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From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:49 am
Subject: Monetary Damages Awarded for Breach of Privacy Act

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Doe v. Chao
U.S. Sup. Ct.
02-24-2004
Justice Souter
02-1377

540 U. S. ____ (2004) The United States is subject to a cause of action for the benefit of at least some individuals adversely affected by a federal agency's violation of the Privacy Act of 1974. The question before us is whether plaintiffs must prove some actual damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award of $1,000. We hold that they must.

I.

Petitioner Buck Doe filed for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 83 Stat. 792, 30 U. S. C. §901 et seq., with the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, the division of the Department of Labor responsible for adjudicating it. The application form called for a Social Security number, which the agency then used to identify the applicant's claim, as on documents like "multicaptioned" notices of hearing dates, sent to groups of claimants, their employers, and the lawyers involved in their cases. The Government concedes that following this practice led to disclosing Doe's Social Security number beyond the limits set by the Privacy Act. See 5 U. S. C. §552a(b).

Doe joined with six other black lung claimants to sue the Department of Labor, alleging repeated violations of the Act and seeking certification of a class of " `all claimants for Black Lung Benefits since the passage of the Privacy Act.' " Pet. for Cert. 6a. Early on, the United States stipulated to an order prohibiting future publication of applicants' Social Security numbers on multicaptioned hearing notices, and the parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court denied class certification and entered judgment against all individual plaintiffs except Doe, finding that their submissions had raised no issues of cognizable harm. As to Doe, the Court accepted his uncontroverted evidence of distress on learning of the improper disclosure, granted summary judgment, and awarded $1,000 in statutory damages under 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4).

A divided panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part but reversed on Doe's claim, holding the United States entitled to summary judgment across the board. 306 F. 3d 170 (2002). The Circuit treated the $1,000 statutory minimum as available only to plaintiffs who suffered actual damages because of the agency's violation, id., at 176-179, and then found that Doe had not raised a triable issue of fact about actual damages, having submitted no corroboration for his claim of emotional distress, such as evidence of physical symptoms, medical treatment, loss of income, or impact on his behavior. In fact, the only indication of emotional affliction was Doe's conclusory allegations that he was " `torn ... all to pieces' " and " `greatly concerned and worried' " because of the disclosure of his Social Security number and its potentially " `devastating' " consequences. Id., at 181.

Doe petitioned for review of the holding that some actual damages must be proven before a plaintiff may receive the minimum statutory award. See Pet. for Cert. i. Because the Fourth Circuit's decision requiring proof of actual damages conflicted with the views of other Circuits, see, e.g., Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F. 3d 1, 7-8 (CA1 2003); Wilborn v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 49 F. 3d 597, 603 (CA9 1995); Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F. 2d 870, 872 (CADC 1989); Johnson v. Department of Treasury, 700 F. 2d 971, 977, and n. 12 (CA5 1983); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 330-331 (CA11 1982), we granted certiorari. 539 U. S. ___ (2003). We now affirm.

II.

"[I]n order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary ... to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by such agencies." Privacy Act of 1974, §2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896. The Act gives agencies detailed instructions for managing their records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals aggrieved by failures on the Government's part to comply with the requirements.

Subsection (g)(1) recognizes a civil action for agency misconduct fitting within any of four categories (the fourth, in issue here, being a catchall), 5 U. S. C. §§552a(g)(1)(A)-(D), and then makes separate provision for the redress of each. The first two categories cover deficient management of records: subsection (g)(1)(A) provides for the correction of any inaccurate or otherwise improper material in a record, and subsection (g)(1)(B) provides a right of access against any agency refusing to allow an individual to inspect a record kept on him. In each instance, further provisions specify such things as the de novo nature of the suit (as distinct from any form of deferential review), §§552a(g)(2)(A), (g)(3)(A), and mechanisms for exercising judicial equity jurisdiction (by in camera inspection, for example), §552a(g)(3)(A).

The two remaining categories deal with derelictions having consequences beyond the statutory violations per se. Subsection (g)(1)(C) describes an agency's failure to maintain an adequate record on an individual, when the result is a determination "adverse" to that person. Subsection (g)(1)(D) speaks of a violation when someone suffers an "adverse effect" from any other failure to hew to the terms of the Act. Like the inspection and correction infractions, breaches of the statute with adverse consequences are addressed by specific terms governing relief:

"In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of --

"(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and

"(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court." §552a(g)(4).*fn1

III.

Doe argues that subsection (g)(4)(A) entitles any plaintiff adversely affected by an intentional or willful violation to the $1,000 minimum on proof of nothing more than a statutory violation: anyone suffering an adverse consequence of intentional or willful disclosure is entitled to recovery. The Government claims the minimum guarantee goes only to victims who prove some actual damages. We think the Government has the better side of the argument.

To begin with, the Government's position is supported by a straightforward textual analysis. When the statute gets to the point of guaranteeing the $1,000 minimum, it not only has confined any eligibility to victims of adverse effects caused by intentional or willful actions, but has provided expressly for liability to such victims for "actual damages sustained." It has made specific provision, in other words, for what a victim within the limited class may recover. When the very next clause of the sentence containing the explicit provision guarantees $1,000 to a "person entitled to recovery," the simplest reading of that phrase looks back to the immediately preceding provision for recovering actual damages, which is also the Act's sole provision for recovering anything (as distinct from equitable relief). With such an obvious referent for "person entitled to recovery" in the plaintiff who sustains "actual damages," Doe's theory is immediately questionable in ignoring the "actual damages" language so directly at hand and instead looking for "a person entitled to recovery" in a separate part of the statute devoid of any mention either of recovery or of what might be recovered.

Nor is it too strong to say that Doe does ignore statutory language. When Doe reads the statute to mean that the United States shall be liable to any adversely affected subject of an intentional or willful violation, without more, he treats willful action as the last fact necessary to make the Government "liable," and he is thus able to describe anyone to whom it is liable as entitled to the $1,000 guarantee. But this way of reading the statute simply pays no attention to the fact that the statute does not speak of liability (and consequent entitlement to recovery) in a freestanding, unqualified way, but in a limited way, by reference to enumerated damages.*fn2

Doe's manner of reading "entitle[ment] to recovery" as satisfied by adverse effect caused by intentional or willful violation is in tension with more than the text, however. It is at odds with the traditional understanding that tort recovery requires not only wrongful act plus causation reaching to the plaintiff, but proof of some harm for which damages can reasonably be assessed. See, e.g., W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts §30 (5th ed. 1984). Doe, instead, identifies a person as entitled to recover without any reference to proof of damages, actual or otherwise. Doe might respond that it makes sense to speak of a privacy tort victim as entitled to recover without reference to damages because analogous common law would not require him to show particular items of injury in order to receive a dollar recovery. Traditionally, the common law has provided such victims with a claim for "general" damages, which for privacy and defamation torts are presumed damages: a monetary award calculated without reference to specific harm.*fn3

Such a rejoinder would not pass muster under the Privacy Act, however, because a provision of the Act not previously mentioned indicates beyond serious doubt that general damages are not authorized for a statutory violation. An uncodified section of the Act established a Privacy Protection Study Commission, which was charged, among its other jobs, to consider "whether the Federal Government should be liable for general damages incurred by an individual as the result of a willful or intentional violation of the provisions of sections 552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) of title 5."*fn4 §5(c)(2)(B)(iii), 88 Stat. 1907. Congress left the question of general damages, that is, for another day. Because presumed damages are therefore clearly unavailable, we have no business treating just any adversely affected victim of an intentional or willful violation as entitled to recovery, without something more.

This inference from the terms of the Commission's mandate is underscored by drafting history showing that Congress cut out the very language in the bill that would have authorized any presumed damages.*fn5 The Senate bill would have authorized an award of "actual and general damages sustained by any person," with that language followed by the guarantee that "in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000." S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., §303(c)(1) (1974). Although the provision for general damages would have covered presumed damages, see n. 3, supra, this language was trimmed from the final statute, subject to any later revision that might be recommended by the Commission. The deletion of "general damages" from the bill is fairly seen, then, as a deliberate elimination of any possibility of imputing harm and awarding presumed damages.*fn6 The deletion thus precludes any hope of a sound interpretation of entitlement to recovery without reference to actual damages.*fn7

Finally, Doe's reading is open to the objection that no purpose is served by conditioning the guarantee on a person's being entitled to recovery. As Doe treats the text, Congress could have accomplished its object simply by providing that the Government would be liable to the individual for actual damages "but in no case ... less than the sum of $1,000" plus fees and costs. Doe's reading leaves the reference to entitlement to recovery with no job to do, and it accordingly accomplishes nothing.*fn8

IV.

There are three loose ends. Doe's argument suggests it would have been illogical for Congress to create a cause of action for anyone who suffers an adverse effect from intentional or willful agency action, then deny recovery without actual damages. But this objection assumes that the language in subsection (g)(1)(D) recognizing a federal "civil action" on the part of someone adversely affected was meant, without more, to provide a complete cause of action, and of course this is not so. A subsequent provision requires proof of intent or willfulness in addition to adverse effect, and if the specific state of mind must be proven additionally, it is equally consistent with logic to require some actual damages as well. Nor does our view deprive the language recognizing a civil action by an adversely affected person of any independent effect, for it may readily be understood as having a limited but specific function: the reference in §552a(g)(1)(D) to "adverse effect" acts as a term of art identifying a potential plaintiff who satisfies the injury-in-fact and causation requirements of Article III standing, and who may consequently bring a civil action without suffering dismissal for want of standing to sue. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U. S. 122, 126 (1995) ("The phrase `person adversely affected or aggrieved' is a term of art used in many statutes to designate those who have standing to challenge or appeal an agency decision, within the agency or before the courts"); see also 5 U. S. C. §702 (providing review of agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act to individuals who have been "adversely affected or aggrieved"). That is, an individual subjected to an adverse effect has injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more has no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act.*fn9

Next, Doe also suggests there is something peculiar in offering some guaranteed damages, as a form of presumed damages not requiring proof of amount, only to those plaintiffs who can demonstrate actual damages. But this approach parallels another remedial scheme that the drafters of the Privacy Act would probably have known about. At common law, certain defamation torts were redressed by general damages but only when a plaintiff first proved some "special harm," i.e., "harm of a material and generally of a pecuniary nature." 3 Restatement of Torts §575, Comments a and b (1938) (discussing defamation torts that are "not actionable per se"); see also 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts §575, Comments a and b (1976) (same). Plaintiffs claiming such torts could recover presumed damages only if they could demonstrate some actual, quantifiable pecuniary loss. Because the recovery of presumed damages in these cases was supplemental to compensation for specific harm, it was hardly unprecedented for Congress to make a guaranteed minimum contingent upon some showing of actual damages, thereby avoiding giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than "abstract injuries," Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95, 101-102 (1983).*fn10

In a final effort to save his claim, Doe points to a pair of statutes with remedial provisions that are worded similarly to §552a(g)(4). See Tax Reform Act of 1976, §1201(i)(2)(A), 90 Stat. 1665-1666, 26 U. S. C. §6110(j)(2)(A); §1202(e)(1), 90 Stat. 1687, 26 U. S. C. §7217(c) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1982); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, §201, 100 Stat. 1866, 18 U. S. C. §2707(c). He contends that legislative history of these subsequent enactments shows that Congress sometimes used language similar to 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(4) with the object of authorizing true liquidated damages remedies. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-938, p. 348 (1976) (discussing §1202(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act); S. Rep. No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986) (discussing §201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act). There are two problems with this argument. First, as to §1201(i)(2)(A) of the Tax Reform Act, the text is too far different from the language of the Privacy Act to serve as any sound basis for analogy; it does not include the critical limiting phrase "entitled to recovery." But even as to §1202(e)(1) of the Tax Reform Act and §201 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the trouble with Doe's position is its reliance on the legislative histories of completely separate statutes passed well after the Privacy Act. Those of us who look to legislative history have been wary about expecting to find reliable interpretive help outside the record of the statute being construed, and we have said repeatedly that " `subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior to its enactment,' " Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U. S. 159, 170, n. 5 (2001) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U. S. 102, 118, n. 13 (1980)).*fn11

V.

The "entitle[ment] to recovery" necessary to qualify for the $1,000 minimum is not shown merely by an intentional or willful violation of the Act producing some adverse effect. The statute guarantees $1,000 only to plaintiffs who have suffered some actual damages.*fn12 The judgment of the Fourth Circuit is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Ginsburg, J., dissenting

Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

In this Privacy Act suit brought under 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(1)(D), the Government concedes the alleged violation and does not challenge the District Court's finding that the agency in question (the Department of Labor) acted in an intentional or willful manner. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35; Brief for Respondent (I). Nor does the Government here contest that Buck Doe, the only petitioner before us, suffered an "adverse effect" from the Privacy Act violation. The case therefore cleanly presents a sole issue for this Court's resolution: Does a claimant who has suffered an "adverse effect" -- in this case and typically, emotional anguish -- from a federal agency's intentional or willful Privacy Act violation, but has proved no "actual damages" beyond psychological harm, qualify as "a person entitled to recovery" within the meaning of §552a(g)(4)(A)? In accord with Circuit Judge Michael, who disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's majority on the need to show actual damages, I would answer that question yes.

Section 552a(g)(4)(A) affords a remedy for violation of a Privacy Act right safeguarded by §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D). The words "a person entitled to recovery," as used in §552a(g)(4)(A)'s remedial prescription, are most sensibly read to include anyone experiencing an "adverse effect" as a consequence of an agency's intentional or willful commission of a Privacy Act violation of the kind described in §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D). The Act's text, structure, and purpose warrant this construction, under which Doe need not show a current pecuniary loss, or "actual damages" of some other sort, to recover the minimum award of $1,000, attorney's fees, and costs.

I.

Section 552a(g)(4) provides:

"In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of --

"(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and

"(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court."

The opening clause of §552a(g)(4) prescribes two conditions on which liability depends. First, the claimant's suit must lie under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D); both provisions require an agency action "adverse" to the claimant. Section 552a(g)(1)(C) authorizes a civil action when an agency "fails to maintain [a] record concerning [an] individual with [the] accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness" needed to determine fairly "the qualifications, character, rights, or opportunities of, or benefits to the individual," if the agency's lapse yields a "determination ... adverse to the individual." (Emphasis added.) Section 552a(g)(1)(D) allows a civil action when an agency "fails to comply with [a] provision of [§552a], or [a] rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an individual." (Emphasis added.) Second, the agency action triggering the suit under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) must have been "intentional or willful." §552a(g)(4). If those two liability-determining conditions are satisfied (suit under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D); intentional or willful conduct), the next clause specifies the consequences: "[T]he United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of" the recovery allowed under §552a(g)(4)(A) and the costs and fees determined under §552a(g)(4)(B).

The terms "actual damages" and "person entitled to recovery" appear only in the text describing the relief attendant upon the agency's statutory dereliction; they do not appear in the preceding text describing the conditions on which the agency's liability turns. Most reasonably read, §552a(g)(4)(A) does not wend back to add "actual damages" as a third liability-determining element. See Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U. S. 803, 809 (1989) ("It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.").

Nor, when Congress used different words, here "actual damages sustained by the individual" and "a person entitled to recovery," should a court ordinarily equate the two phrases. Had Congress intended the meaning that the Government urged upon this Court, one might have expected the statutory instruction to read, not as it does: "actual damages ... but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than ... $1,000." Instead, Congress more rationally would have written: "actual damages ... but in no case shall a person who proves such damages [in any amount] receive less than $1,000." Cf. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U. S. 438, 454 (2002) (" `We refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.' " (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23 (1983))). Just as the words "person entitled to recovery" suggest greater breadth than "individual [who has sustained] actual damages," so the term "recovery" ordinarily encompasses more than " `get[ting] or win[ning] back,' " Brief for Respondent 26 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1898 (1966)). "Recovery" generally embraces "[t]he obtaining of a right to something (esp. damages) by a judgment or decree" and "[a]n amount awarded in or collected from a judgment or decree." Black's Law Dictionary 1280 (7th ed. 1999). So comprehended, "recovery" here would yield a claimant who suffers an "adverse effect" from an agency's intentional or willful §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) violation a minimum of $1,000 plus costs and attorney's fees, whether or not the claimant proves "actual damages."

"It is `a cardinal principle of statutory construction' that `a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.' " TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U. S. 167, 174 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court's reading of §552a(g)(4) is hardly in full harmony with that principle. Under the Court's construction, the words "a person entitled to recovery" have no office, see ante, at 8-9, n. 8, and the liability-determining element "adverse effect" becomes superfluous, swallowed up by the "actual damages" requirement.*fn13 Further, the Court's interpretation renders the word "recovery" nothing more than a synonym for "actual damages," and it turns the phrase "shall be liable" into "may be liable." In part because it fails to " `give effect ... to every clause and word' " Congress wrote, United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152 (1883)), the Court's reading of §552a(g)(4) is at odds with the interpretation prevailing in the Federal Circuits.

I would adhere to the interpretation of the key statutory terms advanced by most courts of appeals. As interpreted by those courts, §552a(g)(4) authorizes a minimum $1,000 award that need not be hinged to proof of actual damages. See Orekoya v. Mooney, 330 F. 3d 1, 5 (CA1 2003) (§552a(g)(4) makes available "[b]oth `actual damages sustained by the individual' and statutory minimum damages of $1,000"); Wilborn v. Department of Health and Human Servs., 49 F. 3d 597, 603 (CA9 1995) ("statutory minimum of $1,000" under §552a(g)(4)(A) meant to provide plaintiffs "with `no provable damages' the incentive to sue" (quoting Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F. 2d 327, 330 (CA11 1982))); Waters v. Thornburgh, 888 F. 2d 870, 872 (CADC 1989) (If a plaintiff establishes that she suffered an "adverse effect" from an "intentional or willful" violation of §552a(e)(2), "the plaintiff is entitled to the greater of $1,000 or the actual damages sustained." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Department of Treasury, IRS, 700 F. 2d 971, 977, and n. 12 (CA5 1983) (Even without proof of actual damages, "[t]he statutory minimum of $1,000 [under §552a(g)(4)(A)], of course, is recoverable."); Fitzpatrick, 665 F. 2d, at 331 ("Because [the plaintiff] proved only that he suffered a general mental injury from the disclosure, he could not recover beyond the statutory $1,000 minimum damages, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees [under §552a(g)(4)]."); cf. Quinn v. Stone, 978 F. 2d 126, 131 (CA3 1992) ("adverse effect" but not "actual damages" is a "necessary" element "to maintain a suit for damages under the catch-all provision of 5 U. S. C. §552a(g)(1)(D)" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parks v. IRS, 618 F. 2d 677, 680, 683 (CA10 1980) (plaintiffs seeking "the award of a minimum of $1,000 damages together with attorney's fees" under §552a(g)(4) state a claim by alleging the agency acted intentionally or willfully when it illegally disclosed protected information, causing "psychological damage or harm"). But see Hudson v. Reno, 130 F. 3d 1193, 1207 (CA6 1997) ("A final basis for affirming the District Court's decision with respect to [the plaintiff]'s claims under the Privacy Act is her failure to show `actual damages,' as required by [§552a(g)(4)]."), overruled in part on other grounds, Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U. S. 843 (2001); Molerio v. FBI, 749 F. 2d 815, 826 (CADC 1984) ("This cause of action under [§§552a(g)(1)(C) and (g)(4)(A)] requires, however, not merely an intentional or willful failure to maintain accurate records, but also `actual damages sustained' as a result of such failure.").

The view prevailing in the Federal Circuits is in sync with an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) interpretation of the Privacy Act published in 1975, the year following the Act's adoption. Congress instructed OMB to "develop guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing the provisions of [the Privacy Act]." §6, 88 Stat. 1909. Just over six months after the Act's adoption, OMB promulgated Privacy Act Guidelines. 40 Fed. Reg. 28949 (1975). The Guidelines speak directly to the issue presented in this case. They interpret §§552a(g)(1)(C), (D), and (g)(4) to convey:

"When the court finds that an agency has acted willfully or intentionally in violation of the Act in such a manner as to have an adverse effect upon the individual, the United States will be required to pay

"Actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater

"Court costs and attorney fees." Id., at 28970.

The Guidelines have been amended several times since 1975, but OMB's published interpretation of §552a(g)(4) has remained unchanged. See id., at 56741; 44 Fed. Reg. 23138 (1979); 47 Fed. Reg. 21656 (1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 15556 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 12338 (1984); 50 Fed. Reg. 52738 (1985); 52 Fed. Reg. 12990 (1987); 54 Fed. Reg. 25821 (1989); 58 Fed. Reg. 36075 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 37914 (1994); 61 Fed. Reg. 6435 (1996).*fn14

II.

The purpose and legislative history of the Privacy Act, as well as similarly designed statutes, are in harmony with the reading of §552a(g)(4) most federal judges have found sound. Congress sought to afford recovery for "any damages" resulting from the "willful or intentional" violation of "any individual's rights under th[e] Act." §2(b)(6), 88 Stat. 1896 (emphasis added). Privacy Act violations commonly cause fear, anxiety, or other emotional distress -- in the Act's parlance, "adverse effects." Harm of this character must, of course, be proved genuine.*fn15 In cases like Doe's, emotional distress is generally the only harm the claimant suffers, e.g., the identity theft apprehended never materializes.*fn16

It bears emphasis that the Privacy Act does not authorize injunctive relief when suit is maintained under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D). Injunctive relief, and attendant counsel fees and costs, are available under the Act in two categories of cases: suits to amend a record, §552a(g)(2), and suits for access to a record, §552a(g)(3). But for cases like Doe's, brought under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D), see supra, at 2, only monetary relief is available. Hence, in the Government's view, if a plaintiff who sues under §552a(g)(1)(C) or (D) fails to prove actual damages, "he will not be entitled to attorney's fees." Brief for Respondent 39 ("[T]he Privacy Act permits an award only of `reasonable' attorney's fees. The most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award is the degree of success obtained. For a plaintiff who enjoys no success in prosecuting his claim, `the only reasonable fee' is `no fee at all.' " (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U. S. 103, 115 (1992)) (citations omitted)).

The Court's reading of §552a(g)(4) to require proof of "actual damages," however small, in order to gain the $1,000 statutory minimum, ironically, invites claimants to arrange or manufacture such damages. The following colloquy from oral argument is illustrative.

Court: "Suppose . . . Doe said, `I'm very concerned about the impact of this on my credit rating, so I'm going to [pay] $10 to a . . . credit reporting company to find out whether there's been any theft of my identity, $10.' Would there then be a claim under this statute for actual damages?"

Counsel for respondent Secretary of Labor Chao: "[T]here would be a question ... whether that was a reasonable response to the threat, but in theory, an expense like that could qualify as pecuniary harm and, thus, is actual damages." Tr. of Oral Arg. 43 (internal quotation marks added).

Indeed, the Court itself suggests that "fees associated with running a credit report" or "the charge for a Valium prescription" might suffice to prove "actual damages." Ante, at 11, n. 10. I think it dubious to insist on such readily created costs as essential to recovery under §552a(g)(4). Nevertheless, the Court's examples of what might qualify as "actual damages" indicate that its disagreement with the construction of the Act prevailing in the Circuits, see supra, at 5-6, is ethereal.

The Government, although recognizing that "actual damages" may be slender and easy to generate, fears depletion of the federal fisc were the Court to adopt Doe's reading of §552a(g)(4). Brief for Respondent 22-23, n. 5. Experience does not support those fears. As the Government candidly acknowledged at oral argument: "[W]e have not had a problem with enormous recoveries against the Government up to this point." Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. No doubt mindful th

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#29

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:44 am
Subject: Prisoner seeking 42 U.S.C. §1983 damages does not need to have first resorted to

lbe818

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Muhammad v. Close
U.S. Sup. Ct.
02-25-2004
Per curiam.
02-9065

540 U. S. ____ (2004) I.

Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U. S. C. §2254, and a complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, Rev. Stat. §1979, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 500 (1973); requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a §1983 action. Some cases are hybrids, with a prisoner seeking relief unavailable in habeas, notably damages, but on allegations that not only support a claim for recompense, but imply the invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular ground for denying release short of serving the maximum term of confinement. In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U. S. 477 (1994), we held that where success in a prisoner's §1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence. Accordingly, in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641 (1997), we applied Heck in the circumstances of a §1983 action claiming damages and equitable relief for a procedural defect in a prison's administrative process, where the administrative action taken against the plaintiff could affect credits toward release based on good-time served. In each instance, conditioning the right to bring a §1983 action on a favorable result in state litigation or federal habeas served the practical objective of preserving limitations on the availability of habeas remedies. Federal petitions for habeas corpus may be granted only after other avenues of relief have been exhausted. 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1)(A). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509 (1982). Prisoners suing under §1983, in contrast, generally face a substantially lower gate, even with the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 that administrative opportunities be exhausted first. 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a).

Heck's requirement to resort to state litigation and federal habeas before §1983 is not, however, implicated by a prisoner's challenge that threatens no consequence for his conviction or the duration of his sentence.*fn1 There is no need to preserve the habeas exhaustion rule and no impediment under Heck in such a case, of which this is an example.*fn2

II.

A.

This suit grew out of a confrontation between petitioner, Muhammad, an inmate, and the respondent Michigan prison official, Close. App. 70. According to his amended complaint, Muhammad was eating breakfast when he saw Close "staring at him through the hallway window." Id., at 71. Eventually Muhammad stared back, provoking Close to assume "a fighting stance" and "com[e] into the dining area at a fast pace with his face contorted." Ibid. Muhammad stood up and faced him, and when the two were within a foot of one another, Close asked, "whats [sic] up," all the while "staring angerly [sic]." In the aftermath of the confrontation, Muhammad was handcuffed, taken to a detention cell, and charged with violating the prison rule prohibiting "Threatening Behavior."*fn3 Under the rules, special detention was required prior to a hearing on the charge, which occurred six days later. Muhammad was acquitted of threatening behavior, but found guilty of the lesser infraction of insolence, for which prehearing detention would not have been mandatory.*fn4 Ibid. Muhammad was required to serve an additional 7 days of detention and deprived of privileges for 30 days as penalties for insolence. Ibid.

Muhammad then brought this §1983 action, alleging that Close had charged him with threatening behavior (and subjected him to mandatory prehearing lockup) in retaliation for prior lawsuits and grievance proceedings against Close. Id., at 72. He amended his original complaint after obtaining counsel, and neither in his amended complaint nor at any subsequent juncture did Muhammad challenge his conviction for insolence, or the subsequent disciplinary action. See Brief for Petitioner 42. The amended complaint sought no expungement of the misconduct finding, and in fact Muhammad conceded that the insolence determination was justified. The only relief sought was $10,000 in compensatory and punitive damages "for the physical, mental, and emotional injuries sustained" during the six days of prehearing detention mandated by the charge of threatening behavior attributable to Close's retaliatory motive. App. 72.

Following discovery, the Magistrate Judge recommended summary judgment for Close on the ground that Muhammad had failed to come forward with sufficient evidence of retaliation to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to that element. Id., at 63. The District Court adopted the recommendation. Id., at 70.

B.

Muhammad then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which, by an opinion designated not for publication, affirmed the summary judgment for Close, though not on the basis recommended by the Magistrate Judge and adopted by the District Court. 47 Fed. Appx. 738 (2002). Instead of considering the conclusion that Muhammad had produced inadequate evidence of retaliation, a ground that would have been dispositive if sustained, the Court of Appeals held the action barred by Heck because Muhammad had sought, among other relief, the expungement of the misconduct charge from the prison record. Relying upon Circuit precedent, see Huey v. Stine, 230 F. 3d 226 (2000), the Court of Appeals held that an action under §1983 to expunge his misconduct charge and for other relief occasioned by the misconduct proceedings could be brought only after satisfying Heck's favorable termination requirement. The Circuit thus maintained a split on the applicability of Heck to prison disciplinary proceedings in the absence of any implication going to the fact or duration of underlying sentence, four Circuits having taken the contrary view. See Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F. 3d 532, 542-544 (CA3 2002); DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F. 3d 607, 613 (CA7 2000); Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F. 3d 19, 27 (CA2 1999); Brown v. Plaut, 131 F. 3d 163, 167-169 (CADC 1997). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict, 539 U. S. 925 (2003), and now reverse.

III.

The decision of the Court of Appeals was flawed as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. Its factual error was the assumption that Muhammad sought to expunge the misconduct charge from his prison record. The court simply overlooked the amended complaint that sought no such relief.

The factual error was compounded by following the mistaken view expressed in Circuit precedent that Heck applies categorically to all suits challenging prison disciplinary proceedings. But these administrative determinations do not as such raise any implication about the validity of the underlying conviction, and although they may affect the duration of time to be served (by bearing on the award or revocation of good-time credits) that is not necessarily so. The effect of disciplinary proceedings on good-time credits is a matter of state law or regulation, and in this case, the Magistrate expressly found or assumed that no good-time credits were eliminated by the prehearing action Muhammad called in question. His §1983 suit challenging this action could not therefore be construed as seeking a judgment at odds with his conviction or with the State's calculation of time to be served in accordance with the underlying sentence. That is, he raised no claim on which habeas relief could have been granted on any recognized theory, with the consequence that Heck's favorable termination requirement was inapplicable.

IV.

Close tries to salvage the appellate court's judgment by arguing for the first time here that Heck is squarely on point because, if the §1983 suit succeeded, Muhammad would be entitled to restoration of some good-time credits with the result of less time to be spent in prison. Brief for Respondent 17-18. But this eleventh-hour contention was waived. The Magistrate's report stated that good-time credits were not affected by the allegedly retaliatory overcharge of threatening behavior and the consequential prehearing detention Muhammad complained of, and Close had every opportunity to challenge the Magistrate's position in the District Court and in the Court of Appeals. Having failed to raise the claim when its legal and factual premises could have been litigated, Close cannot raise it now. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452, 464 (1997).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded for consideration of summary judgment on the ground adopted by the District Court, and for any further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Opinion Footnotes

*fn1 The assumption is that the incarceration that matters under Heck is the incarceration ordered by the original judgment of conviction, not special disciplinary confinement for infraction of prison rules. This Court has never followed the speculation in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 499 (1973), that such a prisoner subject to "additional and unconstitutional restraint" might have a habeas claim independent of §1983, and the contention is not raised by the State here.

*fn2 Members of the Court have expressed the view that unavailability of habeas for other reasons may also dispense with the Heck requirement. See 512 U. S., at 491 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This case is no occasion to settle the issue.

*fn3 The Michigan Department of Corrections Policy Directive, No. 03.03.105 (June 6, 1994) (Directive) defines "Threatening Behavior" as "Words, actions or other behavior which expresses a[n] intent to injure or physically abuse another person." App. 40.

*fn4 The Directive defines "Insolence" as "Words, actions, or other behavior which is intended to harass, or cause alarm in an employee." Id., at 44.

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#28

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:33 am
Subject: Newspaper Vindicated on First Amendment Privledge to Report Assult on Judge

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Judge Trial Referee Robert C. Leuba

Image: Connecticut Law Tribune file photo

'Fair Comment' Privilege Prevails
Newspaper vindicated in coverage of assault on judge

Lisa Siegel
The Connecticut Law Tribune
03-15-2004

New London Superior Court Judge Elaine Gordon has cleared a local daily newspaper of libel claims brought by a pro se litigant upset with its coverage of her criminal proceedings, which involved an attempted assault on another judge.

Plaintiff Jancis Fuller was arrested in 1995 on charges of carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit and attempted first-degree assault against Judge Trial Referee Robert C. Leuba and his wife. Fuller was convicted of firing shots through the Leubas' bedroom window at 4:15 a.m. and sentenced to a 30-year period of incarceration.

In a Feb. 24 decision, Gordon ruled that The Day's article about Fuller's mental health and criminal proceedings was entitled to a qualified privilege of "fair comment."

Fuller's competence to stand trial and her mental health were the subject of many court hearings while the criminal charges were pending. According to The Day's attorney, Thomas W. Boyce Jr., of New London's Faulkner & Boyce, the newspaper article reported on the evidence presented in the criminal case about Fuller's mental illness and stated that she was convicted of the charges against her.

In exonerating the newspaper, its publisher, an editor and a reporter from all of Fuller's allegations with an entry of summary judgment, Gordon recognized the newspaper's First Amendment right to make "fair comment" about matters of public interest. The privilege protects against defamation liability so long as the facts on which the fair comment is made "are truly stated or privileged or otherwise known, either because the facts are of common knowledge or because ... they are readily accessible (to the reader)."

In an interview last week, Boyce said The Day held a privilege to report on the criminal proceedings against Fuller so long as the facts on which the article was based were reported accurately or available elsewhere in the public arena. Judge Gordon concluded that the newspaper article "provided a fair and accurate summary of the proceedings."

It didn't matter, Boyce added, that what was said during the criminal proceedings may have turned out to be untrue.

Fuller claimed that the article was defamatory because it reported her to be mentally ill and convicted of a violent crime. She submitted papers in the defamation case in an attempt to prove that she was neither mentally ill or dangerous.

But the only issue in the libel suit was whether The Day accurately reported the proceedings.

In addition, Boyce said, due to the sensational nature of the case, there were also many other articles written about the criminal proceedings at the time The Day story appeared. The Day only reported that which had already been made known.

Judge Gordon found no basis for Fuller's assertion that The Day lost its privilege by publishing the article with knowledge of, or reckless disregard of, its falsity.

The Day, Fuller alleged, should have known that she is not a mentally ill and dangerous person.

But as a "limited public figure" who "voluntarily injected herself into the limelight by committing a crime," the burden was on Fuller to prove the newspaper's malice by clear and convincing evidence, Gordon ruled.

Boyce said didn't know yet whether Fuller would appeal Gordon's decision. Fuller could not be reached for comment.

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#27

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:29 am
Subject: Laptop Computer Restricted by Judge in CT Divorce Case

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Lockdown Ordered for Laptop

Thomas B. Scheffey
The Connecticut Law Tribune
03-15-2004

Greenwich urologist Jeffrey Ranta is convinced there's something somewhere in his wife's laptop that would help his divorce case.

And now he may have the chance to prove it.

Stamford Superior Court Judge Kevin Tierney recently took the highly unusual step of ordering Mary Ranta to stop using her laptop altogether and immediately turn it over to the court clerk's office.

It's the first computer seizure he's ever ordered, the judge confirmed in an interview last week. Tierney said his goal was to preserve electronic data for discovery.

But Mary Ranta and her Westport divorce lawyer Nancy Segore-Freshman contend the order is overbroad and burdensome. Segore-Freshman said her client, a nursery school teacher, is afraid to even touch the computer, for fear of being in contempt of court.

To appease the wife, Tierney directed Jeffrey Ranta to purchase a duplicate computer for her, along with copies of all the software programs currently on the laptop.

Mary Ranta, in turn, must make a list of all the applications she has on the computer. But even turning her laptop on to find out the names of the software programs could potentially subject her to Tierney's wrath. The judge's four-page order demands she "stop using, accessing, turning on, powering, copying, deleting, removing or uninstalling any programs, files or folders, or booting up" her year-old Gateway.

Under the Feb. 24 order, the wife's receipt of the replacement laptop "will occur simultaneously with the placement of the [original] laptop computer and computer storage devices into evidence" with the court clerk.

It's a catch-22. Because the husband has not provided the replacement, the wife still has the laptop at home, Segore-Freshman said last week.

E-MAILS LEGALLY RELEVANT?

The focus of inquiry appears to be on Mary Ranta's e-mail records, and not financial records or other materials.

The order instructs the parties to choose a mutually agreeable computer expert. If they can't, each side is to suggest two candidates, and the judge will select the finalist.

In open court, the computer expert is expected to start the computer and locate the files needed for discovery. If the wife objects on grounds of attorney-client privilege or for other reasons, the investigation is to continue in the judge's chambers.

Segore-Freshman, who has communicated with her client by e-mail, is directed to prepare a "privilege log" listing of documents that should be exempt from discovery.

She said the order won't let her client keep her digital photo album or the nursery school class planning ideas she gathers and stores on the computer.

While this may be the first laptop ordered into court custody in a Connecticut divorce case, it won't be the last, Segore-Freshman predicted. "Computers are becoming more and more a part of peoples' lives," she noted. They're also becoming the receptacle of large amounts of information upon which civil claims could rest.

The husband's lawyer, Thomas D. Colin of the Greenwich family law boutique Schoonmaker, George & Colin, declined to comment on the case.

In one of the few reported divorce disputes where e-mails have been in hot contention, a spouse was attempting to prove the other's marital infidelity through love letters. That was the issue in the 2001 New Jersey Chancery Court case of White v. White, in which the wife hired a computer expert to find and print out romantic e-mails from her husband's computer at home. The husband was unaware of the wife's exploration until he was being deposed, and objected to her using the e-mails as a violation of wiretap laws and invasion of privacy.

In the White case, the husband was also unaware that he had set his America Online to save all incoming mail to his "Personal Filing Cabinet" space on his hard drive. He could have made it password-protected, but did not, and the computer expert was able to locate and copy the e-mail correspondence directly from the hard drive memory of the family computer.

The judge ruled that the wiretap statute only covers messages intercepted in transmission -- not messages stored after transmission -- and therefore did not apply. And since the computer was in a family room, and was used by the wife and others, the husband's claim of invasion of privacy was denied, as well.

According to the allegations in Ranta v. Ranta, the husband stopped living in the marital home to pursue another relationship about a year ago, near the time of the computer's purchase. Segore-Freshman noted that, in Connecticut, it's legally relevant if one partner is responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Her client contends the husband was at fault.

According to Segore-Freshman, the computer won't contain legally relevant information implicating the wife, because it only has e-mail created after the marriage broke down. What is legally relevant is who caused the marital breakdown in the first place, she said.

At press time, the parties were considering a possible settlement. But even under such a pact, the husband still would be seeking the wife's laptop, according to Segore-Freshman.

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#26

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:25 am
Subject: Two victims accuse priest

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Talk About This Story Here!
Alleged abuse victims suing retired bishop

Friday, March 12, 2004

Associated Press

SPRINGFIELD, Mass. â€” Two men filed a lawsuit Thursday against retired Springfield Bishop Thomas Dupre, claiming he molested them while he was a parish priest, then urged them to keep quiet about the abuse.

Attorney Roderick MacLeish Jr., who represents the two men, also sought subpoenas for Boston Archbishop Sean O'Malley, Worcester Bishop Daniel Patrick Reilly and some priests from the Springfield Diocese, who he wants to question on whether they were aware of the allegations against Dupre.

Hampden District Attorney William Bennett has asked a grand jury to investigate the claims against Dupre, who stepped down Feb. 11, citing health reasons. His retirement was approved by the Vatican one day after The Republican newspaper of Springfield confronted him with the abuse allegations.

If Dupre is indicted, he would become first Roman Catholic bishop in the United States to be criminally charged with sex abuse.

The two former altar boys say Dupre began molesting them in the 1970s while he was a parish priest and told them in 1990 that he would not accept the position of auxiliary bishop unless they remained quiet about the abuse. They say Dupre told them that if the abuse became known, it would embarrass the church.

One of the alleged victims, an immigrant who learned English with Dupre's help, claims Dupre told him no one would believe him if he reported the alleged abuse to his family.

The Associated Press does not identify alleged victims of sexual assault.

The lawsuit, filed in Hampden Superior Court in Springfield, seeks unspecified damages from Dupre and claims the bishop assaulted them, caused them emotional distress and violated their civil rights.

The are also requesting at least $200,000 for long-term psychotherapy. Mark Dupont, a spokesman for the Springfield Diocese, said the church already has agreed to pay for the men's therapy indefinitely.

Since his retirement, Dupre has been at the St. Luke Institute, a Maryland psychiatric hospital known for treating pedophile priests.

His lawyer, Michael Jennings, said he expected the lawsuit from MacLeish, who was one of the lawyers who brokered an $85 million settlement between the Boston Archdiocese and more than 550 victims of clergy sexual abuse.

"It wasn't lost on me that the first person they went to was a civil tort lawyer who represents his clients by trying to get them money," said Jennings.

Dupre, 70, led the Springfield Diocese and its 260,000 Catholics for nine years. The Vatican this week named as his replacement Bishop Timothy McDonnell, who will be installed April 1. Until then, Monsignor Richard Sniezyk is serving as the diocese's interim leader.

MacLeish said he wants to question O'Malley and Reilly under oath because he believes Dupre spoke with both of them about the abuse allegations.

Ray Delisle, a spokesman for the Worcester diocese, said he wouldn't comment on the pending lawsuit, but said Reilly will cooperate. He said Dupre and Reilly had a "professional relationship," but were not close friends.

O'Malley's spokesman, the Rev. Christopher Coyne, said the archbishop only became aware of the allegations against Dupre on the day the bishop retired, when they were widely reported by the media.

"Archbishop O'Malley has never spoken to Bishop Dupre about his reasons for retiring or the allegations being made against him," Coyne said.

The two alleged victims, now 39 and 40, are cooperating with Bennett's criminal probe. Although the statute of limitations on the abuse itself has likely expired, the DA said last week it may still be possible to charge Dupre with molesting the men, because he allegedly tried to conceal the abuse.

Springfield church officials are also investigating the claims against Dupre and have sent their report to the Vatican.

http://www.rep-am.com/popup-sub.html

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#25

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:14 am
Subject: Shays Says CT Local Officials Don't Want to Be Held Accountable on Education

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What's on WCTX
Contests
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March 15, 2004

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Shays urges support for federal education law
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(Stamford-AP, Mar. 14, 2004 3:00 PM) _ Congressman Christopher Shays said yesterday that the No Child Left Behind Act is flawed, but urged state legislators to reject efforts to exempt Connecticut from the federal law.

He told 35 federal, state and local education officials and parents at a forum he hosted at the University of Connecticut Stamford campus that the Bush administration initiative could be better funded and more flexible.

The Advocate of Stamford reports that he also criticized local officials. He says he hears a reluctance on the part of local officials about being held accountable.

A state senator is introducing a resolution in the state Senate asking Congress to exempt from the law states, including Connecticut, that have a good record of test performance and are taking measures to improve student achievement.

http://www.wtnh.com/Global/story.asp?S=1709515

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#24

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 6:11 am
Subject: Man being held on one million dollars bond in sexual abuse case

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Hartford-WTNH, Mar. 15, 2004 6:00 AM) _ A man is behind bars held on one million dollars bond after a Hartford police officer was told in the middle of a church service about a sexual assault.

Watch the story by News Channel 8's Jodi Latina 34-year-old Charles Armstrong is facing multiple charges.

An apartment on James Street in Hartford is where the alleged abuse happened. Detectives say a fifteen year old victim reported she was sexually assaulted numerous times in a second floor apartment there and kept against their will.

The report was made to an off-duty police officer while he was in church, and a search of the apartment lead to the arrest of Armstrong.

Police have charged Armstrong with five counts of first degree sex assault, one count of kidnapping and five counts risk of injury to a minor.

Sources say Armstrong is the boyfriend of the alleged victim's mother.

Armstrong was being held on one million dollars bond.

http://www.wtnh.com/Global/story.asp?S=1710081

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#23

From: lbe818@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 5:30 am
Subject: Re: It got really quiet all of a sudden

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It looks great.

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#22

From: "socialworkersrscum" <JustPassTheBuck@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 9:27 am
Subject: Jail Time Suspended in Filthy House Case

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http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20040225145509990001

BURLINGTON, Vt. (AP) - A woman who faced charges stemming from having
a house so dirty it was declared inhospitable escaped a jail sentence
Monday.

Vermont District Court Judge Ben Joseph suspended the sentence of
Ellen Norton, 46, because he said the time behind bars would be too
cruel.

Norton's house on North Winooski Avenue was ordered closed in June
under an emergency health order after firefighters and police,
responding to a smoke alarm, found garbage and rotting food inside.
Authorities also said the walls were streaked with human and animal
feces.

The former city worker lived in the house with her severely
handicapped son Andrew, 21, and a younger son, then age 10.

She pleaded guilty in January to reckless abuse of a vulnerable adult
and cruelty by a person having custody of another. A third
misdemeanor charge of cruelty was dismissed.

Under the terms of her plea, Norton faced up to 90 days behind bars
and as much as two years of suspended jail time.

Deputy State's Attorney John St. Francis urged Joseph on Monday to
jail Norton for the full 90 days, arguing that she had forced her
children to live in "inhumane" conditions.

"I don't believe we'd let a cat or a dog live in conditions like
that," he said.

Norton's attorney, Harley Brown of Richmond, argued that Norton was
recovering from several surgeries at the time and had become
overwhelmed by the demands of caring for her disabled son. Brown said
that Norton had also been harmed by the publicity her case caused.

Norton lost her job after she was charged and lost her house to Green
Mountain Habitat for Humanity, the mortgage holder. Her children
remain under state supervision.

In announcing his decision Joseph said that although Norton's house
had become filthy she hadn't deliberately tried to hurt her children.

Despite the judge's decision Norton still faces up to a year's
probation.

She declined comment Monday.

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#21

From: "socialworkersrscum" <JustPassTheBuck@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 9:23 am
Subject: Teacher Bets Student to Jump Out Window

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http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?id=20040302203809990002


MIAMI BEACH, Fla. (March 2) - A high school student jumped out a
second-floor window to win a bet with a teacher, who has been
disciplined, officials said. The teen was not injured.

Miami Beach High School science teacher Yrvan Tassy Jr. has been
reassigned to a non-teaching job while police and school officials
investigate the incident.

Tassy's class was discussing evolution last week when the student,
who was not identified, talked about jumping out the window to prove
his point, police said.

The teacher bet him $20 that he would be injured in the jump,
according to police reports.

The student then jumped out the window, landing on his feet in a
patch of dirt and grass, police said. He returned to the classroom
and asked Tassy for his money. Tassy said he would bring it the
following day, students told police.

The incident was reported to police Thursday.

"The teacher is being investigated by our detectives and there is
also a personnel investigation," said Carlos Fernandez, a Miami-Dade
schools police spokesman. "It doesn't look like this is something
where there would be criminal charges. It looks like it will be
administrative."

Tassy does not have a listed phone number and could not be reached
for comment Tuesday.



03/02/04 20:36 EST

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#20

From: "socialworkersrscum" <JustPassTheBuck@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 9:13 am
Subject: Utah Mom Probed in Baby-Sale Scam, Report Says

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http://aolsvc.news.aol.com/news/article.adp?
id=20040311181909990003&_mpc=news%2e10%2e11



SALT LAKE CITY (March 14) - Prosecutors are investigating whether a
woman charged with killing her baby by refusing a Caesarean section
tried to scam a couple by offering to sell them the non-existent
child for bail money, a newspaper reported.Deputy Salt Lake County
District Attorney Kent Morgan told the Deseret News his office was
reviewing the allegations from a California couple who said they
accepted collect telephone calls from Melissa Rowland from jail.


Rowland, 28, accused of refusing a C-section for her unborn twins
because she feared scarring, has been jailed on criminal homicide and
child endangerment charges.

In a jailhouse interview Friday with The Associated Press, Rowland
said without prompting that she had not tried to sell the babies, but
did not elaborate. The latest allegations apparently came after the
interview.

One of the twins, a boy, was stillborn on Jan. 13. A girl survived
and has since been adopted, but prosecutors say she tested positive
for cocaine and alcohol.

Brian Farley told the newspaper for Sunday's editions that the
adoption agency he and his wife were using contacted them about
possibly adopting Rowland's baby boy.

The Sacramento couple said Rowland offered to give them a boy if they
paid her $5,000 bail. They were unaware that Rowland had already
given birth to a stillborn baby boy and thought she was in jail only
on child endangerment charges.

Under the assumption their attorney had checked Rowland's background,
Farley said he and his wife agreed to accept collect telephone calls
from the woman from jail. The calls began Feb. 26 and ended March 2,
he said.

Rowland's attorney has said she had a long history of mental illness.



03-14-04 2035EST

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#19

From: JustPassTheBuck@...
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:29 am
Subject: Re: WOW. This is working really well

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Leonard you are so cool, What you wrote here makes me worry though Because you are sounding EXACTLY like me LOL, I will say a prayer for you, Naw forget the praying, I would rather sh*t on CPS, Keep up the good work, Leonard you are sooooooooooooooooo

<><><>AWESOME<><><>

P.S. Forget I said anything
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In a message dated 3/14/2004 8:39:43 PM Pacific Standard Time, Leonard@... writes:

Subj: [AFRA_Newshawk] WOW. This is working really well
Date: 3/14/2004 8:39:43 PM Pacific Standard Time
From: Leonard@...
Reply-to: AFRA_Newshawk@yahoogroups.com
To: AFRA_Newshawk@yahoogroups.com
Sent from the Internet

In fact, it is working so well that I just reset the Archive to Public viewing. Which means people don't have to join to read the mail.

In fact, this is working SO WELL, I am wondering why I should spend the time transferring everything to AFRA News and make a great big link to here instead.

Whaddya think of that?

Also, would you guys like me to set the out-going mail to all the members to OFF? The way it is now, you are all getting the same avalanche of news tips as I am.

Want me to leave it on? Or turn it off? Well heck, people who doen't want individual emails can turn theirs off or go to digest. So I guess I answered my own question. The option is yours! Freedom to choose. The American way.

Leonard

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#18

From: "azfightcps" <azfightcps@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 8:09 am
Subject: Re: It got really quiet all of a sudden

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Hey Leonard,
I like it!

--- In AFRA_Newshawk@yahoogroups.com, "Leonard Henderson"
<Leonard@o...> wrote:
> I just put this at the top of AFRA News-
>       Check out the NEW AFRA Newshawk Group
>       Family interest stories from everywhere, automatically
updated 24 hours a day
>
>
>
> Now I am wondering if you guys aren't liking this.
>
> Let me know.  OK?
>
> Leonard
>
>
>
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#17

From: "Leonard Henderson" <Leonard@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 5:03 am
Subject: It got really quiet all of a sudden

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I just put this at the top of AFRA News-

Check out the NEW AFRA Newshawk Group
Family interest stories from everywhere, automatically updated 24 hours a day

Now I am wondering if you guys aren't liking this.

Let me know. OK?

Leonard

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#16

From: "Leonard Henderson" <Leonard@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 4:41 am
Subject: WOW. This is working really well

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In fact, it is working so well that I just reset the Archive to Public viewing. Which means people don't have to join to read the mail.

In fact, this is working SO WELL, I am wondering why I should spend the time transferring everything to AFRA News and make a great big link to here instead.

Whaddya think of that?

Also, would you guys like me to set the out-going mail to all the members to OFF? The way it is now, you are all getting the same avalanche of news tips as I am.

Want me to leave it on? Or turn it off? Well heck, people who doen't want individual emails can turn theirs off or go to digest. So I guess I answered my own question. The option is yours! Freedom to choose. The American way.

Leonard

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#15

From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 11:13 pm
Subject: Smugglers Held Toddler over $500 Ransom

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Smugglers held toddler over $500 ransom

Daniel GonzÃ¡lez
The Arizona Republic
Mar. 12, 2004 05:45 PM

Related coverage
â€¢ Desperate migrants giving kids to 'coyotes'

TUCSON - For 42 hours, three kidnappers hid the 14-month-old baby girl in a squalid 100-square-foot apartment in Douglas while they demanded $500 for her release from the girl's father 1,860 miles away in Ohio.

The apartment was empty except for a filthy mattress on the floor. The only food available for the infant was a warm gallon of milk.

As the kidnappers waited for the baby's father to arrive with the ransom, federal agents, who also had contacted the father in Columbus, were closing in.

That was the scenario outlined Friday by federal authorities describing how they rescued the girl from her kidnappers and ended a two-day ordeal that reunited the baby safely with her Mexican parents.

Lee Morgan, the resident agent in charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Douglas, who oversaw the rescue, described the baby's safe return as an emotional tearjerker that "would have made even John Wayne cry."

The three men, two brothers from Mexico and a man from Peru, were arraigned Friday in federal court, charged with conspiracy to commit kidnapping. They each could face up to life in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted, said Paul Charlton, U.S. Attorney for Arizona.

Charlton warned immigrants not to put their children in the hands of smugglers.

"It's important to make everybody understand the risks that are involved when you try and bring children in illegally," Charlton said.

The child's kidnapping, authorities also warned, is a harrowing example of a crime happening with greater frequency along the border and demonstrates how ruthless some smugglers have become in trying to extort money from desperate migrants trying to enter the United States illegally.

"Nothing is important to them except money. They have no regard for human life," said David Aguilar, chief of the U.S. Border Patrol's Tucson sector. " . . . This case is very depictive of the callousness and inhumane nature of the smugglers."

The kidnapping began about 11 p.m. Tuesday when Irma Alberto Gabriel, a 19-year-old undocumented immigrant from the town of Tuxpan in Michoacan, Mexico, went to the international line east of Agua Prieta, carrying her toddler daughter, Maria Guadalupe Villegas Alberto. The mother had arranged to meet smugglers who were supposed to take her across the border under cover of night so she could reunite with her husband, also an undocumented immigrant, U.S. and Mexican officials said.

Instead, the woman was met by four attackers, according to a federal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Tucson. One of the attackers snatched the baby, pushed the mother to the ground and told her she would have to pay to get her child back.

The mother tried chasing the man, who fled into the United States, but the three other attackers beat her and robbed her, according to the complaint.

Border Patrol agents apprehended the woman a few hours later near Douglas, where she was searching for her baby.

Meanwhile, the kidnappers had telephoned the baby's father in Columbus. They told him to come to Douglas and pay $500 for the child's safe return, according to the complaint.

They called him five more times to make arrangements.

At 5:15 p.m. on Thursday, the father met kidnappers at the Motel 6 parking lot in Douglas. Two men in a car approached the father and one of them told him to get inside. As the father was getting in the car, federal agents moved in and arrested the two men, identified in the federal complaint as brothers Victor Alejandro Galaz-Chanez and Miguel Angel Galaz-Chanez, both Mexican nationals.

Victor Alejandro Galaz-Chanez told agents the girl was being held in an apartment at 17th Street and A Avenue in Douglas and agreed to take them there.

Agents knocked on the door. A man answered holding the infant. The man in the apartment was identified as Jose Luis Cervantes-Carlos, a Peruvian national.

The girl was frightened, but otherwise unharmed, federal agents said. She was reunited with her mother and taken to Southeastern Arizona Medical Center in Douglas for observation.

Federal authorities said the mother's lip was so badly torn, doctors had to perform surgery to close the wound.

For their protection, the family is being kept in a "safe guarded location," federal authorities said. They declined to say whether the family would be offered special permission to stay in the United States in exchange for testifying against the kidnappers.

Robert M. Gattison, special agent in charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Tucson, described the successful rescue as a cooperative effort between ICE agents, the Border Patrol, Douglas police, the Cochise County Sheriff's Department, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and Mexican consular officials.

Reach the reporter at daniel.gonzalez@... or at (602) 444-8312.

http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0312childfound-motive-ON.html

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#14

From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 11:11 pm
Subject: Boy Dead from Starvation Even Though Social Workers Visited in Jan

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Print This | Email This | Most Popular | Subscribe |if(is_ie || is_nav6 || (is_mac&&is_ie6) || is_opera5up){ document.write('Larger Type | Smaller Type');} Larger Type | Smaller Type

Police: Mom starved teen to 23 pounds

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Associated Press
Mar. 12, 2004 11:25 AM

CRYSTAL LAKE, Ill. - A woman was charged with involuntary manslaughter in the death of her disabled teenage son, who weighed just 23 pounds, authorities said.

Emergency workers responding to a call for assistance Thursday morning found 15-year-old Seamus M. Leonard, who suffered from cerebral palsy, lying amid piles of trash.

An autopsy revealed the boy died of pneumonia and malnutrition was listed as a contributing cause, prosecutor Gary Pack said.

"The condition of this victim was worse than any victim I have ever seen," he said. "It would bring anyone to tears."

The mother, 44-year-old Kathy Leonard, was in custody Friday in lieu of $1 million bond. Another hearing was scheduled for March 17.

Leonard's public defender, Richard Behof, did not immediately return a call Friday.

Six other children, ages 3 to 17, were placed in protective custody. The home was deemed uninhabitable by the city's building department and county health department, police said.

"The house was in absolute squalor," Police Chief Howard Parth said.

Social workers visited the home in January 2003 after complaints of a fight between the children's father and one of the older sons. Stephen Leonard, 48, no longer lives in the home, officials said.

"There was no indication the home was in the condition it is now," DCFS spokeswoman Jill Manuel said.

Five of the six children - two boys and four girls - occasionally fed the victim, but they did not tell teachers or neighbors of the conditions in the home, according to Pack.

http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0312SonsDeath12-ON.html

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#13

From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 11:05 pm
Subject: Florida Man Convicted of Raping 9 month old

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Florida man convicted of raping baby

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Associated Press
Mar. 14, 2004 12:00 AM

TAMPA - A jury has convicted a man of raping a 9-month-old girl and leaving her for dead in the woods.

Jurors on Friday rejected Randolph Standifer's insanity defense and found him guilty of kidnapping, sexual battery of a child younger than 12 and attempted murder in the second degree.

Standifer, 23, will be sentenced to life in prison, the only penalty allowed by law when a child younger than 12 is raped.

The baby's mother allowed Standifer to spend the night in her trailer home in September 2001. The next morning, she discovered that Standifer and her baby were gone.

Hillsborough County sheriff's deputies found Standifer, who confessed to raping and strangling the baby. He led them to woods where deputies found the baby still alive.

The victim, now 3, bears scars from the rape and a colostomy operation. She and her two older siblings live with their aunt and maternal grandmother.

http://www.azcentral.com/php-bin/clicktrack/print.php?referer=http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/0314rape14.html

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#12

From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:44 am
Subject: A Mistake in California by cps Lead to a Child's Death

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4517771/

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#11

From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 10:39 pm
Subject: Justice Ginsburg says Supreme Court Justices Rarely Recuse themselves

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http://www.rep-am.com/popup-sub.html

Talk About This Story Here!
Ginsburg says justices are reluctant to recuse themselves

http://www.rep-am.com/popup-sub.html

Saturday, March 13, 2004

By Laura Walsh
Associated Press

HARTFORD â€” U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said Friday that despite questions about her involvement in an event sponsored by a women's advocacy group, she and other justices do not easily recuse themselves from court cases.

Ginsburg's role in a NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund lecture series in January was questioned by several lawyers, the Los Angeles Times reported Thursday.

Ginsburg, who lent her name and presence to the series that was co-sponsored by the group, had voted two weeks earlier in a medical screening case and took the side backed by the defense fund in a friend-of-the-court brief, the newspaper reported.

Ginsburg, responding to a question from an audience at the University of Connecticut School of Law in Hartford, explained why she did not recuse herself.

"On the Supreme Court, there are only nine of us," she said. "Some believe that a recuse is the equivalent to a vote against the petitioner. We will not lightly recuse ourselves."

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has been criticized for joining Vice President Dick Cheney on a duck hunting trip in January, shortly after the Supreme Court agreed to review a lower court's decision requiring the White House to identify members of the vice president's energy task force.

During her talk with lawyers, law students and judges at an event sponsored by a Hartford law firm and presented with the Connecticut Law Review, Ginsburg also spoke about less weighty matters related to serving as a Supreme Court justice.

The nine justices shake hands before the start of each court day and they almost always lunch together in the Justice's Dining Room where topics can range from court cases to everyday matters such as theater and grandchildren, she said.

"So far, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has been our only repeat invitee because he has the uncanny ability to eat and speak at the same time," Ginsburg said.

The justices' spouses recently arranged a surprise party to celebrate the justices' historic longevity.

"We are now 9 1/2 years together with no change in the court composition," Ginsburg said. "We are the longest sitting bench since 1823."

Asked whether she had always wanted to be a Supreme Court justice, Ginsburg, who was nominated by President Bill Clinton in 1993 to succeed retiring Justice Byron White, said she had merely hoped to find a job in law.

Ginsburg credited her mother for encouraging her to be independent and said she fought to find a place for herself, and other woman, in the work force in the 1960s and 70s.

Ginsburg said the late Justice Harry A. Blackmun's records that were opened this month on the fifth anniversary of his death were a "treasure trove" for legal scholars.

The papers provide a glimpse into the high court's ruling in a 1992 abortion case.

Blackmun's memory "was not 100 percent accurate though," Ginsburg said. She said he had written that she once appeared in court in a red dress and a matching ribbon.

"That was made up," Ginsburg said to laughter. "I've always told students â€˜It's black, just plain back."'

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#10

From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:30 am
Subject: Abused and Neglected Infant---Omaha, Nebraska

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4505958/

http://www.theomahachannel.com/news/2913086/index.html?subid=10102001
this one has video of the baby's aunt, who wants to take the baby and
care for him.

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From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 10:29 pm
Subject: Fresno Man Charged with 9 Murder Counts

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Mar 14, 9:51 PM EST
Fresno Man Charged With 9 Murder Counts

By BRIAN SKOLOFF
Associated Press Writer

Dyer says the victims ranged in age from one year to 24 years old. (Audio)

FRESNO, Calif. (AP) -- Six coroners, triple the typical weekend staff, worked in shifts Sunday to identify the nine victims of a mass killing, believed to all be family members of a man who lived a bizarre life of polygamy and incest.

Marcus Wesson, who may have fathered two of the victims with his own daughters, was charged Saturday with nine counts of murder. Bail was set at $9 million.

Identifying the victims and tracking down next of kin to be notified was a difficult process.

"It's just very complicated," Deputy Fresno County Coroner Amy Hance said Sunday. "Who do you make notification to if eventually some of the victims are other victims' relatives?"

Wesson, 57, covered with blood but described by police as "very calm," was arrested Friday when he emerged from his home, where authorities found the nine bodies tangled in a pile of clothing in a back room.

LATEST NEWS
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Investigators said the victims were six females and three males, ranging in age from 1 to 24 and probably all Wesson's children and grandchildren.

A memorial of stuffed animals, balloons and flowers grew Sunday on the sidewalk in front of the single-story house, as a steady flow of people came by with more cards and teddy bears. Police closed off the block in front of the house to keep onlookers away from the property.

Officers cordoned off the home's perimeter again on Sunday and carried several boxes of material from the home.

No motive had been determined, Police Chief Jerry Dyer told reporters.

Police said Wesson had fathered children with at least four women, two of them his own daughters.

"We are exploring the possibility that there were other women he was involved with, either sexually or in some sort of polygamist relationship," Dyer said Saturday.

He said police believe they know the cause of death but would not release that information.

"I can tell you that there were no mutilations," Dyer said. "The bodies were intact."

Dyer added that police "have not ruled out the involvement of any other suspects."

The grisly tale of polygamy, incest and murder stunned not only police but also Wesson's 29-year-old son, Dorian.

"He was a good father. He wasn't abusive at all," Dorian Wesson told the Los Angeles Times.

"I don't want to believe it. I want to give him the benefit of the doubt. But they're all dead," said Dorian Wesson, adding that he hadn't seen his father in about a year.

Officers were called to the house Friday for a child custody dispute. After finding the ghastly scene, some officers were placed on administrative leave and were being given counseling.

Police also found 10 wooden coffins. Antique store owner Lois Dugovic said Wesson bought the hand-carved, mahogany coffins about five years ago, saying he planned to use the wood to repair a houseboat.

Wesson had once lived with five women and appeared to have a romantic relationship with each, said Frank Muna, an acquaintance. The women seemed to be under Wesson's control, walking behind him and not speaking when he was present, Muna said.

Neighbors said they knew little about Wesson but noticed that his behavior had become more bizarre, Muna said.

"A lot of what he was saying wasn't relevant to what we were discussing," Muna said.

It is the largest mass killing ever in Fresno, a city of 440,000 people about 190 miles southeast of San Francisco.

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Purchase this AP story for Reprint

What's your opinion? Post it here.

http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/F/FRESNO_SLAYINGS?SITE=CTDAN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

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From: lbe818@...
Date: Sun Mar 14, 2004 10:26 pm
Subject: Prosecutors investigating If Mother Scamed couple over dead baby

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Mar 14, 8:35 PM EST
Report: Utah Mom Probed in Baby-Sale Scam

SALT LAKE CITY (AP) -- Prosecutors are investigating whether a woman charged with killing her baby by refusing a Caesarean section tried to scam a couple by offering to sell them the non-existent child for bail money, a newspaper reported.

Deputy Salt Lake County District Attorney Kent Morgan told the Deseret News his office was reviewing the allegations from a California couple who said they accepted collect telephone calls from Melissa Rowland from jail.

Rowland, 28, accused of refusing a C-section for her unborn twins because she feared scarring, has been jailed on criminal homicide and child endangerment charges.

In a jailhouse interview Friday with The Associated Press, Rowland said without prompting that she had not tried to sell the babies, but did not elaborate. The latest allegations apparently came after the interview.

One of the twins, a boy, was stillborn on Jan. 13. A girl survived and has since been adopted, but prosecutors say she tested positive for cocaine and alcohol.

Brian Farley told the newspaper for Sunday's editions that the adoption agency he and his wife were using contacted them about possibly adopting Rowland's baby boy.

The Sacramento couple said Rowland offered to give them a boy if they paid her $5,000 bail. They were unaware that Rowland had already given birth to a stillborn baby boy and thought she was in jail only on child endangerment charges.

Under the assumption their attorney had checked Rowland's background, Farley said he and his wife agreed to accept collect telephone calls from the woman from jail. The calls began Feb. 26 and ended March 2, he said.

Rowland's attorney has said she had a long history of mental illness.

Copyright 2004 Associated Press. All rights reserved.

Purchase this AP story for Reprint

What's your opinion? Post it here.

http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/M/MOTHER_CHARGED?SITE=CTDAN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

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From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:19 am
Subject: Experts Tips on Preventing SIDS in Black Infants

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4420146/

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From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:15 am
Subject: Another Good Reason to Breastfeed Infants (in UK)

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4422326/

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From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:12 am
Subject: Doctor's Fear Reporting Abuse (in UK)

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From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:09 am
Subject: Moody Kids--Normal or Not?

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4156151/

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From: "LorriAnne" <garrulous_green@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 3:06 am
Subject: Shaken baby, father sentenced, TPR'ed

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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4518076/  From my hometown, too.

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From: "paustin442000" <PStuckle@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 1:39 am
Subject: family violence advocacy center

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Not satisfied with tainting the charges of persons falsely accused of
child sexual assault, the great state of Texas is now rapidly creating
"Family Violence Advocacy Centers" and competing counties are
scrambling for 1.5 million dollars of federal grant money.  The same
vendors ( prosecutors, psychologists, sexual assault nurse examiners ,
forensic interviewers, victim advocates, counselors, etc.) will feed
off this food trough with great enthusiasm.

Bottom line, if the police get called to a domestic disturbance,
someone is going to jail (usually husband) and there will be a
"no-drop" policy in prosecution.  Police call = jury trial, no
exceptions.  Once again, truth will take a back seat to governmental
bureaucracy protections, regardless of actual harm to families.

Will the same brainwashing leading question suggestiveness used by
"forensic interviewers" on 4 year old children work on spouses ?

Trust me, Adult Protective Service caseworkers are a mere stones throw
away.


Paul Stuckle
Attorney at Law
www.paulstuckle.com

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From: "Leonard Henderson" <Leonard@...>
Date: Mon Mar 15, 2004 12:15 am
Subject: March 14, 2004 NEW....NEW....NEW...

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NEW....NEW....NEW...

AFRA Newshawk Group

If you are a News Hawk, join AFRA Newshawk yahoogroup today!

You gotta join before you can send. It's a yahoogroup.

Email your Newshawk tip to AFRA_Newshawk@yahoogroups.com
We are also interested in ORIGINAL News stories to BREAK HERE FIRST!

AFRA Editor note- This is in preparation for bringing more AFRA News Editors on-board. Rather than all the news tips going straight to the over-whelmed AFRA webguy who would just have to forward them to the AFRA News Editor of the day, it seems like a great idea to have all the news tips going to one central place accessible to everybody. This also may alleviate receiving multiple news tips on the same story.

Leonard Henderson
"CPS really, REALLY messed with the wrong guy"
American Family Rights Association
http://familyrightsassociation.com
~and~
Oregon Family Rights
http://oregonfamilyrights.com
~and~
Parent News
http://parentnews.net
~and~
Revolution2.us
http://revolution2.us
"Beware the fury of the patient man." --John Dryden

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