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
then jumping on them;

h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

i. (S) Writing “I am a Rapest” (sic) on the leg of
a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year
old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
detainee’s neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture;

k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee;

l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.

(ANNEXES 25 and 26)

7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written
confessions provided by several of the suspects,
written statements provided by detainees, and witness
statements. In reaching my findings, I have carefully
considered the pre-existing statements of the
following witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company -
Suspect

b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company –
Suspect

c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company -
Suspect

c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company -
Suspect

d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan
Corp., Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

(Names deleted)

8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described
the following acts of abuse, which under the
circumstances, I find credible based on the clarity of
their statements and supporting evidence provided by
other witnesses (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees;

b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm
pistol;

c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
chair;

e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch
the wound of a detainee who was injured after being
slammed against the wall in his cell;

g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light
and perhaps a broom stick.

h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in
one instance actually biting a detainee.

9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements
provided by the following detainees, which under the
circumstances I find credible based on the clarity of
their statements and supporting evidence provided by
other witnesses:

a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee #
13077

c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

l. (U) Ameen Sa’eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470
(ANNEX 26)

10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR
190-8, and the findings found in MG Ryder’s Report,
Military Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US
Government Agency’s (OGA) interrogators actively
requested that MP guards set physical and mental
conditions for favorable interrogation of witnesses.
Contrary to the findings of MG Ryder’s Report, I find
that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP Company, 800th
MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures
to “set the conditions” for MI interrogations. I find
no direct evidence that MP personnel actually
participated in those MI interrogations. (ANNEXES 19,
21, 25, and 26).

11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual
proven abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees
and by the following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25
and 26):

a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company,
stated in her sworn statement regarding the incident
where a detainee was placed on a box with wires
attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, “that her
job was to keep detainees awake.” She stated that MI
was talking to CPL Grainer. She stated: “MI wanted to
get them to talk. It is Grainer and Frederick’s job
to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to
talk.”

b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company,
stated in his sworn statement as follows: “I witnessed
prisoners in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made
to do various things that I would question morally.
In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules
and different SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of
rules or SOP for that section just word of mouth. The
Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He
stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him
to do things, but nothing was ever in writing he would
complain (sic).” When asked why the rules in 1A/1B
were different than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis
stated: “The rest of the wings are regular prisoners
and 1A/B are Military Intelligence (MI) holds.” When
asked why he did not inform his chain of command about
this abuse, SGT Davis stated: “ Because I assumed that
if they were doing things out of the ordinary or
outside the guidelines, someone would have said
something. Also the wing belongs to MI and it
appeared MI personnel approved of the abuse.” SGT
Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to
the guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI
said he stated: “Loosen this guy up for us.” Make
sure he has abad night.” “Make sure he gets the
treatment.” He claimed these comments were made to
CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis
stated that (sic): “the MI staffs to my understanding
have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, “Good job, they’re breaking down real fast. They
answer every question. They’re giving out good
information, Finally, and Keep up the good work .
Stuff like that.”

c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was
asked if he were present when any detainees were
abused. He stated: “I saw them nude, but MI would
tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and
clothes.” He could not recall who in MI had
instructed him to do this, but commented that, “if
they wanted me to do that they needed to give me
paperwork.” He was later informed that “we could not
do anything to embarrass the prisoners.”

d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian
contract translator was questioned about several
detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic): “They
(detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI,
the MP were there that night and the inmates were
ordered by SGT Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the
guys while questioning them to admit what they did.
They made them do strange exercises by sliding on
their stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them
and made them some wet, called them all kinds of names
such as “gays” do they like to make love to guys, then
they handcuffed their hands together and their legs
with shackles and started to stack them on top of each
other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will
touch the guy on tops butt.”

e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support
Medical Battalion, a medic testified that: “Cell 1A
was used to house high priority detainees and cell 1B
was used to house the high risk or trouble making
detainees. During my tour at the prison I observed
that when the male detainees were first brought to the
facility, some of them were made to wear female
underwear, which I think was to somehow break them
down.”

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq
for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion
and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations. I also find that very
little instruction or training was provided to MP
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I
find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva
Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel
or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness
statements)

13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade
Leadership not communicating with its Soldiers or
ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the
incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp
Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd
MP Company reported to the 800th MP Brigade Command at
Camp Bucca, that four Military Police Soldiers from
the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of
detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An
extensive CID investigation determined that four
soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
beaten these detainees following a transport mission
from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred
against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation
conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general
court martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski
supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind
800th MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any
steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated. Nor
is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the
commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca
abuse incident, took any initiative to ensure his
Soldiers were properly trained regarding detainee
treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)



RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an
integrated multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT)
comprised of subject matter experts in
internment/resettlement operations, international and
operational law, information technology, facility
management, interrogation and intelligence gathering
techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and
medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities.
This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive
training in all aspects of detainee and confinement
operations.

2. (U) That all military police and military
intelligence personnel involved in any aspect of
detainee operations or interrogation operations in
CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided
with training by an international/operational law
attorney on the specific provisions of The Law of Land
Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be
responsible for overall detainee operations throughout
the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also recommend that
the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a
minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer
and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee
operations.

4. (U) That detention facility commanders and
interrogation facility commanders ensure that
appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of
protections be made available in both English and the
detainees’ language and be prominently displayed in
all detention facilities. Detainees with questions
regarding their treatment should be given the full
opportunity to read the Convention.

5. (U) That each detention facility commander and
interrogation facility commander publish a complete
and comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures
(SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees, and that all
personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a
document indicating that they have read and understand
the SOPs.

6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of
MG Ryder’s Assessment Report, and my findings and
recommendations in this investigation, all units in
the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all
purposes, to include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.


7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent
for detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations
Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been
appointed by COMCJTF-7).

8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be
conducted to determine the extent of culpability of
Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th
MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF).

9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for
detainee operations is assigned a dedicated Senior
Judge Advocate, with specialized training and
knowledge of international and operational law, to
assist and advise on matters of detainee operations.




FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes
and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7,
specifically allegations concerning these events at
the Abu Ghraib Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,

I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for
theater-wide Internment and Resettlement (I/R)
operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)

2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade
was tasked with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib
Prison Complex during the time period covered in this
investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade
was tasked with detainee operations and Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the Camp Bucca
Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004.
(ANNEXES 41 and 52)

4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade
was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations
at the HVD Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March
2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)

5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade
was tasked with detainee operations and FOB Operations
at the MEK holding facility until TOA on 15 March
2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)

6. (U) Detainee operations include
accountability, care, and well being of Enemy
Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees,
and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal
prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

7. (U) The accountability for detainees is
doctrinally an MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,
implementation, and emphasis of basic legal,
regulatory, doctrinal, and command requirements within
the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units.
(Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).

9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal
prisoners after in-processing was inconsistent from
detention facility to detention facility, compound to
compound, encampment to encampment, and even shift to
shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP
Battalion, had a “Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP”
and a “Training Outline” for transferring and
releasing detainees, which appears to have been
followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being
documented in the National Detainee Reporting System
(NDRS) and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS)
as required by regulation at all detention facilities.
However, it is underutilized and often does not give
a “real time” accurate picture of the detainee
population due to untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)

12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the
accountability of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison
Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a self-created
“change sheet” to document the transfer of a detainee
from one location to another. For proper
accountability, it is imperative that these change
sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be
updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib,
this process would often take as long as 4 days to
complete. This lag-time resulted in inaccurate
detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts, gross
differences in the detainee manifest and the actual
occupants of an individual compound, and significant
confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Battalion
S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David
DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the
lack of manpower to process change sheets in a timely
manner. (ANNEXES 39 and 98)

13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee
accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib.
However, a detailed review of their operational
journals revealed that these accounts were often not
done or not documented by the unit. Additionally,
there is no indication that accounting errors or the
loss of a detainee in the accounting process triggered
any immediate corrective action by the Battalion TOC.
(ANNEX 44)

14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way
the 320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of
their detainees. Each compound within a given
encampment did their headcounts differently. Some
compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some
had them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees
to one end of the compound and counted them as they
passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX 98)

15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls
(100% ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP
Battalion did this check only 2 times per week. Due
to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these
checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units
adopted non-doctrinal terms such as “band checks,”
“roll-ups,” and “call-ups,” which contributed to the
lapses in accountability and confusion at the soldier
level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)

17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds
and the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous
unprofessional entries and flippant comments, which
highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit.
There was no indication that the journals were ever
reviewed by anyone in their chain of command. (Annex
37)

18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed
and standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs
that did exist were not trained on, and were never
distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures were
shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the
subordinate units and guards mount sites. (Annexes
44, 67, 71, and 85)

19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs
lacked specificity, implementation measures, and a
system of checks and balances to ensure compliance.
(AnnexES 76 and 82)

20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced
or utilized to develop the accountability practices
throughout the 800th MP Brigade’s subordinate units.
Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care
appears to have been made up as the operations
developed with reliance on, and guidance from, junior
members of the unit who had civilian corrections
experience. (Annex 21)

21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained
to conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the
mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and
throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

22. (U) The documentation provided to this
investigation identified 27 escapes or attempted
escapes from the detention facilities throughout the
800th MP Brigade’s AOR. Based on my assessment and
detailed analysis of the substandard accountability
process maintained by the 800th MP Brigade, it is
highly likely that there were several more unreported
cases of escape that were probably “written off” as
administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT
Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company,
reported knowing about at least two additional escapes
(one from a work detail and one from a window) from
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC
Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion,
detailed the escape of one detainee at the High Value
Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then
outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis
Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that
there were more than 32 escapes from her holding
facilities, which does not match the number derived
from the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45,
55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention
facilities are significantly over their intended
maximum capacity while the guard force is undermanned
and under resourced. This imbalance has contributed
to the poor living conditions, escapes, and
accountability lapses at the various facilities. The
overcrowding of the facilities also limits the ability
to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee
population who may be organizing escapes and riots
within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of
detainees who should not be in custody takes too long
and contributes to the overcrowding and unrest in the
detention facilities. There are currently three
separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide
internment operations. First, the apprehending unit
can release a detainee if there is a determination
that their continued detention is not warranted.
Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it
has been determined that the detainee has no
intelligence value, and that their release would not
be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had signature
authority to release detainees in this second
category. Lastly, detainees accused of committing
“Crimes Against the Coalition,” who are held
throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR,
can be released upon a determination that they are of
no intelligence value and no longer pose a significant
threat to Coalition Forces. The release process for
this category of detainee is a screening by the local
US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee
Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc
Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7.
MG Fast is the “Detainee Release Authority” for
detainees being held for committing crimes against the
coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category
of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total
detainee population, and is the fastest growing
category. However, MG Fast, according to BG
Karpinski, routinely denied the board’s
recommendations to release detainees in this category
who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly met the
requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski,
the extremely slow and ineffective release process has
significantly contributed to the overcrowding of the
facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely
being conducted after an escape or other serious
incident. No lessons learned seem to have been
disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective
action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team
requested copies of AARs, and none were provided.
(Multiple Witness Statements)

26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and
Recommendations from various 15-6 Investigations
concerning escapes and accountability lapses) were
rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by
BG Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority
of her orders directing the implementation of
substantive changes were ever acted upon.
Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to
verify the corrective actions were taken. Had the
findings and recommendations contained within their
own investigations been analyzed and actually
implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the subsequent
escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may
have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and
the detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and
needs to be improved to illuminate dark areas that
have routinely become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the
language of the detainees at any of the detention
facilities in the 800th MP Brigade’s AOR, even after
several investigations had annotated the lack of this
critical requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements
and the Personal Observations of the Investigation
Team)

29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF)
demonstrate questionable work ethics and loyalties,
and are a potentially dangerous contingent within the
Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi
criminal inmates with contraband, weapons, and
information. Additionally, they have facilitated the
escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC
Polak’s Statement)

30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel
(Titan Corporation, CACI, etc…), third country
nationals, and local contractors do not appear to be
properly supervised within the detention facility at
Abu Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they
wandered about with too much unsupervised free access
in the detainee area. Having civilians in various
outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee
area causes confusion and may have contributed to the
difficulties in the accountability process and with
detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness
Statements, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)

31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of
Engagement (DROE) and the general principles of the
Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount
and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our
witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his
contention. I find that SGM Emerson was not a
credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)

32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and
MI Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular
training on the basics of detainee operations;
however, they have been unable to produce any
verifying documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers
who can recall the content of this training. (Annexes
59, 80, and the Absence of any Training Records)

33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated
by the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons
brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs)
without accounting for them, knowing their identities,
or even the reason for their detention. The Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu
Ghraib called these detainees “ghost detainees.” On
at least one occasion, the 320th MP Battalion at Abu
Ghraib held a handful of “ghost detainees” (6-8) for
OGAs that they moved around within the facility to
hide them from a visiting International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was
deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation
of international law. (Annex 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings
have been documented and reported to this
Investigation Team. Although there is no data from
other missions of similar size and duration to compare
the number of escapes with, the most significant
factors derived from these reports are twofold.
First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical data
needed to evaluate the details of each incident.
Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to
the same types of deficiencies; however, little to
nothing was done to correct the problems and to
implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG
Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to
ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in
the 15-6 Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape,
recapture, and shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant
(320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or
additional information was provided as requested by
this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)

b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five
detainees at Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion)
Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee
was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after
striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A
15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion,
Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up
and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs
took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the
detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs
were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to
protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5
detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were
poor communications, no clear chain of command,
facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF
did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was
inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of
detainee #8399, escape and shooting of detainee #
7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified detainee
from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly made their escape in the
nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigation
by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2) concluded
that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under
the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One
detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the
115th MP Battalion search team recaptured detainee #
8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a
Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing
factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the
nature of the hardened criminal detainees at that
location. It is of particular note that the command
was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the
upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified
announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The
investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines
were not posted in the camps in the detainees’ native
languages. (ANNEX 6)

d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of
detainee # 8968 and the shooting of eight detainees at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400
hours from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib
(BCCF). A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP
Battalion, S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly
escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower
guard was turned in the other direction. This
detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At
about 1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and
pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One guard
was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds
at the rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee.
(ANNEX 7)

e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877
and # 10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the
Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by
SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR
indicated that 2 criminal prisoners escaped through
their cell window in tier 3A of the Hard-Site. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee #
14239 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A
detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from Compound 2 of
the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was
initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst.
NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a detainee escaped
from the North end of the compound and was discovered
missing during distribution of the noon meal, but
there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 12)

g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees #
115089, # 151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and #
116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of
the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was
initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3).
The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners escaped from the
North end of the compound, but there is no method of
escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12
detainees # 150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169,
#116361, #153399, #20257, #150348, #152616, #116146,
and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about
1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci encampment.
This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9
wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A
15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP
Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the
detainees rioted in protest of their living
conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of
non-lethal force was ineffective, and, after the 320th
MP Battalion CDR executed “Golden Spike,” the
emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force
was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of
comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent
SOPs, no formal guard-mount conducted prior to shift,
no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less
than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no
AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted
and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not
standardized, and poor communication between the
command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at
Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly
had a pistol in his cell and around 1830 an extraction
team shot him with less than lethal and lethal rounds
in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6
investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade,
Deputy Commander) concluded that one of the detainees
in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a
couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the
encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this
information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of
MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a
routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of
an MP and the detainee. Contributing factors were a
corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate SOPs, the Detention
ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the
numerous levels of authorization needed for use of
lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of
responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between the
MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal
means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8
of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was
initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3
Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in
the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal
crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which
was successful. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal
means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2
of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was
initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3
Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in
the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to
disperse the crowd, which was successful. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal
means into crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3
of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR
was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3
Section). The SIR indicates that there was a fight in
the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal
crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which
was successful. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means
of detainee from Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459
inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An
SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3
Section). The SIR indicated that three detainees
assaulted an MP, which resulted in the use of a
non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 17)

n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032
from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). A detainee
allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445 and 0640
from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT
Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck
(724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee
escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire.
Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses
in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership
presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and
concise communication between the guards and the
leadership. (ANNEX 9)

o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314
and #109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5
unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility
(310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca.
An AR 15-6 Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th
MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded
that three of the detainees escaped through the front
holding cell during conditions of limited visibility
due to fog. One of the detainees was noticed, shot
with a non-lethal round, and returned to his holding
compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through
the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen
and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were
the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of
MPs during implementation of the fog plan,
overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436
and missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped
at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An
SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion,
S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi
guard assisted a detainee to escape by signing him out
on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the
time of the second SIR, neither missing person had
been located. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been
provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s
115236, 116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca(310th MP
Battalion). Several Detainees allegedly escaped
between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period of
intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP
Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainees crawled
under a fence when visibility was only 10-15 meters
due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited
visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of
proper accountability reporting, inadequate number of
guards, commencement of detainee feeding during low
visibility operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX
18)

36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this
investigation determined that there was virtually a
complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the detention
facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there
were numerous reported escapes at detention facilities
throughout Iraq (in excess of 35), AR 15-6
Investigations following these escapes were simply
forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no
dissemination to other facilities. After-Action
Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all, remained
at individual facilities and were not shared among
other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade.
The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling
escape incidents. (AnnexES 5-10, Multiple Witness
Statements, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE
INVESTIGATION:

(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a
detailed and referenced series of recommendations for
improving the detainee accountability practices
throughout the OIF area of operations. (U)
Accountability practices throughout any particular
detention facility must be standardized and in
accordance with applicable regulations and
international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting
systems must be expanded and used to their fullest
extent to facilitate real time updating when detainees
are moved and or transferred from one location to
another. (U) “Change sheets,” or their doctrinal
equivalent must be immediately processed and updated
into the system to ensure accurate accountability.
The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the
manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure
proper accountability of detainees. (U) Develop,
staff, and implement comprehensive and detailed SOPs
utilizing the lessons learned from this investigation
as well as any previous findings, recommendations, and
reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated,
trained on, and understood at the lowest level.(U)
Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate
facilities from any other category of detainee. (U)
All of the compounds should be wired into the master
manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their
detainees in real time and without waiting for their
change sheets to be processed. This would also have
the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the
accuracy of the manifest as updated by each compound.
The BATS and NDRS system can be utilized for this
function.(U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and
disturbances within the detainment facilities must be
immediately reported through both the operational and
administrative Chain of Command via a Serious Incident
Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be tracked and
followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is
resolved. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE),
Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the
principles of the Geneva Conventions need to be
briefed at every shift change and guard mount. (U)
AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at any
given facility. The observations and corrective
actions that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by
the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed
into a plan of action, shared with the other
facilities, and implemented as a matter of policy.
(U) There must be significant structural improvements
at each of the detention facilities. The needed
changes include significant enhancement of perimeter
lighting, additional chain link fencing, staking down
of all concertina wire, hard site development, and
expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . (U) The Geneva
Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently
displayed in English and the language of the detainees
at each compound and encampment at every detention
facility IAW AR 190-8. (U) Further restrict US
civilians and other contractors’ access throughout the
facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an
authorized and easily identifiable uniform to be more
easily distinguished from the masses of detainees in
civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a stop
movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to
every 100% detainee roll call and ISN counts to ensure
accurate accountability.(U) The method for doing head
counts of detainees within a given compound must be
standardized. (U) Those military units conducting I/R
operations must know of, train on, and constantly
reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF
command policies. The references provided in this
report cover nearly every deficiency I have
enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up
for leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all
levels, can use them to maintain standardized
operating procedures and efficient accountability
practices.




FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment,
command policies, internal procedures, and command
climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

(Names deleted)

(ANNEXES 45-91)

REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of
the 800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul
Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since that
date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP
battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion,
310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP
Battalion, 400th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion,
724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.

(ANNEXES 41 and 45)

2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members
of the 800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed
to go home when all the detainees were released from
the Camp Bucca Theater Internment Facility following
the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003.
At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees
were held at Camp Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals
and a screening process, several thousand detainees
were released. Many in the command believed they
would go home when the detainees were released. In
late May-early June 2003 the 800th MPBrigade was given
a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and
several detention centers. This new mission meant
Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated.
Morale suffered, and over the next few months there
did not appear to have been any attempt by the Command
to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45 and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements
of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the
800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic
MOS skills, particularly regarding
internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there
is no evidence that the command, although aware of
these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any
systemic manner other than ad hoc training by
individuals with civilian corrections experience.
(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)

4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not
adequately trained for a mission that included
operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib
Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also
concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not
receive corrections-specific training during their
mobilization period. MP units did not receive
pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during
the post mobilization training, and thus could not
train for specific missions. The training that was
accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed
and implemented at the company level with little or no
direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade
levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and
law enforcement training. However, I found no
evidence that the Command, although aware of this
deficiency, ever requested specific corrections
training from the Commandant of the Military Police
School, the US Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim,
Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or
the US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)

5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a
civilian internee detention mission, Brigade personnel
relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who
had civilian corrections experience, including many
who worked as prison guards or corrections officials
in their civilian jobs. Almost every witness we
interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions of
AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a
Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater
missions was ever developed nor was a training plan
implemented throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22,
67, and 81)

6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder’s Team, that the
800th MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the
mission for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine
dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with
between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average
battalion size element should be able to handle
approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This
investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her
staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout
the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed
between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated
by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility
maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by
an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an
individual replacement system to mitigate medical or
other losses. Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly
suffered from personnel shortages through release from
active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and
demobilization. In addition to being severely
undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned
to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no
DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were
numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks,
and a serious threat to Soldiers and detainees in the
facility. The prison complex was also severely
overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources
and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems.
Finally, because of past associations and familiarity
of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that
friendship often took precedence over appropriate
leader and subordinate relationships. (ANNEX 101,
Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)

8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission
at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear
friction and lack of effective communication between
the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the
Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee
operations inside the FOB. There was no clear
delineation of responsibility between commands, little
coordination at the command level, and no integration
of the two functions. Coordination occurred at the
lowest possible levels with little oversight by
commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command
relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary
Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003.
Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade
Commander’s Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central
Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205
MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD
CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB
COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE
TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR “SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND
FOB PROTECTION.”

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108
made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the
Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an
MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible for
the MP units conducting detainee operations at that
facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the
different missions and agendas assigned to each of
these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)

10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed
Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control
(TACON) as the detailed direction and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area
necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.
(ANNEX 42)

“TACON is the command authority over assigned or
attached forces or commands or military capability
made available for tasking that is limited to the
detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON is
inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and
exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the
level of combatant commander.”

11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in
this investigation, I find that there was little, if
any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP
Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was
no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly
informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and
specifically the Commander, 320th MP Battalion
assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific
requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45
and 46)

12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of
witness statements and personal interviews that the
320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to
function as if they were responsible for the security,
health and welfare, and overall security of detainees
within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and
COL Pappas clearly behaved as if this were still the
case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I
find that the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry
Phillabaum, was an extremely ineffective commander and
leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the Battalion
S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion
on a day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski
sent LTC (P) Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for
approximately two weeks, apparently to give him some
relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the
320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp
Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by
LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG
Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski
placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP
Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battalion for a
period of approximately two weeks. LTC Chew was also
in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp
Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either
suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from
command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of
the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this
removal and search for a replacement was communicated
to the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or
to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily
removing one commander and replacing him with another
serving Battalion Commander without an order and
without notifying superior or subordinate commands is
without precedent in my military career. LTC (P)
Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in
accountability that resulted in several escapes. The
320th MP Battalion was stigmatized as a unit due to
previous detainee abuse which occurred in May 2003 at
the Bucca Theater Internment Facility (TIF), while
under the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his
proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG
Karpinski allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in
command of her most troubled battalion guarding, by
far, the largest number of detainees in the 800th MP
Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his
duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January
2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I
conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that
lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in
the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely
emotional during much of her testimony. What I found
particularly disturbing in her testimony was her
complete unwillingness to either understand or accept
that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP
Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership
and the refusal of her command to both establish and
enforce basic standards and principles among its
soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the Personal Observations of
the Interview Team)

15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help
from the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no
assistance from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan.
She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI
personnel had given the MPs “ideas” that led to
detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed the 372nd
Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company
Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG
Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in
Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan
because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.
(ANNEX 45)

16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony
that the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) might have been caused by the ultimate
disposition of the detainee abuse cases that
originally occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She
stated that “about the same time those incidents were
taking place out of Baghdad Central, the decisions
were made to give the guilty people at Bucca plea
bargains. So, the system communicated to the
soldiers, the worst that’s gonna happen is, you’re
gonna go home.” I think it important to point out
that almost every witness testified that the serious
criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
occurred in late October and early November 2003. The
photographs and statements clearly support that the
abuses occurred during this time period. The Bucca
cases were set for trial in January 2004 and were not
finally disposed of until 29 December 2003. There is
entirely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP
personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu
Ghrabid (BCCF) was influenced in any respect by the
Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP
Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were
essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous
complaints, these officers were not replaced. This
had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff’s
effectiveness and morale. Moreover, the Brigade
Command Judge Advocate, LTC James O’Hare, appears to
lack initiative and was unwilling to accept
responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary
Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise
the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff
priorities, take overt corrective action when needed,
and supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47,
48, 62, and 67)

18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff
inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did
not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and
Army standards. I specifically found these examples
of unenforced standards:

a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP
Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the fact
that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and officers
were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to wear
civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while
carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on
their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs
have been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct
during this period. Those disciplined include;
(ANNEXES 43 and 102)

1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
Brigade

Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander,
CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for
failing to take corrective security measures as
ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for
dereliction of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP
Battalion

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his
Soldiers. (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16
while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank);
filed locally.
4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate
Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer, which he personally observed; returned to
soldier unfiled.
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective
security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander;
filed locally.
5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP
Brigade

GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1,
consuming alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company

Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and Unauthorized Use of
Government Computer in that he was alleged to have
taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without
their knowledge; Trial date to be announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP
Company

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his
Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16
while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank);
filed locally.
8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major,
800th MP Brigade

· GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis
Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for
fraternization and dereliction of duty for
fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his
unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was removed from
the CSM list.

9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major,
400th MP Battalion

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his
Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16
while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank);
filed locally.
10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th
MP Company

GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his
Soldiers (Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16
while exiting his vehicle, round went into fuel tank);
filed locally.
11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP
Brigade,

GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1,
consuming alcohol; filed locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion,

· Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal
reprimand from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, for failing to adhere to the
guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski;
filed locally.

d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not
enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of
the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical
Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was
enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that
BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse the
saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as
previously existed. (ANNEX 53)

19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the
800th MP Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed
throughout Iraq had very little contact during their
tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG
Karpinski. BG Karpinski claimed, during her
testimony, that she paid regular visits to the various
detention facilities where her Soldiers were
stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by
her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her
contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that
they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.
(Multiple Witness Statements)

20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors,
such as the difference in culture, the Soldiers’
quality of life, the real presence of mortal danger
over an extended time period, and the failure of
commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to
the perversive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) Detention Facility and throughout the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEX 1).

21. As I have documented in other parts of this
investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis
by BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade
Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to
standard in detainee operations and proficiency or
that serious accountability lapses that occurred over
a significant period of time, particularly at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations
regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon,
followed up with corrective action, or disseminated to
subordinate commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit
SOPs for dealing with detainees if they existed at
all, were not read or understood by MP Soldiers
assigned the difficult mission of detainee operations.
Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp
Bucca in May 2003, I could find no evidence that BG
Karpinski ever directed corrective training for her
soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq
clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva
Conventions relating to the treatment of detainees.
(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team )

22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally
admonished in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the
serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez
found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had
not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7.
He found that incidents in the preceding six months
had occurred that reflected a lack of clear standards,
proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG
Sanchez also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) as the most recent example of a poor
leadership climate that “permeates the Brigade.” I
totally concur with LTG Sanchez’ opinion regarding the
performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 102 and the Personal Observations of the
Investigating Officer)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:


1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th
MP Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level
detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate
SOPs for dealing with detainees and that Commanders
and Soldiers had read, understood, and would adhere to
these SOPs.
Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP
Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the
protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.
Making material misrepresentations to the
Investigation Team as to the frequency of her visits
to her subordinate commands.
Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG
McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary
authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer misconduct.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P)
Jerry Phillabaum.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade
Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
Failing to properly ensure the results and
recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6
Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over a
period of several months) were properly disseminated
to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards
throughout her command.
Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned
tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
Failing to ensure that numerous and reported
accountability lapses at detention facilities
throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI
Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10,
US Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in and followed the
IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander,
320th MP Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given
a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be
removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the
following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to properly ensure the results,
recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on
escapes and shootings over a period of several months
were properly disseminated to, and understood by,
subordinates.
Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations
from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically
directed by BG Karpinski.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and
Resettlement Operations.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and
to task organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director,
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison
Officer to 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be
relieved from duty and be given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:

Making material misrepresentations to the
Investigating Team, including his leadership roll at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control were properly trained in and followed the
IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his
direct authority working and “visiting” Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the
Battalion S-3 and be given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:

Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC,
on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to
report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a
subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior
Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed;
GOMOR was returned to Soldier and not filed.
Failing to take corrective action and implement
recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even
after receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander
800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to
take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR
was filed locally.
Failing to take appropriate action and report an
incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally
witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of
a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and
Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader,
372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as
Platoon Leader and be given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
Soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and
Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th
MP Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the
following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned findings:

Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had “never” been
admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in
fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an
order from BG Karpinski to “stay out of the towers” at
the holding facility.
Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had attended every
shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP
Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers
on the proper treatment of detainees, when in fact
numerous statements contradict this assertion.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP
Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant,
372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties as First
Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company and given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP
Company knew and understood the protections afforded
to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant,
372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive
a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive
action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for
the following acts which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:

Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew
and understood the protections afforded to detainees
in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
“visiting” Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic
soldier standards, proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct
control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare
hands and feet in his presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US
Civilian Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand
to be placed in his employment file, termination of
employment, and generation of a derogatory report to
revoke his security clearance for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:

Made a false statement to the investigation team
regarding the locations of his interrogations, the
activities during his interrogations, and his
knowledge of abuses.
Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in
interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations
by “setting conditions” which were neither authorized
and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy.
He clearly knew his instructions equated to physical
abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel,Contract US Civilian
Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to be placed
in his employment file and have his security clearance
reviewed by competent authority for the following acts
or concerns which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:

Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in
violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several
witness statements.
Did not have a security clearance.
13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible
information to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR
381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted
to determine the extent of culpability of MI
personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL
Thomas M. Pappas, LTC Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven
Stephanowicz, and Mr. John Israel were either directly
or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary
action as described in the preceding paragraphs as
well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to
determine the full extent of their culpability.
(Annex 36)

OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this
investigation, I acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.)
Henry Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to analyze the
investigation materials from a psychological
perspective. He determined that there was evidence
that the horrific abuses suffered by the detainees at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select soldiers
in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There was a
complex interplay of many psychological factors and
command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is
contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I
conducted a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that
lasted over four hours, and is included verbatim in
the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely
emotional during much of her testimony. What I found
particularly disturbing in her testimony was her
complete unwillingness to either understand or accept
that many of the problems inherent in the 800th MP
Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor leadership
and the refusal of her command to both establish and
enforce basic standards and principles among its
Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many
individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under
the 800th MP Brigade that overcame significant
obstacles, persevered in extremely poor conditions,
and upheld the Army Values. We discovered numerous
examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative
in the absence of leadership and accomplishing their
assigned tasks.

a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC
Dennis McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention
Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission requirements
with little to no guidance from the 800th MP Brigade.
The unit was disciplined, proficient, and appeared to
understand their basic tasks.

b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC
Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK
Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers were
proficient in their individual tasks and adapted well
to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.

c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing
perimeter security and force protection at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded
standards be enforced and worked endlessly to improve
discipline throughout the FOB.




4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we
observed and believe should be favorably noted
include:

a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro,
US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to
participate in improper interrogations despite
significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu
Ghraib.

b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to
military law enforcement.

c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took
immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported
the incident to the chain of command.

CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed
egregious acts and grave breaches of international law
at Abu Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore,
key senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and
the 205th MI Brigade failed to comply with established
regulations, policies, and command directives in
preventing detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at
Camp Bucca during the period August 2003 to February
2004.

2. (U) Approval and implementation of the
recommendations of this AR 15-6 Investigation and
those highlighted in previous assessments are
essential to establish the conditions with the
resources and personnel required to prevent future
occurrences of detainee abuse.




Annexes

Psychological AssessmentRequest for investigation from
CJTF-7 to CENTCOMDirective to CFLCC from CENTCOM
directing investigationAppointment Memo from CFLCC CDR
to MG Taguba15-6 Investigation 9 June 200315-6
Investigation 12 June 200315-6 Investigation 13 June
200315-6 Investigation 24 November 200315-6
Investigation 7 January 2004 15-6 Investigation 12
January 2004 SIR 5 November 2003 SIR 7 November
2003SIR 8 November 2003SIR 13 December 2003SIR 13
December 2003SIR 13 December 2003SIR 17 December
2003Commander’s Inquiry 26 January 2004MG Ryder’s
Report, 6 November 2003MG Miller’s Report, 9 September
2003AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1
October 1997FM 3-19.40, Military Police
Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1 August 2001FM
34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September
1992Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949CID Report
on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January 2004CID
Interviews, 10-25 January 2004800th MP Brigade Roster,
29 January 2004205th MI Brigade’s IROE, UndatedTOA
Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding
witnessesInvestigation Team’s witness listFRAGO
#1108Letters suspending several key leaders in the
800th MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions
annotated FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September
2002CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8
June 2003Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at
Camp Bucca, 26 August 2003AR 381-10, 1 July
1984Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion310th
MP Battalion’s Inprocessing SOP320th MP Battalion’s
“Change Sheet”Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center’s (JIDC) Slides, UndatedOrder of Battle Slides,
12 January 2004Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions
Armed Forces, 10 July 2001General Officer Memorandums
of Reprimand800th MP Battalion’s TACSOPBG Janis
Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA
Ministry of Justice

48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer,
800th MP Brigade

49. LTC James O’Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th
MP Brigade

50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI
Battalion (Tactical exploitation)

51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI
Battalion

52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion

53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th
MI Brigade

54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP
Battalion and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP
Brigade

58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP
Battalion

65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion

68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th
MP Company

70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
Company

72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade
Commander, 800th MP Brigade

73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP
Battalion

74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP
Company

75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major,
320th MP Battalion

77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major,
800th MP Brigade

78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major,
310th MP Battalion

79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP
Company

80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion

81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company

82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant,
310th MP Battalion

83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP
Company

84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP
Company

85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler

88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler

89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler

90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract
Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract
Interpreter, Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade

92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March
2001

93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated

94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance
Policy, 12 October 2003

95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders

96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004

97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February
2004

98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of
Military Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004

99. SIR 14 January 2004

100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March
2004

101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP
Battalion

102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to
BG Karpinski, 17

January 2004

103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP
Battalion

104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12
December 2003

105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company

106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP
Company





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