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#1487 From: PeaceNowUK@...
Date: Sun Jul 1, 2001 6:17 am
Subject: The Oslo Accords by Professor Galia Golan PeaceNowUK@...
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The Oslo Accords
Professor Galia Golan

The Oslo Accords were significant, valuable and indispensable as well as
historic, not for the details therein but for the principle of mutual
recognition they contained. In fact the accords were actually a Declaration
of Principles comprising what was the "historic compromise" for both sides
(though the term was Palestinian), namely Palestinian acceptance of the State
of Israel and by implication a two-state solution, and Israeli recognition of
the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, referring explicitly
to the legitimate and political rights of both peoples. This was comparable
in importance - and psychologically - to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977.

The Oslo Accords, as the DOP is referred to, (usually including thereby the
subsequent Cairo Agreement), were, however, also an interim agreement
outlining measures to be taken building up to the opening of final status
talks. It was believed by Israel that a period of time was necessary to
prepare domestic public opinion, test the intentions of the other side and
create a degree of trust. It is possible that these were also the
Palestinians' assumptions. Indeed there was great skepticism on both sides,
possibly even more in the respective leaderships than in the publics, but the
leaderships had reached the conclusion that this was an alternative worth
trying: Rabin believed that a window of opportunity had been created by the
changes in the world order, including the Arab world, with the collapse of
the Soviet Union. He was also concerned over of the spread of weapons of
mass destruction in the region, and he was aware of the greater willingness
of the Israeli public to compromise as a result of the Intifada. Arafat was
under pressures from within the occupied territories, but also faced the loss
of the Soviet Union as well as the loss of financial resources from Saudi
Arabia and help from the Arab world as a result of PLO support for Iraq in
the Gulf crisis. Additionally, both political elites as well as their
publics (among the Palestinians, mainly in the population under occupation,
presumably less in the diasporas and refugee camps) had been gradually moving
toward the "historic compromise", namely mutual recognition and a two-state
solution.

It is relatively easy today to point to the flaws in the Oslo Accords, and
there were in fact analysts on both sides who hastened to point them out from
the outset. The more frequently noted problems were, first, the interim
nature itself of Oslo. It could have been foreseen that a prolonged period
(no later than three years until the beginning of final status talks) in
which the two sides were to act as if there were peace (stop terrorism and
violence, cooperate on security, withdraw from certain areas, etc.) without
there actually being peace or even acknowledgment of the ultimate mutual goal
(Palestinian State next to the State of Israel), would invite opponents to
intensified action. A second problem was the absence from the accords of an
explicit ban on further building of settlements or land expropriations (for
the building of by-pass roads) in the occupied territories. In fact the
by-pass roads were in part a result of Oslo as Israel redeployed its forces
in the West Bank and Gaza. The Oslo Accords stated only that agreements
reached in the interim period should not prejudice or preempt the final
status negotiations and that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to be treated
as one entity. That is as close as the DOP got to a reference, however
obliquely, to the settlement issue. For the Palestinians the continued
building and land confiscation were daily, concrete signs of continued
Israeli aggression, increasingly viewed as indications that Israel had no
intention of leaving the territories or, at best, of leaving sufficient or
contiguous territory upon which to build a Palestinian state. This sentiment
was further aggravated by the gradual nature of the accords, by which
additional areas became subject to roadblocks and checkpoints, and freedom of
movement was increasingly reduced. A further flaw, according to Palestinian
observers, was the obligation of the Palestinian side to prevent terrorism in
conditions in which the Palestinians did not have full authority.

While these were problems arising from the accords themselves, an additional
cause for the failure of Oslo was that the accords were not fully implemented
- nor was a mechanism created to monitor implementation. Each stage was
negotiated and renegotiated, each new agreement led to still another
agreement to implement the previous agreement, delays and postponements
became the norm. Israel benefited significantly - internationally and
economically, from the appearance of peace, although internally the opponents
became exceedingly vociferous, even violent though not especially greater in
number. On the Palestinian side, however, the benefits (release of
prisoners, return of PLO people from exile, in time Israeli withdrawal from
the cities and so forth) were overshadowed by increased (not reduced)
restrictions on Palestinian movement, including in particular the closure of
East Jerusalem, continued loss of land and houses, and the failure to
implement further elements of the accords (prisoner releases and the like).
As Palestinian disappointment began to appear, the opponents to Oslo, namely
Hamas and Islamic Jihad increased their terrorist actions, and the
Palestinian Authority either would not or could not take sufficient steps to
stop them. In response to the terror attacks, the Israeli public opted in
May 1996 for a right-wing government to restore order - although not to
abandon Oslo.

It is a moot point as to whether or not Rabin could have weathered the
terrorist attacks of early 1996, but his assassination had brought Shimon
Peres to office in November 1995, and Peres was not able to persuade the
public that he could provide peace with security - thus leading to the
right-wing victory in the elections of May 1996. The fact that Benyamin
Netanyahu was elected on the promise to continue the peace process was an
indication that there was still majority support for Oslo (the polls
indicated this as well), but it may be argued that the Oslo process actually
ended with this election. The process did break-down, despite further
agreements (signed only under great outside pressure), as the right-wing
government in Israel not only suspended many of the measures called for by
Oslo but also deepened the occupation through further restrictions, land
expropriations, house demolitions, settlement building and caustic rhetoric.
More or less total disillusionment with Oslo set in among the Palestinian
public. This could be seen not only in the collapse of cooperation in many
areas, including security, but also in the negative changes that took place
in the Palestinian media and official rhetoric. Something of the opposite
occurred for the Israeli public: with the break-down of the peace process
Israel lost many of the benefits it had reaped during the Oslo period
(1993-1995), the economy declined, terrorism continued, diplomatic isolation
set-in, all this and more leading to a decision by the Israeli electorate in
May 1999 to abandon the right-wing alternative and return to a genuine peace
process in hopes that a renewal of the process would restore Israel's economy
and position in the world.

The Israeli public greeted the election of Barak with great optimism that the
Oslo process would be revived, final status talks would finally begin (three
years late) and peace would ultimately be achieved. Barak's promise of
specific target dates were of less interest to the public at large for whom
revival of the economy was the most important thing, believing that peace was
now a sure thing. Barak promised also peace with Syria and, more
specifically, in response to the growing domestic pressure, withdrawal of
Israeli troops from Lebanon within a year.

The Palestinian public was far less optimistic, and it is probably the case
that Israelis greatly underestimated the damage that had been done by the
failure to implement Oslo and the regression of the intervening years.
Failing to understand this has meant failure to understand the reason a
violent Palestinian revolt, the Al Aksa Intifada broke out, after Camp David
II.

Did the Oslo Accords die at Camp David? Did they cause the failure of Camp
David?

Pages and pages of newsprint have been expended regarding the reasons Camp
David led to what appears to be the end of the Oslo process. Unquestionably
a significant factor lies with the tactics employed by Barak, from the
beginning of his administration up to and including the "take it or leave it"
manner in which he concluded Camp David - tactics which included priority for
the Syrian track (like Rabin before him Barak apparently believed that only
Syria constitutes a military threat, the Palestinians could wait), along with
insensitivity to counter parts on the other side as well as to advisors on
his own side. One may add to this President Clinton's timetable and
designation of blame after Camp David. Similarly, Arafat's failure to
present counter-proposals at Camp David - such as those in fact presented
later at the Taba talks, must also be taken into account. An attempt by
Arafat to garner public support for what was virtually a secret continuation
of the talks after Camp David may also have made a difference, although his
authority had already been greatly impaired by the failure of Oslo to bring
an end to the occupation (and by his authoritarian form of rule).

In fact Camp David failed because the offer presented by Barak contained
major territorial elements Arafat could not accept (most notably the division
the West Bank into three disconnected sections) and Arafat's position on
Jerusalem was one Bark could not accept (Palestinian retention of the Temple
Mount). Given the finality of the Barak offer, clinched by Clinton's public
allocation of blame and followed by the absence of information regarding
continued talks, the Palestinian public gave vent to its frustration and
hopelessness by means of the second Intifada begun at the end of September
2000. Even that did not end the Oslo process, since formal talks were
resumed at Taba. The progress achieved at Taba, however, was too late for
the Israeli elections given the damage caused by the continued violence and
terror.

The failure of Camp David has also been attributed to the formula of Oslo
itself, namely, not the interim nature of the accord but actually the final
component: final status talks to resolve all outstanding issues including
Jerusalem and the refugee problem. Strong arguments have been heard, on the
left and on the right (based on different premises) to the effect that there
should not have been an attempt to seek a comprehensive final agreement but
rather another interim accord, leaving the issues of Jerusalem and the
refugees to a later stage. It may be counter-argued, however, that the
Palestinians could not create a state without resolution of these two issues
while Israel could not remove settlements without a peace agreement. Thus an
interim agreement could at best implement earlier elements of Oslo (another
withdrawal, further prisoner releases), but no final status issues (border,
settlements, security, even water) could have been resolved independently of
the difficult Jerusalem issue and, most likely even the refugee problem.

In the wake of the Intifada and the election of Sharon, the options all
appear to be post-Oslo, that is, an abandonment of the Oslo path. Sharon's
plan is another interim agreement for a long period in which the Palestinians
would have control over 42% of the West Bank and Gaza with the remaining 58%
under Israeli control (area C of the previous accords). It would appear most
unlikely that the Palestinians would agree to such an agreement unless of a
very, very short duration (which is not Sharon's offer).

A large majority of Israelis today support the idea of unilateral withdrawal
or unilateral separation (see the Peace Index, Haaretz, 5 June 2001). These
are two separate ideas, often confused or intentionally blurred in the public
debate. Their growing popularity arises from both the reaction to the
continued violence and terrorism and to the conviction that a peace agreement
is not possible. The unilateral withdrawal idea is based on the premise that
the territories do not enhance Israel's security and together with the
settlements (or because of the settlements) actually hinder Israel's
security. Since an agreement is not possible today, because of Arafat or
Sharon, or perhaps ever possible, it is in everyone's interest to eliminate
at least this source of conflict - Israel's control over the West Bank and
Gaza.

The unilateral separation idea does not posit Israel's relinquishment of the
territories or the settlements inside them. Rather it calls for construction
a strong (physical) barrier between the territories and Israel proper - with
freedom of access to and from the settlements for Israelis and continued
Israeli military control of the territories. A more moderate view - espoused
by many in the unilateral withdrawal camp, and probably the view most widely
supported, would have Israel draw a line around the areas it wants directly
to control or a line wherever it is in Israel's interest to have the line,
fortify it against Palestinian penetration and leave the remainder of the
territories under Palestinian control with Israeli control of the Jordan Rift
(the outer border in the East).

The simple unilateral withdrawal idea stands virtually no chance of adoption
in as much as it is hard to imagine an Israeli government (or even majority
public) willing to abandon the settlements without an agreement - including
security agreements with the Palestinians. For Israel to pick up and leave
the territories may be an appealing policy in the eyes of many in Israel, but
despite its general popularity it would appear to be totally impractical at
this time (as distinct from the years prior to the massive Jewish settlement
of the territories - namely pre-1979). Unilateral separation is a far more
likely option for the Sharon government (indeed it was contemplated by both
Rabin and Barak), although it would not end either the conflict or the
violence and terrorism, while it would require a still larger Israeli
military presence in the territories to protect the settlers.

The question remains, then, is there a possibility of an agreement and what
would it comprise? The majority of Palestinians want an agreement. Their
hatred for Israel is undoubtedly greater than perhaps any time in the past,
and many (the majority?) would probably prefer a bi-national state in all of
mandated Palestine (Israel plus today's occupied territories) in which they
would soon become the majority (in fact there is already a non-Jewish
majority for the under 14 population of the area between the sea and the
Jordan). Yet the Palestinian elites and most of the population realize that
such a solution is not an alternative, and the 1988 PLO decision to accept a
two-state solution remains the Palestinian policy. The majority of Israelis,
too, want an agreement, even though hatred of the Palestinians is greater
than perhaps any time in the past, and many (not the majority) would like to
hold onto the territories permanently. It is argued that Arafat does not
want an agreement, preferring his role as revolutionary fighter-leader rather
than mundane government president; it is argued that Sharon does not want an
agreement, preferring greater Israel over the truncated Israel of 1949-1967.
Neither side today believes that the other is genuinely interested in a peace
agreement yet polls indicate that the populations want-and the leaderships
claim that they too want - to return to the negotiating table.

Estimates vary as to Arafat or Sharon's willingness or even ability to make
peace given the steps each would have to take to combat opposition
forces. Nonetheless, I believe that each would be capable of "selling" an
agreement provided he were willing to reach one mutually acceptable - and I
would put the chances for Arafat being willing as higher than the chances of
Sharon being willing to reach such an agreement. The reason for that
estimate is that the only real possibility for a Palestinian-Israeli peace
agreement is the general model presented in the Clinton bridging proposals,
and that model is far closer, at least in direction and general principles,
to the Palestinians' needs than to Sharon's ideology. In the case of new
leadership, expectations may not warrant optimism, for younger Palestinian
leaders may be more, not less, militant than Arafat and less able to maneuver
majority support; center-left Israeli leaders will certainly be more flexible
than Sharon, but they will have a more difficult time garnering support for
compromise given the damage caused by the Al Aksa Intifada. Nonetheless,
given the perceived need for a settlement on the part of both peoples, there
is still a good chance (though less certain than five years ago) that any
leadership presenting a mutually agreed settlement will be able to win
support for it.

The parameters of such an agreement are generally clear, and indeed were
close to achievement at the Taba talks: a Palestinian State in all of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip with the exception of two or three clusters of
settlements along the new border of the West Bank, with territorial
compensation to the Palestinians from an area south of Gaza; Palestinian
control of the Jordan Rift (possibly some element or period of joint or
international control); various types of demilitarization and security
arrangements (though not Israeli control of the skies and outer borders);
Jerusalem as the capital of both states with Palestinian rule in East
Jerusalem and Israeli rule in West Jerusalem as well as in certain designated
neighborhoods, and international or some form of joint control of the holy
places including the Temple Mount (though possibly Palestinian control of the
Temple Mount); the choice of return for a specified number of refugees
according to numbers determined in negotiation subject to Israeli control,
plus international compensation (with Israeli participation) and resettlement
for the vast majority of refugees.

There may be gradual implementation of such an agreement, just as it is
possible that there will be minor, very temporary interim agreements even in
the Sharon period. But the chances for achieving a final agreement will be
enhanced if two major mistakes of the original Oslo Accords are avoided,
namely continued Israeli building in the territories and uncertainty as to
the final outcome, namely a Palestinian state. Security cooperation is
imperative; international monitoring would be helpful; and two important
provisions for facilitation of the negotiating process would be restoration
of some confidence in the other side through implementation of the earlier
agreements regarding incitement, arrests and releases, and mutual education
(citizen diplomacy once again).

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