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The US role

May 30, 2005 Edition 18

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IN THIS ISSUE
================================
>< ג€œIs Bush serious?ג€ by Yossi Alpher
This is not a sufficient expression of involvement and commitment.

>< ג€œOnly the US can push the parties forwardג€ - by Ghassan Khatib
Only a clear American position to encourage Israel in a positive direction can
improve chances of peace.

>< ג€œDisengagement is the wrong moveג€ - an interview with Moshe Arens
If there is no terror, Abbas will get the credit, and Bush will begin urging
both parties to sit down.

>< ג€œAction, Mr. President, pleaseג€ - by Ali Jarbawi
The American administration knows what it takes to diffuse the crisis and how
to reach a political settlement to the conflict.

================================
AN ISRAELI VIEW
Is Bush serious?

by Yossi Alpher
=================================

President Bush's remarks in the Rose Garden on May 26 constituted yet another
exercise by the US leader in hinting at a genuine leadership role... then
backing off. As he has done repeatedly in recent months and years, the
president bravely stuck his toe in the cold waters of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and decided it's not the time to dive in and get wet.

The "escalation" in commitment reflected in the president's remarks was so
carefully calibrated, so deftly spun, that we are left asking and examining,
cautiously, what was new in the president's performance. He added Jerusalem to
the list of regions where Israel was admonished not to contravene roadmap
obligations. And he mentioned not only Palestinian territorial contiguity in
the West Bank, but the need for "meaningful linkages between the West Bank and
Gaza". He left us to ponder the precise meaning of "meaningful linkages", with
some Israeli observers speculating (for the millionth time in the course of
the past 12 years) about a "sunken road" or a "road on stilts" to bridge the
43 km. separating the two parts of Palestine.

He's sending Secretary of State Rice back to the region before the beginning
of disengagement. But apparently not to mediate or facilitate. Just to visit.

He's giving Abbas a direct gift of $50 million to improve Palestinian lives in
Gaza. This softens the blow of some $200 million in "aid to the Palestinians"
that Congress insists be doled out to Palestinian NGOs and to Israel, rather
than to Abbas' democratically-elected reformist government.

Bush also referred to the need for Israelis and Palestinians to coordinate all
"changes to the 1949 armistice lines" rather than to the pre-1967 lines, which
is the usual term employed. This, interestingly, was not new; Bush used the
same phrase in his April 14, 2004 letter to PM Sharon. While changes in the
armistice lines carried out by Israel and Jordan between 1949 and 1967 were
relatively minor, this was not the case with Israel and Syria, and Bush's
repeated reference to the 1949 lines, as opposed to those of 1967, appears to
reflect an attempt to maintain consistency on more than one front.

Everything else in Bush's remarks about the need for both sides to fulfill
their roadmap obligations and for Israel's security fence to be a "security,
rather than political, barrier" is well known. He could have broken new ground
when asked by a reporter about US readiness to recognize Hamas if it disarms,
but carefully avoided doing so.

This is not a sufficient expression of involvement and commitment from the man
who first made a two-state solution official American policy; who has
dedicated his administration to rewarding democratization in the Arab Middle
East; and who rhetorically champions Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

What we need to hear from the American president is that, if Abbas "delivers"
on security, democracy and reform, and assuming disengagement leaves the
Sharon government intact, Bush will demand a serious peace process or, failing
that, another massive disengagement, this time from the West Bank mountain
heartland. We need t hear that he will send Condoleezza Rice not for a
weekend, but for whatever period of time is necessary to ensure compliance and
progress. That he will not flinch when confronted with domestic political
pressures to desist. That he knows that, in order to succeed, he must not be
deterred by the prospect of the kind of failure that ushered out the Clinton
presidency in late 2000-early 2001.

Everything about President Bush's repeated statements regarding the
Israeli-Palestinian issue appears to be calculated to hold out the possibility
that this will happen, but without committing the president. Some would say
his caution is understandable: the US is mired in an ugly and seemingly
intractable conflict in Iraq; it has no solution thus far for Iran's nuclear
ambitions; Abbas could fail; Hamas could gain a portion of power and refuse to
disarm or negotiate; disengagement could go horribly wrong; and Sharon will
almost certainly be intractable about moving ahead quickly to exploit the
momentum of disengagement. Others would argue that a more persuasive
commitment by Bush to progress in the Israeli-Palestinian sphere would
facilitate positive movement on all these fronts.

Either way, the question remains: is Bush serious? Knowing Abbas' and Sharon's
weaknesses and views on final status, there is not the slightest prospect of
progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front after disengagement unless Bush
commits. Even then it will be an uphill battle.- Published 30/5/2005 ֲ©
bitterlemons.org

Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications.
He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv
University, and a former senior adviser to PM Ehud Barak.

A PALESTINIAN VIEW
Only the US can push the parties forward

by Ghassan Khatib
=================================

The first US visit by Mahmoud Abbas as Palestinian president has raised hopes
among Palestinians and others of a possible renewal of American efforts to
push Palestinian-Israeli peace and of a greater level of American political
involvement in the conflict.

The results of the visit, furthermore, exceeded Palestinian expectations, not
only because of stated American positions and the warm reception, but because
of the positive image afforded Palestinians and their president in the
American media and among the American political elite during and after the
visit.

Palestinians and analysts in general heard a new language from American
President George W. Bush. It was the first mention by this administration of
the green line, and it was the first time it framed its position consistent
with international legality saying that any changes to the borders of 1967
must be agreed upon by the two parties.

In addition, Bush for the first time suggested that the wall should run along
the 1967 borders, and specifically mentioned the need to remove checkpoints,
one of the most harmful aspects of the Israeli collective punishment measures.

Washingtonג€™s stance is the most decisive external factor in this conflict
bar none. In Bushג€™s first term, this stance could be characterized as
falling between hostile and negligent of Palestinian needs and interests. This
is why this recent American position marks a dramatic and positive change.

That, of course, will be worthless if it is not complimented by a change in
American practices. In particular the American government must do what it
takes in order to pressure Israel to end settlement expansion, a fundamental
precondition for any possible future peaceful settlement.

An even more immediate requirement, however, is to convince Israel to stop any
activities and positions that have the effect of weakening the Palestinian
Authority led by Abu Mazen. Three developments are required in this regard:
first an end to Israeli economic punishments, especially restrictions on the
movement of persons and goods, to enable an improvement of the economy;
second, a resumption of peace negotiations on the basis of international
legality to bring back hope for the Palestinian people of a possible peaceful
end to occupation; and, finally, the above-mentioned cessation of settlement
expansion.

The other immediate need for serious American intervention is related to
Sharonג€™s unilateral Gaza withdrawal plan. The US must ensure that this
step
is done in a way that contributes to a resumption of the peace process,
improves the economic situation and is followed by other withdrawals in
accordance with the roadmap. If it is left to the Israeli government this
withdrawal will simply become what it was designed as: a punishment to inflict
further economic and social hardships.

Only the US can ensure that all these needs and requirements, short- and
long-term, are carried out. Only American encouragement and support enabled
Israel to maintain practices that were responsible for this deterioration,
and, by the same token, only a clear American position to encourage Israel in
a positive direction, based on adherence to the roadmap, can improve chances
of peace. The roadmap is the only accepted plan by the parties as well as the
international community that includes the elements that will allow both
parties to achieve their respective needs and requirements--whether immediate
ones like ending violence and stopping settlement expansions, or long-term
ones, such as ending the occupation and laying the ground for lasting peace,
security and stability.- Published 30/5/2005 ֲ© bitterlemons.org

Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet
publications. He is the Palestinian Authority minister of planning and has
been a political analyst and media contact for many years.

AN ISRAELI VIEW
Disengagement is the wrong move

an interview with Moshe Arens
=================================

bitterlemons: Looking at President Bush's commitments to PM Sharon and
President Abbas (Abu Mazen), would you judge that American support for
Sharon's disengagement plan is adequate?

Arens: That depends how you gauge "adequate". Is [the support] adequate for
the domestic Israeli political scene? I'd say yes. The Israeli public feels
President Bush is giving wholehearted support to Sharon's disengagement plan.
Many people even feel erroneously that Sharon is carrying out disengagement
due to pressure from Bush. That is the gauge of "adequate" that counts for
both supporters and opponents of disengagement.

bitterlemons: Assuming Abbas is judged successful in his reforms by the
administration, how do you anticipate Bush will act following disengagement?

Arens: "Successful" for Bush means first and foremost an end to acts of
terrorism. I don't think he'll support Abbas if terror continues or there's an
upsurge. But if there is no terror, Abbas will get the credit, and Bush will
begin urging both parties to sit down.

bitterlemons: And beyond urging? Do you see pressure?

Arens: What can he do beyond urging? Bush doesn't have a stranglehold on
Israel. There is nothing the US can do that Israel feels is contrary to its
best interest. The atmosphere might get sour, and most Israeli governments,
including the present one, do not want to give the Israeli public the
impression that they are responsible for souring [the relationship]. That is
the indirect leverage the US has over Israel, obliging the government to do
something it doesn't support.

bitterlemons: Some observers point to the AIPAC/Franklin affair and Pentagon
complaints about Israel's abuse of American weapons technology as signs of
growing tensions, possibly related to US expectations regarding the
post-disengagement era.

Arens: As far as I can tell as an observer there is no growing tension. The
AIPAC affair is separate, not connected, and not the result of tensions in the
relationship. I can understand that the US authorities don't look kindly on
monkey business in AIPAC, if there was any. In my experience I don't recall
any case of an Israeli government doing something it did not want to due to US
pressure. You can look at the Reagan plan which Begin rejected, the loan
guarantees that Bush refused to give Shamir and Shamir did not back down.

bitterlemons: The Israeli public went on to punish Shamir at the polls in
1992.

Arens: I agree that the public punished Shamir for being persona non-grata in
Washington, but Shamir did not give in. By the same token, some people think
Bush senior lost his election in 1992 due to this same tension [with Israel].

bitterlemons: From the standpoint of Israeli-American relations, how in your
view should Sharon be acting?

Arens: It's simplistic, but essentially correct, to say that he, like any
other Israeli prime minister, should be working in the best interests of the
state of Israel. US-Israel relations are good for the state of Israel, but if
we get some degree of fouling in the relationship then he should back off. But
I don't see that happening.

bitterlemons: But you feel disengagement is a mistake.

Arens: I think disengagement is the wrong move. Disengagement was Sharon's
idea, not Bush's, and he talked Bush into it. Once that was done Bush would be
disappointed if disengagement didn't happen. But I did not discern on the
horizon any pressures by Bush for Israeli concessions when Sharon opted for
disengagement. The US government respected the way we were handling terrorism.
I think we could have just continued successfully.

bitterlemons: Even in the post-Arafat era, with Abbas winning Bush's approval
and backing?

Arens: We'd still be in this situation, with Bush insisting that the first
thing to be done is to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. But now Bush
has been convinced that this is difficult for Abu Mazen to do, that he needs
more time, and is continuing to insist that [pressure on Abu Mazen] could not
only bring him down but would upset the disengagement schedule.

bitterlemons: Finally, on a related topic, should the administration engage
Arab Islamist movements like Hamas that participate in democratic elections,
and if so under what conditions?

Arens: Bush's position is to demand and expect democratization of the Arab
countries. This means elections, and if one of these parties wins, Bush might
have something of a problem refusing to talk to them. But he knows they are
terrorist organizations. I doubt his experts are forecasting they will cease
to be terrorist organizations in the near future.- Published 30/5/2005 ֲ©
bitterlemons.org

Moshe Arens is a former minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, and
Israeli ambassador to the United States.

A PALESTINIAN VIEW
Action, Mr. President, please

by Ali Jarbawi
=================================

The visit of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to the White House should be
considered a huge public relations success. There were smiles, pats on the
back and positive statements as regards the future, as well as a $50 million
aid package long ago promised to the Palestinians but prevented until now from
reaching the Palestinian Authority by the US Congress because of its absolute
bias toward Israel.

Still, everything went smoothly. It seems as though the two sides have learned
their lesson from when Abu Mazen was prime minister--one that he would not
want to repeat. It seems the Palestinian president remembered well the failed
Aqaba experience when he gave a speech that he hoped would portray him as
bringing down the level of expectations and demands, but which, instead, many
Palestinians considered a catastrophe.

This time, the Palestinian rhetoric was clear, specific and included all the
demands that form the basis of any settlement from the official Palestinian
viewpoint. Abu Mazen clearly realizes his position before his people in the
face of sharp criticism from Fateh circles under the leadership of Farouq
Qaddumi.

US president George W. Bush has also learned a lesson, making supportive
statements for Abbas. The American administration seems to have realized that
its negative attitude toward Abu Mazen during his stint as prime minister
contributed to the weakening of his position and status, something they did
not want to repeat. On the contrary, they wanted to present Abu Mazen as a
leader with their full support, especially in view of the difficult internal
situation Fateh is facing vis-a-vis Hamas.

Bushג€™s statements during the joint press conference with Abbas were
reassuring in that they reaffirmed the constants in Bushג€™s position,
outlined in his vision for a political settlement.

So, everyone came out pleased with the meeting, perhaps even the Israelis, who
were able to prevent any losses to their own position.

However, is this euphoria well placed? Given that we need more than public
relations, it most certainly isnג€™t. If things remain the same as now, the
entire situation will inevitably explode and the region will be pushed back to
a boiling point.

This is exactly what the US administration does not want. It is in their
interest for the calm to continue and for the situation to be contained so
they can be free to deal with Iraq and its many complications. The question
then remains whether this administration has the vision and necessary tools to
diffuse the explosive spark between the Palestinians and Israelis?

The American administration knows what it takes to diffuse the crisis and how
to reach a political settlement to the conflict. In short, pressure needs to
be applied on Israel if we are to reach a settlement that is in any way
acceptable to the Palestinians and Arabs. However, this administration does
not want or cannot pressure Israel because it is under pressure by the
American-Israeli Political Action Committee, AIPAC, and the message being sent
to the American administration by the Jewish lobby is loud and clear.

As a result, this administration is circumventing what is really necessary by
creating an impression that Abbasג€™ basic problems are internal, that is,
the
danger he faces from Hamas. It is because of this ג€œinternal dangerג€
that
the US should help Abbas, both financially and morally. It is with this in
mind that we should read the positive statements and gestures Bush extended to
Abu Mazen during their press conference.

As long as the United States refuses to comprehend that the crux of the
problem lies with the Israeli government not wanting to reach a political
settlement with the Palestinian people, preferring rather to impose a
settlement on its own terms, the situation in the region will continue to
explode time and again. The occupation is the reason for the struggle and
tension and not vice versa. American pressure should be directed at Israel and
not the Palestinians. Even if Abbas reins in Hamas, as long as Israel
continues to impose facts on Palestinian ground this creates a constant
potential for explosion.

Although the Palestinian people appreciate the United States and its people,
it has little confidence in its policies in the region or in consecutive
administrations that grow increasingly biased toward Israel. For Bushג€™s
statements to be treated with anything but scorn, they must be followed up by
action.

It would be good if the American president remembered all the obligations his
own government outlined for Israel to abide by. It would be better still if
the administration guaranteed that Israel commit to these obligations. The
Bush administration and Sharonג€™s government cannot continue to have their
cake and eat it too.

Palestinians must feel a tangible change on the ground. The checkpoints and
the humiliation they bring are still realities. The occupying Israeli army is
still in Palestinian cities. Settlement construction is intensifying
throughout the West Bank, and the building of the separation wall in the West
Bank is continuing apace, with Jerusalem completely isolated from its
Palestinian surroundings.

In the meantime, the Israeli government is trying to rid itself of the Gaza
Strip in order to confront the Palestinian ג€œdemographic dangerג€. And
for
this Bush wants the Palestinians to turn a blind eye to all of the above and
praise Sharon.

Mr. Bush: Years ago, we heard your vision for a solution to the conflict. You
then came up with a roadmap that gained international acceptance. We
appreciate your statements confirming your support of that roadmap, which have
been repeated several times since. And we appreciate even more that you
reaffirmed these statements before the Palestinian president in the White
House. We understand your message, but it is Sharon who must understand it.
What is required is to translate your words into actions. We are tired of
repetition. Every day we live these things that are happening to us and to
this country. So please, hurry up before it is too lateג€¦that is, if it
isnג€™t already.- Published 30/5/2005 ֲ© bitterlemons.org

Ali Jarbawi is a professor of political science at Birzeit University.

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