President al-Assad delivers a speech at the People's Assembly
www.sana.org/english/headlines/5-3/Assad's%20speech.htm

[IMRA: SANA - The official Syrian News Agency, put the entire text of the
speech on their website after IMRA advised them on Sunday morning that they
only had part of the speech on their website.]

Ladies and Gentlemen, members of the people's Assembly;
My Syrian sisters and brothers,

I address you at this critical stage of the history of Syria and the
region, with the events that you have experienced with your feelings and
ardor for your homeland. You prove time and time again your faithfulness,
loyalty and concern for the protection of its pride and dignity.

I wanted to meet you today, under these conditions, in order to give you a
review of recent developments and your country's position towards them, and
in order to provide answers to the many questions you have in mind as part
of the close and transparent relationship between us. I mean to stress a
basic fact: that everything we do, and all the positions we take are
inspired by you.

Syria has lived for the past two years at the heart of a number of
interwoven and complicated events and developments on the regional and
international levels which accelerated in a stormy manner. We had to deal
with them with a great deal of care and concern.

The acceleration of these events has imposed a complicated reality of
reactions, opinions and viewpoints amidst a number of sections of those
concerned with the political situation. On a parallel line, there is an
intense media campaign which has caused great confusion among the local and
Arab public opinion and raised a number of questions about the nature of the
challenges facing us and our position towards them.

The most prominent issues that have preoccupied the world, become part of
the plans of great powers and shaped their political objectives, go through
Syria, directly or indirectly, whether it is the Middle East peace process,
terrorism, the question of Iraq or the ramifications of the situation in
Lebanon.

I presented, on different occasions, a detailed explanation of our
positions and our vision of these interwoven issues. That is why I am not
going to review what happened, the meaning and significance of these events;
but I will stop at the most recent developments and explain our position and
our vision for the future of these developments, so that our people is well
informed and aware of the efforts we have made in order to achieve
satisfactory results.

Within this framework, we can stress that our political approach towards
these developments is based on two pillars: the first is the protection of
national and pan-Arab interests through adherence to our identity,
independence, loyalty to our principles and beliefs, providing the
appropriate conditions for the protection of our political and social
stability, as part of the stability of the whole region, and also enhancing
all the above factors in order to regain our occupied lands.

The second pillar is our concern, within this framework, for achieving the
objectives I have stated and dealing with the
concerned parties with an open mind, without any preconceptions and with a
great deal of realism, flexibility and responsibility, realizing the nature
of the international conditions in recent years and the equation between the
possible and the desirable; namely adherence to our rights and at the same
time dealing realistically with emergent challenges and developments.

The issue of peace was at the heart of these events and cast shadows over
other issues. This process receded, in its general atmosphere, many steps
backward, not only because of Israeli intransigence and its rejection to
respond to the requirement of peace, but also because of the lack of
international responsibility, when Israel is concerned, for the
implementation of international resolutions, and the lack of seriousness on
the part of the international community in shouldering its responsibilities
in this concern.

As far as we are concerned, we have stressed on many occasions that peace
in our region will not be achieved until we restore our occupied land; and
that many of the problems that have appeared recently find their solution in
providing the opportunities for just peace, which removes the causes of
tension, conflict, frustration and disappointment.

Syria has proposed the resumption of negotiations without preconditions.
But we stress at the same time that the absence of these conditions doesn't
mean discarding the frames of reference, the rules and resolutions which
have to be met and implemented. Our frame of reference is that of Madrid
which includes resolutions of the international legitimacy. It was not
surprising for us that Israel rejected the resumption of negotiations, and
has put condition under deferent pretexts to escape and avoid the
requirements of peace. We simply think that the peace process needs
requirements: first of all, the will of the parties to achieve peace, second
to have an honest sponsor, and third technical requirements like
negotiations, terms of reference and standards. What is lacking today is
the will of the Israelis; the will of the sponsor, the United States, and
also the standards and criteria. So the peace process is stalled for the
foreseeable future. But until that time we should not stop talking about
the peace process. That is why we continue dialogue with our European
friends and other concerned parties, in order to identify the mistakes of
the past and in order to draw a vision for the future. And when all these
conditions change we proceed forward with the peace process.

Of course Israel has been proposing that we should go back to the
negotiations without any preconditions. Many of the delegations that
visited Syria asked about the Syrian conditions. When we say we don't have
any conditions they are usually surprised. They say that Israel claims you
have preconditions. Israel's objective is to give the impression that it is
prepared for peace but the problem is the conditions put by Syria. In
actual fact Israel puts the condition of going back to square one. We
talked about resuming negotiations from the point they had stopped. They
want to go back to square one. We tell our international visitors: you want
to achieve peace and at the same time you ask as to disagree about what we
have already agreed on!

This means lack of seriousness and lack of credibility, because every
Israeli government comes and says that they are not responsible for what the
previous Israeli government approved. We stress that we are prepared for
negotiations without any preconditions in accordance with the Madrid terms
of reference. In other words, we resume from the point we stopped at in the
early 1990s.

As far as the Palestinian question is concerned, we stress the importance
of national unity through enabling the Palestinians to regain their national
rights within a comprehensive solution.

Concerning Iraq, our position has always been based on consideration and
appreciation of our national interests and the interests of the Iraqi
people. We opposed the war, like many others in the Arab region and in the
world at large. We have our pan-Arab and strategic reasons. We thought
that the war would lead to a state of chaos and confusion, not only in Iraq
but in the whole region. We knew that the war's negative impacts will
affect us politically, economically and socially. The stability of Iraq and
the region was at the heart of our concern and preoccupation. That is why
we expressed our keenness for national dialogue in Iraq; and we were among
the first to call for elections on a national basis, without excluding any
party. And here we have set a number of priorities: the first priority is
the unity of Iraq, which is the most important thing for us, because it
doesn't touch the Iraqis only, but it affects national and pan-Arab
security, as far as Syria is concerned.

The second priority is elections, and to vote on a constitution which will
produce institutions. Any constitution which is not unanimously approved by
the Iraqis will lead to fragmentation and civil war in Iraq. The second
point is closely related to the first, and so unity needs stability. So, we
need national unity and a constitution which is approved unanimously by the
Iraqis.

The third priority is independence. This automatically means withdrawal of
the American troops. The strange thing is that all the American delegations
we received talked about these three priorities. So we asked them where are
the differences you talk about then? We oppose occupation as a matter of
principle, but the mechanism should be discussed with the Iraqis and not
with others.

On the other hand, there are many accusations against Syria under
different pretexts. One pretext is intervention in Iraqi affairs, another
is not controlling the borders and enabling infiltrations to enter Iraq, a
third is giving refuge to members of the former regime. Here also we have
done everything within our capacity which could preserve the stability of
Iraq: controlling the borders, not allowing the use of Syrian territories in
order to interfere in Iraqi affairs, and supporting to the political process
there. Before the war there were accusations that Syria used to send
weapons to the regime in Iraq. We asked them at that time to provide just
one piece of evidence. As far as we are concerned, its was against our law;
and we were going to bring those responsible to account. They had not
provided any information yet.

Three weeks after the war, I also talked to them and said that now you are
in Baghdad, you have an embassy. Just give us one document to prove what
you are saying. We have not received any.

At that time the resistance had not started yet. They started talking
about Syria controlling its borders. We said that was impossible. In the
1980s, the Iraqi regime used to send us lorries loaded with explosives in
order to go off in Damascus killing thousands of people; and we could not
control our borders at that time. How can we prevent individuals
infiltrating the borders, specially that we don't have the high technology
necessary for that job. Later on William Burns came and heard the same
thing. Afterwards there was a long pause, with the exception of US Congress
delegations. But we met a number of Iraqi delegations representing the
Governing Council, and later the Interim Government. We said to them, you
say that you caught a umber of Syrians or people who infiltrated from Syria.
Why don't you give us their names or passports? Are they fake or real
passports? How did they pass? What kind of logistic support have they
received; or whether they were given money or food or any logistic support
of any kind. They usually promised to do that; but so far we have not
received any information about any Syrians infiltrating the borders . Of
course we don't claim that the borders are completely controlled. Usually
the Americans say they could not control their borders with Mexico; Yet,
they tell us to control our borders. It is a strange argument. The last
delegation we received was headed by William Burns last September. The
delegation comprised people from the US Ministry of Defense, the State
Department, Intelligence, and the Army. They talked with us clearly. They
said they wanted to know whether Syria had the will to cooperate. We told
them that since 1974, when the relations with the United States were
resumed - you remember Nixon's visit in 1974 - President Hafez al-Assad told
him that we want the best relations with the United States. That was after
the 1973 war and all the conditions were different. And so it is not
reasonable to say we don't want good relations. Concerning cooperation, we
have to distinguish our desire for cooperation and our capacity to
cooperate. Having the desire does not mean that we have the capabilities.
Nevertheless, we do not want to put the scenarios, we leave it to you. Just
draw the scenarios that you want. A few months ago, the Iraqi Interior
Minister came to Syria and told me that the Americans want a tripartite
agreement for security arrangements between Syria, Iraq and the American
forces. We said that we are ready. Of course they proposed this in a
meeting, and we said we are ready. Many of them didn't want us to say yes,
they wanted us to say no. We said we are ready. We asked them to send us
the details and to send us their scenarios: the details and the concerned
individuals to meet different institutions, the security and army people, in
order to have an executive plan. So far we have not received any of these
people, but from time to time, they send us lists of names. Most of these
names are unknown to us. Some of them were in Syria but were expelled
during the war. There were individuals who came to Syria as members of the
regime. Of course we don't regret handing them over because they were
responsible for crimes perpetrated in Syria in the 1980s or 1990s. They
were either expelled or they were caught at the borders and were asked to go
back. For the rest of the names, we don't know how they look like, we don't
know anything about them. In Iraq, there is chaos now. Some of them might
be in Syria under false names. We need more information. As you see, the
media campaign is non-stop. We have not put any conditions for this
cooperation as I said. Our concern in Iraq is unity and stability, but we
have to wait.

My brothers and sisters, there is no doubt that the Lebanese situation,
with its complications, is the most prominent and pressing event at this
stage. I am not going to discuss the past; neither am I going into details
of the events which were witnessed in Lebanon or the Syrian-Lebanese
relations. But I'll stop at the consequences of resolution 1559 and our
position towards that resolution.

Since the resolution was passed, the Lebanese arena has witnessed a strong
debate because it created, even among its supporters, serious problems in
terms of the potential negative impact of its implementation on Lebanon and
its stability in the absence of an appropriate mechanism for its
implementation. This becomes possible if it does not take into account the
objective conditions for implementation. Despite our reservations on
resolution 1559 - that it provides for the intervention of international
parties under the pretext of Lebanese sovereignty - our decision was to deal
with it in a positive manner in light of our care and concern for the unity
and stability of Lebanon.

Here, I would like to shed some light on a number of points on how we take
a certain decision. Most of you read the interview given by the American
President to a French daily in which he says that the French President asked
him to prepare a draft resolution to get Syria out of Lebanon. So, there is
no connection between the resolution and the extension of President Lahoud's
term of office. We have discovered in the past few months that there are
certain implicit and explicit provisions in resolution 1559. They were
prepared immediately after the war on Iraq. I am not talking about the idea
of the resolution but about some of the contents and provision of the
resolution; and I will discuss that later.

The second point, as I said, is that when the resolution was passed it was
passed in violation of the UN Charter; and it was selective. It was not
upon the request of the concerned countries. But since we live in a world
without a law or justice, to talk about this is a waste of time. The third
point is that one of the basics of Syrian policy is its support for the
United Nations. And Syria cannot, under any circumstances, oppose or
confront the Untied Nations. The fourth point, as far as 1559 is concerned,
among all its provisions, the one related to Syria is withdrawal. Contrary
to the what many people believe, this is the simplest provision; because
Syria is not against withdrawal. We started withdrawing in 2000. So when
we talk about withdrawal, does any one in Syria say that we will remain in
Lebanon? Of course not. So, this is the simplest provisions. The other
provisions are problematic, as far as Lebanon is concerned. This will bring
us back to the 1980s or even before. The fifth point is the report. I
think in April we should be able to see where this resolution will go. We
cannot say that this resolution is negative or positive. If it takes into
account the objective conditions of its implementation, then it is positive.
If it does not take these conditions into accounts, it will be a problem for
Lebanon and for the whole region.

The main two points in this report are related to the mechanism of
withdrawal and to the Lebanese resistance. The sixth point, Syria's
withdrawal from Lebanon does not mean the end of the Syrian role; because
this role is defined by geographical and political factors. On the
contrary, we will be free and open in dealing with Lebanon. The seventh
point is what I said in an interview with a French television. When I was
asked about Syrian forces in Lebanon, I said clearly that the normal
position of Syrian troops is on Syrian territories. These are the
principles. And I am stressing them because there are so many distortion
nowadays. I wanted to say this clearly so everyone will hear what I am
saying, especially those who doubt our intentions. We should not remain in
Lebanon one day after there is a Lebanese consensus over our presence. This
should not be a subject of discussion. Syria went to Lebanon in order to
prevent division, not to cause division among the Lebanese.
A final point, withdrawal does not harm Syria's interests. On the contrary,
it strengthens Syria's interests. That is why we started withdrawing five
years ago. We have withdrawn over 64 percent of the forces; and this is
something many Syrians don't know. The number of forces was 40,000; and now
we have only 14,000. Of course this is not mentioned because; and many
don't mention that intentionally. They want to show that Syria is
withdrawing under pressure.

Now I'll talk abut meetings with Larsen and other officials who visited
Syria recently. They used to ask how are you going to deal with resolution
1559. We have always had a clear answer: we are going to deal with it
positively despite our reservations. And we used to explain to them how
Syria has started to withdraw in 1999. After the war was over, and it
became clear that the army became stronger and Lebanese institutions became
stronger, we started to think that withdrawal from Lebanon has become a
necessity. We put plans and then we started withdrawal either in late 1999
or early 2000.

That is what I explained to the delegates and envoys I received. You know
we carried out four withdrawals before 1559 was passed. The fifth
withdrawal was last September. The main thing is that these withdrawals
ensured stability in Lebanon. That is why we told them that we don't have a
problem with 1559; and we don't think it is against our interests. It is
about withdrawal; and al-Taif accord, to which Syria is committed and has
always supported, provides for withdrawal. Thus, we don't have a problem
with the United Nations regarding 1559. So, in principle we don't have any
problem. The important thing is the mechanism. The difference between 1559
and al-Taif accord is that al-Taif accord has a mechanism while 1559 does
not provide for a mechanism. They only said withdrawal and every state in
the world is interpreting it as it wishes. Perhaps, some people think it
should have a retroactive effect, to pre-date 1974 perhaps.

So, we believe in systematic and gradual withdrawal in cooperation and
coordination with Lebanese institutions. A few people believe that it
should happen immediately, regardless of any negative impact, and without
shouldering any responsibility. We say, you are the United Nations, you
should state that clearly. You have not stated that. Of course, they all
want stability; and you call for coordination. Of course the atmosphere was
very positive in this dialogue. They have a vision close to ours. And they
wanted to find a link between the al-Taif Accord and 1559. We told them
that the important point is the report. It should not be drafted according
to the mood of certain people in the world; otherwise we would be wasting
our time. But if we assume that the report will be based on the resolution
without any moody interpretations, we give three answers to three questions.
The first question: how will you find common grounds between 1559 and
stability in Lebanon? The answer comes through the mechanism. The second
question: how can you find common grounds between 1559 and sovereignty? We
understand that the resolution was passed for the sake of Lebanese
sovereignty; and sovereignty is usually represented by the state. So, what
if the state asks the United Nations for something? Will you be committed
to that? And how do you interpret sovereignty? Who would define that? The
third question: can you find common grounds between 1559 and al-Taif Accord?
The Taif accord is mentioned in the resolution; and it is also recognized by
the United Nations. If we find objective answers for this question, the
resolution provides stability for Lebanon and the whole region. We should
not look at the resolution as a pure evil. So it is in the gray area now;
and it depends on how it is used. Larsen will come back to Syria in few
days, or ten days perhaps. So, we will continue dialogue. Larsen talked
positively about al-Taif accord and about the cooperation agreement between
Syria and Lebanon. Escalation started immediately after that in order to
point to the failure of the Larsen mission and other envoys who visited
Syria. Other European envoys were also given the same impression . Our
Arab brother made moves through visits and communications; and also the
wrong impression was given: that Syria is confused as far as withdrawal is
concerned.

Consequently, we asked them about their vision. Some people talked shyly
about al-Taif accord. We told them go and say on my behalf that we support
al-Taif accord. We support 1559; and we supported withdrawal a long time
ago. We don't have a problem with that. We have an interest in withdrawal.
If we go back to 1999 and early 2000, we have an interest that our forces
finished their mission and they remained in order to ensure security. And
the last bullet was fired after Beirut was unified. Ten years later, when
the forces remained without anything to do, of course their readiness would
decline, and they would not do their job properly. They would become a
financial liability, a political liability. This is natural and normal in
any country in the world. I intentionally postponed my speech in order to
monitor what the Syrian people want. I see a consensus on this issue.

As I said we have an interest in the withdrawal. And regarding the latest
developments, some people in the media talked about the cards that Syria has
in the face of the United Nations. I haven't heard at any moment in time
that Syria wanted to have cards against the UN. And I believe that even the
superpowers can't do that. The situation in Iraq is a clear example: even
when a superpower goes against the international will, it suffers. In the
past few days we had meetings with Arab officials. The media said they put
pressure on Syria and convinced Syria. I need to explain that. When the UN
envoy, Terj Roed Larsen, came twice to Syria, once late last year and once
last month, we told him that we will cooperate with you: when you have a
clear vision we are prepared to withdraw. When we meet Arab officials, we
explain our viewpoint to them, that we are not against al-Taif Accord, and
we are not against UN resolution 1559 at all. The Arab officials showed
understanding and they supported us. The situation is not as it is
portrayed in the mass media, that we begged them for support. 1559 is
already past; so they can't bring the clock backwards. The problem is not
withdrawal, it is concerned with resistance on the Lebanese level; and it
will create a problem if it is not dealt with reasonably in the report.
There is a hidden provision not in 1559, but in the uses of 1559; and it is
settling Palestinian refuges in Lebanon. We found that there was a momentum
for the Palestinian track. The assassination of Arafat, the assassination
of Prime Minister Hariri, pressure on Iraq, pressure on Syria, all that
creates a scene that I am sure you can understand.

The atrocious crime which claimed the life of prime Minister Hariri
targeted Lebanon's stability and unity; and it also targeted the role and
position of Syria in Lebanon and the whole region. That is why we stress
that finding the culprits and those who stand behind them is a Syrian
necessity in as much as it is Lebanese necessity. This crime came to
increase the escalation, either under the influence of the shock caused by
the calamity, or according to a preconceived and suspect plan, or because
of bad faith. They used to this crime to inflame hostile feelings against
Syria and to escalate accusations against it. Of course, in any crime there
are a number of factors, only in this one there is only one factor, Syria.
It is strange.

Some international parties started to work unjustifiably, on first sight,
with coordination and incitement in one direction; and they started to throw
arrows of betrayal and treachery towards Syria which hasn't withheld its
capabilities and even its blood in support of some of those people.

But Syria will be greater than caring or responding to these machinations.
Of course this doesn't mean that all our acts in Lebanon were correct. We
have to acknowledge clearly and transparently that there have been mistakes
made on the Lebanese arena, because we went along with certain details and
went too far with some Lebanese at the expense of others. We believed that
dealing with the status quo enhances the Syria role in helping Lebanon to
achieve stability. But the reality was not like that. Of course some
people have exploited the presence of Syrian forces for narrow material or
electoral reasons which led to a number of negative accumulations. We
should not of course deny the role of those loyal Lebanese brethren with
whom we stood in one trench in the face of enemies of Lebanon and Syria, and
worked together for the good of Lebanon and Syria. The Taif accord was
concluded in 1989, and all different parties and militias accepted it. Some
people were convinced that the state is a natural resort for the Lebanese.
Some were not convinced, but they could not face the changes in those days.
They got integrated in the state believing that the state can become the
largest militia which can be divided among others according to political and
material benefits.

As far as we in Syria are concerned, after al-Taif and after the
unification of Beirut, the priority was peace. The second priority was
launching the political process, particularly the parliamentary elections in
1992. As I said, we tried to get along with all parties and we wanted all
parties to be with the state, particularly after the war. It was the state
of militias, as some people said, but that continued for longer than
necessary, and the name of Syria was used by some people for their own
reasons. Some called themselves Syria's allies and used their relationship
with Syria in order to achieve their private interests. Some Lebanese used
to call them political traders. Of course trading is products is a
respected trade but trading in politics is like slave trade. They were
political traders. They used to sell and buy positions; and they moved from
one position to another; and most of them are well known to you. We took a
decision towards a Lebanese state. The problem started with those people
who started talking about sovereignty. Of Course talking about sovereignty
is honorable for every one. And we fully support every Lebanese who talks
about sovereignty. But we want to know the nature of this sovereignty. We
discovered it is not the sovereignty of the Lebanese; it is rather the
sovereignty of any country, except Syria, over Lebanon.

That is why, as you can see, when any foreign official comes to Lebanon
and stands in an official or in an unofficial place and makes statements
about their internal affairs, they are happy; but when we say anything in
Syria we become against sovereignty and against independence. But we know
of course that those forces are part of the Lebanese history. They had been
there for over two hundred years. There are those who extended their hands
to outside forces; and there are patriotic forces. But the other forces
failed with the Baghdad Pact; they failed to destroy the Lebanese
resistance; and they failed with the 17th of May agreement with Israel.
They know that we will always stand with these patriotic parties. This
makes me stress two main facts. The first fact, which I have already
stressed several times, that we don't have any interest in Lebanon when the
bazaar of cheap calculations and narrow interests is open. And if we have
any interest, it is of national and strategic nature, related to the
national security of Syria and Lebanon. We carried with our brethren the
burden of this relationship in light of our vision and our commitment to
unity of our fate. As far as the presence of Syria forces in Lebanon is
concerned, we shoulder this responsibility on our own. The second fact is
that Syria's power and its role in Lebanon do not depend on its presence in
Lebanon, because this strength has to do with the facts of geography,
history, politics, culture, spiritualism and humanity.

That is why we don't want our relationship with Lebanon to be victim of
the mistakes of others, mainly politicians. Syrian citizens have been
throughout the past decades the major supporters of the Syrian role in
Lebanon. The Lebanese and Syrian citizens built this pure relationship
without any temporal interests. I want to say to all Syrian citizens who
have feelings of frustration and disappointment towards treachery, betrayal
and lack of loyalty towards what Syria offered to Lebanon: this is not the
general case in Lebanon. This represents a number of groups we know fully
well and those who stand behind them. Notice how TV cameras usually zoom in
onto a small group of people, but if they zoom out, you will discover there
are not so many people supporting them.

Please, we should not pay attention to reactions that appeared at certain
moments, most of which is pre-planned and mediated. The heart of Syria that
gave Lebanon blood can't be harmed by certain wrong doings. We, the Syrians
would continue to give Lebanon because you are the grand children of the
Syrian Arabs.

Based on these facts and considerations, completing the steps which we
have conducted within the framework of al-Taif accord, and in line with
1559, we are going to withdraw our forces in Lebanon completely to the Bekaa
valley, and then to the Lebanese-Syrian borders. I agreed with the Lebanese
President, Emile Lahoud that the Syrian Lebanese Supreme Council will meet
this week to discuss and approve the withdrawal plan. When this measure is
finished, Syria would have met the al-Taif accord and implemented the
requirements of 1559.

All that doesn't mean that Syria has neglected its responsibility towards
our Lebanese brethren with whom we have a unity of objective and have been
together in the crucial times of our history. Syria will remain their
supporter at all times, and the battles of honor that we have fought
together will remain a symbol of solidarity between the two peoples, and
this will be enhanced in the future, God willing .

I'll tell them that another 17th of May is looming on the horizon. I want
you to be prepared to bring it down as you did before.

My sisters and brothers,

Through this information and these ideas, I wanted to explain to you what
we have done in the past days, and to explain the reality towards current
issues, particularly to those who believe that we deal with developments
with intransigence, or that we lack sufficient flexibility. In fact our
policy is based on cooperation with others whether they are super powers or
small countries on the basis of friendship and mutual respect. Objective
dialogue can solve all existing problems. All that doesn't mean that you
will feel safe soon. Of course you will hear attacks on this speech
immediately after I finish.

That is why before they say it is not sufficient, we will tell them it is
not sufficient.

"Interruption from the audience": We will tell them that we sacrifice our
souls and blood for you President Bashar.

That is why, in taking such decisions, and under any condition, we base
them on popular support; and when we are unified, the people and the state,
we do not fear anything. As you notice, its natural that these events
affect the internal situation; and they put pressure on our developmental
performance. It is not only because we are preoccupied with these
developments, but because of the tension they create in the general
atmosphere. This obstructs what we want to do on different levels. The
question is how to face this. I say, through more openness and through our
preoccupation with these developments. This will not prevent me from
following up the detailed internal situation because it is my top priority.

On such a crucial moment, I didn't want to talk about the internal
situation. But since I'll make a few sentences, we are preparing for a
regional conference of al-Baath Party; and hope this will be a leap for
development in this country.

Brothers and sisters,

Syria has its role and has its priorities in its Arab environment and
regional environment. This makes some people happy and some people not so
happy.

Syria's role will remain and will be strengthened more and more with the
will of God and the will of our people. Our first objective will be
protecting this role; the second strengthening it and the third developing
it.

Thank you very much
Assalamu alaikum


--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il




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