Dr Glen Rangwala - Lecturer in politics at Cambridge University, UK
(email: :gr10009@...)

These comments are designed to assist United Nations delegations in
analysing the new draft resolution put to the Security Council on 5
November 2002 by the United Kingdom and United States. They provide
an overview of how the draft needs to be altered in order to create a
viable regime that will achieve the verifiable disarmament of Iraq's
non-conventional weapons. At present, the UK-US draft, if accepted,
is unlikely to achieve this goal. It is unnecessarily provocative, in
that it attempts to establish mechanisms and criteria that are
unrelated to the effective disarmament of Iraq but which will be a
cause of considerable tension between the UN and Iraq. It attempts to
legitimise prior UK-US military action, in contravention of the legal
opinion of almost all other members of the United Nations, by
falsifying history and by misappropriating and even misquoting past
Security Council resolutions.

The draft of 5 November drops some of the more preposterous elements
of the earlier two US drafts that have made their way into the public
arena (2 October and 25 October), such as the granting of rights for
P5 members to place their selected personnel on inspections teams
(para.5 of the 2 October draft), and for any member of the UN to
unilaterally declare a material breach of the resolution and use
military force against Iraq (para.10 of the 2 October draft). These
may have been provisions that US diplomats knew would never be backed
by the Council, and so designed to act as negotiating devices; they
could be dropped to demonstrate "compromise" at the UN. What is left
in the draft resolution remains harmful and counterproductive enough
for achieving a peaceful solution to the Iraq crisis.

PP1: "Recalling ... 688 (1991)".
In its first operative paragraph, the draft resolution brings SCR688 -
- demanding that Iraq "immediately end" ... "the repression of the
Iraqi civilian population" -- into a resolution purportedly on Iraq's
disarmament. By incorporating mention of SCR688 into a resolution
setting out the new standard for Iraqi compliance, the US and UK may
be leaving the way open to claim that Iraq is not in compliance with
the new resolution, even if there is full progress on the disarmament
agenda.

SCR688 was adopted as a non-Chapter VII resolution during a civil
war; its applicability for the present day is tenuous at best. This
has not stopped successive US administrations from using SCR688 as a
partial justification for ongoing military action against Iraq, in
opposition to mainstream international legal opinion. The October
2002 Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed
Forces Against Iraq, passed by the US Congress, grants the authority
of Congress to use military force to "achieve the goals of [SCR]
688". The mention of SCR688 in the draft resolution seems to be
designed to broaden the causus belli in line with the Congressional
stance. This hampers the possibility of a peaceful resolution to the
Iraq crisis.

It is worth noting that the Council has not made reference to SCR688
in its previous resolutions on Iraq's disarmament -- for example,
SCR1284, establishing Unmovic, does not mention SCR688. That there
has now been a change of US-UK policy in this regard is an immediate
cause for concern.

PP2: "Recalling also .. 1382 (2001) .. and its intention to implement
it fully".
The new reference to 1382, the only resolution mentioned in this
paragraph and unmentioned in the previous drafts, is puzzling. Its
renewal of the oil-for-food programme expired in May 2002 and has
been supplanted by 1409 (2002), so the implementation clause is not a
commitment to continue the oil-for-food programme. 1382 does not
commit the Council to lift economic sanctions -- either the import or
the export prohibition -- upon Iraqi compliance with its disarmament
obligations: preambular paragraph 2 of 1382 only lists compliance in
disarmament as a necessary, not sufficient, condition for the lifting
of sanctions.

It is possible that Council members have been mis-sold this part of
the resolution. According to reports, certain Council members wanted
to relink Iraq's effective and verifiable disarmament to the lifting
of sanctions. The US and UK may present this preambular paragraph as
a concession to this argument, but in reality it is no concession at
all.

PP4: "Recalling that its resolution 678 (1990) authorized member
states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its
resolution 660 (1990) .. and all relevant resolutions subsequent to
Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security
in the area".
This paragraph is a clear attempt to provide post hoc legal
justification for the bombing of Iraq since 1991. It suggests that
resolution 678 authorised the use of force to implement all
resolutions on Iraq from 1990 to the present day. This is clearly
untrue: 678 only justifies the use of force to implement resolutions
on Iraq passed between 2 August and 29 November 1990. This is a
position that has been repeated by Council members ad nauseum since
1991, with no states but the UK and US holding anything other than a
literal and meaningful construction of SCR678. If this draft
resolution is passed, every country that has provided legal
criticisms of US and UK bombing since 1991 will now be acknowledging
that their past criticism was misconceived, and that US-UK bombing
was legally justifiable after all.
PP7: "Deploring further that Iraq .. ultimately ceased all
cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA in 1998".

This is a wholly disingenuous claim, in that it presents the
termination of inspections in Iraq as a consequence of Iraq's
cessation of cooperation with Unscom. The only period in which Iraq
ceased all cooperation with Unscom in the period between 1991 and 16
December 1998 was for two weeks from 31 October to 14 November 1998.
This period of non-cooperation began on the day that the US President
signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, to further the long-
held goal of overthrowing the Iraqi regime, in defiance of Security
Council resolutions which affirm the sovereignty and political
independence of Iraq. Iraq reannounced its intention to cooperate
fully with UNSCOM in a letter of 14 November; the US response to
incomplete but extensive Iraqi cooperation was to order weapons
inspectors to leave Iraq on 16 December. For the draft resolution to
portray the termination of Unscom's work in terms of the earlier and
unrelated brief Iraqi stance is to misrepresent the history of the
inspections process entirely.

PP8: ".. in spite of the Council's repeated demands that Iraq
provide .. access to [Unmovic]".

This is a pure fabrication: the Council has not made "repeated
demands" that Iraq comply with Unmovic -- it has only made one such
demand, in resolution 1284 (1999). No resolution subsequent to its
creation even mentions Unmovic.
".. regretting the consequent ... suffering of the Iraqi people".

The draft resolution states here that because Iraq has not complied
with its disarmament obligations, the Iraqi people have suffered.
This seems to be the most frank acknowledgement yet by the US and UK
that economic sanctions have caused suffering.

PP10: "Recalling that in its resolution 687 (1991) the Council
declared that a ceasefire would be based on acceptance by Iraq of the
provisions of that resolution.."

This is an even more egregious re-writing of history than those cited
above: the draft resolution simply misquotes the Security Council's
earlier resolution. The ceasefire was not based on Iraq's acceptance
of the provisions of resolution 687: it was based on "official
notification by Iraq to the Secretary-General and to the Security
Council of its acceptance" of that resolution (resolution 687,
para.33). The difference is highly significant: the US-UK draft text
implies that the ceasefire would no longer be operative if Iraq is
taken by them as no longer accepting its full disarmament
obligations, thus leaving open the justification to use force against
Iraq without further Council authorisation. The ceasefire is thus
portrayed as continually conditional upon Iraqi compliance. This is
contrary to the position of every other Council member since 1991:
this consistent position has been that the ceasefire can only be
terminated if there is new Council authorisation to use force.
Through this paragraph, the US-UK are attempting to award themselves
the legal right to use force if they alone perceive Iraq as non-
compliant; the abandonment of the specific authorisation to use force
that was in earlier drafts is thus resuscitated in an oblique but
legally equivalent form here.

OP1: "Decides that Iraq .. remains in material breach of its
obligations .. in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with
United Nations inspectors.."

This claim is made without any legal basis. Iraq, through the letter
of its Foreign Minister of 16 September 2002, has made an
unconditional offer to allow inspectors into Iraq in order to fulfil
all their tasks in line with existing resolutions. Iraq simply does
not "remain" in breach -- material or otherwise -- of any obligations
relating to cooperation with weapons inspectors, as it has fully
accepted the existing terms for the re-entry of inspectors. By
labelling compliance as violation, the message from the Council to
Iraq is that acting in accordance with the terms of the Council's
resolutions is a purposeless and unproductive activity.

OP2: "..decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime.."

The draft resolution recognises that the new resolution is creating a
different inspections regime from that agreed in 1991. As such, the
resolution is explicitly imposing new obligations on Iraq, in
addition to those already accepted. Therefore, the US and UK can no
longer claim that they are trying to ensure Iraq's compliance with
resolutions dating back to 1991.

OP3: "Decides that .. the Government of Iraq shall provide .., not
later than 30 days from the date of this resolution, a currently
accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its
programmes to develop .. other delivery systems such as unmanned
aerial vehicles and dispersal systems designed for use on aircraft,
including any holdings and precise locations of such weapons,
components, sub-components, stocks of agents, and related material
and equipment, the locations and work of its research, development
and production facilities, as well as all other chemical, biological,
and nuclear programmes, including any which it claims are for
purposes not related to weapon production or material"

This long paragraph, firstly, raises the barrier for Iraqi
compliance; and secondly, may make compliance impossible to achieve
at all. It raises the barrier by including items in the list of
weapons open to disclosure that were not previously regarded as
prohibited. Iraq has not been prohibited from developing aerial
vehicles or dispersal systems. The draft resolution compels Iraq now
to disclose not only these items but also sub-components and "related
material" of these items.

It may make compliance impossible because it, if read literally, is
asking for Iraq to provide a full "declaration of all aspects of its
programmes" in the chemical field, including those activities not
relating to weapons issues. If this draft is accepted, Iraq would be
compelled to produce within 30 days a full inventory of all the
activities of all the chemical facilities throughout the country,
including those engaged in relatively trivial and harmless
activities. It is difficult to see how any country could possibly
compile and guarantee the validity of such a declaration, given the
logistical problems that would be encountered. Any inaccuracies in
this declaration would, in accordance with OP4, constitute
a "material breach" by Iraq of this resolution. As such, this
paragraph ensures that the resolution cannot be complied with. At the
very least, the final clause needs to be re-written or removed.

In this context, the comments of Hans Blix, Unmovic's Executive
Chairman, to the Security Council should be noted:

"A declaration regarding weapons programme should be possible within
30 days and the same should be true for declaring remaining permitted
peaceful nuclear programmes (op.3). To declare all other chemical
programmes in a country with a fairly large chemical industry, as
well as other biological programmes might be more problematic in a
short time." (Hans Blix, "Notes for the Briefing to The Security
Council", 28 October 2002, para. 7).

OP5: "Decides that Iraq shall provide UNMOVIC and the IAEA .. private
access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC and the IAEA
wish to interview ... . further decides that UNMOVIC and the IAEA may
at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may
facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside
of Iraq".

This is perhaps the key "deal-breaker" in the resolution. The Council
would be according to Unmovic and the IAEA the right to transport
anyone -- seemingly without his or her permission -- outside the
country. For example, the resolution would allow Unmovic the right to
order senior governmental officials, including the Iraqi President,
to leave the country at their discretion. The Council, if it endorses
this draft, would be according to Unmovic the legal right to abduct
individuals with their families, and to take them abroad. It would be
wholly implausible to expect cooperation with such an unchecked range
of powers. Even if Unmovic does use this power in a responsible way,
the resolution would enable the US to encourage senior Iraqi
scientists to defect once they have been taken outside the country.
To expect open-ended cooperation from the Iraqi government in such a
matter is not plausible. The only way to reach a resolution to the
conflict, and to reach the verifiable disarmament of Iraq of its non-
conventional weapons, is to set reasonable and achievable standards
for cooperation. This is impossible to reconcile with provisions for
taking Iraqi individuals outside the country.

OP7: sub-paragraph (iii): "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and
unrestricted access to Presidential sites equal to that at other
sites".

This provision does away with resolution 1154, which endorsed the
memorandum of understanding (MoU) that created special procedures for
the inspection of eight defined and delineated Presidential sites. If
this provision is accepted, it firstly causes a new and unnecessary
arena for conflict between the UN and the Government of Iraq: the
presidential sites can be inspected already under the terms of the
MoU. Secondly it would demonstrate that agreements with the UN are
without value, in that one party to the agreement has acquired a
habit of nullifying them when it no longer suits its interests. For
the UN to abandon the principle that the agreements that it makes can
be overridden to the detriment of the other party would be to cast a
grave aspersion on the United Nations and the fabric of international
law.

OP7, sub-paragraph (v): "sufficient UN security guards".

There is no description of the number or composition of
these "guards". Iraq is being asked to accept a resolution that
permits a foreign military presence on its soil, without knowing the
nature of that military presence.

OP7, sub-paragraph (vi): "UNMOVIC and the IAEA shall have the right
to declare .. exclusion zones, in which Iraq will suspend ground and
aerial movements".

This provision again grants to the weapons inspectorate an extensive
range of unchecked powers. For example, Unmovic could declare large
areas of Iraq to be "exclusion zones" for an indefinite period of
time. Limitations on the authority of inspectors need to be worked
into the resolution to preserve a sense of the inspectors' legitimate
role, with an obligation imposed on the inspectorate to limit the use
of this measure to the environs of specific buildings and only for
the duration of a specific inspection. Without such a provision, long-
term cooperation between the parties is likely to be subject to
periodic crises that would threaten to derail the on-going work of
the inspectorate.

The experience of the weapons inspectorate - whose actions were
discredited through the manipulation of their work by one outside
party - demonstrated to the Security Council's own panel on
disarmament and monitoring (the first Amorim Panel report, 1999) that
an accountable system must be devised that can retain its rigorous
standards for the implementation of Iraq's disarmament obligations.
Without amendments of the form suggested above, progress in the field
of disarmament is likely to remain elusive.
--
References:
1. Draft resolution of 2 October in part at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,803436,00.html
2. Draft resolution of 25 October at:
http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/usdraftscr021025.pdf
3. Draft resolution of 11 November at:
http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2002/msg02002.html
4. Hans Blix, "Notes for the Briefing to The Security Council", 28
October 2002",
http://www.cam.ac.uk/societies/casi/info/blix021028.pdf
5. The Amorim Panel report on Disarmament and Monitoring, 27 March
1999
http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/Amorim%20Report.htm

SOURCE:
http://traprockpeace.org/commentson021105.html

--- In DeWaarheid@y..., "dewaarheidnu" <yahoo@d...> wrote:
> AP; Reuters. 7 November 2002. Iraq Gov't Media Denounce U.S. Draft;
> Saddam urges world to stop "evil" US-British plans.
>
> BAGHDAD -- Iraq's government-controlled media on Thursday denounced
> the latest U.S. draft resolution on weapons inspections as a
pretext
> for war against Baghdad and urged the U.N. Security Council not to
> bow to American demands.
>
> "America wants to use this resolution as a pretext and a cover for
> its aggression on Iraq and the whole Arab nation," the ruling Baath
> Party newspaper Al-Thawra said in a commentary. "The Security
Council
> should not give (the Americans) a pretext and a cover for the
coming
> aggression."
>
> The United States is pressing for a vote this week on its revised
> draft, which was submitted Wednesday following eight weeks of
intense
> lobbying by the American administration.
>
> While the revised draft includes a greater role for the Security
> Council, it still frees the United States to take military action
> against Iraq if inspectors say it isn't complying.
>
> "The new aggressive U.S. draft resolution is full of dictation and
> demands - accompanied by war threats - that should be fulfilled by
> Iraq while ignoring a decade of Iraqi cooperation with the
> international body," said the newspaper Babil, owned by Saddam
elder
> son Odai.
>
> In a front-page editorial, Babil expressed hope that Russia and
> France would prevent American moves that "would turn the
> international body into a tool to implement U.S.-British schemes."
>
> Echoing that view, Al-Thawra said the Council "should shoulder its
> responsibilities to prevent the U.S. planned aggression on Iraq."
>
> President Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, accused the United States and
> Britain of pressuring the Security Council to vote on resolutions
> that contradict international law and world opinion, the state-run
> Iraqi News Agency reported.
>
> During a reception for the visiting Malaysian information minister,
> Saddam said, "There are two administrations that violate the
> international law ... the American administration ... and the
British
> administration."
>
> Saddam indicated he would not reject outright a new U.N.
resolution,
> saying Iraq wanted to look at the conditions first. However, he
said
> Iraq would not accept any resolution that go against "the
interests,
> security and independence of Iraq."
>
> "The most important thing is that we don't let America get the
> international cover for its aggression," Saddam said.
>
> He said Washington and London were "exerting pressure on the
Security
> Council to take resolutions that contradict international law and
the
> United Nations charter."
>
> "Any just position by the world against the evil wishes of these
> countries will not be in the interest of Iraq alone but also in the
> interest of the countries of the world," Iraqi television quoted
> Saddam as telling visiting Malaysian Information Minister Khalil
> Yaacob.
>
> "If these two American and British administrations are able to
> achieve their wishes, the world would return to a new law, which is
> the law of evil based on power and opportunity rather than the law
of
> love and justice," Saddam said.
>
> Saddam said Baghdad, accused of breaching U.N. resolutions on
> disarmament, would not have had any conflict with the Security
> Council had it not been for the interference of the United States
and
> Britain.
>
> Saddam has repeatedly said that U.S. President George W. Bush's
real
> motive behind his declared aim of "regime change" in Iraq is to
> control Baghdad's vast oil reserves.
> --
> ProletarianNews.