India Pakistan Arms Race and Militarisation Watch (IPARMW) # 125
17 July 2003
URL: groups.yahoo.com/group/IPARMW/message/136

[1.] Of Kitchener and Musharraf (Ejaz Haider)
[2.] Growing up with violence (Kalpana Sharma)
[3.] Pakistan's DEPO Discusses Prospect of Defence Exports With ICCI
[4.] Politics continues to thwart owners of 'enemy property' (NR Moorthy)
[5.] Killing fields - Civilians worst hit by land mines (Rajesh Sinha)
[6.] Sri Lanka mulling 20-million-dollar arms deal in Israel
[7.] India can build ICBM within 2 years: US
[8.] India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics (Itty Abraham)
[9.] Is a storm brewing in the [Kashmir] valley? (Praveen Swami)
[10.] Sayeed seeks early clearance for mobile telephony
[11.] Nepal: Maoists in security vow to Delhi (PRANAY SHARMA)
[12.] India, Nepal agree to exchange intelligence
[13.] The Spirit of Terrorism - December 13th, 2001 (Geoffrey Cook)
[14.] Training camps worrying India's minorities (Prajnan Bhattacharya)
[15.] Tea with Mussolini - Hindu nationalism and European fascism
have a lot in common (Vivek Oberoi)
[16.] Pakistan's Indigenous UAVs to be rolled out this month (Naveed Ahmad)
[17.] Pakistan PM refuses to lift ban on weapons' import (Rauf Klasra)
[18.] Politics of excessiveness (Asim Sajjad Akhtar)

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1.


The Daily Times
July 17, 2003

Of Kitchener and Musharraf

Ejaz Haider

For a civilian government to function unhindered and for political
parties to realise their potential, they have to claim prime
political estate. Nothing short of that would do even as different
political cultures will continue to grapple with the issue of how to
guard the guardians in ways peculiar to them

General Pervez Musharraf's uniform still hangs fire even as recent
developments indicate that at least the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal may
have softened its position on the issue in the wake of the warning
signals sent to it by the government. In theory this means the
government may get its way with General Musharraf deciding when to
doff his uniform.
The interesting aspect of the debate relates to the framework in
which it has unfolded. General Musharraf's viewpoint is very clear:
as the coup-maker, he has managed to push through his agenda and in
doing so employed both the instruments of force as well as law. The
first is the function of his control of the army as chief of the army
staff, the second the outcome of his ability to control the judiciary
through his effective monopoly of the state's coercive apparatus. In
other words, he has used the interactive dynamics that inform the
relationship between law and force. But in doing so, he has basically
exploited the space his position as COAS gives him. It also
guarantees him a degree of impunity that no other office, including
that of the president, can afford him.
Doffing the uniform at this stage would mean cutting himself off from
the fount of his power. This he finds unacceptable both because of
internal, political reasons as well as the external agenda he has set
for Pakistan (whether what he is doing is right or wrong is a
different issue and we will eschew any discussion of that).
The opposition chose to play according to his rules - for instance,
the PPP reincarnated itself as the PPPP in order to contest the
elections - but having done that now wants to divest General
Musharraf of his uniform. It is, therefore, prone to conducting the
debate in a framework that seeks to grant supremacy to the civilian
set-up even as it grapples with the reality of General Musharraf's
presence and all that has happened since he took over in October
1999. Is it wrong in doing that?
Not really. While it has to contend with the presence of the army,
that does not, per se, take away from it the right to try to change
the rules of the game - essentially, to upstage the military from the
political arena. The opposition political parties' dilemma springs
from the fact that the political dynamics naturally require them to
reclaim the political space while the ground reality requires them to
do so in a way that does not give the military the excuse to relent
the transition. It's effectiveness versus longevity. And the latter,
within the political configuration peculiar to Pakistan and within
which civil-military relations have unfolded, certainly tends to
influence the former. Yet, longevity itself means nothing if it is
merely to result in the entrenchment of military's varied interests
and through a mechanism that would keep the politicians subservient
to the military. Turkey is a good example of this.
The current tug-of-war, therefore, reflects the tension between these
two conflicting requirements. It also indicates why the two sides are
bent upon looking at the problematic through different prisms.
A good example of why military leaders like to dominate the political
scene and why civilian leaders try to prevent them from doing so is
the current tussle between Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, a
former IDF (Israel Defense Forces) chief and General Moshe Ya'alon,
one-time deputy of Mofaz and now the IDF chief of staff. The main
reason for the tug-of-war is Mofaz' attempt to 'tighten the
civilian-political control over the defense establishment, and weaken
the army's involvement in the political processes'. This is most
interesting since Mofaz himself was widely known to be the most
intrusive IDF chief while in office. He would also go down in
Israel's history as the least taciturn COS. He spoke regularly to the
media and slugged it out on policy matters, especially on the
question of how to deal with the Palestinians with not just former
Labor defense minister Be-Binyamin Ben-Eliezer but also prime
minister Ariel Sharon. (A good study of civil-military relations in
Israel and the conduct of various IDF chiefs, especially Mofaz's, is
Yoram Peri's "The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy,"
put out last year by the United States Institute of Peace.)
Peri uses the term "political-military partnership" to describe
civil-military relations in Israel. Yet, the tension that reflects
through his study clearly shows that the military often wants to
dominate the equation even as the civilians try to put it down. This
is also evinced by what Mofaz wants to do as a civilian minister:
leashing Ya'alon and preventing him from doing what he (Mofaz) was
only too eager to do as COS even when it meant treading on the
civilian government's toes.
The current tension is owed to Mofaz' attempt to 'gain control at the
critical stage of the planning and policy making, instead of
receiving only completed proposals'. Currently, the 'defense minister
has no independent staff and his authority is usually restricted to
approving or rejecting the army's recommendations'. So Mofaz wants to
push the IDF out of strategic planning and bring in civilians to man
the section.
According to an analysis in the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, "This
change will have a far reaching effect on formulating Israel's
foreign and security policy. The strategic section, today headed by
Brigadier General Eival Giladi, is the main source of documents, work
papers and drafts presented to the political level on the conflict
with the Palestinians and the political process."
A somewhat similar situation arose in the subcontinent when
Commander-in-Chief Lord Kitchener argued for the abolition of the
post of the military member in the Viceroy's Council. Kitchener
wanted to centralise powers (organisational and command) in his own
hands. The Viceroy, Lord Curzon refused to oblige him. This resulted
in what has come to be known as the Kitchener-Curzon dispute. Curzon
lost the battle to Kitchener and had to leave India. The dispute, and
Kitchener's victory, in some ways is symbolic of what has happened in
Pakistan: the civilians (Curzon) losing out to the military
(Kitchener). To that extent, of the two armies born of the same womb
(Indian Army of the Raj), it is the Pakistan Army that has kept up
the Kitchenerian tradition!
Nonetheless, it should be clear that for a civilian government to
function unhindered and for political parties to realise their
potential, they have to claim prime political estate. Nothing short
of that would do even as different political cultures will continue
to grapple with the issue of how to guard the guardians in ways
peculiar to them.
Ejaz Haider is News Editor of The Friday Times and Foreign Editor of
Daily Times


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2.

The Hindu
July 17, 2003

Growing up with violence
By Kalpana Sharma

What was associated with "normal" college and university life in
India was totally absent in Kashmir over these last 13 years.

THE FACE of the average young Kashmiri that you see on television is
an angry one. But what is life really like for a person who has grown
up during a period when the gun has ruled and curfew has been a daily
routine? Under its Violence Mitigation and Amelioration Project,
Oxfam (India) Trust recently produced a rather unusual report that
documents the opinions of nearly 200 young Kashmiris. The primary
research was conducted by a group of young Kashmiris familiar with
the situation in the State.

Although the report, "The impact of violence on the student community
in Kashmir," does not claim to be either empirical or statistically
significant, what it does convey through its qualitative material is
the mood of the college-going person in Kashmir. Reports such as this
are often dismissed because they lack academic rigour and also openly
state their political bias.

Yet, it is inconceivable that a group of young Kashmiris could
produce a report without articulating their views on the political
situation in their State. In this report, that view is stated
up-front; the reader can agree or disagree but the substance lies in
the narratives and the information on what the young people think and
what they experience.

In a city such as Mumbai, for instance, college students are busy at
this time of the year trying for admission, shopping around for
books, clothes and music, going to the movies, restaurants or just
hanging around the roadside tea stalls. Such a scene would be unheard
of in Kashmir, although in the last six months things could have
changed.

The report records how the 13 long years, when the State was
convulsed in violent conflict, took their toll on the life and
academic performance of thousands of students. A majority of colleges
could not function normally. Curfews, `bandhs' and continuous
violence meant that students did not know from one day to the next
whether they would get to college. Degrees were awarded even though
students had not attended college. Also, many educational
institutions were burnt down at the height of the troubles. Others
were occupied by security forces and thus could not be used.

Even in the colleges that continued to function, there was little by
way of extra-curricular activities. And student unions were not
permitted. Thus, what was associated with "normal" college and
university life in India was totally absent in Kashmir over these
last 13 years.

In the course of the study, the researchers, Sarwar Kashani, Idrees
Kanth and Gowhar Fazili, spoke to students in colleges in Srinagar,
Sopore, Baramulla and Anantnag.

Ninety per cent of those interviewed said that they were angry over
the current situation, and over 63 per cent said they had been
affected by the violence. Over 90 per cent said they had no faith in
the political leadership and did not attend political meetings. Yet,
the overwhelming majority believed that education would help them
find jobs and most of them ranked peace and employment in that order
as their major concerns. Although these figures are drawn from a
fairly small sample of boys and girls, they do give us an inkling of
what the young in the State feel.

Far more interesting and helpful than the statistics are the
narratives in the report. They provide a vivid picture of the
different moods and views that are inevitable when you get a bunch of
students together. Here are just two out of 17 in the report.
Rukhsana Jabeen from a college in Baramulla, who lost her father at
the age of 12, says, "Although women are trying to come out of the
shambles, the society, particularly in Kashmir, is still dominated by
men. I have to give an explanation to the family elders if I am late,
which is not the case with my brother who is never asked this
question."

Ajaz, a student of history, says, "I want peace now. The gun culture
is going to ruin us. Educationally, we have suffered equally. No
classes were held in those early years and I didn't attend college
except for exams. I have been deprived of the simple yet joyful
experiences of college life. Interaction with others is important. It
enriches you. It teaches you a whole lot of things and above all, it
makes you conscious. Staying back at home is very frustrating. You
don't grow."

Most plaintive of all is this plea from Mohammad Ashraf Jatta of
Anantnag, "Can you give us a break and take us out for a while to a
place where there is no terror, where we will be able to roam about
or at least get a whiff of fresh air? Can you take us out of this
hell for a week or so?" When matters of state, of historical rights
and wrongs, are being discussed, the voices of the young are ignored.
Yet, for the future, these are the people who should be heeded, on
whose shoulders a peaceful future can be built.


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3.

Asia Pulse
July 15, 2003

PAKISTAN'S DEPO DISCUSSES PROSPECT OF DEFENCE EXPORTS WITH ICCI

KARACHI, July 15

The prospect of exporting defence equipment was discussed with the
secretary-general of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI),
Aqeel Al-Jaseem, and Defence Export Promotion Organisation (DEPO) director,
Air Commodore Mansoor Malik, at the ICCI headquarters last week.

Air Commodore Mansoor Malik told the ICCI secretary general about the
growing role of the DEPO in introducing the equipment in the international
market.

He said that out of the DEPO's 100 stakeholders, 80 were from the private
sector and 20 from the public sector.

As a result of the efforts of the DEPO, the defence exports, which stood at
US$40 million three years ago, had risen to US $100 million, while the
organisation had orders worth US$30 million in hand, he said.

He envisaged substantial growth in these non-traditional goods after the
participation of the private sector, and said that five years earlier the
share of private sector was only five per cent, which had now grown to 20
per cent.

This clearly indicated that after some years, the share of the private
sector would surpass the share of the public sector, he said.

To promote cooperation and coordination among the private sector, Air
Commodore Mansoor Malik said the DEPO had planned to establish a Defence
Industries Association (DIA), which would provide platform support for the
exports by the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in engineering and
manufacturing.

He was, however, hopeful that the establishment of the DIA would be a
beneficial tool in augmenting exports of defence-related equipment.

He also sought cooperation of the ICCI in creating business contacts within
the Islamic countries.


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4.

The Economic Times
JULY 15, 2003

Politics continues to thwart owners of 'enemy property'
SPOTLIGHT/ NR MOORTHY
TIMES NEWS NETWORK

This write-up is to focus on the injustice done to Pakistani
nationals of Indian origin, who were citizens of undivided India and
hold shares in Indian firms. Such shareholders are classified as
"enemy" and their shareholdings in companies which were incorporated
before partition are called "enemy properties".

In terms of Section 11 of the Sebi Act, it is one of the duties of
Sebi to protect the interests of investors in the securities market
by taking necessary steps as it deems fit. It is pertinent to
highlight that the act must embrace all segments of investors,
irrespective of their place or nationality, so much so that it is
incumbent upon Sebi to approach the appropriate authority and come to
an arrangement where under a remedy can be found out to address the
grievance of such investors. In normal circumstances regulators wake
up either when there is a media expose or public out-cry and not
otherwise. Let us proceed to analyse the legal position as it emerges.

During the India-Pakistan war an act was enacted titled 'The enemy
property act '68 (EPA). Under the provisions of EPA the Central
government is authorised, to appoint a custodian of enemy property
for India and one or more deputy custodian and assistant custodian of
enemy property for such local areas as may be specified in the
notification. There is a provision, which validates the appointments
made under Defence of India rules '62 and '71.

Section 5 of the EPA reads as under: Notwithstanding the expiration
of the Defence of India Act 62 and the Defence of India Rules 62, all
enemy property vested before such expiration in the Custodian of
Enemy Property for India appointed under the said rules and
continuing to vest in him immediately before the commencement of this
act shall as from such commencement, vest in the custodian.

Notwithstanding the expiration of the Defence of India Act 71 and the
Defence of India Rules 71, all enemy property vested before such
expiration of the custodian of enemy property for India appointed
under the said rules and continuing to vest in him immediately before
the commencement of the Enemy Property (Amendment) Act 77 shall, vest
as from such commencement, in the custodian.

Section 2(b) describes 'enemy' or 'enemy subject' or 'enemy firm' as
a person or country who or which was an enemy, an enemy subject or an
enemy firm, as the case may be, under Defence of India Act 62 and the
Defence of India Rules 62, (or the Defence of India Act 71 or the
Defence of India Rules 71), but does not include a citizen of India.

Under the notification issued by the government on 10th and 11th
September 65, the Central government had vested the under mentioned
property in India belonging to or held by or managed on behalf of
Pakistani nationals in the custodian of enemy property for India with
immediate effect.

Immovable Property
* All lockers and safe deposit
* All negotiable instruments such as promissory notes, shares ,
debentures and other government securities
* All vessels and vehicles including automobiles and aircraft
* Significantly such properties are not expatriated


By virtue of the provisions under Enemy property custody and
registration (Order) 62 it is incumbent on any one in possession of
such property to submit to the custodian at his official address a
return of all such property. Pursuant to the said order, it is
incumbent upon every company then in existence to submit the return
in respect of shareholding of Pakistani nationals in the company and
the dividend on those shares payable to them.

Accordingly, shares, dividends and other accretions by way of bonus
shares etc are lying vested with the custodian. Value of such assets
runs into several crores. The solution to this problem lies under
Section 18 of EPA where under the Centre may by general or special
order direct any enemy property vested in the custodian under this
act and remaining with him shall be divested from him and be
returned, in such manner as may be specified in the direction and
then such property shall cease to vest in the custodian and shall
revest in such owner or other person.

There are some shareholders who originally stayed in India,
temporarily went to Pakistan and died there and whose heirs and
successors are settled abroad as foreign nationals. Such nationals
can be regarded as ⤦persons of Indian Origin� and in my view
subject to Fema provisions such shares can be repatriated on
satisfactory evidence being produced.

Now with the present trend of softening of the relationship between
the two countries a solution must be found to address the grievance
of such shareholders whose property worth crores are blocked for no
fault of theirs. In my view Sebi is the right authority to take the
necessary initiative to protect the rights of such investors.


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5.

Hindustan Times, 13 July 03

Killing fields - Civilians worst hit by land mines
By Rajesh Sinha

SRIGANGANAGAR, India
What were young Sukhwinder's last minutes like, his grieving family members
keep asking themselves. The 10-year-old son of Roop Singh, a resident of 63F
(the name based on the location of settlement on the Gang canal network) in
district Sriganganagar, died in land mine explosion on May 31, 2003 his
hands blown off, his belly ripped open, the intestines spilling out.

That morning Sukhwinder had taken goats for grazing. He took the herd
around, going across the pond near his home. The rest of his family went
about their chores. But within minutes, there was an explosion. Everyone
rushed out, to find the boy's shattered frame lying face down near a tree.

They picked him up and rushed him to the hospital at tehsil headquarters in
Sri Karanpur. Lacking facilities for treatment, the hospital referred him to
the district hospital at Sriganganagar. By the time the villagers reached
there, Sukhwinder was dead.

It was an accident that few had foreseen. The boy died at a place located
outside the area that was mined by the Army. Moreover, even the mined area
had been declared safe by the Army in April when it completed demining and
withdrew, handing over fields to villagers.

But this was not an isolated incident. In two months since demining was
completed, half a dozen incidents involving land mines, resulting in one
death and injuries to four persons, have been reported in this border
district alone.

During the 15-16 months of the military mobilisation since December 2001,
land mines claimed 113 victims: 29 died and 84 suffered injuries in just one
district of Rajasthan, Sriganganagar. The dead include three children and
four women. Three Army personnel were killed. Among the injured were 15
children, four women and four Army men.

There were even agricultural losses due to land mines of over Rs 50 crore in
the first year. No crops were sown in the seasons that followed. The
district administration said it had asked for a compensation of Rs 1.5 crore
for the last season. Nothing of that has yet come, according to the district
administration. Compensation to the victims has not arrived either. The
government had announced a compensation of Rs 2.5 lakh for the family of the
deceased and between Rs 1 lakh and Rs 2 lakh for the injured, depending on
the extent of disability suffered. Meanwhile, land mine accidents continue.

In reply to an unstarred question in the Lok Sabha in May 2002, the
Government said that mine laying was always a hazardous task and casualties
were acceptable even in training. The Government also said that in spite of
all precautionary measures taken by the Army, civilian casualties did occur
in mine accidents when they entered fenced mine fields to tend to their
crops or in pursuit of livestock. But it added that details of all civilians
killed in land mine blasts were not separately maintained.

Under international law, causing harm to civilians or civilian objects is a
war crime. It perhaps provides a remedy of sorts when hostilities break out
between two countries, but does not apply to cases such as this. Many died,
several others were deprived of their means of livelihood due to military
action without a war. The victims of anti-personnel mines laid on Indian
territory were Indians, both civilians and combatants.

The mining exercise caused large-scale dislocation and villagers returning
home cannot be sure that their fields and grazing pastures have been
entirely demined. That is even though in many places the Army ran tanks over
fields to show the villagers that the land was now safe. But many land mines
still remain.

The post de-mining scenario is in some ways more dangerous than earlier,
when the minefields were demarcated and fenced off. Now there is no barrier,
no warning sign. It was reported that even according to the Army's
estimates, 20 per cent of land mines that were laid could not be detected
during de-mining - the Army had reportedly conceded that the task was not
complete as yet.

On May 25, in Khakha village under Hindumal Kot police station, Gurdev, 13,
was playing with his six-year-old brother Sukhdev Singh and cousin Beant
Singh, 6. They found a metallic object and were fiddling with it when it
went off. It made a deep wound in Gurdev's palm while its splinters sprayed
the forearms of the two younger boys.

Dara Singh, Beant's father, said it was a fuse used to detonate land mines.

Villagers of 63F have not resumed farming yet. According to them, the BSF,
which took over when the Army left after handing over the fields to their
owners, told them they did not think the fields were still safe for
cultivation.

On the very first day that Om Prakash of 7F, drove his tractor over his
fields to begin cultivation on May 27, he hit an anti-personnel mine that
blew up the front tyre of the vehicle. Land mines were also found in the
fields of his neighbour Kartar Singh, he says.

Land mines, once laid, are extremely difficult to detect. Sevak Singh of
Hakam Singh Ki Dhani found one when he was ploughing the fields with his
tractor. "I had become confident and relaxed since I had already worked the
fields with my tractor thrice earlier," he said. Luckily, the land mine did
not go off as it had not come under the wheels.

Gurmeet Singh of Khakha village in Hindu Mal Kot, Sriganganagar district was
not so lucky. He had already tilled the land, watered it thoroughly and had
hired the tractor of a panchayat member, Mahendra Singh, for seeding. He was
following the tractor when a land mine came under one of rollers in the
tractor's attachment at the rear. The roller was blown off and some
splinters hit Gurmeet in the belly.

On May 19, an anti-tank mine was found in the fields of Hanuman Sharma of
Lakkha Tibba village in the Raisinghnagar area of Sriganganagar. The Army
had de-mined the area some time ago. It had also run tanks over the fields
for the villagers' satisfaction before handing over the fields to them. The
anti-tank mine escaped all this and turned up in the soil even before the
tracks left by tanks disappeared. The villagers informed the police. Army
experts were called in and the mine removed and destroyed the next day.
There was no mishap, but this was enough to spread a scare among the people
of the area.

(c) 2003 The Hindustan Times Ltd

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6.

Khaleej Times Online

Sri Lanka mulling 20-million-dollar arms deal in Israel
(AFP)
15 July 2003


JERUSALEM - A Sri Lankan delegation including Defence Minister Tilak
Marapana is in Israel negotiating a major arms purchase estimated at
20 million dollars, the Haaretz newspaper reported on Tuesday.

Marapana and the senior Sri Lankan defence officials have been in
Israel for several days to further a deal for weapons control systems
to equip the Dabur missil-armede patrol boats it bought from Israel
several years ago, the daily said.

A top-level Israeli delegation visited Sri Lanka around two weeks ago.

Israel is a key supplier of weapons to Sri Lankan security forces and
the visit sparked protests from pro-rebel Tamil politicians, who
accused the government of trying to strengthen the military while
talking peace.


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7.

Hindustan Times
July 16, 2003

India can build ICBM within 2 years: US
Press Trust of India
Washington, July 16
India could convert its polar space launch vehicle into an
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) within a year or two of a
decision to do so, says a National Intelligence Estimate,
representing a consensus of all US intelligence agencies, including
the CIA, projecting trends through 2015.

Most components needed for an ICBM are available from India's
indigenous space programme, it says, adding that New Delhi believes
that a nuclear-capable missile delivery option is necessary to deter
Pakistani first use of nuclear weapons and thereby preserve the
option to wage limited conventional war in response to Pakistani
provocations in Kashmir or elsewhere.

"Nuclear weapons also serve as a hedge against a confrontation with
China," NIE says.

The NIE expects the Agni to be the mainstay of India's nuclear-armed
missile force. It assesses that the Sagarika Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missile probably will not be deployed until 2010 or later.

India continues to push towards self-sufficiency, specially regarding
its missile programme. "Nevertheless, New Delhi still relies heavily
on foreign assistance," it says.

About Pakistan, it says, since 1980s, it has pursued development of
an indigenous ballistic missile capacity in an attempt to avoid
reliance on a foreign entity.

Islamabad will continue with its present ballistic missile production
goals until it has achieved a survivable, flexible force capable of
striking a large number of targets throughout most of India, it adds.

Foreign support for Pakistan's "ambitious" solid-propellant ballistic
missile acquisition and development programme "has been critical",
NIE says.

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8.

The Economic and Political Weekly (India)
June 28, 2003
Book Review

India's Nuclear Fantasies: Costs and Ethics


Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream edited by M V Ramana and C Rammanohar
Reddy; Orient Longman, Hyderabad, 2003; pp xiii+502, Rs 575.

Itty Abraham

This volume is the latest and most com- prehensive collection of
essays arguing against nuclear weapons in the sub-continent, taking
forward and adding to the findings, insights and arguments found in
Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik's path-breaking South Asia on a Short
Fuse1 and Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian's extensive collection of
essays and opinion pieces published following the tests of 1998.2

Amartya Sen's essay, 'India and the Bomb', offers the most direct
entry point to some of the key questions at stake in the nuclear
problem in south Asia. His lucid contribution raises a number of
critical issues that can be used to map other articles which go into
particular issues in greater depth. These include the tactical and
strategic costs of the tests, implications of nuclearisation at a
global level, the cost factor, the ethics of nuclearisation, and the
anxieties of a post-colonial elite.

On the central question of what India gained from going nuclear,
Sen's answer is, very little. At the domestic politics level, it
didn't help the BJP win state elections. At the tactical level Sen
says nuclearisation constrained Indian conventional military options
in the efforts to expel the intruders and regain the heights of
Kargil.

At the strategic level, it allowed Pakistan to overcome its
conventional weakness and claim parity with India on a nuclear scale.
These points and the dangers inherent in the Kargil conflict are
brought to the fore by Ejaz Haider, a senior editor of Lahore's Daily
Times and Friday Times, in one of the few pieces in the volume not
written by an analyst of Indian origin. He reminds us that at least a
dozen nuclear threats were made by officials on either side during
the conflict, making a mockery of the idea of nuclear weapons
deterring conflict; the reverse if anything was true. In fact, he
argues, nuclear weapons emboldened the Pakistani military leadership
to undertake the operation in the first place. "Pakistan saw its
nuclear weapons capability as an 'equaliser' against India's
conventional military superiority" (p 136). Ultimately, he notes,
international pressure prevented escalation and allowed the cessation
of conflict, another blow to Indian strategic policy which seeks to
keep the region free of foreign influence.

At the global level, nuclearisation alienated China and hardly
furthered Indian ambitions to become a permanent member of the
Security Council. Kanti Bajpai addresses the China question directly.
He argues that while Indian decision-makers have seen in China the
ultimate rationale for their nuclear programme, this perception is
fatally flawed. Bajpai demonstrates this in two ways: first, by an
examination of China's India policy and foreign policy objectives,
and second, by discussing the China-Pakistan relationship. He notes
that "India has never figured in China's threat cosmology in any
serious fashion" (p 36). While Bajpai is realist enough to argue that
the Middle Kingdom needs to be watched carefully and that India's
relative 'military weakness' is being ignored (p 39), he notes that
China has already obtained what it needs as regards the contested
border. In other words, in relation to India, China is the status quo
power, India the revisionist one. Bajpai stresses the value of the
ongoing rounds of discussions between the two countries and suggests
that it is hardly in India's interest to create a permanent enemy of
China. That may be so, the hardliners would say, but what of Chinese
support of Pakistan? In the most provocative section of his paper, he
offers a series of hypothetical reasons for Chinese support of
Pakistan, all of which have nothing to do with India. His basic point
is, does China really need Pakistan to deter or defeat India?
Although Chinese support for Pakistan makes India edgy and nervous,
is China supporting Pakistan for other reasons altogether? Bajpai
proposes that Chinese assistance to Pakistan has more to do with
rewarding Pakistan for its constantcy, limiting US influence in the
region, and keeping Muslim separatists in Xinjiang in check.

If this assistance upsets India, that's a price China is willing to
pay. Bajpai suggests that perhaps Pakistan has also shared western
military technology with China, for which there is not yet much
evidence. What seems more plausible is that Pakistan is also valuable
to China in relation to North Korea, offering a low cost and
hands-off means of subverting US non-proliferation policy and support
for Taiwan. Some of these questions should have been answered in Ye
Zhengjia's disarmingly direct paper on India-China relations. Yet in
the 'officially correct' manner typical of Chinese scholars of
international relations, Ye completely avoids mention of the
unpleasant subject of Chinese relations with Pakistan. The paper
correctly points out that there still remains a great deal of
misunderstanding in India of Chinese motivations, in my view a
combination of ignorance bolstered by neo-orientalist western
journalism and the absence of a critical mass of first rate scholars
of China in India.

All in all, Sen concludes, nuclearisation has set back India's
"national self-defence" vis-a-vis its neighbours. To this prudential
concern - was the decision sensible? - is then added the ethical
concern of the 'rightness or wrongness' of the policy itself. The
ethical issue, he argues, is in turn a prudential matter of the
highest importance as it is a factor in how we assess each other's
actions. The now present threat of massive devastation and mass
murder in the subcontinent cannot, under any circumstances, be
considered an ethical policy, especially when set against
India's historic opposition to nuclear weapons.

The ethical questions raised by the nuclearisation of south Asia
cannot be dismissed as mere debating points for armchair
philosophers. A strong ethical stance underwrote longstanding - for
half a century - Indian demands for global nuclear disarmament, a
comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nuclear weapons convention, and
bolstered its opposition to the nuclear asymmetry enshrined in the
US-led non-proliferation regime. In retrospect, India's self-imposed
restraint after testing in 1974 added to the moral weight of these
demands. These arguments reached their short-lived zenith - and
acquired quasi-legal standing - when India submitted a Memorial to
the International Court of Justice as it prepared its 1996 Advisory
Opinion on the legality of the threat of use or use of nuclear
weapons.

Siddharth Mallavarapu presents the details of this historic ruling in
his contribution to the volume. Two key aspects of the opinion are
worth repeating. First, the special nature of nuclear weapons is
clarified; second, the weakening of the principle of national
self-defence, insofar as the court agued that self-defence could not
be considered independent of principles of humanitarian law. But in
the end, the court blinked. It "[could not] conclude definitively
whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or
unlawful in an extreme case of self-defence in which the very
survival of the state would be at stake" (p 255).

While for a long time, it could be taken as obvious that it was the
tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons that set them apart
from other weapons, this position weakened with the development of
battlefield or tactical nuclear weapons and the enormous leaps in
destructive capacity of conventional munitions, especially in the US
arsenal. This helps us clarify that it is the long-term effects of
nuclear weapons, namely its radiation and environmental effects,
which not only affect the present, but which threaten the well-being
of future generations and the survival of the eco-system, that make
nuclear weapons truly stand apart as weapons of mass destruction.

The effects of radiation are unfortunately already with us. M V
Ramana, a physicist and environmentalist at Princeton, and Surendra
Gadekar, scientist and co-founder of the anti-nuclear journal
Anumukthi, walk us through the horrific effects of the production
cycle of the Indian nuclear programme, from the mining of uranium to
the fabrication of fuel rods, to waste, reprocessing and testing, and
discuss environmental impacts such as ground-water contamination.
They make it absolutely clear that in India it makes no sense at all
to separate the 'civilian' and the 'military' programmes on the basis
of final use, as some political parties and anti-nuclear groups do,
when in practice these systems are completely fused. The evidence
presented would have been even more effective if the authors had
included a map showing the location of the different sites of
reprocessing, production, and extraction, the areas of greatest
contamination and their proximity to areas of dense settlement, and
the likely routes that nuclear materials and wastes travel across the
country. Elsewhere Ramana et al calculated that India has to cope
with 5,000 cubic metres (the equivalent of five Olympic-size swimming
pools) of high level waste from reprocessing.3 High level waste
contains 99 per cent of the total radioactivity from all wastes
produced. The harmful effects of this waste will be with us for
thousands of years, and there is more being produced daily. Given
this, it is not surprising that Thomas George, a physician, describes
nuclear weapons as biological weapons (p 449) in his useful summary
of the physical effects of radiation on the human body. In a
conclusion that brings us into the realm of horror films, he reminds
us that following the devastation of nuclear conflagration, insects
will rule the world.

The principle of self-defence, an indispensable element of a state's
claim to sovereignty, has long been held as inviolable. But India's
submission to the court noted that even this principle has its
limits. In its brief India cited proportionality - the idea that the
use of force even for legitimate defence has to be proportionate to
the means and ends of the attack; that the use of force must cease
once other means, i e, diplomacy, become available; and that where
reprisal involves nuclear weapons, their use becomes subject to
international humanitarian law. Humanitarian law precludes the
targeting of non-combatants and proscribes their needless suffering.
The use of nuclear weapons promises both. And if the law is not
enough, the Indian submission speaks directly to the non-ethics of
deterrence: "deterrence has been considered abhorrent to human
sentiment since it implies that a state, if required to defend its
own existence, will act with pitiless disregard for the consequences
of its [actions on its] own and adversary's people" (pp 260-61).

We still do not fully understand the transformation that took place
between 1996 and 1998. In a matter of two years, the same country
that issued the statements above conducted five nuclear tests and
declared itself a nuclear state. As Sen puts it: "The claim that
subcontinental nuclearisation would somehow help to bring about world
nuclear disarmament is a wild dream that can only precede a
nightmare" (p 187). The easy explanation blames the whole mess on the
BJP, or, as Krishna Ananth suggests, on the entire Indian ruling
elite.

Political scientist Srirupa Roy agues that the decision to go nuclear
must be seen in historical context, situated and justifed within a
coherent set of post-colonial state discourses, hence both the
origins and the impact of nuclearisation lie outside the nuclear
question, narrowly construed. Just as contemporary Hindu nationalism
is less of a break from the past than is often imagined, the official
frame of Indian nationalism offered the resources, conceptual and
material, for a government that sought to go nuclear. "Just as it is
impossible to ignore the fact that Hindu nationalism has emerged in
India through the working of the existing democratic process, it is
also impossible to ignore the ways in which a nuclear India draws
upon and reproduces familiar and unquestioned assumptions about
national identity and state-society relations" (p 350). Or, by the
same logic, going nuclear seeks to affirm and strengthen 'official'
Indian nationalism. This is tricky ground, because it also forces us
to think why forms of destruction become the means by which state
continuity and ideological affirmation get reproduced. Is the answer
militarism, defined by economist Jean Dreze as "the propensity to use
military power, or the threat of it, for political settlement"
(p 280), or is it even more structural, an inherent feature of the
modern or postcolonial state? The endemic nature of modern warfare
and its disproportionate effects in the developing world suggest the
latter; be that as it may, it is impossible to deny the staggering
impact of war on the process of development, including "material and
psychological deprivations associated with entitlement failures,
health crises, physical violence, forced displacement,
...[destruction of] productive infrastructure, public services,
settlement patterns, environmental resources, social capital and the
institutions of governance" (pp 312-13).

The full and sunk costs of nuclearisation are as yet unknown, but
economist and journalist Rammanohar Reddy offers a careful and even
conservative analysis of the likely costs of the programme in the
future. It is worth remembering that the Brookings study of the US
nuclear programme, which estimated a total cost of $5 trillion
dollars over a half century, found that nuclear weapons themselves
were a rather small proportion of the overall costs. Reddy estimates,
at a minimum over the next 10 years, the cost of nuclear weapons at
Rs 650 crore, the cost of delivery systems at Rs 17,000 crore, the
cost of C4I2 (command and control) at Rs 16,000 crore, or Rs 34,000
crore over the decade. When other costs are factored in, including
the costs of operating this system, it works out to Rs 7,000-8,000
crore per annum at 1998-99 prices, approximately 0.5 per cent of
India's GDP (pp 273-93), equivalent to the "annual cost of
introducing universal elementary education in India" (p 394). Put
another way, 7-8 paise of every tax rupee will be spent on this
programme (p 393). But what is worse is that these expenditures on
nuclear weapons will, in all likelihood, take place alongside an
increase in India's conventional military budget, already 2 per cent
of GDP.

Dreze argues that democracies are less likely to be militaristic (in
the sense defined above), but notes soberingly that democracy itself
is a casualty of militarism. The threats to Indian democracy are
real. Nuclear affairs are protected under the colonial era origin
Offical Secrets Act with the post-colonial Atomic Energy Act thrown
in for good measure. The first casualty of official secrecy is
visible in the data used in this volume. Due to the lack of data
available from Indian sources, Ramana and Gadekar constantly turn to
international comparisons and estimates drawn from extrapolations
from international data. Rammanohar Reddy in his analysis of the
economics of the Indian nuclear programme adopts the same technique,
while making amends for its limitations. With little public
information available on India and Pakistan's planned command and
control infrastructures, physicist and activist Zia Mian does a
superb job of drawing together existing sources and borrowing from
the US experience to construct a careful and comprehensive argument
showing the complexity and risks inherent in such an organisation.
His point is that there are huge risks 'built in', even when the
system is working well within its stated parameters.

With all these arguments and data together making a comprehensive
case for the lack of benefits from, and the dangers and ethical
consequences of nuclearisation, how is it possible that such a
programme continues unabated? Sen helps us get a little deeper into
this question when he narrows in on the grievances held by Indian
elites, and sets them in an international context. He reminds us that
India's scientist-president, Abdul Kalam, is kind-hearted,
mild-mannered, amiable, philanthropic, and, an intense nationalist
who greeted the bomb with joy. Kalam is a product of what I have
elsewhere termed the "strategic enclave" of Indian state scientists,4
the focus of articles by M V Ramana and Amulya K Reddy. Ramana
recounts in now familiar detail the important story of how the
scientists around Homi Bhabha, present at the founding of the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission, have become a de facto bomb lobby,
restrained only by political leaders. The distinguished scientist
Amulya Reddy explores the complicity of modern science with
large-scale destruction. He reminds us of the qualitatively new
levels of destruction that were reached in second world war by both
sides, thanks to the scientisation of death, from genocide in
Auschwitz and the concentration camps to the firebombing of Dresden
and Tokyo, and the only hitherto recorded use of nuclear weapons.
This complicity is not necessary, but comes from a failure of
morality and will. Reddy notes with dismay how the scientific
establishment in India either greeted the tests with joy or remained
silent. His diagnosis of the scientific community in India is
sociological. He argues that the lure of state patronage
post-independence marked the initial fall from grace: with it went
scientific independence. Symptoms of decay include the lack of a
"community of interacting scientists" (p 198), the "manipulation" of
peer review, the marginalisation of unorthodox thinking, and, most
telling, the absence of scientific controversies. His insight that
the "decoupling" of science and technology in India has led to
"abnormality" is also the context for a plea that the natural work of
science in India is to address "the country's defining characteristic
and fundamental reality" - poverty (pp 197, 199). Unfortunately, the
poverty of Indian state science precludes consideration of this
reality.

The grievances held by Indian nuclear scientists may be generalised
across the Indian elite, especially the political class. Their
obsession is to be taken more seriously - how often do we hear that
India is the world's largest democracy, produces the second (or is it
third?) largest pool of scientists and engineers in the world, etc,
etc - but this obsession is symptomatic of global tensions that work
in contradictory ways. On the one hand, we have to take seriously the
fact that considerable segments of the upper middle class urban
populations of India delighted in the decision to 'go nuclear',
whether they voted for the BJP or not.5 Getting the attention of US
media and policy-makers remains, for the still-to-be-decolonised, the
only measure of world success. They remain oblivious to Sen's insight
regarding their "overestimation of the persuasive power of the bomb
[...] and underestimation of the political, cultural, scientific, and
economic strength of the country" (p 186). The crudeness of their
response, on the other hand, should not blind us to the degree to
which American imperial power and military force has become the
currency of the day, forcing into disrepute alternative forms of
public diplomacy and non-coercive international relations.
American-style realism is not alien to India. The constituent
assembly debates demonstrate that realism of this kind has been an
element of elite discourse about India since independence, a
discourse that until given centre-stage by the Hindu right remained
embarrassing and marginal. But global nuclear relations have always
been the site for the clearest representation of a grossly unequal
world system which sanctions weapons of mass destruction only in the
hands of a select few. In fact, a simplistic and not unreasonable
lesson to learn from contemporary US responses to North Korea and
Iraq is how much the presence of nuclear weapons appear to count.

In other words, once we set the south Asian nuclear equation in
global terms, the ethical and the prudent diverge sharply. While
there is still no substitute, from the point of view of human
security, to general and global disarmament, is it a prudent strategy
to wait until the difficult conditions for such an agreement are made
possible? Or, is it necessary to work on multiple fronts
simultaneously, from the regional to the global, seeking to reduce
the very real threat of nuclear conflagration wherever possible?
Adopting the latter, pragmatic, position is not without its own
dilemmas. It means that anti-nuclear activists in south Asia join
hands with some elements of the nuclear establishment who argue that
the global nuclear forces are no less a threat to world security and
that simultaneous reductions in global and regional arsenals are
necessary: the adoption of a rigorous and verifiable global
convention on nuclear weapons is the minimum goal of such joint
efforts. This is not a trivial concern: the rise of US triumphalism
has coincided with reports that indicate pressure building up for a
resumption of testing and the development of a new generation of US
tactical nuclear weapons. At the same time, the south Asia
anti-nuclear movement must continue its efforts towards mutual
restraint in the region.

Should these efforts stop short of rollback for the time being? In
the present political conjuncture, there is a case to be made for the
presence of nuclear weapons in the region, not to deter the US from
attack, but as a form of pressure and bargaining chip that may yet
force decision-makers in Washington to reduce their own immense
arsenal, based ultimately on their fear of weapons in the hands of
people unlike them. This is a dangerous position to adopt; using
nuclear weapons as means to an end is a deeply problematic position
to take, whether justified in terms of destructive or progressive
ends. An interim and unhappy solution offers itself in the formation
of a new international regime on the lines of the missile technology
control regime (MTCR) which would seek to bring the five old nuclear
powers, India, Pakistan and Israel into a mutually binding compact.
Such a move would mean the effective end of the discriminatory
non-proliferation regime, which is perhaps on its last legs anyway,
and its replacement with a new discriminatory system whose only
saving grace is that it puts a hold on the expansion of nuclear
weapons in south Asia and globally. This would delight the pro-bomb
lobby in both India and Pakistan for symbolic reasons but would also
impose a form of restraint on them that would make military
adventures of the kind south Asia has become all too familiar with in
the last few years much more difficult to pull off. Such is the
definition of pragmatic.

Whether these proposals are viable or not, the anti-nuclear movement
in south Asia, in India in particular, is faced with a dilemma. Five
years from the time that the national security states in India and
Pakistan formally declared themselves weapons-capable through a
series of nuclear tests, little progress has been made in rolling
back or capping the nuclear juggernaut in either country. The
movement has been proven correct in its analysis - the risks inherent
in nuclearisation and misguided faith in the false god of deterrence
have been made manifestly visible to all but the wilfully 'Blind Men
of Hindoostan'.6 Being correct, however, is no guarantor of positive
change. What restraint there is in the system - declarations of no
first use, no further testing, continued adherence to a limited set
of confidence-building measures - has been self-imposed by those who
decided to carry out these tests. The anti-nuclear movement cannot
really take credit for these marginally positive developments nor can
it fall back, for all the reasons expressed in this volume, on a
wholly justified but politically vacuous response of 'I told you so'.

In the last instance, India and Pakistan are unlikely to shelve their
own programmes once and for all unless enormous pressure is put on
them from all fronts. These include the international, the economic
and the political. To the extent that the latter front has remained
underdeveloped, it remains a fertile zone for the anti-nuclear
movement to exploit. In India, this means above all transforming the
mindset of regional political formations into taking positions on
'national' issues. There are local reasons for doing so, as the cost
of sanctions against India for its nuclear follies are
disproportionately felt in some parts of the country rather than
others, but also because not to do so allows the ostensibly national
parties such as the BJP and Congress to fill this vacuum and
monopolise some policies 'in the name of the nation'. As
heterogeneous coalitions become the standard form of governance in
New Delhi, vernacular nationalisms rooted in local struggles and
expressing diverse interests hold out the promise of less bellicose
and aggressive expressions of Indian national interest. Only then
might it be possible to confront the costs and ethics of India's
nuclear fantasies.

Notes

1 Praful Bidwai and Achin Vanaik, South Asia on a Short Fuse: Nuclear
Politics and the Future of Global Disarmament, Oxford University
Press, New Delhi, 1999.
2 Smithu Kothari and Zia Mian, eds, Out of the Nuclear Shadow, Zed
Books, London and New York, 2001.
3 M V Ramana, Dennis Thomas and Susy Varghese, 'Estimating Nuclear
Waste Production in India, Current Science, 81, no 11 (December 10,
2001), pp 1458-62. Cited on p 433.
4 Itty Abraham, 'India's 'Strategic Enclave': Civilian Scientists and
Military Technologies', Armed Forces and Society, 18, 2, (Winter
1992), pp 231-52.
5 We still lack rigorous public opinion data on the views of
non-elite and non-metropolitan Indians and Pakistanis. Some of the
surprising results that may emerge are prefigured in the study of 200
rural and urban Sindhis conducted by Haider Nizamani and reported in
'Whose Bomb Is It Anyway?'. Full text available
on http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/gsc_activities/nizamani.page/
6 K Sundarji, 'Blind Men of Hindoostan', Vikas, New Delhi, 1987.

© Copyright 2001 The Economic and Political Weekly


______

9.

The Hindu
Jul 13, 2003

Is a storm brewing in the valley?

The 'Healing Touch' policy of the Mufti Mohammad Sayeed Government in
Jammu and Kashmir could soon be tested by sterner challenges than it
has had to face so far, writes PRAVEEN SWAMI.

There is hope...

IN 1971, airman Bakhtawar Bhat watched as combat jets screamed across
the skies over Srinagar, wondering just how long it would be before a
Pakistani bomb came his way.

Now, more than three decades on, the jets were overhead again. This
time around, though, it was for an aerobatic exhibition above the Dal
Lake, put up to attract recruits to the ranks of the Indian Air
Force. "This", he says, smiling at the sight of a gaggle of excited
schoolchildren cheering the jets thundering over the lake, "is a lot
better than war."

Not even the best public relations firm could have dreamt up this
kind of advertisement for the `Healing Touch' policy, put in place by
the Government of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed nine months ago. Srinagar is
chock-a-bloc with tourists, in numbers adequate to send hotel and
taxi rates through the roof, and make it near-impossible to find even
a quiet place to lay out a picnic hamper at Gulmarg or Pahalgam. The
obtrusive Army presence in the State's major cities and towns seems
to have dramatically thinned down, and traffic moves without
hindrance until late at night. There is more electricity, the streets
are cleaner, and, received wisdom has it, there is considerably less
terrorist violence.

It all sounds too good to be true - and the bad news is that it
probably is. Storm clouds are again gathering over Jammu and Kashmir,
and the `Healing Touch' could soon be tested by sterner challenges
than it has had to face so far.

Enormous logs block the road passing before the Rashtriya Rifles camp
at Wagar, the last-but-one military encampment before the road ends
and the climb into the mountains of Lam begins. All who pass this way
must enact a bizarre ritual. First, the logs must be moved to make
way for the vehicle they are travelling in. Once the vehicle has
inched a few feet forward, the logs must be moved to block the road
again. Then, travellers must present themselves to be searched at an
Army checkpoint a few metres away - and, finally, move the next set
of logs before driving on.

Like most officially-imposed procedures, the log ritual serves no
purpose at all. The road from Tral to Lam has not been resurfaced
since it was first built more than two decades ago. The awe-inspiring
potholes that scar its surface are a considerably more effective
deterrent against a high-speed car-borne suicide squad attack than
any number of logs. Then, vehicles are not actually checked at the
logs - leaving a potential suicide squad free to drive up to the
checkpost, delayed only by the time it takes to complete the ritual,
and do what they wish.

What the ritual illustrates, however, is that that the soldiers in
the camp are nervous. Areas such as these mark the frontiers of the
`Healing Touch', so evident in the towns below. Villagers in Lam
reported the presence of large groups of terrorists in the forests,
some over a dozen-strong. Unusually large groups have been sighted in
Bandipora, Shopian and Kokernag. Prakhpora, near Chrar-e-Sharif,
recently saw an encounter in which four terrorists were killed; no
fire exchanges had taken place there for over two years. Even in some
towns, the renewed influence of `jehadi' groups is evident. On July
9, Tral shut down to protest the killing of two terrorists by the
Army a day earlier. The strike is unlikely to have actually reflected
local opinion. Tral residents, after all, elected the National
Conference MLA, Ghulam Ahmad Bhat, who lost his father and two
brothers to terrorist attacks.

Public anger with continued violence is evident - and yet, for
obvious reasons, no one wants to be the first to stand up and defy a
Kalashnikov. As terrorist domination of civil society builds up,
nervous soldiers often react with aggression. Villagers at Lam
claimed that beatings in the course of search and cordon operations
had become common once again. The story is similar in some other
areas. The Army has, for example, flatly refused to reopen the
Brenthi-Dayalgam road in Anantnag, citing security considerations.
This means the villagers, blocked from using the road since a
November 2001 fidayeen (suicide) attack, must traverse a 17-km
detour. The faultline between civil society and the forces here, and
in dozens of similar areas, remains.

Yet, there is no denying the fact that many ordinary people in the
Kashmir Valley face less day-to-day harassment than ever before.
`Healing Touch' advocates claim that the policy, where it has been
enforced, has had two major achievements. First, it has contained the
ugly fallout of aggressive counter-terrorist operations. On June 8,
the State Finance Minister, Muzaffar Beig, announced that he would
meet the expenses for the schooling of a son of Maulvi Abdul Qayoom,
allegedly killed in custody by the Army. Lieutenant General V.G.
Patankar, 15 Corps Commander, was by his side, a gesture impossible
to imagine a year ago.


...and anger too.

Occasional allegations of custodial killings now receive official
responses in quick time. Second, these gestures have helped build
public faith in the security apparatus, and thus isolated terrorists.
`Healing Touch' enthusiasts - although, notably, not Mr. Sayeed
himself - claim that all this has translated into lower levels of
violence, and that `jehadi' groups stand isolated.

The data obtained from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs provides
empirical tools with which the course of the `Healing Touch' may be
plotted. It is clear that there has indeed been some decline in
violence. The data compares terrorism during eight months of PDP
rule, from November 2002 to June 2003, with terrorism during the
National Conference rule from November 2001 to June 2002. It makes
clear that any major indicator of terrorism levels, be it the total
number of acts of violence, the killings of civilians, or the deaths
of security force personnel, has shown a decline. Yet, a closer look
at the data shows that this aggregate impression of improvement is,
quite simply, a myth.

First , the decline in the number of violent incidents relates only
to the first four months of this year. In May and June, terrorist
attacks showed a sharp upsurge and registered numbers very similar to
those seen in 2002. Killings of Indian security force personnel and
terrorists followed a very similar pattern. The much-commented-on
lull of these months, it is important to remember, may have been as
much the consequence of an unusually bitter winter, which made
movement difficult for terrorists and security forces alike. June, in
a sign of what might be yet to come, saw more civilians, terrorists
and security force personnel fall victim than witnessed in the same
month last year.

More important, though, is that one key figure has shown no
meaningful decline at all - the killing of Muslim civilians. Even
during the winter lull, killings of Muslim civilians remained at
levels similar to those seen in 2001-2002, a sign that terrorist
groups retained their ability to strike at those perceived to be
security force informers, political activists, or simply hostile to
the `jehadi' control of civil society.

Although killings of Hindus and Sikhs have sharply declined under the
PDP rule, it could be an outcome of the realisation among `jehadi'
groups that mass communal killings undermine their already-precarious
international legitimacy. Killings of Muslims rarely provoke the same
outrage.

It does not take much to see why terrorist groups must sustain
civilian killings, whatever the contours macro-level India-Pakistan
détente takes. "Democratic politics is encroaching on the control the
jehadis have over their constituency", notes the Kulgam MLA, Mohammad
Yusuf Tarigami, "so they use guns to keep their flock together."

For the PDP, the recent events have been a rude awakening. The party
has lost almost a dozen workers since the assassination of the
Pampore MLA, Abdul Aziz Mir, in December, while Mr. Beig himself was
fortunate to survive an assassination attempt in April. In the latest
incident on July 8, a party worker, Mohammad Abdullah Shah, was shot
dead at his home in Chansar, near Kulgam. Other alliance partners
have also come under assault. On July 4, the Rural Development
Minister, Peerzada Mohammad Sayeed, suffered injuries in a grenade
assault that claimed the life of a bystander and injured 33.

Cynics attribute the PDP's decision to press ahead with the release
of top secessionist leaders, notwithstanding opposition from New
Delhi, to this welter of attacks. The attempt on Mr. Beig's life, for
example, was followed in quick time by the release of the top
Jamaat-e-Islami leader, Qazi Ahadullah. Mr. Ahadullah is close to the
Jamaat political chief, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, who is engaged in
efforts to marginalise centrist elements in the secessionist All
Parties Hurriyat Conference. The return of his trusted lieutenant
strengthened Mr. Geelani's hands, to the not-inconsiderable ire of
the Jammu and Kashmir policy establishment in New Delhi.

On top of it all, the `Healing Touch' might leave the Chief Minister
without the resources he needs to fight back. Signs of demoralisation
are evident within the State Police force, until a year back at the
cutting edge of counter-terrorism operations.

In several recent incidents, police personnel have been found to have
made their peace with local terrorist groups; officers posted at
Nadimarg are even alleged to have aided the terrorists who carried
out the massacre of Kashmiri Pandits there in March. Those who
continue to collaborate with counter-terrorism measures face death.
On July 4, the Assistant Sub-Inspector, Ghulam Hassan Rishi, was
kidnapped and beheaded with a butcher's knife at the Government
Higher Secondary School in Yaripora, near Kulgam.

All this has translated into a generalised decline in the efficiency
of counter-terrorist operations. Between November 2002 and June 2003,
4.5 terrorists have been killed for every security force personnel
lost; the figure was 5.2 during the same months of 2001-2002.

If officials are to believed, the figures might get worse. "If I
cordon off a village to search terrorists," says an Army officer, "I
must do it in the middle of the night, when I'm most likely to find
them. That means peo<147,1,7>ple will face harassment, they might
protest, they might fight, someone might get hurt, and then there
will be trouble. So most of us think, why bother?"

Renewed hostilities are also certain to impact on development work, a
key focus of the `Healing Touch.' Put simply, terrorist pressure
makes it difficult for ground-level Government functionaries to work,
and becomes an excuse for inefficiency and corruption.

While ordinary people understand that the Government has been in
power for far too short a while to launch major works, signs of
frustration are evident. "We were promised a drinking water
pipeline", says a villager of Naodal, Abdul Ahmad Bhat, "and we've
been told it will soon be built. But surely it can't take so many
months to lay a pipe?"

Perhaps, the one thing working in the PDP's favour is the National
Conference's equally poor record in office. The National Conference
workers tried to capitalise on the Government's demolition of
illegally-constructed shops during the recent by-election in Pampore.
"We reminded them," says a shopkeeper, Shaukat Ahmad, "that we had
bribed their leaders for permission to build the shops in the first
place."

But it is unlikely that this sentiment will sustain any political
dispensation for long. Recent increases in power availability, which
has won the Government great goodwill, will leave it between Rs. 750
crores and Rs. 1000 crores in debt because of poor realisation -
this, in addition to a pending backlog of Rs. 2,300 crores! The State
Government has promised to freeze recruitments in return for
financial assistance from New Delhi, but that too could create
further problems.

As things stand, Jammu and Kashmir's population of 9,000,000 includes
600,000 employees of the Government and Government-run enterprises,
one of the highest ratios in the country. While there is ample
opportunity for creating alternative employment - the Kashmir Valley
imports Rs. 13,000-crore worth of meat each year, although it has the
highest livestock-to-population ratio, and has no worthwhile
fruit-processing facilities although it is the largest producer -
continued violence makes investment in rural industry difficult.
Plans to address these problems do exist, but will take time to
implement - which the ruling alliance may not have because of its
internal strains.

The Panther's Party has already begun to campaign aggressively for
concessions to the Jammu region, notably the creation of new
districts and the implementation of constituency delimitation, which,
it claims, will give it more Assembly seats than the Valley.
Meanwhile, the Congress is under increasing pressure to take a more
aggressive line on the PDP. Indeed, there is considerable speculation
about a future Congress-National Conference alliance, sparked by the
latter's July 10 decision to sever its links with the National
Democratic Alliance in New Delhi.

The big question, then, is: can democracy work with a gun pointed at
it? If the Mufti finds a way to manage the multiple contradictions
facing him, he will have pulled off one of the most sensational coups
in Indian political history. If he fails, the `Healing Touch' could
be headed for an unfortunate end, trapped between a rock and a hard
place.

______


10.

The Hindu
July 15, 2003

Sayeed seeks early clearance for mobile telephony

New Delhi, July 15 (PTI): The Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Mufti
Mohammed Sayeed, today sought an assurance from the Defence Minister,
George Fernandes, for early clearance of mobile telephony in the
restive State.

Sayeed, who met Fernandes here at his office, requested an early
clearance from the Defence Ministry to start mobile phone services in
the State.

The Minister has given an indication about clearing the mobile
telephony services soon, Sayeed said after the meeting.

The Home Ministry has already given the clearance for the project.

Mufti has been pressing for starting the services in the State, a
project which was initiated by his predecessor, Farooq Abdullah.

There are indications this time that the project would materialise
soon, Sayeed said adding the infrastructure for flagging off the
service was already in place.

The Defence Ministry has raised objections over the erection of
antennae within the Cantonment area in Srinagar citing building
by-laws.

Commencement of mobile telephony in J&K was delayed at least on two
occasions this year.

According to earlier schedules, the service was to be inaugurated by
the Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajapyee, in April this year.
However, it was shelved citing technical reasons.

The second time President A P J Abdul Kalam had to inaugurate it but
it met with the same fate.
______


11.

The Telegraph
Sunday, July 13, 2003

Maoists in security vow to Delhi

PRANAY SHARMA
Kathmandu, July 12: Maoists in Nepal promised to take care of India's
security concerns if the armed rebels succeed in wresting power, but
said Delhi's continued support to the palace was "morally untenable".

"India's main concern in Nepal is over its security. We want to
assure India that when we come to power, we will safeguard its
security concerns," Maoist spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara said
in an interview.

"In the present Nepalese establishment, some are Pakistan's ISI
agents while others are working for the Americans. We don't want to
be pawns in anybody's hands. But once we come to power, we will
ensure that all anti-Indian activities from Nepalese soil come to a
complete halt."

Mahara's statement reflects a fundamental shift. Till a few years
ago, the main plank of the Maoists was built around an anti-Indian
stand. In a charter, they described India as an imperialistic power
with hegemonistic tendencies towards Nepal.

But growing American presence and involvement in Nepal after
September 11, 2001, have, perhaps, made them realise that they will
not be able to take on both the US and India. Still, their assurance
on India's security concerns has never been this categorical.

However, going by the initial reaction of Indian officials, Delhi
does not seem impressed by the assurance of the Maoist leader, who
also criticised India for its continued support to King Gyanendra.

"India's support to the palace is not morally tenable. Is there
monarchy in India? If India decided to do away with monarchy decades
back, why is it supporting the palace in Nepal?" Mahara argued.

India's stated policy has been that constitutional monarchy and
democracy are the two pillars on which Nepal's security and stability
rest.

Mahara pointed out that Nepal lacked even a constitutional monarchy.
The rebel leader, part of the Maoist team negotiating with the
government, stressed that a political solution was needed through
dialogue to solve the impasse between Kathmandu and the rebels, who
have been trying to topple the monarchy. The two sides have been
observing a ceasefire since January.

Mahara said the palace was split on the issue of negotiating a
settlement with the Maoists. "Those who favour a peaceful solution to
the problem are in the minority. It is the hardliners in support of
the army and favouring a military solution who seems to have the
upper hand," he added.

According to the Maoists, King Gyanendra is under the control of the
Nepalese Army, which, in turn, is taking instructions from the
Americans, who, in the name of fighting global terrorism, are pushing
for a military solution. "It is the Nepalese Army which is calling
the shots and the king is just a powerless bystander," Mahara said.

He said though informal consultations were on, the Maoists were
suspicious of the army's role. He claimed that in the name of
conducting health camps in rural areas, the armed forces were trying
to find out details about Maoist leaders and activists. "All
indications suggest that they are preparing for a confrontation,"
Mahara said.

The Maoists are of the view that the king should adopt an
"equidistant" policy like King Birendra, who was killed in a palace
massacre. "He may not have been a democrat, but he was definitely a
liberal. He tried his best to find a political solution and for
nearly six years did not send the army to confront us," the Maoist
leader said. "Perhaps, that is the reason (why) he was killed."

Mahara made it clear that the rebels wanted to improve relations with
all countries, including the US. "But for this, the Americans will
have to change their policy towards us. If they continue to push for
an aggressive policy and support a military solution, then we will
also put up a stiff fight and resist their designs," he said.

For a political solution to the stalemate, the Maoists want the king
to convene an all-party meeting. Democratic political parties, they
feel, are in no position to break the deadlock.

"They are caught up in looking for a solution within the existing
constitution of Nepal. But to look for a lasting solution, we need to
go beyond. And for this, we are willing to discuss the issue with all
the forces in the country," Mahara said.

______


12.

The Daily Times, July 7, 2003
India, Nepal agree to exchange intelligence
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_9-7-2003_pg4_15


______


13.

Geoffrey Cook
P.O. Box 4233
Berkeley, California 94704-0233
011- (510) 654-9251 (voice)
011- (510) 217-2365 (fax)
GCooketal@...


The Spirit of Terrorism
December 13th, 2001



"...Le spectacle du tourisme impose le terrorisme du spectacle. Et
contre cette fascination immorale...l'orde politique nepeut rien"

"Le'espirit du terrorisme"
Jean Baudrillard
Le Monde, Paris
November 11, 2001

Three years ago, at a banquet following a symposium on South
Asian nuclear proliferation at the University of Wisconsin at
Madison, I was at a table with the well known expert on
Subcontinental Islamic political science Professor (emeritus)
Theodore Wright from the State University at New York at Albany; the
Director of the W. Alton Jones Foundation in Washington; the expert
and author of India's Bomb, George Perkovitch; Neil Joeck, who at
that time was about the highest ranking expert on South Asian nuclear
matters directly employed by the U.S. government -- then at Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory and now with the U.S. State Department; the
Indian Consul-General Sharma at Chicago and myself.
Professor Wright, who because of his generation, was slightly
baffled by the popularity of the new methodologies in the humanities
and the social sciences, brought the discussion with these men, who
are daily involved with issues of preventing mega-death, to the
subject of Post-Modernism, the current rage in academic America.
Ambassador Sharma, who had previously represented New Delhi
in Hanoi after a career as a military man and had even written an art
history book there about the relics of Hindu temples in Viet Nam,
asked, "What is Post-Modernism?" I responded with a quick repartee,
"There is no bomb." I would like to extend that comment for this
exercise, "There is no Terrorism." That is the précis of this paper.
Everyday as a student of South Asian media, I listen to
news broadcasts from both Radio Pakistan and All India Radio (AIR).
It is interesting to compare descriptions of the same violent
encounter in Kashmir where the identical space is claimed by the
competing powers. The Pakistani announcer describes the Vale as
"occupied Kashmir" while New Delhi as Kashmir. Islamabad talks of
"freedom fighters" and "martyrs". While the Indians describe the
insurgents as "terrorists" and talk in the language of the grim
statistics of death. What we observe is opposing rhetoric. The
tragedy is that solutions are hidden behind the impenetrable rhetoric
of the contending parties. Peace will never be achieved unless this
obfuscating oratory can first be pierced. One of the thickest slabs
of rhetoric is "Terrorism".
This article will ask: "What is Terrorism?" "Is Terrorism
real or is it rhetorical?"
Undeniably, something is real because there is great suffering and
death, what is real (material) what is ethereal (immaterial) in the
concept of Terrorism? This study will be an abstract one to better
understand the phenomenon; and, thereby, hopefully, to successfully
grabble with it. There are great risks in this approach -- that we
lose sight of humanity suffering; and, thus, the point of my vignette
at the beginning of this essay. So, let us proceed with caution.
On November 11th 2001, exactly two months after the Twin
Towers outrage in New York City, a full two page large news-sheet
sized article, "L'espirit terrorisme"
(http//:humanities.psydeshow.org/political/baudrillard/htm) -- i.e.
"The Spirit of Terrorism"
(http://amsterdam.nettime/Lists-Archives/nettime-1-0111/msg00083.html)
by one of the leading living French Post-Modern philosophers, Jean
Baudrillard, was published in the important Parisian newspaper Le
Monde in the French language. For the influence it has generated it
is rather short -- between 5-6,000 words. Subsequently, before the
end of last year, the article was published as a pamphlet under the
same title by Editions Galilee, also, in Paris, and it has been
reported that it has become a best seller there having done much to
generate a great deal of questioning and dissatisfaction with
American foreign policy in Afghanistan and the Middle East and
Southern Asia within Europe.
The essay attempts to get at the symbolic meaning of the
tragedy, and along the way it asks what is Terrorism and its relation
to Globalization and Modernism. It clarifies why it is happening
now, and even makes suggestions on how it can best be fought. Your
author would like to use Baudrillard's original thinking as a
backdrop into the "meaning" of Terrorism or if there is any meaning
in the act at all. Although Baudrillard's work was written with
American and French realities in mind and in complete ignorance of
the South Asian model, I would like to apply his controversial (which
created quite a stir on the pages of Le Monde itself) and unique
ideas to the political realities of the Subcontinent.
Now, again, cross-cultural comparisons can, also, be fraught
with danger, for there are commonalities, but, at the same time
totally different assumptions that are basic to dissimilar cultural
milieus. Too often this has caused political misunderstandings
between New Delhi and Washington and Paris, and hence, unfortunately,
has lead to low level antagonism over the past 55 years.
Most of my readers in South Asia and in the Diasporas are
probably not fluent in French. Therefore, I am using a quickly put
together translation into English by a Dr. Rachel Boll of the School
for Social Sciences at the Australian National University. For the
complete version follow the URL above after the English reference to
the "The Spirit of Terrorism" (the full French text can be found at
the URL after "L'espirit du terrorisme"). There are other
translations appearing on the Internet, but, in my less than expert
opinion, I feel this is the best at this time until a fully literary
and philosophical translation can be made. In reading both, I notice
differences in tone between the original and the translation, and may
at occasion put the French in parenthesis. Your critic has done
three literary translations - but none from the French - so from time
to time he will work to smooth out the flow of the phrasing in the
target language of English.
Post-Modernism is a belief that the world is in a new
historical period from Modernism -- especially in the fully
industrialized world, but most contemporaries cannot put their
fingers on what makes it different. But it is agreed that attitudes
have changed throughout most of the world. One of the most maddening
markers of this attitude is the assumption that there are no firm
eternal truths that people can rely on as in past ages. It is truly
a vision of the world in a constant state of flux and relativity.
With the death of the Second World (Socialist camp) and the
birth of a "unipolar" world, what has arisen to challenge late
Capitalism (Neo-libralismo) on the material plane and Post-Modernist
cynicism on the intellectual level has been fundamentalism(s). And
it is not only Islamic fundamentalism (although there is a historical
reason that it has predominated in certain periods of crisis in the
Islamic world), but it exists in all fundamentalisms - including in
Hinduism, Christianity, Sikhism, Judaism, even Buddhism et al. Your
author might add that Lalita Ramdas, the wife of the former Chief of
the Indian Naval Staff (he is the now the vocal leader in opposing
nuclear proliferation in both India and Pakistan) pointed out -- in a
San Francisco area talk she made with her husband -- that a
fundamentalism need not only be religious.
A close senior professor colleague who teaches at the University of
Texas at Austin in a non-South Asian area studies field wrote to me a
letter of shock at the events at the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
He deemed people would never again fight over religion as an
indicator of difference. But, when the prevailing system of liberal
Communism collapsed in the Balkans, ancient repressed rivalries
re-emerged. So it was in South Asia at Partition, and the horrors of
Partition have not been fully resolved over the past fifty-five years
-- especially brought to our attention this year in the horrid
excesses of Gujarat last February and March. Curiously, competing
fundamentalisms are most antagonistic to each other than liberalism
is to fundamentalism. (Please note that both Osama bin Laden and
George W. Bush are Fundamentalists from different religious beliefs
systems.) The Indian political environment is disturbed by such
fractures and schisms as religion, caste, class, language and
sub-nationality. And similar fissures also, rupture Pakistani
society. Therefore, an understanding of Terrorism on the Subcontinent
is a complex enterprise. It has become a cliché - but true -- to say
that Terrorism is the weapon of the weak and not of the powerful --
especially suicidal terrorism. Or, in Baudrillard's words. "When the
situation is monopolized by powerŠwith technological Šhegemony
[pensee unique]Šthe terrorist responds with a definitive actŠ"
Of course, in India, December 13th, 2001 in New Delhi is
uttered in the same breath as September 11th in New York. The attack
on the national Parliament on that date and the attack on the
Kashmiri Parliament of the previous October 1st and the army
cantonment at Kaluchak in the same contested State of May 14th of
that year led to two nuclear showdowns with Pakistan that are still
smoldering just below the surface.
The root of the public sympathy for Islamic militants
worldwide lies not so much in Kashmir as in Palestine, for it is the
outrages of the Israeli army that are portrayed on our televisions so
prominently in most of the world. Jean Baudrillard points out "ŠIt
is they who did it, but we who wanted itŠ" ["Šc'est eux qui l'ont
fait, mais c'est nous l'avons vouluŠ"] Now, he is talking about the
French popular response to the American tragedy, but in India the
repressed and wretched probably had similar secret thoughts. "If one
does not take that into account, the event lost all symbolic
[symbolique] dimension Šthe murderous fantasy of a few fanatics, who
need only to be suppress. But we know ŠthatŠis not so." Notice the
word "symbolic". The World Trade Center was symbolic of the heart of
American Capitalism, but the Parliament was even more symbolic of the
Indian soul. It stands at the heart of Indian democracy itself. And
the act vibrated horror throughout that nation. A psychological
attack at such a central symbol pervades emotional fear throughout
the commonweal, for anyone, therefore, could be a terrorist or, on
the other hand, a victim of one. Shortly thereafter there was
another terrorist action in Calcutta that was criminal and not
politically based. Along with the high profile attacks in Kashmir,
the Indian nation was understandably devastated by the symbolic
suicidal assaults of the Terrorists. Baudrillard's European
Post-Modernist sensibility states that "Š their death does not prove
anything, but there is nothing to prove in a system where truth is
self-elusive..." ["Šleur morte ne prouve rien, mais il n'y a rien a
prouver dans un systeme ou la verite elle-meme est insaisissableŠ]"
India, because it is a state that is quickly developing but still is
not developed to the point of the First World, the advance populace's
sensibility is probably more attuned to Modernism than to
Post-Modernism, but the battle lines have been drawn up between the
modern world and the Medieval mindset of the fundamental. "...they
[the terrorists] do not fight with equal weapons if they have the
right to a salvation, we can no longer hope forŠ" ["Šils ne luttent
pas a armes egales, puisqu'ils ont droit au salut, don't nous ne
pouvons meme plus entretenir l'espoirŠ"]
After the end of the Afghan War against the Soviets, Arab and other
irregular fighters remained in the Hindu Kush. (Please note the
internationalization of the Kashmir struggle indirectly grew out of
great power rivalry in the region.) After an indigenous revolt,
which had been simmering for some time, began in the Vale during
1989, many of these ideological mercenaries began filtering into J &
K. Some came across the porous Pakistani borders -- whether with
the connivance of the Pakistani ISI or not -- and some through other
more devious routes directly from Afghanistan. They caused
disruption within Kashmiri society itself for they forced their harsh
Islamicist views upon the more Sufic-oriented citizens of the State -
often quite harshly. But, at the same, time, as independent human
rights reports have documented, violent repression against
non-combatants by the Indian defense forces lost the hearts and minds
of Srinagar's State to the Center in New Delhi.
India will very likely become a great world power if she can solve
some grave problems. One of those challenges is the relationship of
the Center with its Peripheries, for violent dissatisfaction is found
mostly at the peripheries. India is the last great Nineteenth
century empire. If it cannot solve these political problems of
geography, insurrection and sub-nationalities, it will go the way of
the Soviet Union. If it can, it will transpire into a mighty
Twenty-first century powerfully unified state by the popular will of
all of its citizens. One of the most disturbing elements to an
outsider is the current administration's abandonment of the nation's
founding principles that made India into a great and inspiring
nation. That is Secularism. As a well-known Dutch anthropologist on
South Asia said at the University of California at Berkeley,
"Secularism is what people do in private." That is difference should
not be forced on an Other. To deny people their rights of lawful
expression is to invite rebellion. And that is what is happening
under the current rightwing regime.
"Suicidal Terrorism was [is] the Terrorism of the poorŠ" ["Le
terrorisme suicidaire etait un terroisme de pauvresŠ"] This purest
symbolic sacrifice opposes all politico-historical models in that it
does not make sense under our [i.e., Western] value system (i.e. the
primacy of life and even brute animal survival), and, thereby, under
"our" rules; i.e., the Terrorist "cheats". Terrorism does not follow
the "moral" axiom of historical (i.e., permissive) aggression such as
the revolutionary. Even though "Terrorism is immoral" ["Le terroisme
est immoral]," his act is not gratuitous, for in his twisted theology
his exploit grants salvation to his soul. That is why it is so hard
to counter his actions and to break his cells and other structures.
In a strange twist of history, he is a product of Globalization. He
has made good use of Globalism to build worldwide configurations of
confraternities that can strike at many points at any time or at
once. That is the secret of his thinking and his success and that is
what we must understand to counter him.
We should be heading towards bringing these ideas fully into a South
Asian context, and how we can lessen the popular support for these
militants, and make our political process more inclusive in so doing.
Sadly, the political evolution in both the United Sates and the
Indian Union have grown more exclusive - not only to its own
marginalized, but to those beyond its borders. Both the States and
India are hegemons. The U.S.A., a less than humble world power, and
India has gained hegemony within South Asia, and, if we are to
believe the Prime Minister's boasts after the 1998 nuclear blasts,
there are those aiming for hegemony from the China Sea to the Persian
Gulf within his Government! In one sense, though, India
underestimates the power of its nemesis in Islamabad that was so
dramatically dramatized last spring.
The terrorist act makes the system itself suicide. ("L'hypothese
terroriste, c'est que le systeme lui-meme se suicideŠ") In
democratic societies such as the United States, the United Kingdom
and India such draconian measures as the Patriot Act, POTO and POTA
are put forward to protect the society from these allusive asuras,
but at the same time these measures attack the very democratic values
of the societies themselves. These incorporating principles are
subsumed in trying to save the commonwealth itself. Thus, the
Terrorist has won the battle leading the system into a collapse. The
power of the terroristic adversary has humbled the hegemon. Yet,
most importantly, for the counter-insurgent to hold in mind is that
repressive action travels the same road of unpredictability as
terrorist actions ("L'acte represif parcourt la meme spirale
impevisible que l'acte terroristeŠ")
The Terrorist could not have the power he has over the minds of a
population without the unconscious collusion of the media. The image
consumes the event of the sacrificial suicide, and the media hands it
back as a consumer good with an unprecedented impact. "The real and
fiction are inextricableŠ["Reel et fiction sont extricablesŠ"].
Especially in the Parliament incident, when the Real was added to the
Image, mass terror and anger were created. What followed were two
(this observer feels there were two separate crises - one set off by
December 13th and the other by May 14th) nuclear confrontations -- in
disproportion to the threat -- with their nuclear neighbor Pakistan.
The potential nuclear reaction came from a perceived violation of
symbolic space.
What can we extract from Baudrillard on how to apply
counter-insurgency in the South Asian environment, and what would be
the most effective methods of action. He has said above that we are
destroying our values in protecting our societies from the terrorist
challenge. For the ten days immediately after the World Trade Center
attacks a constant barrage of Talking Heads (no nothing "experts")
were paraded across American television screens. The only comment
that made any sense was "You can't protect yourself from Terrorism,
you can only change policy." For Terrorist action is not a totally
destructive action in the terrorist mind, and it mirrors the violence
of the hegemonic power he is attacking. That is to say, the
terrorist has a point from his perspective, and if we are to counter
it, we must see it, and understand it. We must not underestimate it.
The adversary of the State has humbled the Union in both India and
the United States. It is not simply enough that the terrorists be
eliminated as in previous insurgencies - they must be made to lose
face in the hearts and minds of the people who secretly support them.
"Šthis cannot be obtained by pure force and by suppression of the
OtherŠ" ["ŠEt cela on ne l'obtient jamais par la force pure et par la
suppression de l"autreŠ"]
It was said above that the ideology of contemporary Islamic militancy
was born in the Middle East, and has traveled to South Asia. India
like America has become suicidal (to ourselves/themselves) in our
unbearable power over the powerless. For India, this is certainly
true with Kashmir. In the last fifty-five years there has been
opportunities to reach a win-win solution. But this author feels
that the biggest obstacle has been New Delhi. Every time that three
(or better yet a fourth partner so each side has a negotiator that it
can trust) way discussions are suggested, India proclaims the Simla
Agreement. Well, the Simla Agreement has not worked. The
Subcontinent was too close to war just a few short months go.
Kashmir must be discussed with the wishes of the State's people
participating as well as the two contending nation states.
Otherwise, terrorism will only continue, and nuclear war is only a
matter of time. Another crisis must not be allowed to arise. But
how can the preconditions be established for serious negotiations?
From New Delhi the issue of Terrorism is paramount. Pakistan has to
agree that this has to be a priority to be addressed at any future
peace table.
But back to the point between the descriptions on Radio Pakistan and
All India Radio (AIR): What New Delhi calls Terrorism, Islamabad
calls freedom fighting. The violent actors within Kashmir are
probably more independent agents than dependent upon Rawalpindi. In
opposing them they must be respected for that, as Pakistan must be
respected as autonomous and powerful people, also. At the height of
this spring's crisis Western intelligence reports that leaked out
suggested that Al'Quaida operatives operating in India were trying to
destabilize Kashmir as much as possible in hopes that they could win
against the American-led Coalition in Afghanistan. In other words
they were promoting the chances for nuclear war for their own
perverted interests against the security of both India and Pakistan
by stepping up attacks against Indian targets in J & K.
India had become trapped in a rhetoric regarding Terrorism from which
she found she could not easily extradite herself. If we are to
believe The Times of India, the Indian high command estimated, by
assuming the nuclear option in 1998, New Delhi did not have the 2:1
advantage over the Pakistani forces as assumed during the recent
crises, but rather a 1:1.2 -- a factor that better training, morale
or even plain luck could offset. This was reported to a
Parliamentary Committee, too, according to the Times report. The
fact is that South Asia was lucky this time. The next time it may not
be. So, it is time that the two nations with the Kashmiri people as
equals talk in earnest to create a formula to resolve their
contentious claims. A formulistic settlement at the international
level could thwart the swampy grounds for terrorism to breed.
Finally, to the issue of the existence of Terrorism, the terrorists
are men who have very fixed goals and tactics. They are subnational
in structure. And to say they are only Islamic is to miss the point.
(The Basque nationalistic rebels are another group who are described
as Terrorists.) If the Islamicists were hegemonic, they would have
similar groups applying the same tactics against them. "Terrorist"
is a moral pejorative used against a weaker insurgent by a militarily
dominant group. Those insurgents are better described as guerrilla
irregulars who employ suicidal tactics. As the stronger party, it is
too easy to absolve oneself of any moral complicity in the historical
predicament by calling the weaker side Terroristic. In that sense
Terrorism does not exist, but violence does. But, most importantly,
applying violence alone or blaming another strong state will not make
the problem disappear. We have to look into our own policies and
actions as well as defending ourselves from harm. And this includes
Indians, Kashmiris, Pakistanis, Americans and all others who face
this challenge.
Finally, this exercise has shown how greatly symbolism and rhetoric
have played into our concept of "Terrorism." For a successful
counter-insurgency along with an extra-insurgent solution, these two
obfuscations have to be sliced away from our vocabulary. It is too
easy to call this type of violence "Terrorism," and refuse to
understand the underlying causes. The word "Terrorism" can be a way
of avoiding a solution to a larger, under lying quandary.

______


14.

Los Angeles Daily News
July 12, 2003

Training camps worrying India's minorities
By Prajnan Bhattacharya , Associated Press

KANPUR, India -- At her summer camp, 10-year-old Stuti Gupta is
learning to use guns, leap through rings of fire and fight with
knives and wooden truncheons -- skills India's most powerful Hindu
nationalist group tells her she needs to protect her faith.

The women's wing of the World Hindu Council is holding training camps
in several parts of India, where girls learn martial arts and are
"ordained" with metal tridents, the symbol of Shiva, the Hindu god of
destruction.

But in a modern nation built on principles of tolerance and equality,
such camps don't just deepen Hindus' faith. They create cauldrons of
hostility and inject hatred against Muslims and Christian minorities,
critics say.

"Such trends are inconsistent with prosperity, development and
modernization. They are completely antithetical to the modern project
of nation building," said Mushirul Hasan, a Muslim who is a professor
of modern Indian history.

"If the government wants to create a modern state, it must call the
bluff of the Hindu fundamentalists and show the danger they pose to
the country."

Stuti, a fourth-grader, traveled 170 miles from her native Banda to
attend the camp in the northern industrial city of Kanpur. Both
cities are in Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state.

"This training will prepare me to fight the odds in the society
confidently. They are killing Hindus everywhere to reduce us to a
minority and this would help me to face that challenge," the girl
said.

The World Hindu Council's main target is Muslims, who make up more
than 12 percent of the country's 1.02 billion people. Some 84 percent
of India's citizens are Hindus, and the Hindu nationalists often warn
of what they say are the growing militant ambitions of Muslims.

While the camps for girls are a relatively new phenomenon, the
nationalist group has long held camps for boys, who attend them by
the thousands.

"The camps are not only organized to impart arms training and
physical education, but also to give them an in-depth knowledge of
Indian culture and traditions," said Hari Agarwal of the camp in
Lucknow, capital of Uttar Pradesh.

But Muslims are alarmed. In a rare move, a Muslim organization in
Uttar Pradesh has announced it would distribute 5,000 tridents to
Muslims next week to counter what they see as a growing threat.

In the western state of Gujarat, several summer camps are under way
for hundreds of young women. Gujarat was the scene of Hindu-Muslim
riots last year that claimed over 1,000 lives, most of them Muslims.
The riots began after Muslims burned a train car, killing 60 Hindus.

"These camps are being run across the state without any ban from the
government," said Ataullah Khan, a Gujarati industrialist and
organizer of a relief camp for Muslims whose homes were burned in the
riots.

"If tomorrow, Muslims start organizing such camps in the name of
their religion, and the same with Christians and Buddhists, would the
state government permit them to do so?" he asked.

The Gujarat state government, widely accused last year of doing
little to stop the anti-Muslim violence, has not taken a stand on the
camps.

Kalpana Vyas, a senior Hindu Council leader who is supervising the
camps in Gujarat, said they were meant to aid girls in "physical,
mental and spiritual development."

"Learning how to use firearms is not illegal and it is not meant to
kill anyone without provocation," she said. "Muslims also organize
such camps in Pakistan to train people how to handle deadly weapons."

The Hindu Council campaign has been bolstered by the 13-year Islamic
insurgency in the disputed Himalayan province of Kashmir. India has
long accused Pakistan of supporting the militants, a claim Islamabad
denies.

The Hindu Council, an ideological affiliate of India's ruling
Baharatiya Janata Party, has used the Kashmir insurgency to push its
hard-line brand of Hinduism, traditionally a peace-loving religion.

Minorities throughout India and those who defend the country's
secular constitution say training young Hindus how to use weapons is
neither patriotic nor religious.

"These camps are being organized to scare the minorities," said
Sharif Khan Pathan, secretary of the Citizens Relief Service in
Gujarat. "We understand that the state government is a sponsor of
such activities, but the (federal government) should ban such
training camps, as ultimately it is the Muslims who will suffer."


_____

15.

Business Standard
July 17, 2003

Tea with Mussolini
Hindu nationalism and European fascism have a lot in common says Vivek Oberoi

Have you seen Tea with Mussolini? It's quite a charming film -
especially if you are the sort who loves art and Italy.

The film is set in Italy at the time when the fascists were in power.
At least one protagonist - an English lady - is happy with the turn
of events.

She is happy that the trains run on time! Many Italians, of course,
shared the same sentiment at the time. I have heard similar stories
about the emergency in India.

More than a few people have said that the emergency really wasn't so
bad. The trains ran on time, everyone came to office at the right
time and so on. The more things change, the more they remain the same!

Meanwhile, this month The Atlantic Monthly carries an article in
which "analysts at the RAND Corporation lay out 10 international
security developments that aren't getting the attention they deserve."

One such international security development is the growing
"Hindu-Muslim divide" in India. Rollie Lal, a political scientist at
RAND writes, "A defining element of Indian politics since
independence has been a commitment to secularism. That commitment is
now at risk from an aggressive brand of Hindu nationalism that
equates Indian national identity with Hindu religious identity."

So what do the Italian fascists and the emergency in India have to do
with each other? Well, both have their roots in stresses produced by
rapid urbanisation and industrialisation.

And so does the rise of Hindu nationalism. The physical, economic,
psychological and religious dislocation at this stage of economic
development is a source of discontent.

It's the daily grind of urban Indian life - huddling in crowded
cities, dealing with a big, unresponsive government and watching the
TV beam the promise of a cleaner, greener life on the other side -
that produces these frustrations. Most of us deal with it.

But there are others who resort to escapism - finding someone to
blame and finding some strong leader to quickly solve their problems.
And you'll always find a strongman to exploit this weakness.

The British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli once remarked that you
could tell a weak government by its eagerness to resort to strong
measures.

According to the Berkeley economist, Brad Delong, "If one goes back
to the foundation of European fascism around World War I, one finds:

* A glorification of the ethno-nation.
* A belief that the ethno-nation will realise its glorious
destiny only if it has strong leaders (read Bal Thackery, Osama).
* Contempt for the redistributive politics of parliaments
dominated by interest groups.
* Contempt for the "cretinism of parliaments" in general.
* A belief that the ethno-nation not only should, but must band
together because it has powerful enemies.
* Blaming their current troubles on a specified "other" (Jews
for Hitler/Mussolini and the Arabs; Indian Muslims for the BJP).

Some or all of these features can be found among the supporters of
Hindutva and the emergency.

The emergency was authoritarian, but secular. Hindutva, by
comparison, is more democratic but rabidly anti-Muslim. And if these
forces are not checked they will fuse to become European style
fascism.

Already, the sort of rabble that the VHP/Bajrang Dal attracts is
eerily similar to the Mussolini's Black Shirts and Hitler's Brown
Shirts.

If you think I am going too far- just watch newsreels of the Babri
Masjid demolition. The real solution to their anger is to find them
jobs bagging groceries, not to kow-tow to their kooky demands.

However, finding everyone a job that affords a decent standard of
living is going to take time. We have done well economically over the
last 20 years. A 5.6 per cent growth rate from 1980 to 1990 and 6.2
per cent growth rate from 1990 to 2000 is a solid record, upon which
we can continue to build.

But even if we achieve the much-ballyhooed 8 per cent growth rate
projected for this decade it will still take a few decades for India
to join the ranks of the developed nations.

Meanwhile, one cannot allow the few who have lost patience with
history to ruin it for the rest of us. Hindu fascism will ruin
India's shot at economic and social modernity by making this place
unattractive for investors and skilled professionals.

For investment and skilled professionals will only head for a place
with political stability, the rule of law, where property and
contract rights are secured - in short a liberal democracy.

We know from the history of 20th century Europe what happens when you
try to appease the mob. Liberals must stand up to latter day fascists
aggressively.

Personally, I think the VHP/Bajrang Dal's bark is worse than their
bite. Remember Togadia whimpering out of the Rajasthani jail when the
court rapped him for distributing trishuls.

Aggression in this context could mean only a lathi-charge or two when
VHP rallies get out of control; not allowing their leaders to
question the sanctity of the Constitution and poll alliances to
defeat the BJP in the upcoming polls.

Hannah Arendt argued in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) that
the Holocaust was a peculiarly modern phenomenon.

Colliding social forces, the rise of the nation-state, the collapse
of old systems of class and rank, and the emergence of explosive new
technologies of propaganda and mass destruction conspired to make it
possible. You know we've seen this movie before. It will be sad
indeed if we forgot the ending.


____

16.

The News International
July 17, 2003

Indigenous UAVs to be rolled out this month

By Naveed Ahmad

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan is set to commission indigenous state-of-the-art
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) into service anytime this month.

Sources told The News on condition of anonymity, "our scientists and
engineers have mastered the UAV technology and all test flights have
shown excellent results." The sources said that after passing through
the crucial testing phase, the UAV could be commissioned anytime this
month.

Another source described the achievement as landmark and hoped the
country would move towards further sophistication in the UAV
technology. The Indian scientists and their armed forces research
facilities have although entered in secondary phase of such
technology, they are mostly dependent on Israel. A few months ago,
Pakistan downed an Indian UAV, which was purchased from Israel.

The sources claimed the Pakistani UAVs are much better in speed,
technology and tactical efficiency. The News learnt that the UAV,
which has not been named so far, was tested for a number of times
over the last few months.

_____

17.

The News International
July 17, 2003

PM refuses to lift ban on weapons' import
By Rauf Klasra

ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali has refused to lift
six-year old ban, imposed by Nawaz Sharif in December 1997, on the
import of sophisticated foreign arms and ammunition including
shotgun, revolver, pistol and rifles, a cabinet source confirmed.

Sources said the prime minister rather questioned the three
ministries - commerce, defence and interior -- for bringing this "non
issue" before the cabinet. When contacted, Information Minister
Sheikh Rashid Ahmed confirmed that the prime minister in the cabinet
meeting on Saturday turned down the summary seeking lifting of ban on
weapons' import.

The defence and interior ministries supported the commerce ministry's
move on lifting of ban on the import of arms and ammunition because
of pressure by some powerful arms dealers. Sources said a powerful
lobby had been using the commerce ministry to get the ban lifted.
Many summaries have turned down or sent back by the authorities.

The ban was imposed by Nawaz Sharif though PM Secretariat No JS
(Public wing)ban/242919/31666 dated December2, 1997. Sources said
when the summary when put up before the cabinet, it was criticised.
It was asked why Pakistan needed import of arms and ammunition at
this stage. Reportedly the bosses of the commerce ministry could not
justify the demand for lifting the ban.

Commerce Minister Humyaun Akthar Khan, Interior Secretary Tasneem
Noorani and Secretary Commerce Kamal Afsar remained unavailable for
comments. Giving details of the summary, sources said the cabinet was
informed that arms and ammunition import, not otherwise banned, is
permissible with the authorisation of the Ministry of Commerce in
terms of existing import, trade and procedure order (IT&PO).

In response to the demand of category pass book holders as well as
the sporting association, the commerce ministry submitted a summary
to the Chief Executive, proposing to restore the import of arms and
ammunition by dealers (category pass book holders), newcomers and
sporting association, on authorisation from the ministry.

The Chief Executive Secretariat directed that the summary be
re-submitted after the lifting of ban on issuance of arms licenses.
The Ministry of interior lifted the ban on July 18, 2002. Now that
the Ministry of Interior has lifted the ban on issuance of licences,
it is only appropriate that the authorisation to eligible parties to
import the non prohibited arms and ammunition be restored. The
summary said such a measure would not only provide the users a lawful
means to acquire arms and ammunition but also help generate some
legitimate economic activity. The Prime Minister's Secretariat on
February 6, 2003 directed the Ministry of Commerce to submit the
summary before the cabinet.

_____


18.

The News International
July 17, 2003

Politics of excessiveness

Asim Sajjad Akhtar

On the 1st of July, on the weekly talk show hosted by Hamid Mir on
GEO TV named Capital Talk, a "paindoo" from Okara who spoke what he
felt and gave us all an idea of why there is hope yet for this
country. The show brought together an intriguing assortment of people
to discuss the now famous conflict raging between the state and
landless tenants on Okara military farm. The Director-General ISPR a
spokesman for the Pakistan Army, Maj Gen Shaukat Sultan, chairman of
Anjuman Mazarain Punjab (AMP) Liaquat Ali, MNA Riaz Fateyana, and
myself were the four invited guests.

Liaquat Ali also pointed out as he started speaking that he would not
try and converse in Urdu, and instead spoke the whole time in his
native Punjabi language. And it was Liaquat Ali's rambunctious
overtures throughout the 40-minute recording which left a mark on all
in the studio, and surely, the millions that watched.

All Liaquat Ali really did was express the true range of emotions
that a landless farmer from the rich heartland of Punjab feels when
he is challenging the might of a repressive state. Alongwith Liaquat,
I too was worked up, because I understand the gravity of the
situation faced by the 150,000 residents of Okara military farm, and
the almost one million people across are Punjab who struggling for
68,000 acres of state land. It is a question of life and death, as
the question of land is for the vast majority of people in this
country. And for General Shaukat and Mr Fateyana, it was painfully
clear that this is far from a question of life and death, and more
one of ego and the inability to relinquish their claims to an
obsolete system of domination that calls on ordinary people to accept
sacrifice so that the elite can indulge in self-righteous
extravagance.

The general stated that the tenants' fear of eviction was unfounded,
but that in any case, they would have to abide by the army's wishes
and sign lease agreements and pay cash rents if they wanted to
continue tilling the land. As AMP has asserted from the very
beginning of this dispute, and as Liaquat and myself repeatedly
pointed out, the army has no right whatsoever to be demanding that
the tenants sign lease agreements because the army does not own the
land. In fact, it does not even have a valid lease to the land, which
is owned by the government of Punjab. The same applies to the entire
68,000 acres of land in 10 districts across the province. Be it the
army or other autonomous agencies such as the Punjab Seed Corporation
(PSC) that have established control over the 26 state farms in these
10 districts, none have any legal claim to even maintain their
occupation of the land, let alone demand a change in tenure status of
the tenants tilling it.

But the amazing thing about this day was that it did not play out the
way most days in this country usually play out. Liaquat Ali stole the
show, telling Hamid Mir and everyone else who was willing to listen
why the tenants refuse to acknowledge the authority of the army, why
not signing the contracts is their democratic right, and most
importantly, that the tenants have acquired a moral right to the land
after having spent almost a century helping stuff the pockets of
people who did not care to build schools or dispensaries in the 19
villages of Okara military farm until the 1990s.

Liaquat explained what the tenants' slogan of 'malki ya maut' really
means, saying that if the tenants did not get ownership rights to the
land and instead became contract workers, the eventual eviction that
they would face would be equivalent to death. He said that the land
was more than just an instrument of production, and in fact
represented the tenants' history, replete with the graves of their
ancestors who served the colonial state. And so 'malki ya maut'
captures this consciousness -- that if the tenants are to be deprived
of their historical rights to this land, the state may as well kill
all of them.

And this is what the state seems to have decided to do in any case.
The general repeated the story that the authorities have repeated
numerous times about the handful of deaths in Okara, saying that they
have been the outcome of the terror that is being inflicted upon the
tenants by AMP. And when Liaquat asked why it is that only tenants
and not Rangers or police personnel have died over the course of this
whole affair, the general was silent. Hamid Mir did his best to
change the subject when I mentioned that the post-mortem and FIR
relating to the death of 60-year-old tenant Mohammad Amir, who died
on May 11, presented contradictory reports that clearly proved that
Rangers fire killed him.

On Capital Talk on GEO, the cable-watching public witnessed the
bravery of someone who has quietly abided by this social contract for
his entire life, and has now emphatically decided to speak the truth
about the legitimacy and morality of the militarisation of state and
society that the vast majority of Pakistanis are subjected to. And
while symbolic resistance on a TV show cannot extricate the people of
this country from the mess that has been created for them, it gives
us all a taste of the vibrancy and resolve that is needed to start
dealing with the mess.

The fact of the matter is that it is high time that the people of
this country openly take a stand against the arbitrary and often
brutal exercise of power by the state. This requires courage and the
willingness to break with centuries of mental slavery. And AMP has
showed many of us exactly what courage is, and how it is possible to
expose the blatant fraud that our state continues to propound. It is
time for as many of us as possible to exhibit the courage that AMP
has done, and make this movement into everything that the
establishment fears. Because, as Liaquat asserted at the end of the
show, there is only one solution to the conflict between the
authorities and the people, and that is for the people's will to
prevail.

The writer is affiliated with People's Rights Movement, a
non-partisan political confederation of social movement



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