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John Norris, Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo. Foreword by Strobe
Talbott. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2005. 360pp, USD 49.95, ISBN 0
275 98753 1 (hardcover).
Reviewed by Emilian Kavalski (Loughborough University, UK), Email:
E.R.Kavalski@...
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The word "exceptional" is perhaps an understatement when used to describe
John Norris' account of the various wars – diplomatic, military,
institutional, etc. – fought over Kosovo during 1999. His narrative
benefits from his personal "front seat" experience as assistant to US
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and is complemented by access to
primary resources and interviews with a number of the individuals involved
in these developments. The book unmasks the (rather disturbing) inability
of Moscow to project a coherent foreign policy during the final days of the
presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Norris offers an astute analysis of the
dynamic between the US and Russia, paying attention to the details of this
relationship without losing sight of the larger picture of the 78 days of
NATO bombing. Therefore, his book is not only a day-by-day testimony of the
Kosovo campaign, but a detailed account of the intensive, behind-the-scenes
negotiations among the Allies as well as between the US and Russia.
Like most authors Norris stresses that one of the main achievements of NATO
bombing was maintaining the Alliance unity. Yet, in a novel twist he
details the difficulty in upholding a "united" American position. The
narrative points to the sharp inter-agency bickering between the
intelligence services, the Pentagon and the State Department. Like most
commentators Norris concurs that most of the inter-institutional turf
fighting centered on the controversial figure of General Wesley Clark who
was being forced to wage a "three-front war", simultaneously fighting the
Serbs, the Allies and the Pentagon (49). Norris dents the myth not only of
American unity of purpose during NATO's campaign, but also points the major
divisions in the traditional Anglo-American special partnership. He argues
that the British Prime Minister Tony Blair favored sending ground troops in
Kosovo and consistently lobbied the American administration for this
option. Consequently, although the White House thought that "the British
were desperately wrong", it kept communicating that Washington heeds
London's suggestions (278).
However, Norris' main contribution is the repository of information on the
trilateral talks between the US (represented by Strobe Talbott), Russia
(represented by Viktor Chernomyrdin) and the Finnish President Martti
Ahtisaari (who subsequently came to represent the EU's involvement). Part
of the incentive for such talks was finding a way for convincing the
Belgrade leadership to comply with the demands of the international
community. At the same time, a major objective was to engage Russia in this
process and obviate a relapse into a Cold-War-style confrontation,
especially in the face of the waning authority of President Yeltsin.
Furthermore, Washington perceived that even if Moscow does not deliver
Belgrade, it could deliver the UN Security Council and a resolution
embodying NATO's principles for settlement (30). Norris' argument is that
the preparation for a US war under NATO did not allow sufficient time for
engaging Russia prior the start of the bombing campaign. But once
Washington initiated discussions with Moscow, it was increasingly difficult
to maintain them as it was unclear who is in charge of the country.
The narrative deftly depicts the near disarray of the Russian political
establishment in the twilight of Yeltsin's presidency. It details the
division within and among the military and civilian authorities. Norris'
account is bustling with instances of absence of coordination most
poignantly encapsulated in the scene during which members of the Russian
Foreign Ministry and the Russian Department for International Cooperation
introduce themselves not only to the American and Finnish teams but also to
each other (101). More alarmingly, however, this development was emphasized
during the negotiations of the Military Technical Agreement between NATO
and Yugoslavia, when the Russian Military Attaché to Belgrade actively
encouraged Yugoslav representatives to desist from complying with "Western"
demands (211). Norris emphasizes that Russia's launch of Operation Trojan
Horse and the occupation of the Prishtina airport with a regiment sent from
its SFOR troops in Bosnia was executed without the prior knowledge of the
Russian Foreign Ministry. In particular, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was
as stunned as US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to hear the news
(248). Such account demonstrates that the dysfunctional state of Russian
governance at the time made Moscow's position in the negotiations
increasingly volatile. Therefore, the trilateral negotiations between
Washington, Helsinki and Moscow had more to do with Russia's domestic
problems than with NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia. Furthermore, Norris
highlights that Russian negotiators were primarily interested in Moscow's
rather than in Milosevic's objectives (162). In effect, he argues that
Russia and Yugoslavia were members of a "mutual disdain society" (133)
since for Russia, Milosevic was an inconvenience for its strategic
relationship with the West, while Belgrade could not perceive Moscow's
benefit from such an association. Norris also zooms on the little known
role of the then Russian National Security Advisor Vladimir Putin, and
seems to implicate that he was (at least) privy to the military fiasco of
capturing the Prishtina airport. However, the aspect of Putin's role is
perhaps one of the least satisfactorily developed in the book.
At any rate, Norris' narrative would be of interest to scholars of the
Balkans and the Kosovo conflict with the wealth of first-hand accounts of
previously undocumented data. For instance, he details that the US was
willing to agree on a "token" Yugoslav military presence ("between 500 and
1,500") in the province, if this was to be the price for securing the
return of refugees (133). Also he bestows the authorship of the idea that
the status of Kosovo should be decided at a later date on the US National
Security Advisor Samuel Berger (28). Moreover, Norris notes that Viktor
Chernomyrdin had specifically asked Strobe Talbott not to involve the US
Vice-President Albert Gore in the negotiations as it could potentially
jeopardize his upcoming presidential bid (71). At the same time, the book
is full of character descriptions, individual faux pas and peccadilloes, as
well as interesting details of particular meetings and the various
"cultural" differences (136) among the negotiators. In this respect,
Norris' book is an excellent companion-volume to a number of recent memoirs
of people involved in the decision-making during the Balkan conflicts of
the 1990s. Furthermore, it is going to be a lasting reference source as
well as a main point of departure for further explorations on this issue.
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Book Review Editors: Jelena Obradovic (jelena_obradovic@...) and
Cristina Bradatan (cbradata@...)
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© 2005 Balkan Academic News. This review may be distributed and reproduced
electronically, if credit is given to Balkan Academic News and the author.
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