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MONDAY QUARTERBACKING: Ethnicity, Conflict Resolution and the
Nigerian State

By

Mobolaji E. Aluko, PhD
Burtonsville, MD, USA



Monday, October 8, 2001

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Introduction
------------


Writing just five days after the September 11 World Trade Center (New
York) terrorist attack, the former professor, ambassador and US Senator,
the erudite Daniel Patrick Moynihan (whose vacated US Senate
seat from New York is now occupied by Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton) had this
to state in a Sunday, September 16 article in the Washington Post:


QUOTE

All that [THAT IS, CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUT COMMUNISM BEING THE
CULPRIT FOR EVERY DISASTER THAT HAPPENS TO AMERICA] now changes. The
world out there is now in here, and nothing will ever be the same.
The test now will be for us to get straight just what it is "out
there." The answer is ethnicity, but this has proved hard to learn.
Ethnicity was a dominant political fact of the 20th century. The
collapse of the great empires in 1918 and 1945 brought about, in the
words of the late Harold Isaacs, "a convulsive ingathering of people
in their numberless groupings of kinds -- tribal, racial,
linguistic, religious, national." The old "larger coherences" were
not replaced; instead the world was "breaking into bits and pieces,
bursting like big and little stars from exploding galaxies."
Neither of the subsequent superpowers seemed able to grasp this.
This destroyed the Soviet Union. And keep in mind: We [THAT IS,
THE UNITED STATES] are a singularly successful multi-ethnic society.
We have a vibrant Islamic community of emigrants from across the
world. They will be heard in those parts of the world they come
from, and they can speak out.

UNQUOTE


It is that inability to "grasp" the "convulsive ingathering" of these
ethnicities in a multi-ethnic Nigeria that may yet destroy us in Nigeria
if we are not careful, that inability to understand what it means to
pro-actively re-arrange our governance in order to make our own society
"successful".

Why do I write so?

Ever since May 29, 1999 when we began a new civilian administration under
President Obasanjo, the ethnic stew-pot in Nigeria has been boiling,
wracked by severe ethnic strifes in all of its parts - in Lagos, Shagamu,
Kaduna, Kano, between various permutations of the Yoruba, Igbos and
Hausa-Fulani, between Tivs and the Azare in Nassarawa, in within the
Yoruba in Ife and Modakeke, within the Igbos in Aguleri and Umuleri, and
between the Urhobos and the Itsekiri in Delta State, in Kaduna, Aba and
Umuahia, and most recently between the Tivs and Hausas in Jos of all
places and among the Ijaws in Okrika.

What is truly amazing is that until each conflagration is almost over,
government - whether federal, state or local - stands idly by, having
failed to anticipate and/or take positive action to prevent it, and only
to lament afterwards. Yet the problems are a permutation of just four
issues everywhere:


(i) communal strife between purported indigenes and settlers over land;

(ii) crisis over chieftaincy (whether of the religious (that is Emir,
non-Emir) or traditional (Oba, Olu, Eze) kind);

(iii) crisis over political (a.k.a. financial/resource) control of one or
the other local government and/or state. All of these sometimes occur with an
overlay of:

(iv) crisis over differential religious laws (that is, Sharia, non-
Sharia; traditional worship versus imported religions.).


While the conflagration is going on, government has shown abject
indecision, unable to send its ill-equipped, under-manned and hence
incompetent police force, and at the same time frightened about the
prospect of a greater carnage if military force is invoked - as we all
witnessed in Odi, Bayelsa State. So government is stuck between the rock
and a hard place, while more people die needlessly.

In a recent classic lament of President Obasanjo, on seeing the massive
scale of destruction in Jos, he had this to say:

QUOTE

http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/September/17092001/f2170901.htm

President Obasanjo who addressed religious and community leaders at
Government House, Jos described what he saw after visiting various
parts of Jos and environs as "an act of extreme barbarism,"
adding "there is probably more to it than we know."

"Even when I was serving there (referring to his prison experience) I
was not as saddened as I was today, because of the extent of
destruction of lives and property I saw," he declared.

He blamed religious, ethnic and community leaders as well as the
elite for the crisis, noting: "If we had all done what we ought to
have done as we should have done it, this would not have happened."

The President said necessary steps should be taken to avoid things
that could breed ethnic and religious tension among the people,
citing the mounting of loud speakers indiscriminately on places of
worship as a possible cause of religious tension. He said: "We have
to work out what we should do in these areas. Places that are
designated as residential should not be made worship places, so that
we do not create room for unnecessary tension.

"No matter our religion, we have no right to make life unbearable for
others," he stressed.

UNQUOTE


How did it get to be this way, and what can we do about it? 41 years after
attaining our flag independence, my discussion here will first start with
Nigeria's ethno-geography, proceed to some general ethno-sociology with a
discussion of conflict resolution, and finally end with Nigerian
ethno-politics. The specter of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) will then
once again be brought up.


The Ethno-Geography of Nigeria
------------------------------


Nigeria is a country that attained flag independence from the British in
1960. With a population of about 120 million people, its size is 923,768
square kilometers (356,669 square miles). It is divided into 36 states,
774 local governments - and 374 identifiable ethnic groups. Table 1 shows
these groups on a state-by-state basis.

From the table and other information, six indices distinguish Nigeria's
ethnicity:

1. its diversity. 374 ethnic groups within a relatively small
geographical space under tight economic circumstances, unpopular
Constitution and other unclear laws is quite a number. It has another
distinction of greatly uneven distribution: as observable from Table 1,
certain states in the country have as many as sixty ethnic groups, while
many other states have just one or two.

2. its geographical contours: despite increasing geographical diffusion,
again Table 1 shows that except for the Fulani, the overwhelming majority
of the ethnic groups still have identifiable geographical homelands within
one or two given states within the entity called Nigeria.

3. its distinctiveness with respect to language and name affiliations:
the name of a person invariably gives his or her ethnic (and oftentimes
religious) background right away, instantly conjuring up all biases of the
jaundiced mind, and therefore a sometimes perpetual stereotyping based on the
allegedly bad conduct of one person from an ethnic group. The reverse exception
here is that the fact that you speak Hausa does not mean that you are Hausa, a
non-recognition of which is a boon for the Fulani (a dominant minority in the
North which imbibed and spread the acculturation of the Hausa
language) and a bane of the Hausa and non-Hausa population of the North.

4. limited contact with each other before the advent of the British, and
except for the Igbos, still relatively small MASS contact between the
peoples. This has both positive and negative impacts: positive in the sense
that lack of contact means that the natural historical angst that could have
arisen from distant-past contacts do not exist; however, negative in that it
could also mean that lack of such experience makes it difficult to negotiate
present conflicts, and again leads to actions based on stereotyping.

5. The different modes of interaction of the British with the various
ethnic groups during colonialism: for example, indirect rule (through the
Emirs) in the North with limited Western education and, in the South,
direct rule (through the Obas in the West and warrant chiefs in the East)
coupled with broad Western education; all coupled with real or imagined
political favoritisms during and immediately following colonial rule.

6. religious identification with particular ethnic groups. Except for the
Yoruba where there is almost an even distribution of Christians and
Muslims, each of the other ethnic groups are either OVERWHELMINGLY
Christian in population or else overwhelmingly Muslim. This leads to a
confusion as to whether a particular crisis is a religious strife or an
ethnic strife.


Ethnic Conflict and Resolution
------------------------------

What is "ethnic conflict?" Some scholars define it narrowly as a type of
social competition that "typically involve(s) large amounts of violence
and often particularly vicious forms of violence" [Samuel Huttington,
"Civil Violence and the Process of Development", in "Civil Violence and
the International System", Adelphi Paper 83, London: IISS, 1971, p.13.]
This kind of "extreme prejudice" that results in competition AND
elimination going hand-in-hand leads to genocides, pogroms, "ethnic
cleansings" and other kinds of mass destructions of lives. A more useful
and broad definition [quoted by Berry and Tischler] is due to Coser which
defines conflict as "a struggle over values or claims to status, power and
scarce resources, in which the aims of the conflicting parties are not
only to gain the desired values but also to neutralize, injure or
eliminate the rivals". In the same book, Bernard is quoted as writing that
"conflict exists between groups when there is a fundamental
incompatibility in their values, goals, interests, etc." Thus Coser and
Bernard's definitions allow competition without elimination, where the
"reduction of the status of one's opponents" - through non-war, non-riot
means such as picketing, boycotts, ridicule, laughter, plain insolence and
occasionally, through the ballot - would be the limited objective.

One of the most important points (to my mind) touched on by Berry and
Tischler is the question of whether "group reactions (conflicts) merely
represent the total of the individual reactions to a particular series of
events, so that that the action of a group is the expression of the views
of its 100, 500 or 5 million members" and therefore whether "improving the
individual interpersonal relations of the members of each group will
improve or eliminate the potential for conflict." Quoting Bernard, these
authors state that:

"In brief, a thousand friendships between members of two
groups - German and American Scientists, for example, or a
thousand love affairs between soldiers and forbidden enemy
women - will not add up to a friendly group relation. Nor
conversely, will a thousand quarrels between American tourists
and French taxidrivers add up to a Franco-American
conflict."


Nor would a thousand "Omo Yoruba" gentlemen marrying a thousand Igbo
"nwanyi oma" damsels necessarily add up to a friendly inter-group
relations!

The verdict therefore seems to be that "group conflict must be analyzed
from a group perspective; it is not merely the outcome of thousands of
individual prejudices and disagreements." Obviously such individual
agreements will aid in resolving the conflict, and conversely such
individual disagreements will hurt its resolution, but they are generally
not the CAUSE or CURE of the conflict.


Ethno-Sociology
---------------

What is an ethnic group, and is it a useful concept? It depends on who
you are talking to, and their "world view." But first, it is important to
discuss "race" as a concept before attempting to define "ethnicity". Let
us read Berry and Tischler ("Race and Ethnic Relations", Houghton-Mifflin,
1978; 4th Edition):


QUOTE

Race is .. a vague and ambiguous term. All sorts of groups of people are
referred to as races, and various and sundry criteria are used to assign
people to racial categories.

It has been estimated that there are over 1 million different species of
animals and plants. These organisms are incapable of interbreeding, and
it is not possible to belong to more than one species at the same time.
For example, the animal we might be looking at can be a horse (Equus
caballus), an ass (Equus asinus), or a sterile species hybrid (mule).
When it comes to race, there is no agreement among anthropologists or
biologists on how many races there are in human species. At first
anthropologists and biologists tried to describe and classify races of
humans in the same way as they had done with species of animals. Each was
isolated, described and given a name. However, this approach became
problematical since opinions on the number of races varied greatly. In
fact, the more the scientists studied human populations, the less
clear-cut the differences among races became.

Dobzhansky has made the point that the difficulty arises from the fact
that biological species are genetically closed systems, while races are
genetically open ones. In other words, species do not generally
interbreed and exchange genes. We could say that such systems are
reproductively isolated. For examples, interchanges between the gene
pools of the species man, chimpanzee, and gorilla cannot take place. Two
species may have had a common ancestor, but each species progressed along
a separate evolutionary course when it became independent.

This is not the case with humans. All humans belong to one species, and
there has been a considerable amount of gene interchange even with the
barriers of segregation, apartheid and slavery. Races are not, and have
never, been clearly defined biological groups. The general interchange
between human populations has caused racial boundaries to become more or
less blurred.......

An ethnic group is a human group bound together by ties of cultural
homogeneity. Complete uniformity, of course, is not essential; but there
does prevail in an ethnic group a high degree of loyalty and adherence to
certain basic institutions such as family patterns, religion, and
language. The ethnic group often possesses distinctive folkways and
mores; customs of dress, art and ornamentation; moral codes and value
systems, and patterns of recreation. There is usually some sort of object
to which the group manifests allegiance, such as a monarch, a religion, a
language, or a territory. Above all, there is a consciousness of kind,
feeling of association. An ethnic group may even regard itself as a race,
a people with common ancestry; but the fact of such common descent is of
much less significance than the assumption that there is a blood
relationship, and the myths that the group develops to substantiate such
an assumption. Ethnic groups, of course, are not all alike, and none
would embody all the features we have enumerated. Some will emphasize
certain of these characteristics to the exclusion of others. Religion may
serve as an important object of allegiance to one and be of little
importance to another. Furthermore, ethnic groups are dynamic. The
folkways may change, the institutions become radically altered, and the
object of allegiance shift from one trait to another, but the sentiment of
loyalty to the group and the consciousness of belonging remain as long as
the group exists. An ethnic group may or may not have its own political
unit; it may have had one in the past, it may aspire to have one in the
future, or its members may be scattered through existing states.
Political unification is not an essential feature of the group. The term,
accordingly, would include such groups as Arabs, French Canadians, British
Canadians, Welsh, English, Flemish, Walloons, Scots, Jews, and
Pennsylvania Dutch. The Soviet Union itself is composed of more than a
hundred ethnic groups, including, for example, Polish, Kazak, German,
Armenian, Georgian, Tartar, and Ukrainian.


UNQUOTE

Thus, it therefore becomes clear that what we have for races is not a
scientific definition, but a social - or even sometimes strictly legal (in
fascist states) - definition of race, while for ethnic groups we have a
social and dynamic definition with underlying political ramifications.

Expanding further on the notion of ethnicity, let me allow Tellis, Szayna
and Winnefeld (in their book "Anticipating Ethnic Conflict"; Rand, 1997)
to lay forth some definitions:


QUOTE

Approaches to Ethnicity
-----------------------

Definitional Problems

The definition of ethnicity remains one of the most contested categories
in social science. Due in part to the definitional problem, the
relationship between ethnicity and other classificatory categories such as
race, nation, and class remains poorly understood. In fact, the pioneer
of modern sociology, Max Weber, even while producing one of the most
sophisticated social scientific frameworks that could be applied to
analyze ethnicity, concluded that:

"the notion of "ethnically" determined social action subsumes
phenomena that rigorous sociological analysis would have to
distinguish carefully...[and]...it is certain that in this
process the collective term "ethnic" would be abandoned, for it
is unsuitable for a rigorous analysis."

Considerable scholarly attention to the phenomenon over the past three
decades seemingly has been intent on proving Weber wrong. The more recent
analyses of ethnicity have taken a variety of approaches and produced some
sophisticated new insights. But when these disparate approaches are
analyzed systematically, they usually fall into one of three main "ideal
types" relating to ethnicity as a social phenomenon, each with a
distinctive perspective on what ethnicity is and how it relates to social
conflict. These three approaches are discussed below...


The Primordialist Approach
--------------------------

The first approach to ethnicity is commonly termed the "primordialist"
approach, in that it centers on the assertion that certain primitive (or
basic) sociological groupings exist in society. Such primitive groupings
exist a priori, meaning that they are natural units that derive their
cohesion from some inherent biological, cultural, or racial traits which
then become instruments of social differentiation. The primordial school
asserts that human societies are in effect conglomerations of "tribes."
The regulating principles that define distinctions between "tribes" may
vary, but what is crucial is that they determine both the boundaries and
the meaning of tribal membership in such a way that the "in-group" and
"out-group" can always be clearly demarcated. Such a priori existent
groupings then constitute the primitive units in society: they define for
the individuals within them critical existential distinctions centered on
the dichotomy of "us and them" and they perform the crucial task of
forming an individual's personal identity through a process of "collective
definition." This process, defining the way that "racial groups come to
see each other and themselves", is centred on constant redefinition and
reinterpretation of historical events and social experiences vis a vis
other such groups, and it eventually results in the "aligning and
realigning of relations and the development and reformulation of
prospective lines of action toward one another. Thus, in the
primordialist view, ethnic groups function as insular universes. Their
membership is defined by accident of birth, and once constituted, they
perpetuate their distinctiveness by a continuing process of socialization
that accentuates their perceptions of uniqueness and their sense of
separateness from other, similar, social formations.....

The Epiphenominalist Approach
-----------------------------

In sharp contrast to the primordialist account, which provides an
"essentialist" description of the meaning of ethnicity, the second
approach, which might be termed the "epiphenomenalist" perspective, denies
that "ethnicity" as a social phenomenon has any inherent biological basis
whatsoever. This approach to ethnicity, evident especially in the Marxist
tradition, does not by any means deny the raw existence of physical or
social differences ultimately derived from biology and perhaps finally
manifested in some specific cultural forms. However, it denies the claim
that such biological or cultural formations have an independent effect,
unmediated by class formations or institutional relationships, on
politics. In fact, the epiphenominalist perspective emphatically asserts
that it is the class structures and institutionalized patterns of power in
society that are fundamental to explaining political events rather than
any biologically or culturally based social formations like "ethnicity."
To the degree that "ethnicity" in the primordialist sense plays a role, it
functions merely as a "mask" that obscures the identity of some class
formations struggling for political or economic power. Ethnicity per se
is, therefore, merely incidental appearance (ie. "epiphenomenal")" it is
not the true, generative, cause of any social phenomenon, even though it
often may appear to be.

To the degree that ethnicity appears at all, scholars who accept the
epiphenomenal approach treat it either as a strategy for mobilization on
the part of class elites forced to latch on to such means of group
identity by pressures of necessity, or especially in Marxist sociology, as
a transient from of false consciousness that will be superceded in due
time by true class consciousness. In any event, ethnicity in the
primordial sense is altogether denied the status of an "efficient cause."
It matters primarily as a "label" that identifies different groups place
in relations of cooperation, symbiosis, and conflict based on their
location amid the relations of production in a given society...


The Ascriptive Approach
------------------------

The third approach to ethnicity overcomes the limitations of both the
primordial and the Marxist perspectives while retaining the best elements
of both traditions. This approach, which can be dubbed "ascriptive' and
derives from the work of Max Weber and scholars who have followed him, is
distinguished by a view of ethnicity that is best described as real, but
constructed. Weber's discontent with the "multiple social origins and
theoretical ambiguities" of ethnicity as a concept has been alluded to
earlier, but despite his arguments about the "disutility of the notion of
the "ethnic group", he defined the latter carefully enough to make a
productive analysis possible. Ethnic groups, according to Weber, are:

Those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their
common descent because of similarities of physical type or of
customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and
migration. This belief must be important for the propagation of
group formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not
an objective blood relationship exists.

The key distinguishing mark of ethnicity in this reading is the notion of
"subjective belief", that is, the animating conviction held by members of
a group that they do enjoy a common ancestry and hence are bound together
by some ineffable tie that in truth may be wholly fictitious. Thanks to
this belief, "ethnic membership differs from the kinship group precisely
by being a presumed identity". This insistence on presumed identity as
the structuring principle of ethnic unity does not imply, however , any
particular consequences for social and political action. In fact, Weber
insistently argues that "ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it
only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the
political sphere."

Weber's general approach consists of of the affirmation that ethnic
groupings can exist as a result of certain mythical intersubjective
beliefs held by a collectivity, but their mere existence does not have any
necessary consequences for social action. To the degree that the latter
phenomenon needs to be explained, the explanations must be found
elsewhere. Through such a "constructivist" approach Weber manages to
solve the vexing problem afflicting both the primordialist and
epiphenominalist traditions in that he suggest how "ethnicity" can be
treated as a causative variable without allowing it to dominate the
explanatory space. The primordialist asks for too much, while the
epiphenominalist gives away too little. The former treats ethnicity as a
self-evident fact that automatically explains all manner of collective
action; in contrast the latter treats ethnicity as merely an accidental
appearance that can be readily and completely discarded in favor of more
consequential, though hidden, social forces.


UNQUOTE


I find these classifications very useful indeed first in order to assist
in placing one's self in this ethnic firmament called Nigeria; secondly in
order to judge the critics of ethnic nationalism in Nigeria (some of who,
though not Marxist, dismiss ethnicism as epiphenomenalist trite), and
finally in order to begin to understand ethnic group dynamics and conflict
in Nigeria and elsewhere. It is fair, for example, to expect that those
people in Nigeria with little or no contact with other ethnic groups are
most likely to be "primordialists", and would be too easily dismissed by
so-called "enlightened" and/or "principled" critics as "primitive."
Epiphenominalist ethnicists would be dismissed as opportunistic by these same
critics, while those in support of the ascriptive approach would be
described with an air of disappointment as "enlightened persons who should
know better; closet opportunists with a hidden agenda!" A government
bent on homogenizing its people and making a country out of many ethnic
nations might dismiss all types of ethnicists as undesirable, and hence
seek to crush them. Such an attempt might then lead to ethnic-state conflict.


Ethnic Conflict and the State
-----------------------------

When one mobilizing ethnic group "jams" another, or more accurately,
intersects with state power, what happens, according to Tellis, Szayna and
Winnefield, depends on:

(1) the manner (eg primordialist, epiphenominal or ascriptive) and quality
of each group's leadership (strong or weak), resources (man, financial and
material; good or weak) available to it and popular support (broad or
weak), each of which property might be independent of each other. The
particular mix of qualities will then determine the internal capacity of
the group (binarily high or low in each category) to be:

(i) accommodative in its goals to the other competing social
formations, especially the state;

(ii) sustaining in its political campaigns as it attempts to redress
its grievances; and

(iii) cohesive in maintaining group identity in the process of pursuing
its aims.

(2) the quality of the state's leadership (strong or weak; whether
confident, risk-taking and visionary), fiscal health (strong or weak) and
the regime type (exclusive or inclusive with regard to decision-making
processes and censorship), again each of which might be independent
of each other. The particular mix of qualities will then determine the
state's internal (high or low) capacity to be:

(i) accomodative of groups' demands;

(ii) sustaining of its own ability to maintain its political
preferences in competition with other groups; and

(iii) coercive as it tries to force opponents into compliance.


The upshot of all of this, according to the authors, is that

(1) for THE GROUP, the propensity for violence decreases in the
following order:

G1: Strong leadership, weak resources, weak popular support;
G2: Strong leadership, good resources, weak popular support;
G3: Weak leadership, Good resources, weak popular support;
G4: Weak leadership, weak resources, weak popular support;
G5: Weak leadership, good resources, broad popular support;
G6: Strong leadership, weak resources, broad popular support;
G7: Strong leadership, good resources, broad popular support;
G8: Weak leadership, weak resources, broad popular support;


(2) for THE STATE, the propensity for violence decreases in the following
order:

S1: Weak leadership, weak fiscal position, exclusive regime;
S2: Strong leadershhip, strong fiscal position, exclusive regime;
S3: Strong leadership, weak fiscal position, exclusive regime;
S4: Weak leadership, strong fiscal position, exclusive regime;
S5: Weak leadership, weak fiscal position, inclusive regime;
S6: Strong leadership, strong fiscal position, inclusive regime;
S7: Strong leadership, weak fiscal position, inclusive regime;
S8: Weak leadership, strong fiscal position, inclusive regime.

If for example G1 confronts S1, the propensity for state-group conflict is
much higher than if G8 collides with S8. More generally,

(1) a strong ethnic group leadership faced with a strong state leadership
will have a preference for negotiation with an inclusive regime;

(2) A strong group leadership faced with a weak state leadership usually
will have a preference to exploit or in with weak popular support
confronting an exclusive regime has a good chance of state- group
conflict, particularly if both have strong leadership. On the other hand,
an ethnic group with broad popular support would be more willing to
negotiate than be violent with an inclusive regime.

And so on.

Although these models sound theoretical, and are more applicable when the
state rather than a neighboring ethnic group is the target of ethnic
strife, I believe that they provide a credible spring-board to attempt to
prevent ethnic conflicts and to give an insight into resolving them when
they occur. For example, attempts by the STATE to destroy ethnic group
leadership and solidarity through UNDEMOCRATIC means in order to prevent
INTER-ETHNIC strife is bound to bring ethnic groups in conflict with the
state, and could merely exercerbate the situation rather than solve the
problem.


Ethno-Politics of Nigeria
-------------------------

What does all the above mean for the current state of Nigeria?

1. The first issue is to observe that there are all kinds of "ethnicists"
in Nigeria depending on the various socio-economic levels of the masses
and their leaders (sometimes derisively referred to as "identity
enterpreneurs"), and that ethnicism, as a global phenomenon, cannot be
wished away. The need for an inclusive (democratic) regime is very clear, but
the paradox of then strengthening ethnic leadership as a way of reducing the
prospects of conflicts should be addressed.

2. Secondly, the six distinctive characteristics of Nigeria's ethnic
divisions outlined earlier makes the above observation even more
compelling, and also indicate the limitations of intentional
interventions. However, they also hint at some of the steps required to
anticipate and reduce the conflicts.

3. Finally, and most importantly, issues of individual bill of rights,
which must include inviolable residency rights; local determination of
chieftaincy issues; devolution of power to lower tiers of government with
respect to resource control; the establishment of a truly secular
constitution without denying citizens their rights to worship according to
their religion; are all parts of what a truly INCLUSIVE democratic regime
must facilitate.


How Shall We Resolve?
----------------------

For quite some time now, various politicians and commentators have called
for a Sovereign National Conference - with a prelude of a Conference of
Ethnic Nationalities - to begin to resolve the multifarious problems
facing Nigeria. One of the major hurdles that would be cleared would be
how to choose from the various ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Let us address this important issue quickly.

The fact of the matter is that the three most populous groups
(Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo) contribute almost 60% of the population,
the ten most populous ethnic groups comprise about 80%, the next ten
contribute another 10-15%, while another ten would make up a further 4-5%.
Thus a Conference of Ethnic Nationalities of 30 of the most populous
ethnic groups would account for about 95-99% of Nigerians (see list in
Table 2), not a bad number as numerical democracy goes. The horrid specter
of representatives of all 374 ethnic groups bargaining in some
smoke-filled room of therefore a red herring.

It is conceivable that in each state, the most populous ethnic groups in
each local government and/or state can first have their own mini-
conference, bubbling up to the National Conference of Conferences where
the first ten most populous ethnic groups in the nation would be allotted
(say) 25 members each, the next ten 16 members each and the last ten 9
members each. Other modes of agreement and consensus reaching could be
worked out.

One would hope that reason would soon prevail, and that such a Sovereign
National Conference would be convened soon.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------

APPENDIX
--------



TABLE 1: STATE-BY-STATE DISTRIBUTION OF NIGERIA'S 374 ETHNIC GROUPS
-------------------------------------------------------------------

[Adapted from Table 1.1.1 of "Nigeria: Giant in the Tropics, Vol. 1",
1993, I.A. Adalemo and J.M. Baba, Editors; Gabumo Publishing Ltd.]


In the following table, states are shown in their respective political
zone, with the number of DISTINCT ethnic groups in the particular zone in
angular brackets < >. The name of a given state is followed [in curly brackets
{ }] by the number of ethnic groups that have been identified therein, and then
the names of the ethnic groups. The alternative names of such ethnic groups are
in circular brackets ( ), while the states which share the presence of such
ethnic groups are in square brackets [ ]. Such square brackets with two
dots [..] mean that common states sharing the indicated ethnic group have
already been named for the same political zone.


SOUTH-WEST ZONE < 5 >
---------------------

Ekiti {1} - Yoruba [LAGOS, OGUN, ONDO, OSUN, OYO, KWARA, KOGI]

Lagos {3} - Yoruba [..], Awori [OGUN], Egun (Gu) [OGUN]

Ogun {3} - Yoruba [..], Awori [..], Egun (Gu) [..],

Ondo {3} - Yoruba [..], Izon (Ijo, Ijaw) [DELTA, RIVERS, BAYELSA], Ebirra
(Igbirra) [KOGI, EDO]

Osun {1} - Yoruba [..]

Oyo {1} - Yoruba [..]


SOUTH-EAST ZONE < 2 >
----------------------

Abia {1} - Igbo [ANAMBRA, ENUGU, EBONYI, IMO, DELTA, RIVERS, BENUE]

Anambra {1} - Igbo [..]

Enugu {1} - Igbo [..]

Ebonyi {2} - Igbo [..], Mbembe [CROSS-RIVER]

Imo {1} - Igbo [..]


SOUTH-SOUTH ZONE < 61 >
-----------------------

Akwa-Ibom {7} - Ibibio, Anang, Andoni [RIVERS], Eket, Ibino, Okobo
(Okkobor), Oron

Cross River {29} - Abayon, Adim, Adun, Agbo, Akaju-Ndem (Akajuk), Anyima,
Bachere, Bahumono, Bette, Bekwarra, Boki (Nki), Efik, Ejagham,, Ekajuk,
Ekoi, Etung, Ikom, Iyala (Iyalla), Mbembe (EBONYI), Mbube, Nkim, Nkum,
Ododop, Olulumo, Qua, Ukelle, Uyanga, Yache, Yakurr (Yako)

Delta {6} - Igbo [ABIA, ANAMBRA, ENUGU, EBONYI, IMO, RIVERS, BENUE],
Isoko, Itsekiri, Izon (Ijo, Ijaw) [ONDO, RIVERS, BAYELSA], Ukwani (Kwale),
Urhobo

Edo {9} - Bini, Ebirra (Igbirra) [EKITI, PLATEAU, KOGI], Ebu [KOGI], Isan
(Ishan), Etsako, Etuno, Okpamheri, Owan, Uneme (Ineme)

Rivers {10} - Etche, Gokana (Kana), Igbo [..],Andoni [AKWA-IBOM],
Abua (Odual), Degema, Ebana (Ebani), Egbema, Engenni (Ngeni), Epie

Bayelsa {1} - Izon (Ijo, Ijaw) [..]


NORTH-EAST ZONE < 152 >
-----------------------

Adamawa {59} - Babur [BORNO, YOBE, TARABA], Bachama, Baya, Banso
(Panso), Batta, Bette, Bilei, Bille, Bollere, Bura, Bwatiye,
Bwazza, Daba, Daka, Falli, Ga'anda, Gira, Gizigz, Gombi, Gude, Gudu,
Gwamba, Higi (Higgi) [BORNO], Holma, Hona, Ichen, Jibu, Jirai,
Kaka, Kambu, Kanakuru (Dera) [BORNO], Kanuri [BORNO, KANO, NIGER,
TARABA, YOBE, PLATEAU, JIGAWA], Kilba, Kurdul, Lakka, Lala, Libbo,
Longuda (Lunguda) [BAUCHI], Mambilla, Margi (Marghi) [BORNO],
Matakam, Mbol, Mbula, Muchalla, Mundang, Ngweshe (Ndhang, Ngoshe-
Ndang) [BORNO], Njayi, Pire, Shuwa [BORNO], Sukur, Teme, Tigon,
Tur, Vemgo, Verre, Wagga, Wula, Wurbo, Yungur

Bauchi, Gombe {64} - Angas [PLATEAU, JIGAWA], Bambora (Bambarawa), Banka
(Bankalawa), Bara (Barawa), Barke, Bele (Buli, Belewa), Bole (Bolewa)
[YOBE], Boma (Bomawa, Burnamo), Bomboro, Buli, Burak, Buta (Butawa) Chama
(Chamawa Fitilai), Chamo, Dadiya, Daza (Dere, Derewa), Deno (Denawa),
Duguri, Duma (Dumawa), Fulani (Fulbe) [BORNO, KADUNA, KANO, JIGAWA,
NIGER, TARABA, KATSINA, SOKOTO, YOBE, KEBBI, etc.], Galambi, Geji, Gera
(Gere, Gerawa) Geruma (Gerumawa) Gingwak, Gubi (Gubawa) Guruntum, Gyem,
Hausa [ BORNO, KADUNA, KANO, KEBBI, NIGERI, TARABA, KATSINA, SOKOTO,
JIGAWA, etc.], Jaku, Jara (Jaar Jarawa, Jarawa-Dutse), Jere (Jare, Jera,
Jerawa) [ PLATEAU], Jimbin (Jimbinawa), Jukun [Benue, Taraba, Plateau],
Kamo, Karekare (Karaikarai) [YOBE], Kariya, Kirfi (Kirfawa), Kubi
(Kubawa), Kudachano (Kudawa) Kushi, Kwami (Kwom), Kwanka (Kwankwa)
[PLATEAU], Limono [PLATEAU], Longuda (Lunguda) [ADAMAWA], Miya (Miyawa),
Ngamo [YOBE], Ningi (Nigawa), Pa'a (Pa'awa Afawa), Pero, Polchi Habe,
Rebina (Rebinawa), Sanga, Saya (Sayawa Za'ar), Segidi (Sigidawa), Siri
(Sirawa), Tangale, Tera (Terawa) [BORNO], Tula, Waja, Warji, Zaranda,
Zayam (Zeem), Zul (Zulawa)

Borno {19} - Babur [ADAMAWA, YOBE, TARABA], Buduma [NIGER], Chinine,
Dghwede, Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Gamergu-Mulgwa, Gavako, Gwoza (Waha), Hausa
[..], Higi (Higgi) [ADAMAWA], Kanakuru (Dera) [ADAMAWA], Kanembu, Kanuri
[..], Mandara (Wandala), Margi (Marghi) [ ADAMAWA], Mobber, Ngweshe
(Ndhang, Ngoshe-Ndang) [ADAMAWA], Shuwa [ADAMAWA], Tera (Terawa) [BAUCHI]

Jigawa {7} - Angas [BAUCHI, PLATEAU], Auyoka (Auyokawa), Fulani (Fulbe)
[..], Hausa [..], Kanuri [..], Kurama [KADUNA, PLATEAU, NIGER], Warja

Yobe {11} - Affade, Babur [BORNO, TARABA, ADAMAWA], Bade, Buru, Chibok
(Chibbak), Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Kanuri [..], Karekare (Karaikara)
[BAUCHI], Manga (Mangawa), Ngamo [BAUCHI], Ngizim,


NORTH-WEST ZONE < 45 >
----------------------

Kaduna {31} - Atakkar (Ataka), Ayu, Bassa [KOGI, PLATEAU, NIGER], Bina
(Binawa), Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Gure, Gwandara [NIGER, PLATEAU], Gwari
[NIGER, PLATEAU], Hausa [..], Jaba, Kadara [NIGER], Kafanchan, Kaje
(Kache), Kajuru (Kajurawa), Kamaku (Kamukawa) [NIGER, KEBBI], Kanikan,
Kanufi, Katab (Kataf), Kiballo (Kiwollo), Koro (Kwaro) [NIGER], Kurama
[PLATEAU, JIGAWA, NIGER], Mada [PLATEAU], Manchok, Moruwa (Moro'a, Morwa)
Ninzam (Ninzo) [PLATEAU], Nunku [PLATEAU], Rishuwa, Rumada, Rumaya, Srubu
(Surubu), Uncinda [NIGER, SOKOTO, KEBBI]

Kano {5} - Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Hausa [..], Kanuri [..], Shira [Shirawa],
Teshena (Teshenawa)

Katsina {2} - Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Hausa [..]

Kebbi {11} - Achipa (Achipawa), Dakarkari [NIGER], Danda (Dandawa), Duka
(Dukawa), Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Hausa [..], Kamaku (Kamukawa) [KADUNA,
NIGER], Kambari [NIGER], Reshe [NIGER], Uncinda [KADUNA, NIGER, SOKOTO],
Zarma (Zarmawa)

Sokoto, Zamfara {5} - Fulani (Fulbe) [..], Hausa [..] Kyenga (Kengawa),
Shanga (Shangawa), Uncinda [KADUNA, NIGER, KEBBI]



NORTH-CENTRAL (OR MIDDLE-BELT) ZONE < 163 >
-------------------------------------------

Benue {10} - Akweya-Yachi, Egede (Igedde), Etolu (Etilo), Idoma (TARABA),
Igbo [..], Jukun [ BAUCHI, TARABA, PLATEAU], Tiv [PLATEAU, TARABA], Ufia,
Utonkong, Yalla

Kogi {7} - Bassa [KADUNA, PLATEAU, NIGER], Bunu, Ebirra (Igbirra) [ONDO,
PLATEAU, EDO], Ebu [EDO], Gbedde, Igalla, Ijumu

Kwara {5} - Yoruba [LAGOS, OGUN, OSUN, ONDO, EKITI, OYO, KOGI], Ogori,
Owe, Oworro, Yagba

Niger {26} - Baruba (Barba), Bassa [..], Baushi, Boko (Bussawa, Bargawa),
Buduma [BORNO], Darkarkari [KEBBI], Fulani [..], Gade, Gurmana, Gwandara
[KADUNA, PLATEAU], Gwari (Gbari) [KADUNA, PLATEAU], Hausa [..], Kadara
[KADUNA], Kamaku [Kamukawa) [ KADUNA, KEBBI], Kambari [KEBBI], Kanuri
[..], Koro (Kwaro) [KADUNA], Kurama [KADUNA, PLATEAU, JIGAWA], Laaru
(Larawa), Lopa (Lupa, Lopawa), Nupe, Pongu (Pongu), Reshe [KEBBI], Rubu,
Uncinda [KADUNA, SOKOTO, KEBBI], Ura (Ula), Yumu, Zabara

Plateau, Nassarawa {67} - Afizere, Afo, Alago (Arago), Amo, Angas [BAUCHI,
JIGAWA], Ankwei, Bada, Bashiri (Bashirawa), Bassa [KADUNA, KOGI, NIGER],
Birom, Bikkos, Buji, Burma (Burmawa) , Bwali, Challa, Chip, Chokobo,
Doemak (Dumuk), Ebirra (Igbirra) [EKITI, KOGI, EDO], Eggon, Fyam (Fyem),
Fyer (Fer), Ganawuri, Gerka (Gerkawa), Goemai, Gusu, Gwandara [KADUNA,
NIGER], Gwari (Gbari) [KADUNA, NIGER], Irigwe, Jere (Jare, Jera, Jerawa)
[BAUCHI], Jidda- Abu, Jukun [BAUCHI, BENUE, TARABA], Katana, Kenem
(Koenoem), Kulere (Kalere), Kurama [KADUNA, JIGAWA, NIGER], Kwalla, Kwanka
(Kwankwa) [BAUCHI], Kwaro, Kwato, Limono [BAUCHI], Mabo, Mada [KADUNA],
Mama, Mernyang (Meryan), Miango, Miligili (Migili), Montol, Munga
(Mupang), Mushere, Mwahavul (Mwaghavul), Ninam (Ninzo) [KADUNA], Nokere
(Nakere), Nunku [KADUNA], Pai, Pyapun (Piapung), Rindire (Rendre), Ron,
Rukuba, Shangawa (Shangau), Shan-Shan, Sikdi, Sura, Tarok [TARABA], Tiv
[BENUE, TARABA], Yergan (Yergum), Yuom

Taraba {54} - Babur [BORNO, YOBE, ADAMAWA], Bakulung, Bali, Bambuku, Banda
(Bandawa), Bobua, Chamba, Chukkol, Dangsa, Diba, Fulani (Fulbe) [..],
Gengle, Gomun (Gmun), Gonla, Gwom, Hausa [..], Idoma [BENUE], Jahuna
(Jahunawa), Jero, Jonjo (Jenjo), Jukun [BAUCHI, BENUE, PLATEAU], Kaba
(Kabawa), Kanuri [..], Karimjo, Kenton, Koma, Kona, Kugama, Kunini, Kuteb,
Kutin, Kwanchi, Lama, Lamja, Lau, Mbum, Mumuye, Ndoro, Nyandang, Panyam,
Pkanzom, Poli, Potopo, Sakbe, Sate, Shomo, Tarok [PLATEAU], Tikar, Tiv [
BENUE, PLATEAU], Vommi, Waka, Wurkun, Yandang, Yott


--------------

TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF PERCENTAGES OF VARIOUS MOST POPULOUS ETHNIC
GROUPS IN NIGERIA*

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Ethnic Ref. 1 Ref. 2 Ref. 3 Ref. 4
Group
-------------------------------------------------------------------

Hausa 24.3 29 21.3 29.5

Fulani (a) (a) 11.2 (a)

Yoruba 23.2 21 21.3 20.3

Igbo 13.9 18 18.0 16.6

Ibibio-Efik 5.7 3.5 5.6 3.6

Kanuri 5.2 4 4.2 4.1

Tiv 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.5

Ijaw 1.6 10 1.8 2.0

Edo 1.6 .. 3.4 1.7

Urhobo 1.1 .. .. ..

Nupe 0.9 .. 1.2 1.2

Bura .. .. 1.7 ..

Others 19.8 13 8.1 18.5

----------------------------------------------------------

*Footnotes to Table 2

(a) means that the number above is for both Hausa and Fulani.

"Others" include Ebirra, Andoni, Baburs, Angas, Jukun, Bassa, Kurama,
Uncinda, Gwari, Isan, Isoko, Itsekiri, Idoma, Mbembe, Kamaku, Igalla,
Gwandara, Ebu, Birom, etc.]


Ref 1: Chief Obafemi Awolowo: "Voice of Wisdom: Selected Speeches of Chief
Obafemi Awolowo Vol. 3" (Fagbamigbe Publishers), 1981.

Ref 2: CIA WorldFactbook on Nigeria (http://www.cia.gov)

Ref 3. Erdkunde-Online http://www.erdkunde-online.de/1211.htm

Ref 4: Source: Oladimeji Aborisade and Robert J. Mundt (1999) "Politics
in Nigeria", New York: Longman Publishers. [Quoted in
http://publicpolicy.subr.edu/jsda2/Fallwinter2000/Articles/emanuel.htm]


--------------


Some Relevant News Item URLs
-----------------------------

http://sg.news.yahoo.com/010910/1/1fc5p.html
More than 6,000 dead in Nigeria since return to civilian rule
LAGOS, Sept 10, 2001 (AFP)

http://allafrica.com/stories/200110010373.html
Things Are Getting Better, Says President Obasanjo
The Guardian (Lagos) October 1, 2001

http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/September/14092001/nn9140901.htm
Spate of religious, ethnic intolerance worries Obasanjo
Vanguard, Friday, 14th September, 2001

http://allafrica.com/stories/200109200400.html
Rage, Riot, Ruin in Jos
A combustible mix of political, ethnic and religions passions,
renders Jos, capital of Plateau State, a suburb of hell after three
days of violent riots. Reports by AKINJIDE AKINTOLA

http://allafrica.com/stories/200109240331.html
Jos Crisis: Dariye Refutes Allegation, Sets Up Inquiry Committee
Daily Trust (Abuja) September 24, 2001

http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/99aug1/4aug-nigeria.html
Ethnic violence threatens Nigeria's new democracy
Johannesburg, South Africa. August 4, 1999

http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/august99/18_31_077.html
POLITICS-NIGERIA: President Appeals For An End To Ethnic Violence
Aug 10 (IPS)

http://www.janes.com/regional_news/africa_middle_east/news/jir/jir0002
23_1_n.shtml
Ethnic violence threatens Nigeria's nascent democracy; Janes Defence
Review February 23, 2000

http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ACR/ACR00/ACR00-Nigeria.html
ARMED CONFLICTS REPORT 2000 (Project Ploughshares)

http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/africa/nigeria.html
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001: Nigeria:

http://www.vanguardngr.com/news/articles/2001/june/27062001/vp227601.h
tm
Ethnic nationality crises and public relations
By J. O. S. Ayomike (Wednesday 26th June, 2001) - Vanguard

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AlukoArchives/message/31
SUNDAY MUSINGS: Organizing Our Sovereign National Conference (SNC)
Mobolaji E. Aluko, Sunday, December 12, 1999

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AlukoArchives/message/32
SATURDAY ESSAYS: On the SNC - Again - Re-Venezuela and Zimbabwe
Mobolaji E. Aluko, December 18, 1999

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/AlukoArchives/message/52
SATURDAY ESSAYS: How Many Nigerians Are There Today? 58.4 Million, I Dare Say!
Mobolaji E. Aluko, March 27, 1999


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