(The author formerly worked for the Cuban
foreign ministry [MINREX] and now lives in
Miami. He originally wrote this for Cuba-L
list serve moderated by Nelson Valdes.
It's been a month since we ran this before
and it's worh looking at again in light of the
subsequent development in Cuba, etc.)
================================

CUBA: THE REASONS BEHIND
A COSTLY DECISION
By Domingo Amuchastegui
April 5, 2003

The Cuban government's crackdown on certain sectors of the
local dissident movement was an extremely costly decision,
and not just because of a strong international reaction
against it. The high price paid by Cuban authorities
encompasses a wide range of its top priorities that have
suffered considerable damage. They are the following:

/ The April conference in Havana known as La Nación y la
Emigración lost much of its expected political results.
Friendly émigrés willing to participate felt embarassed and
frustrated. Finally, the holding of the
conference -scheduled for April 13th-16th, was cancelled,
based on arguments that avoided mentioning the crackdown and
its negative impact.

/ The considerable gains within U.S. Congress received a
serious blow, placing many of the lawmakers in a very
awkward position.

/ After months of political dialogue and negotiations, the
EU was about to admit Cuba into the Cotonu Agreement and its
many benefits (250 million euros in five years among
others), as announced by Commissioner Paul Nielson prior to
his successful visit to Havana. Now the EU has condemned the
crackdown and -according to a recent meeting of experts in
Madrid- the process of admission is "paralyzed" and
surrounded by all kinds of "uncertainties."

/ And last, but not least, the crackdown takes place
precisely in the midst of the Geneva sessions on Human
Rights and facing a very mild project from a group of Latin
American countries. Anyone could ask if Cuban authorities
want to commit some sort of political suicide or is this a
major blunder, something that is not very likely for a
regime that has been in power for 44 years. A more
opportunistic approach could suggest: If it is not a matter
of life and death, they could have waited a couple a months,
gaining considerable advantages... The obvious questions
then arises:

Why this costly decision?

Because of these particular dissidents becoming a sudden and
unexpected threat? Certainly not. Some time ago, El País
correspondent in Havana, concluded that : "Los disidentes no
le hacen ni cosquillas a Fidel Castro." Then -if this is the
case- what are the real reasons?

For some Fidel Castro decided to take advantage of the War
on Iraq to wipeout the dissident movement. Then why not
during the attack on Panama, Gulf War I, the Balkans or the
more recent on Afghanistan? The argument does not seem to
fit very well.

For others, this is the beginning of an oslaught of
"repression and terror."

Are the dissidents taking the streets of Havana?

Are they demonstrating in the streets or, in the eyes of
experts, to have enough strength to bring down the Cuban
regime that may justify or explain such an onslaught? This
does not seem to be the case.

For Emeritus Professor Edward Gonzalez at the University of
California and analyst for the Rand Corporation, the
possibilities of a democratic transition "are remote," the
current correlation of forces is overwhelming against "Cuban
democrats," and courageous dissident leaders "are better
known to foreign governments and international human rights
groups than to the majority of Cubans in the island."

If there is the intent of wiping out the dissident movement
or an actual long-term onslaught, then why letting Payá
collect 11,000 signatures to support his Proyecto Varela and
turned it in to the National Assembly with ample
international coverage?

Why allowing Payá to travel abroad to collect his Sakharov
Prize given by the EU, meeting with State Secretary Colin
Powell, and visiting Miami?

Why being more lenient to dissident socialdemocratic
organizations in Cuba?

Why the different dissident organizations that called upon
the people to boycott government-sponsored one party
elections were not repressed in 1992, 1997 or last years?

Why was former President James Carter invited to
Cuba -knowing perfectly well what he was going to advocate
for- and his support to Payá´s project was totally covered
by the Cuban official media?

Why Cuban intellectuals write for Encuentro, in Madrid, and
nothing happens to them? All kinds of dissidents meet with
U.S. lawmakers and EU officials visiting Havana and nothing
happens to them?

Such actions conform a pattern that does not fit all too
well into the paradigm of overall repression. There has to
be something else that current debates are overlooking.

To understand the reasons, we should focus, first, on
Carter´s most recent statement asking Cuban authorities for
the immediate release of the dissidents that were arrested,
which implies a rather explicit condemnation of what
happened. But, at the same time, Carter concluded urging the
U.S. government to work with the Cuban side to deflate the
current tensions and stabilize a "relationship of mutual
respect." Obviously enough, he is placing some degree of
responsability on the U.S. side; thus, the issue involves
not only actions against the dissidents but the involvement
of the U.S.

Across the Atlantic, a more explicit approach surfaced at
the Madrid meeting of experts, where Mr. Altozano stated:
"From the U.S. Interest Section in Havana dissidents were
kindled seeking to generate a reaction from the Cuban
government."

Is it the U.S. Interest Section to be blamed for what is
happening?

Of course not; we all know they follow instructions whether
their names are Huddleston or Cason. And such instructions
have been changing, especially since Otto Reich was
appointed by President Bush and the latter made public his
"Initiative for a Free Cuba."

Both Interests Sections -just like everybody else in the
trade of Diplomacy and Intelligence- carry out their
activities quite normally, and FBI and State Security play
their game after them.

But never, not even in 1959 and 1960, the heads of the
Interests Sections were directly involved in work-contacts,
distribution of materials and resources, and other
activities alike. For these activities diplomatic missions
have their operatives and other positions (press, cultural,
and all kinds of attachés).

When one instructs its head of missions to get directly
involved is because, to say the least, they are looking for
trouble in addition to breaking the rules and conventions.

Dissidents attend social activities at the embassy and
nothing happened for years and years.

But never a diplomatic mission, protected by diplomatic
immunity, will host workshops or training sessions of any
sort for well-known opponents to the government to which
that mission is accredited; such activities are conducted by
operatives and attachés, unless you want to risk a serious
diplomatic incident with undeclared intentions and goals.

And this is what we are witnessing in Havana since the final
period of Ms. Huddleston and since the beginning of Mr.
Cason's term, last September. As an inevitable reaction you
start having actions and counter-actions, restrictions of
movements, verbal confrontations, new OFAC regulations
against Cuba, and others.

If we place such a change of policies in a broader picture
where U.S. policies are becoming more and more
confrontational under the Preemptive Doctrine and your
country, Cuba, is still in the terrorist list of nations,
worries and concerns start rising high. The Cuban security
syndrome starts dominating within the mindset and actions of
the Cuban leadership. After all, current developments
world-wide and U.S. role are -as recently stated by
well-known Cuban-American sociologist and professor at
Princeton University, Alejandro Portes- granting additional
credibility to Fidel Castro's hypothesis about the U.S. as
an aggressor. In view of such trends and prevailing
perceptions, Fidel Castro has always reacted resorting to
unexpected actions and placing tensions at a higher level.
That is his understanding of forcing a crisis to be
negotiated more successfully, if not confronted. The
crackdown on certain dissidents and threatening with closing
down the Interests Sections, are his initial moves. Others
may come depending on how the U.S. handles the recent, and
almost consecutive, kidnappings of planes and boats in view
of the existing bilateral agreements between Cuba and the
U.S. There is one last clarification to be made. The term
"certain dissidents" clearly indicates that not all
dissidents are considered the same and, subsequently, are
being treated differently.

Dr. Portes made a valuable remark when explaining that Cuban
dissidents are faced with a dilemma: They need resources and
assistance from abroad, but when they turn to the U.S.
Interests Section in search of help is like the kiss of
death, their legitimacy and credibility falls apart and all
kinds of questionings fall upon them. Dr. Portes added a
final remark: The current set of events are a very serious
blow for any notion for a democratic transition. The fact is
that the vast majority of dissidents that have being
arrested, are those more closely connected to Miami's most
fierce anti-Castro organizations, being funded and supported
by various means and ways by the latter as well as by
USAID/NED programs, and that have a well-proven connection
to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, in particular to
the latest actions personally conducted by its head person,
James Cason. Prominent figures like Payá, Sánchez Santacruz,
Morúa, Vladimiro Roca, Arcos, G'omez Manzano, and others
have not been touched. Some may argue that this is Fidel
Castro´s own game of¨divide and rule. This is not the case;
such dissident leaders have known, since the beginning of
their struggle, that there is one key rule to be respected :
Stay away, as much as you can, from the U.S.

One last thing must not be overlooked. In a long history of
confrontation and conflict, U.S.-Cuba relations have managed
to reach a significant amount of agreements after serious
crises (on piracy, economic zones and fisheries, Interests
Sections, immigration, and others).

Several recent crises have managed to circumvent a final
clash and reach settlements and cooperation (like during the
shooting down of the Brothers to the Rescue and in the field
of drug-trafficking).

In the current Cuban agenda there are some additional
relevant topics like the Cuba Adjustment Law and the five
intelligence agents, captured and sentenced in Miami.

When dealing with the present crisis, the eyes of Fidel
Castro may very well be looking far-ahead to these two other
issues; after all, Cuban experts like to remind everyone
that dealings with republican administrations, from Nixon to
Reagan, proved to be rewarding in mutual communication and
agreements.